莱茵霍尔德·尼布尔的基督教现实主义道德观

莱因霍尔德·尼布尔是20世纪在美国乃至西方最著名和颇具影响的基督教神学家.他坚持原罪论,并将基督教伦理思想广泛应用于社会问题及政治问题的研究,从而形成了系统并具有现代精神的基督教应用伦理学(即基督教现实主义伦理学),在现代宗教伦理学的推广方面做出了独特的贡献.他所倡导的现实主义伦理学影响了一代神学家和政治家,后来更是成为冷战时期美国对外政策的哲学依据.本文考察了尼布尔的原罪论及其与理想主义的分歧,以及尼布尔现实主义道德观的基本内容及其影响.     

Reinhold Niebuhr's Paradox: Groundwork for Social Responsibility

This paper is an examination of Reinhold Niebuhr's embrace of the paradoxical in relation to his conception of the self. While it explores the theoretical and practical difficulties entailed in Niebuhr's account, it also seeks to defend his position, suggesting that in the light of Niebuhr's negative apologetic, the paradoxical self represents the only intelligible means of self–understanding available. Though Niebuhr never develops this epistemological ground, it may provide a way of avoiding the moral consequentialism to which Niebuhr appears to be resigned. The resulting framework points toward moral pragmatism, retaining its orientation and relevance in the midst of deliberations concerning means and ends.     

An African therapy in dialogue with Freudian psychoanalysis

This article summarizes and compares selected characteristics of Freudian psychoanalysis and of African psychotherapy. The author concludes that the Freudian emphasis on the individual and the African therapy's emphasis on the community may both lead to the positive restoration of both therapies' clients.     

THE MORALITY,POLITICS, AND IRONY OF WAR: Recovering Reinhold Niebuhr's Ethical Realism

The American experience of war is ironic. That is, there is often an intimate and unexamined relationship between seemingly contrary elements in war such as morality and politics. This article argues that without understanding such irony, we are unlikely to reflect in morally comprehensive ways on past, present, or future wars. Traditional schools of thought, however, such as moralism and political realism, reinforce these apparent contradictions. I propose, then, an alternative—“ethical realism” as informed by Reinhold Niebuhr—that better explains the irony of war. Through an ethical realist examination of the U.S. Civil War, World War II, and the Iraq War, I consider how American political interests have been inextricably linked with deep moral concerns. Ethical realism charts a middle path that ennobles traditional realpolitik while eschewing certain perfectionist tendencies of moralism. Ethical realism provides a conceptual framework for evaluating these other frameworks—a distinct form of moral‐political deliberation about war.     

From nature in love: The problem of subjectivity in Adorno and Freudian psychoanalysis

This paper investigates the potential of the concept of sublimation for thinking subjectivity at the intersection of psychoanalysis and critical theory. I first rehearse a recent argument by Whitebook that Freud’s notion of sublimation presents a nonviolent integration and expansion of the ego, which can mediate the modern dichotomy between the rational subject and nonrational impulse and desire. On this view, sublimation turns subjectivity into a site of possibility in the context of modern, rationalized thought and society. I then argue that the concept of sublimation offered to critical theory in this form is insufficiently developed. Both Freud and Adorno analyze a deep-seated destructiveness of the modern subject, which turns up right at the heart of attempts to mediate the dichotomies of rationalized modernity. What is needed to counter this problem is a theory of love in which love is not separated from, but, rather, correlated with drive and desire, and can thereby get on a level with the unconscious or unacknowledged, impulsive nature of death-bearing subjectivity in enlightened modernity. A central conception in Kristeva’s development of Freudian psychoanalysis, the idea of transference love, delivers such a theory and thereby develops the concept of sublimation in the way that is needed at the intersection of psychoanalysis and critical theory.

War,revolution, and psychoanalysis: Freudian thought begins to grapple with social reality

Psychoanalytic theory and practice have been affected by external events as well as by internal development. Specifically, the period of the Great War and its aftermath was a turning point in the history of psychoanalysis. These experiences emphasized the inadequacy of the libido theory alone, accelerated Freud's impetus toward metapsychology, and encouraged the articulation of theories of innate destructive urges, of ego instincts, of the superego, and of social interaction. Discussionsof war neuroses, of aggression and the death instinct, of the reality principle, and of the mechanisms of social psychology undermined Freud's original biologism in favor of a social-scientific approach. Psychoanalytic theory began to take more account of social experience and was profoundly changed in the process.     

Attachment theory and psychoanalysis Some remarks from an epistemological and from a Freudian viewpoint1

The author examines Bowlby's attachment theory and more recent versions of it from an epistemological viewpoint and subjects it to questioning on whether they are in line with central concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis. He argues that Bowlby's basic tenets regarding attachment theory, which later attachment theorists never seriously questioned, do not conform to scientifi c standards, and that psychoanalytic issues such as the dynamic unconscious, internal confl icts, interaction of drive wishes and the role of defence in establishing substitutive formations are either ignored or not treated in suffi cient depth. In the light of this, Fonagy's assertion that psychoanalytic criticism of attachment theory arose from mutual misunderstandings and ought nowadays to be seen as outdated is reversed: psychoanalytic criticism can only be regarded as outdated if either basic tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis, or attachment theory or both are misunderstood.     

The analyst's knowledge and authority: a critique of the "new view" in psychoanalysis

A critical assessment is presented of positions recently taken by Mitchell and Renik, who are taken as representatives of a "new view" in psychoanalysis. One article by Mitchell and two by Renik are examined as paradigmatic of certain ways of construing the nature of mind, the analyst's knowledge and authority, and the analytic process that are unduly influenced by the postmodern turn in psychoanalysis. Although "new view" theorists have made valid criticisms of traditional psychoanalytic theory and practice, they wind up taking untenable positions. Specifically called into question are their views on the relation between language and interpretation, on the one hand, and the mental contents of the patient on the other. A disjunction is noted between their discussion of clinical material and their conceptual stance, and their idiosyncratic redefinitions of truth and objectivity are criticized. Finally, a "humble realism" is suggested as the most appropriate philosophical position for psychoanalysts to adopt.     

The Freudian superego

Beginning psychotherapists tend to judge themselves in terms of their Freudian superego, their idea of how a stereotypical classical analyst is supposed to work. This Freudian superego derives from culturally prevalent negative stereotypes about the nature of Freudian psychoanalysis.     

Freudian modalities of disbelief

This article can be characterized as a ‘rediscovery’ of a notion of psychoanalysis that had disappeared or had been confused by later operations. The authors explore a Freudian notion that has been unjustly misunderstood, especially because of the multiple ways in which ‘Unglaube’ – disbelief – has been translated. We shall establish the archaeology of this term in Freud by extracting its three significant modes. Firstly, paranoiac disbelief designates an unconscious process of the rejection of belief in the subject's first encounter with a sexual reality that is always traumatic. Secondly, the obsessional neurotic's disbelief, which we shall call ‘incredulity’, is a secondary, less radical refusal of belief, one that is different from its paranoiac counterpart. Finally, we shall envision a third – dialectical – type of disbelief, which Freud called ‘act of disbelief’ and which will enable us to approach the fundamental epistemic and ethical stakes for psychoanalysis.     

Rabindranath Tagore and Freudian thought

The paper draws our attention to the Indian poet and philosopher Rabindranath Tagore's notion of psychoanalysis. Focusing on the period between 1926 and his death in 1941, during which Tagore had not only met Freud but had also spoken to several persons on psychoanalysis, the author has unearthed a mass of archival material, primarily in Bengali, and translated most of it into English for the first time, in order to show how Tagore's opinion regarding Freudian thought gradually changed from severe criticism and a near complete rejection to appreciation, especially of its good use in literature and literary criticism. The author has also identified a number of literary works, both prose and verse, from the final years of Tagore's life and tried to document the extent of influence of Freudian thought on their composition. In short, the author explores a significant interdisciplinary area that has not been looked into either in India or abroad.     

弗洛伊德心理学的神经生理学模式

将研究人类大脑的神经科学与研究人类心智的精神分析相结合的设想,源于精神分析心理学的创始人弗洛伊德,精神分析理论中一直隐含和贯穿着一种神经学或神经生理学的模式.弗洛伊德提出的这个神经学模式包括神经元和能量或数量两个元素,其工作原理是神经元的惯性原理.