"I couldn't have seen it coming": The impact of negative self-relevant outcomes on retrospections about foreseeability

We examined a phenomenon related to hindsight bias, specifically, retrospective judgements about the foreseeability of an outcome. We predicted that negative, self-relevant outcomes would be judged as less foreseeable by the recipient of the outcome than by others, unlike either positive outcomes or outcomes that are not self-relevant. In the context of a "stock market decision-making game", the hypothetical stock selected by one of two players showed an extreme increase or decrease. As predicted, the player who received an extreme negative outcome reported that this outcome was less foreseeable than did the opponent and an observer, for whom the outcome was less self-relevant. For no other kind of outcome was there a difference between the recipient of an outcome, the opponent, and the observer. The findings have several implications, including the possibility that hindsight bias should be considered as a special case of retrospective foreseeability.     

Controllability and hindsight components: Understanding opposite hindsight biases for self-relevant negative event outcomes

There is an anomaly in the hindsight bias literature with respect to hindsight effects obtained after self-relevant negative event outcomes: Whereas some studies have reported reduced hindsight bias, others have shown increases. This article contrasts two explanations for the anomaly. The first points to an influence of perceived control over the event outcome: In hindsight, people decrease foreseeability (and hence, responsibility and blame) for controllable events, but they increase the perceived inevitability of uncontrollable events for coping reasons. The second explanation, derived from a reconception of hindsight bias in terms of separate components (Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008), traces the anomaly to differences in the observed hindsight components: Hindsight decreases are to be expected for foreseeability, whereas increases are restricted to the inevitability component. Our experiment (N=210) manipulated controllability and the hindsight component orthogonally and showed strong support for the component explanation, but also some influence of perceived control.     

Surprise, defence, or making sense: what removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite-that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.     

Surprise,defence, or making sense: What removes hindsight bias?

This paper examines predictions concerning the absence of hindsight bias. Some hypothesise that because hindsight bias increases with outcome "surprisingness", only unsurprising outcomes will remove it. Others suggest the opposite--that very surprising outcomes will reduce or reverse the bias. A proposed sense-making model suggests that unexpected outcomes (i.e., initially surprising) invoke greater sensemaking, which typically produces greater hindsight bias. If the process is not successful, however, the bias may be reduced or reversed. Expected outcomes will also produce little hindsight bias, but only because they invoke relatively little sensemaking in the first place. Feelings of surprise arising from sensemaking (i.e., resultant surprise) should be inversely related to hindsight bias. Results of four experiments provide support for the model. A secondary goal was to determine the boundaries of a defensive-processing mechanism also thought to reduce hindsight bias for negative, self-relevant outcomes. Results suggest that a sense of responsibility for the outcome may be necessary for defensive processing to be activated.     

Evaluating scientific research: Belief,hindsight bias,ethics, and research evaluation

Students may exhibit two forms of cognitive biases, belief and hindsight bias, in evaluating a scientific experiment. Counter to disagreement, they may only believe an outcome that agrees with their belief to be more predictable in hindsight than foresight. The focus of this research is on the relationship between these biases. Students were queried about their dichotomous beliefs (learned vs. genetic) about behavior for an animal experiment and then assigned randomly to a no‐outcome or genetic outcome condition. With agreement between students' belief and outcome, the findings revealed hindsight bias (foreseeability) supported by the outcomes for surprise, disappointment, ethics, and research evaluation. With disagreement, hindsight bias was trumped along with perceiving the experiment as being less ethical and scientifically sound. Regardless of the outcome, students seem to adhere to their beliefs. Hence, students may believe that the outcome is inconsequential because it is obvious or contrary to their beliefs.     

Judgments about Felony‐Murder in Hindsight

The purpose of this research was to investigate the role of hindsight bias in application of the felony‐murder law, a controversial rule stating that felons can be held responsible for any foreseeable deaths that occur as a result of their felony. Some versions of the rule involve notions of proximate cause requiring legal decision makers to determine foreseeability and assess case evidence. Those judgments may be biased by outcome information and the process of cognitive sense‐making. Jury eligible participants read a crime vignette modeled on an actual felony‐murder case manipulated with regard to outcome information and relevant case facts. They made likelihood judgments and rated felons on intent and culpability. Results indicated that outcome information biased death likelihood ratings in hindsight but did not significantly affect assessments of case evidence. Implications for further applied cognitive research regarding the felony‐murder rule are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hindsight bias and outcome-consistent thoughts when observing and making service provider decisions

Two studies examined the relationship between hindsight bias and corresponding open-ended thoughts for decisions in a service provider setting. Perspectives of those observing and making decisions were examined. In study 1, business students who learned the results of a financial advisor’s stock purchase showed the traditional hindsight effect regardless of outcome favorability, and produced heightened outcome-consistent thoughts. In contrast, study 2 participants were asked to make (rather than to observe) a purchase decision. They produced hindsight bias and consistent thoughts only when their decision outcomes were favorable. Relative to observers, those acting as the service provider (a) showed more bias when outcomes were favorable, and (b) showed less bias when outcomes were unfavorable. Discussion focuses on hindsight implications in service provider decision-making settings.     

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: a motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.     

Surprise influences hindsight–foresight differences in temporal judgments of animated automobile accidents

The hindsight bias occurs when people view an outcome as more foreseeable than it actually was. The role of an outcome’s initial surprise in the hindsight bias was examined using animations of automobile accidents. Twenty-six participants rated the initial surprise of accidents’ occurring in eight animations. An additional 84 participants viewed these animations in one of two conditions: Half stopped the animations when they were certain an accident would occur (i.e., in foresight), and the other half watched the entire animations first and then stopped the animations when they thought that a naïve viewer would be certain that an accident would occur (i.e., in hindsight). When the accidents were low in initial surprise, there were no foresight–hindsight differences; when initial surprise was medium, there was a hindsight bias; and when initial surprise was high, there was a reversed hindsight bias. The results are consistent with a sense-making model of hindsight bias.     

Hindsight bias after receiving self-relevant health risk information: A motivational perspective

The phenomenon of hindsight bias was explored in the context of self-relevant health risk information. Participants in a community screening estimated their cholesterol level (foresight measure) before receiving positive or negative feedback based on their actual cholesterol level. Hindsight estimations were then assessed twice: once immediately after the feedback, and again several weeks later. While the unexpected positive feedback group showed no systematic recall bias, hindsight estimations of individuals receiving unexpectedly negative feedback showed a dynamic change over time. Immediately after the feedback, participants' recollection of their expected cholesterol level were shifted towards their actual cholesterol level (hindsight bias). In contrast, several weeks later, foresight estimations were recalled as less accurate than they had been (reversed hindsight bias). These data might reflect a change of the motivational focus from "hot affect" and fear control, which occur immediately after receiving negative feedback, to danger control, which occurs some time after the feedback, as proposed by the dual process model.     

Cultural Interpretations of Global Information? Hindsight Bias after Reading Wikipedia Articles across Cultures

Summary: Hindsight bias is the mistaken belief that an outcome could have been foreseen once it is known. But what happens after learning about an event? Can reading biased media amplify hindsight distortions? And do people from different cultural backgrounds — with different cognitive thinking styles — draw equal conclusions from equal media reports? We report two studies with Wikipedia articles and samples from different cultures (Study 1: Germany, Singapore, USA, Vietnam, Japan, Sweden, N = 446; Study 2: USA, Vietnam, N = 144). Participants read one of two article versions (foresight and hindsight) about the Fukushima Nuclear Plant and estimated the likelihood, inevitability, and foreseeability of the nuclear disaster. Reading the hindsight article increased individuals' hindsight bias independently of analytic or holistic thinking style. Having excluded survey language as potential impact factor (Study 2), this result remains. Our findings extend prior research on hindsight bias by demonstrating the amplifying effect of additional (biased) information on hindsight bias. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Role of Hindsight Bias,Ethics, and Self-Other Judgments in Students’ Evaluation of an Animal Experiment

Does hindsight knowledge make research seem more ethical and predictable? In line with the notion of hindsight bias, students in 3 experiments knowing the outcome of an animal experiment judged the results as more foreseeable and ethical relative to students who did not know the outcome. Via self to other comparisons, students evaluate themselves more favorably compared to a peer but exhibited hindsight bias in doing so. Uniquely, the findings reveal the possibility that students deem themselves to be more skeptical and objective than their peers. Implications for teaching animal ethics and for Institutional Review Boards are discussed.     

Perceptions of adolescent bullying: Attributions of blame and responsibility in cases of cyber‐bullying

Cyber‐bullying (where victims are targeted via online social networking or other electronic means) has gained increased attention in research and the broadcast media, but previous research has not investigated attribution of blame in such cyber‐bullying events. This experiment hypothesized that participants would assign higher ratings of blame to bullying perpetrators when the bullying situations were depicted as having highly foreseeable outcomes (vs. unforeseeable outcomes), and as occurring in school (vs. online). In addition, a significant interaction was predicted between outcome foreseeability and bullying situation, with highly foreseeable in‐school events being rated as the most predictable and attributable to the bully's actions. One‐hundred sixty‐three participants completed surveys containing demographic items, items regarding their past experiences of victimization, and one of four randomly‐assigned vignettes detailing a bullying situation (which participants rated). While hypotheses regarding outcome foreseeability were supported, no cyber‐bullying vs. in‐school main effects (or corresponding interaction effects) were detected. Implications for future research and practice, as well as study limitations, are discussed.     

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.     

Perception of line‐up suggestiveness: effects of identification outcome knowledge

Research on the hindsight bias has shown that knowledge of an event outcome makes the observed outcome appear more predictable than it does in the absence of outcome knowledge. It was hypothesised that perceptions of the suggestiveness of a line‐up would be similarly influenced by knowledge of a witness' identification decision, with a positive identification of the suspect increasing, and a negative non‐identification decreasing, perceived suggestiveness. The ratings of undergraduate students (N = 50) in Experiment 1 showed the predicted influence of positive outcome, whereas negative outcome had no demonstrable influence. In contrast, Experiment 2, conducted with police trainees (N = 126) and with the line‐up presented in the context of a criminal investigation, partially supported the predicted influence of negative, but not positive, outcome. The discrepant findings are discussed in terms of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the hindsight bias and the implications for real‐life judgements of line‐up suggestiveness. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"I knew we would win": hindsight bias for favorable and unfavorable team decision outcomes

This study examined hindsight bias for team decisions in a competitive setting in which groups attempted to outperform each other. It was anticipated that, because of self-serving mechanisms, individuals would show hindsight bias only when decision outcomes allowed them to take credit for their own team's success or to downgrade another team for being unsuccessful. MBA students playing a market simulation game made hindsight estimates regarding the likelihood that either their own or another team would perform well. Consistent with a self-serving interpretation, when decision outcomes were favorable individuals evaluating their own team, but not those evaluating another, showed hindsight bias. When outcomes were unfavorable individuals evaluating their own team did not show hindsight bias, but those evaluating another team did. Discussion focuses on implications of hindsight bias in team decision-making settings.     

Hindsight bias and outcome bias in judging directors’ liability and the role of free will beliefs

Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and damaged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the company's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investigators such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Hindsight bias and causal reasoning: a minimalist approach

What factors contribute to hindsight bias, the phenomenon whereby the known outcome of an event appears obvious only after the fact? The Causal Model Theory (CMT) of hindsight bias (Nestler et al. in Soc Psychol 39:182–188, 2008a; in J Expl Psychol: Learn Mem Cog 34:1043–1054, 2008b; Pezzo in Mem 11:421–441, 2003; Wasserman et al. in Pers Soc Psychol Bull 17:30–35, 1991) posits that hindsight bias can occur when people have the opportunity to identify potential causal antecedents and evaluate whether they could have led to the outcome. Two experiments incorporating highly controlled minimalist scenarios supported the CMT. As predicted by the CMT, hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the actual outcome better than the alternative outcome, and reverse hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the alternative outcome better than the actual outcome. Moreover, we found new evidence that outcome knowledge alone was insufficient to elicit hindsight bias in the absence of a potential causal antecedent. Implications for future directions in hindsight bias research are discussed.     

“As soon as the bat met the ball,I knew it was gone”: Outcome prediction,hindsight bias,and the representation and control of action in expert and novice baseball players

A virtual-reality batting task compared novice and expert baseball players’ ability to predict the outcomes of their swings as well as the susceptibility of these outcome predictions to hindsight bias-a measure of strength and resistance to distortion of memory for predicted action outcomes. During each swing the simulation stopped when the bat met the ball. Batters marked where on the field they thought the ball would land. Correct feedback was then displayed, after which batters attempted to remark the location they had indicated prior to feedback. Expert batters were more accurate than less-skilled individuals in the initial marking and showed less hindsight bias in the postfeedback marking. Furthermore, experts’ number of hits in the previous block of trials was positively correlated with prediction accuracy and negatively correlated with hindsight bias. The reverse was true for novices. Thus the ability to predict the outcome of one’s performance before such information is available in the environment is not only based on one’s overall skill level, but how one is performing at a given moment.     

Negative affect and hindsight bias

The relationship between hindsight bias and individual differences in negative affect, or ‘dysphoria’, was investigated in a naturalistic study. In a first session, 76 undergraduates predicted their grades prior to a midterm exam. In a second session, after having received feedback from the exam, they attempted to recall their predictions and predicted their grades on a second exam. Dysphoria was associated with hindsight bias whether initial predictions were overly optimistic or pessimistic. In the former case, the standard hindsight bias was modal for the sample, whereas a ‘reverse hindsight’ bias was modal in the latter. This asymmetry suggests that hindsight bias is influenced by motivational or affective factors. The bias did not hinder the improvement of predictions between the first and second exams, and therefore could not have mediated a hypothesized adaptive learning impairment among dysphoric subjects.