The absent professor: why we don't teach research ethics and what to do about it

Research ethics education in the biosciences has not historically been a priority for research universities despite the fact that funding agencies, government regulators, and the parties involved in the research enterprise agree that it ought to be. The confluence of a number of factors, including scrutiny and regulation due to increased public awareness of the impact of basic research on society, increased public and private funding, increased diversity and collaboration among researchers, the impressive success and speed of research advances, and high-profile cases of misconduct, have made it necessary to reexamine how the bioscience research community at all levels provides ethics education to its own. We discuss the need to and reasons for making ethics integral to the education of bioscientists, approaches to achieving this goal, challenges this goal presents, and responses to those challenges.     

Knowing what you're feeling and knowing what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion differentiation and emotion regulation

Individuals differ considerably in their emotion experience. Some experience emotions in a highly differentiated manner, clearly distinguishing among a variety of negative and positive discrete emotions. Others experience emotions in a relatively undifferentiated manner, treating a range of like-valence terms as interchangeable. Drawing on self-regulation theory, we hypothesised that individuals with highly differentiated emotion experience should be better able to regulate emotions than individuals with poorly differentiated emotion experience. In particular, we hypothesised that emotion differentiation and emotion regulation would be positively related in the context of intense negative emotions, where the press for emotion regulation is generally greatest. To test this hypothesis, participants' negative and positive emotion differentiation was assessed using a 14-day diary protocol. Participants' regulation of negative and positive emotions was assessed using laboratory measures. As predicted, negative emotion differentiation was positively related to the frequency of negative emotion regulation, particularly at higher levels of emotional intensity.     

The development of perceptual averaging: learning what to do,not just how to do it

The mature visual system condenses complex scenes into simple summary statistics (e.g., average size, location, orientation, etc.). However, children, often perform poorly on perceptual averaging tasks. Children's difficulties are typically thought to represent the suboptimal implementation of an adult‐like strategy. This paper examines another possibility: that children actually make decisions in a qualitatively different way to adults (optimal implementation of a non‐ideal strategy). Ninety children (6–7, 8–9, 10–11 years) and 30 adults were asked to locate the middle of randomly generated dot‐clouds. Nine plausible decision strategies were formulated, and each was fitted to observers' trial‐by‐trial response data (Reverse Correlation). When the number of visual elements was low (N < 6), children used a qualitatively different decision strategy from adults: appearing to “join up the dots” and locate the gravitational center of the enclosing shape. Given denser displays, both children and adults used an ideal strategy of arithmetically averaging individual points. Accounting for this difference in decision strategy explained 29% of children's lower precision. These findings suggest that children are not simply suboptimal at performing adult‐like computations, but may at times use sensible, but qualitatively different strategies to make perceptual judgments. Learning which strategy is best in which circumstance might be an important driving factor of perceptual development.     

Problems in Rorschach research and what to do about them

This article identifies many interrelated problems that interfere with progress in Rorschach research. These include vague hypotheses, confounded comparisons, failure to control extraneous variables; misuse of statistics, and distorted interpretation of results. Two crucial solutions to address many of these problems are offered: knowing the data and paling out rival hypotheses. Underlying conceptual confusions are addressed and prototypical examples derived from the literature, are discussed is the hope of improving the scientific foundation of the Rorschach.     

The analyst in action: An individual account of what Jungians do and why they do it1

This paper describes some similarities and differences between contemporary approaches to analysis as practised by ‘Freudians’ and ‘Jungians’ in London today. It aims to contribute to mutual understanding between different schools of analysis by showing how the analyst’s interventions can only be understood in terms of the theoretical context from which they arise (cf. ‘the analyst’s preconscious’, as discussed by Hamilton [1996] ). A discussion of five key themes of Jungian theory is followed by an account of clinical work with a patient who enacted her inner world through the use of material objects brought to the consulting room, presenting difficult technical dilemmas concerning boundaries and enactment. The paper aims to shows how these Jungian themes influenced the analyst’s response, particularly in relation to ideas of symbolic transformation, the unknowable nature of unconscious processes and the purposive orientation of the self towards wholeness and integration.     

The fundamentality of existence or quiddity: a confusion between epistemology and ontology

Regarding the exhaustive discussions of the fundamentality of existence versus the fundamentality of quiddity, it is a necessary preliminary to examine and analyze the first documented statement of the fundamentality of existence. Following this, we must inquire how the concept is obtained on the basis of which such a judgment could be formed. Then we must illuminate the meaning of propositions that state only that an object is or exists (ontological propositions). Finally, by explaining the meaning of the words “quiddity” and “existence” and comparing them, indications are found of confusion between epistemological and ontological issues.

A paradigm for exploring what the mind does while deciding what it should do.

One widespread belief about automatic mental processes is that, among other characteristics, they are involuntary. No initial conscious intent is necessary because such processing is stimulus initiated. This claim was studied in the context of a novel task-choice procedure in which subjects were informed as to which of two tasks they should perform on a letter string either well in advance of a target, or when the target appeared. The hypothesis that initial processing of the target occurs without intent predicts that the effect of contrast reduction will be absent when the task cue appears synchronously with the target. This is because initial processing of the target should be completed during the time taken to decode the task cue. The results are inconsistent with this account. Instead, they support an account in which functional target processing is delayed until the subject knows what the task is. Some directions for future investigations are noted.     

To "do the right thing" or to "just do it": locomotion and assessment as distinct self-regulatory imperatives

An integrated series of studies investigated 2 functional dimensions of self-regulation referred to as assessment and locomotion (E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski, 1995). Assessment constitutes the comparative aspect of self-regulation that critically evaluates alternative goals or means to decide which are best to pursue and appraises performance. Locomotion constitutes the aspect of self-regulation concerned with movement from state to state, including commitment of psychological resources to initiate and maintain such movement. Two separate scales were developed to measure individual differences in these tendencies. Psychometric work attested to the scales' unidimensionality, internal consistency, and temporal stability. The authors found that (a) locomotion and assessment are relatively independent of each other, (b) both are needed for self-regulatory success, and (c) each relates to distinct task orientations and motivational emphases.     

What we know and what to do

This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). I argue that (i) relevant information determines whether considerations of value may be treated as reasons for actions that realize them and against actions that don’t, (ii) incorporating this normative fact requires a revision of the standard ordering semantics for weak (but not for strong) deontic necessity modals, and (iii) an off-the-shelf semantics for weak deontic necessity modals, due to von Fintel and Iatridou, which distinguishes “basic” and “higher-order” ordering sources, and interprets weak deontic necessity modals relative to both, is well-suited to this task. The prominence of normative considerations in our proposal suggests a more general methodological lesson: formal semantic analysis of natural language modals expressing normative concepts demands that close attention be paid to the nature of the underlying normative phenomena.     

Rethinking homosexuality: what it teaches us about psychoanalysis

This presentation, written ten years after the American Psychoanalytic Association adopted a nondiscrimination policy with regard to sexual orientation, discusses the evolving relationship between psychoanalysis and homosexuality. The paper is in three sections: (1) the process of policy change and the overturning of injustice; (2) the excursion after Freud's death into analytic bias and extreme pathologizing of homosexuality, the struggle to overcome those distortions, and the lessons to be learned from this history; and (3) the search, in the coming decade, for new understanding of homosexuality and all aspects of sexuality.     

Doing what one meant to do

When I engage in some routine activity, it will usually be the case that I mean or intend the present move to be followed by others. What does ‘meaning’ the later moves consist in? How do I know, when I come to perform them, that they were what I meant? Problems familiar from Wittgenstein's and Kripke's discussions of linguistic meaning arise here. Normally, I will not think of the later moves. But, even if I do, there are reasons to deny that thinking of them can constitute what it is to mean to perform them. I argue that the problem can be solved, in the case of routine action, by the notion that our behavioural routines are guided by what I callmodest agent memory. It will help explain both how wecan have future moves ‘in mind’ and how we can be in a position to avow the fact.     

On regulating what is known: A way to social epistemology

This paper lays the groundwork for normative-yet-naturalistic social epistemology. I start by presenting two scenarios for the history of epistemology since Kant, one in which social epistemology is the natural outcome and the other in which it represents a not entirely satisfactory break with classical theories of knowledge. Next I argue that the current trend toward naturalizing epistemology threatens to destroy the distinctiveness of the sociological approach by presuming that it complements standard psychological and historical approaches. I then try to reassert, in Comtean fashion, the epistemologist's credentials in regulating knowledge production. Finally, I consider how social epistemology may have something exciting and relevant to say about contemporary debates in the theory of knowledge.A version of this paper appears as chapter one of Fuller (1988). My warmest thanks goes to Fred Schmitt, who saved me from many unclarities and howlers, as well as provided many probing remarks and criticisms with which I have barely begun to grapple.     

Knowing what we do not know about sexual orientation change efforts

Comments on the original article, "Guidelines for psychological practice with lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients," by the American Psychological Association (see record 2011-19419-001). The present authors notes that the APA has provided a very helpful document for those who do clinical work with individuals experiencing same-sex attractions. Psychologists no doubt need to be familiar with the literature described in these guidelines as a part of ethical practice. However, the present authors register concern regarding how the guidelines address sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE). They focus their critique on how the guidelines portray two issues pertaining to SOCE-effectiveness and harm-and conclude with a proposal to move the discussion forward via science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Programmed instruction: What it is and how to do it

Five behaviorological features of programmed instruction are outlined: behavioral objectives, reinforcement, activity rate: high and relevant, successive approximation, and mastery progression. Each of these topics is explained, and examples are given to illustrate the differences between programmed instruction and the more common transmission model of teaching. A final section provides suggestions on specific techniques of successive approximation.