共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1.
2.
Rebecca Lynn Stangl 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(2):201-229
According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral truths in both reaching and justifying our particular moral judgments without thereby violating the particularists' stricture against substantive moral principles. In this paper, I argue that the most prominent non-substantive accounts of moral generalities appealed to by radical particularists – the heuristic account and default reasons accounts – fail in this aim. 相似文献
3.
4.
5.
Andrew Gleeson 《Philosophical Investigations》2007,30(4):363-380
In one version, moral particularism says that morality has no need of principles. Jonathan Dancy has argued for this in his recently published Ethics Without Principles. For Dancy, the central issue is whether it is necessary for moral reasons to be codified in principles. He thinks not. This misses the point. Whether or not it needs to be or can be codified, moral agents should not follow rules, on pain of a bad‐faith rule‐fetishism. The authority of particular cases does not reside in any alleged failure of codifiability. It rests on the fact that moral agents cannot palm off responsibility for their actions on to experts or rules and that they must respond freshly to each case with an appropriate moral reaction: indignation, pity, remorse, etc. Ironically, this reconfiguration of the particularism issue follows from the proper appreciation of a passage from George Eliot, which Dancy cites as his own inspiration. 相似文献
6.
Nikola Kompa 《Erkenntnis》2004,61(2-3):457-467
Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them – at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an epistemic contextualist should commit himself to epistemic holism he can nevertheless appeal to epistemic principles other than defeasible generalizations in order to provide his epistemology with a structure. 相似文献
7.
8.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - 相似文献
9.
Jörg Schroth 《The Journal of value inquiry》2003,37(4):455-461
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
P. S. Greenspan 《The Journal of Ethics》1998,2(2):103-122
The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes. 相似文献
16.
Sarah Stroud 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1998,79(2):170-189
I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them. 相似文献
17.
Pekka Väyrynen 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2004,7(1):53-79
This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at
a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I
first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims
won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent
distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot
therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons
by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not
a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify
the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion,
and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’. 相似文献
18.
Alan Thomas 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):151-167
This paper makes the non-monotonicity of a wide range of moral reasoning the basis of a case for particularism. Non-monotonicity
threatens practical decision with an overwhelming informational complexity to which a form of ethical generalism seems the
best response. It is argued that this impression is wholly misleading: the fact of non-monotonicity is best accommodated by
the defence of four related theses in any theory of justification. First, the explanation of and defence of a default/challenge
model of justification. Secondly, the development of a theory of epistemic status and an explanation of those unearned entitlements
that accrue to such status. Thirdly, an explanation of the basis of epistemic virtues. Finally, an account must be given of
the executive capacity of rational decision itself as a ‘contentless ability’. This overall set of views can accommodate a
limited role for generalizations about categories of evidence, but not such as to rescue a principled generalism. In particular,
the version of particularism defended here explains why one ought not to accept the principled “holism” that has proved to
be a problem for Dancy’s form of particularism. Ethics certainly involves hedged principles. However, principles cannot be
self-hedging: there cannot be a “that’s it” operator in a principle as Richard Holton has claimed that there can be. Practical
reasoning is concluded by the categorical detachment of the action-as-conclusion itself. 相似文献
19.
Avrum Stroll 《Topoi》1998,17(2):137-147
According to a widely accepted conceptual model, principles play essential roles in moral reasoning: it is asserted that they hold universally and cannot be avoided in the justification of human action and belief. This paper challenges that view. It argues that, though some principles play such substantive roles, most do not. They can be characterized instead as being fragile or defeasible, i.e., they are capable of being weakened, voided or undone. The claim is made that it is the pressures exerted by particular cases of moral dilemmas that are the sources of such fragility. The paper contains detailed examples illustrating how the process of defeasibility, including a retreat into moral vacuity, arises from such pressures. 相似文献