Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

     

Generalized imitation of facial models by children with autism

Imitation is an essential skill in the acquisition of language and communication skills. An initial phase in teaching young children with autism to engage in appropriate affective responding may be to teach the imitation of facial models. Using a multiple baseline across participants design, imitation training (consisting of modeling, prompting, differential reinforcement, and error correction) was introduced successively across 3 participants. Low and inconsistent rates of imitation of facial models were observed in baseline. All of the participants learned to imitate some of the facial models presented during imitation training, but only 2 of the 3 participants demonstrated generalized responding across stimuli.     

Imitation improves language comprehension

Humans imitate each other during social interaction. This imitative behavior streamlines social interaction and aids in learning to replicate actions. However, the effect of imitation on action comprehension is unclear. This study investigated whether vocal imitation of an unfamiliar accent improved spoken-language comprehension. Following a pretraining accent comprehension test, participants were assigned to one of six groups. The baseline group received no training, but participants in the other five groups listened to accented sentences, listened to and repeated accented sentences in their own accent, listened to and transcribed accented sentences, listened to and imitated accented sentences, or listened to and imitated accented sentences without being able to hear their own vocalizations. Posttraining measures showed that accent comprehension was most improved for participants who imitated the speaker's accent. These results show that imitation may aid in streamlining interaction by improving spoken-language comprehension under adverse listening conditions.     

Self-projection in younger and older adults: a study of episodic memory,prospection, and theory of mind

Self-projection is the ability to orient the self in different places in time and space. Episodic memory, prospection, and theory of mind (ToM) are all cognitive abilities that share an element of self-projection. Previous research has posited that each of these abilities stems from the same neural network. The current study compared performance of cognitively healthy older adults and younger adults on several self-projection tasks to examine the relatedness of these constructs behaviorally. Episodic memory and prospection were measured using an episodic interview task where the participants were asked to remember or imagine events that either had happened in the past or could happen in the future and then gave ratings describing the extent to which they were mentally experiencing the event and from what perspective they viewed it. ToM was measured by asking participants to make judgments regarding the intentions of characters described in stories that involved cognitive, affective, or ironic components. Our results demonstrate that aging influences episodic memory, prospection, and ToM similarly: older adult participants showed declines on each of these measures compared to younger adults. Further, we observed correlations between performance on the measures of episodic memory and prospection as well as between episodic memory and ToM, although no correlation between prospection and ToM was observed after controlling for chronological age. We discuss these results in the light of theories suggesting that each of these abilities is governed by a common brain system.     

Embodied temporal perception of emotion

The role of embodiment in the perception of the duration of emotional stimuli was investigated with a temporal bisection task. Previous research has shown that individuals overestimate the duration of emotional, compared with neutral, faces (S. Droit-Volet, S. Brunot, & P. M. Niedenthal, 2004). The authors tested a role for embodiment in this effect. Participants estimated the duration of angry, happy, and neutral faces by comparing them to 2 durations learned during a training phase. Experimental participants held a pen in their mouths so as to inhibit imitation of the faces, whereas control participants could imitate freely. Results revealed that participants overestimated the duration of emotional faces relative to the neutral faces only when imitation was possible. Implications for the role of embodiment in emotional perception are discussed.     

Direct and Indirect Associations of Empathy,Theory of Mind,and Language with Prosocial Behavior: Gender Differences in Primary School Children

The authors examined the contributions of empathic concern, perspective taking, theory of mind (ToM), and receptive language to prosocial behavior in a sample of primary school children between 8 and 11?years old. Results showed that empathic concern, perspective taking, and ToM had direct positive effects on prosocial behavior. Girls exhibited higher levels of empathic concern and prosocial behavior; furthermore, gender moderated the observed associations, as perspective taking and ToM were positively and significantly associated with prosocial behavior in boys but not in girls. Last, two indirect paths were detected: empathic concern partially mediated the relation between perspective taking and prosocial behavior, and receptive language had an indirect effect on prosocial behavior by increasing ToM ability. Implications for understanding the impact of the four social-cognitive skills on children’s prosocial development are discussed.     

视觉观点采择中自我中心性偏差的抑制和归因之争

自我中心性偏差是社交失败的重要原因,但其产生机制还存在争议。以往研究存在抑制性选择模型与流利性错误归因两种理论观点:前者认为对自身观点的抑制失败会导致自我中心性偏差;后者则认为错误地选择自身更为流畅的信息会导致自我中心性偏差。为整合上述争论,提出抑制-归因协同作用模型,认为抑制和归因两种加工或可共同导致自我中心性偏差。未来研究应借助精巧的研究范式和特殊被试群体,进一步验证该模型。     

Investigating ToM in aging with the MASC: from accuracy to error type

Growing evidence indicates that Theory of Mind (ToM) declines in normal aging. However, the majority of this research has used classic and static verbal tasks that present scenarios, which are very different from real life. The present study was designed to fill this gap by administering the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) to young and older participants. It allows one to analyze not only the accuracy, but also the typology of error in mental states attribution distinguishing between iper-ToM (over-mentalization), ipo-ToM (insufficient mentalization), and no-ToM (lack of mentalization). We recruited 30 young (20–29 years), 39 young-old (65–74 years), and 31 old-old (75–86 years) participants. Along with the MASC, we administered a classic ToM task, the Strange Stories, and several measures of cognitive functioning. Results showed that older adults were less accurate in mental state attribution than young adults in the MASC, but not in the Strange Stories. In addition, compared to young adults, older adults committed more errors of both ipo- and no-ToM, while young adults committed more often iper-ToM errors. Additionally, older adults, but not young adults, did not show a difference between iper-ToM and ipo-ToM errors, which were equally frequent in this age group. Globally, results indicated that older adults’ failure in classic ToM tasks may be due to both ipo- and iper-ToM and provide needed evidence for the MASC as a suitable measure of ToM in aging.     

The influence of inhibitory processes on affective theory of mind in young and old adults

The primary aim of this study was to examine the impact of an inhibition manipulation on the effect of age on theory of mind (ToM) in an ecologically valid, affective ToM task. Participants were 30 young and 30 old adults. The Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery was used to measure ToM; in addition, measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence were taken. Participants were subjected to three levels of inhibitory demand during ToM reasoning: emotional inhibition, non-emotional inhibition, and no inhibition. Old adults performed worse than young adults. The emotional and non-emotional inhibition conditions resulted in worse ToM performance compared to the no inhibition condition. There were no differences in the impact of the inhibition conditions on old and young adults. Regression analyses suggested that old adults’ crystallized intelligence was a significant predictor of ToM performance, whereas it did not predict young adults’ ToM performance. Results are discussed in terms of verbal ability as a possible compensatory mechanism in coping with verbal inhibitory load in ToM reasoning.     

Gaze,goals and growing up: Effects on imitative grasping

Developmental differences in the use of social‐attention cues to imitation were examined among children aged 3 and 6 years old (n = 58) and adults (n = 29). In each of 20 trials, participants watched a model grasp two objects simultaneously and move them together. On every trial, the model directed her gaze towards only one of the objects. Some object pairs were related and had a clear functional relationship (e.g., flower, vase), while others were functionally unrelated (e.g., cardboard square, ladybug). Owing to attentional effects of eye gaze, it was expected that all participants would more faithfully imitate the grasp on the gazed‐at object than the object not gazed‐at. Children were expected to imitate less faithfully on trials with functionally related objects than those without, due to goal‐hierarchy effects. Results support effects of eye gaze on imitation of grasping. Children's grasping accuracy on functionally related and functionally unrelated trials was similar, but they were more likely to only use one hand on trials where the object pairs were functionally related than unrelated. Implications for theories of imitation are discussed.     

Empathy is a beautiful thing: Empathy predicts imitation only for attractive others

Research shows that we spontaneously imitate people. Moreover, empathy predicts the degree of this non‐conscious imitation. Little is known, however, if or how this expression of empathy is influenced by stable physical characteristics of our interaction‐partners. In two studies, we tested whether attractiveness of others moderated the relation between empathy and imitation. While seeing a woman performing joystick movements, participants either imitated, or non‐imitated these movements. Results showed that the higher participants empathy score, the faster they imitated an attractive person. The level of empathy did not predict the degree of imitation of unattractive targets. The findings demonstrate that the expression of empathy through imitation can be moderated by attractiveness, thereby introducing a new dimension to the conditionality of empathy.     

Effects of verbal imitation and comprehension training on verbal production

This study sought to determine whether some combination of imitation training and comprehension training was necessary to achieve verbal production or whether comprehension training alone was sufficient to result in verbal production. Fifty-one first- and second-grade subjects were trained to imitate eight words (Spanish nouns) for which there were no referents. An additional set of eight words was trained in a comprehension task where overt verbal rehearsal was prohibited. Once criterion of two successive sessions of 100% performance was reached in training for both imitation and comprehension, training modes were reversed so that items initially trained in imitation were then trained in comprehension andvice versa. Results showed that initial comprehension training did result in some verbal production, whereas initial imitation training, as expected, did not. A marked improvement in verbal production performance was observed when initial comprehension training was followed by imitation training. When initial imitation training was followed by comprehension training, verbal production also resulted but not to the degree or with the consistency of performance which marked the comprehension-then-imitation sequence. Furthermore, comprehension training required more trials to reach a similar level of proficiency when it followed imitation training than when it preceded imitation. These data indicate that initial imitation training interferes with acquisition of subsequent comprehension and production responses and that the preferred training sequence is one which initially focuses on comprehension and follows this with verbal imitation.This study was supported by Grant HD 00870 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and Grant NS 10468 from the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke awarded to the Bureau of Child Research, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.     

4岁儿童对他人记忆的评判与错误信念理解的关系

从观点采择的角度考察儿童对他人记忆的评判及其与错误信念理解的关系。与他人分享记忆时,个体需要同时处理自我与他人对过去的表征和看法;而要顺利完成错误信念任务,个体需要同时加工自我的真实信念与他人的错误信念。因此个体对他人记忆的评判能力可能会与其对错误信念的理解相关。40名4岁儿童完成一系列错误信念任务和评判他人记忆是否正确任务,情境包括视觉、意图解释和情绪解释。结果表明,控制年龄、语言和记忆能力等因素后,被试评判他人记忆的成绩仍然可以预测其对错误信念的理解。这些结果为幼儿在回忆叙述中谈及他人越多,其心理理论越好提供了进一步的证据和可能的解释     

Visual search and coordination changes in response to video and point-light demonstrations without KR

The authors examined the observational learning of 24 participants whom they constrained to use the model by removing intrinsic visual knowledge of results (KR). Matched participants assigned to video (VID), point-light (PL), and no-model (CON) groups performed a soccer-chipping task in which vision was occluded at ball contact. Pre- and posttests were interspersed with alternating periods of demonstration and acquisition. The authors assessed delayed retention 2-3 days later. In support of the visual perception perspective, the participants who observed the models showed immediate and enduring changes to more closely imitate the model's relative motion. While observing the demonstration, the PL group participants were more selective in their visual search than were the VID group participants but did not perform more accurately or learn more.     

An assessment of age differences in theory of mind using the virtual assessment of mentalizing ability

ABSTRACT

Prior research has shown that older adults perform more poorly than young on tasks that assess theory of mind (ToM). However, these studies have used tasks that are performed “offline” (i.e., requiring a second-person perspective) as opposed to “online” (i.e., requiring a first-person perspective). Therefore, the present study was designed to establish whether age-related ToM difficulties are also evident when an “online” measure of ToM is used. Forty younger and 40 older adults completed the Virtual Assessment of Mentalizing Ability (VAMA) along with two conventional ToM tasks. No age differences were evident on the conventional measures, but older adults had lower accuracy on the VAMA relative to their younger counterparts. The overall pattern of errors did not differ between the groups. These data provide no evidence that age effects are reduced when stimuli are used that are more likely to engage the mentalizing processes elicited in real life social interactions.     

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age

Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function.     

Development of the Basel Version of the Awareness of Social Inference Test – Theory of Mind (BASIT-ToM) in healthy adults

Impairments of Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities occur in a wide range of brain disorders. Therefore, reliable and ecologically valid examination of these abilities is a crucial part of any comprehensive neuropsychological assessment. An established and ecologically valid, English-language test identifying deficits in ToM abilities is “The Awareness of Social Inference Test – Social Inference Minimal (TASIT-SIM)”. However, no comparable German-language ToM test currently exists. In this study, we aimed to develop the first German-language adaption of TASIT-SIM in healthy adults. We selected 13 scenes [four scenes per message type (i.e., honesty, simple sarcasm, paradoxical sarcasm) and one practice scene] out of the 30 TASIT-SIM scenes. In collaboration with a film institute, we filmed each scene at three different intensities. These intensity version scenes were then administered to 240 healthy adults, equally distributed in sex and age, ranging from 35 to 92 years. By applying Rasch analysis, we selected intensity versions that showed neither floor nor ceiling effects in the majority of ToM questions in participants whose ToM abilities were in the medium range. In conclusion, we have developed the first German-language adaption of TASIT-SIM, i.e., the “Basel Version of the Awareness of Social Inference Test – Theory of Mind (BASIT-ToM)”. The BASIT-ToM incorporates the strengths of TASIT-SIM, while overcoming its limitations such as inconsistencies in cinematic realization and ceiling effects in healthy participants. Next, the BASIT-ToM needs to be validated in healthy people and clinical populations.     

视觉观点采择需要抑制控制的参与：一项负启动研究

从抑制控制模型出发,采用负启动范式考察视觉观点采择的认知机制。实验1采用自身体转换任务(N=35) 、实验2采用圆点数量判断任务(N=33)分别考察成人在完成二级和一级视觉观点采择任务时是否需要抑制控制的参与。结果发现,成人在完成两类视觉观点采择任务时均出现了负启动效应,说明当他人观点和自我观点不一致时,个体需要抑制自我的观点才能成功采择他人的观点。     

Reasoning bias for the recall of one's own beliefs in a Smarties task for adults

While many studies in the theory of mind (ToM) literature have investigated how we understand others' mental states, few have explored the mechanism by which we reflect on our own mental states. This study examined how adults reflect on their own and others' mental states within the same ToM task. To do so, we modified the Smarties task, one of the traditional ToM tasks for children. The results showed that adult participants were biased by outcome knowledge when recalling their false belief and that the participants who overestimated their false belief also overestimated the mental states of a naive other. These results were analogous to young children's failure in the Smarties task. Considering the current findings, we discuss possible cognitive processes that are common across children and adults when reflecting on their own mental states and the mental states of others.     

From imitation to conversation: the first dialogues with human neonates

The functional maturity of the newborn infant's brain, the resemblances between neonatal imitation and imitation in adults and the possibly lateralized neonatal imitation suggest that the mirror neuron system may contribute to neonatal imitation. Newborn infants not only imitate but also initiate previously imitated gestures, and are able to participate in overlapping imitation–initiation communicative cycles. Additionally, these social responses in neonates are faster than previously thought, and may enable them to have long‐lasting intimate interactions much before language develops. Infants are equipped with a powerful, innate, reciprocal communicative ability already at birth. The earliest communication originates from imitation and this communicative ability presumably later evolves to language. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.