Implicit social cognition: from measures to mechanisms

Most human cognition occurs outside conscious awareness or conscious control. Some of these implicit processes influence social perception, judgment and action. The past 15 years of research in implicit social cognition can be characterized as the Age of Measurement because of a proliferation of measurement methods and research evidence demonstrating their practical value for predicting human behavior. Implicit measures assess constructs that are distinct, but related, to self-report assessments, and predict variation in behavior that is not accounted for by those explicit measures. The present state of knowledge provides a foundation for the next age of implicit social cognition: clarification of the mechanisms underlying implicit measurement and how the measured constructs influence behavior.     

Developmental phenomenology: examples from social cognition

Continental Philosophy Review - We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most...     

Continuity in social cognition from infancy to childhood

Research examining the development of social cognition has largely been divided into two areas: infant perception of intentional agents, and preschoolers’ understanding of others’ mental states and beliefs (theory of mind). Many researchers have suggested that there is continuity in social cognitive development such that the abilities observed in infancy are related to later preschool ability, yet little empirical evidence exists for this claim. Here, we present preliminary evidence that capacities specific to the social domain contribute to performance in social cognition tasks both during infancy and in early childhood. Specifically, looking time patterns in an infant social cognition task correlated with preschool theory of mind; however, no such relationship was found for infants in a nonsocial cognition task.     

Thinking is for doing: portraits of social cognition from daguerreotype to laserphoto.

From the outset, perspectives on social cognition have taken an emphatically pragmatic stance, as evident in early writing by James, Allport, Bruner, Asch, Heider, Tagiuri, and Jones. After a hiatus, during which social cognition research neglected its proper attunement to social behavior, researchers again are emphasizing that thinking is for doing, that social understanding operates in the service of social interaction. Early and recent (but not intermediate) theories have reflected a pragmatic orientation in 3 recurring themes: People are good-enough social perceivers; people construct meaning through traits, stereotypes, and stories; and people's thinking strategies depend on their goals. The pragmatic viewpoint again opens up new areas for research and theory in social cognition.     

The face and person perception: insights from social cognition

Social-cognitive investigations of face perception have tended to be motivated by different goals than cognitive and neuropsychological studies-namely, to understand the dynamics of social categorization rather than identity recognition-and the result has been a lack of cross-pollination of insights and ideas between the disciplines. We review the evidence from social cognition, with an eye to discussing how this work aligns with the Bruce and Young (1986) model of face recognition. Acknowledging the invaluable impact the model has exerted on our understanding of face recognition, we suggest that considering the bottom-up constraints of visual processing and the top-down influences of semantic knowledge will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of face perception.     

The social control of generalized imitation

Instructions, discrimination procedures, and sources of reinforcement were manipulated in order to determine the bases for the maintained "non-reinforced" imitations observed in generalized imitation research. Six girls received imitation training from two experimenters. One experimenter modelled only reinforced responses; the other modelled only non-reinforced responses. The children imitated all responses when no reinforced alternative was available, even though results of choice procedures and special instructions clearly demonstrated that they discriminated reinforced from non-reinforced responses. Instructions not to perform non-reinforced imitations immediately eliminated these behaviors. It is suggested that social setting events may be largely responsible for generalized imitation.     

Triggering social interactions: chimpanzees respond to imitation by a humanoid robot and request responses from it

Even the most rudimentary social cues may evoke affiliative responses in humans and promote social communication and cohesion. The present work tested whether such cues of an agent may also promote communicative interactions in a nonhuman primate species, by examining interaction-promoting behaviours in chimpanzees. Here, chimpanzees were tested during interactions with an interactive humanoid robot, which showed simple bodily movements and sent out calls. The results revealed that chimpanzees exhibited two types of interaction-promoting behaviours during relaxed or playful contexts. First, the chimpanzees showed prolonged active interest when they were imitated by the robot. Second, the subjects requested ‘social’ responses from the robot, i.e. by showing play invitations and offering toys or other objects. This study thus provides evidence that even rudimentary cues of a robotic agent may promote social interactions in chimpanzees, like in humans. Such simple and frequent social interactions most likely provided a foundation for sophisticated forms of affiliative communication to emerge.     

The social context of imitation in infancy

Infants increasingly generalize deferred imitation across environmental contexts between 6 and 18 months of age. In three experiments with 126 6-, 9-, 12-, 15-, and 18-month-olds, we examined the role of the social context in deferred imitation. One experimenter demonstrated target actions on a hand puppet, and a second experimenter tested imitation 24h later. When the second experimenter was novel, infants did not exhibit deferred imitation at any age; when infants were preexposed to the second experimenter, all of them did. Imitating immediately after the demonstration also facilitated deferred imitation in a novel social context at all ages but 6 months. Infants' pervasive failure to exhibit deferred imitation in a novel social context may reflect evolutionary selection pressures that favored conservative behavior in social animals.     

On the role of social interaction in social cognition: a mechanistic alternative to enactivism

Researchers in the enactivist tradition have recently argued that social interaction can constitute social cognition, rather than simply serve as the context for social cognition. They contend that a focus on social interaction corrects the overemphasis on mechanisms inside the individual in the explanation of social cognition. I critically assess enactivism??s claims about the explanatory role of social interaction in social cognition. After sketching the enactivist approach to cognition in general and social cognition in particular, I identify problems with an enactivist taxonomy of roles for social interaction in the explanation of social cognition (contextual, enabling, and constitutive). In particular, I show that this enactivist taxonomy does not clearly distinguish between enabling conditions and constitutive elements, which would make them in danger of committing the coupling-constitution fallacy found in some attempts to extend cognition. I explore resources enactivism has to more clearly demarcate constitutive parts of a cognitive system, but identify problems in applying them to some of the main cases of social cognition enactivists characterize as being constituted by social interaction. I offer the mechanistic approach to explanation as an alternative that captures much of what enactivists want to say about the relations between social and individual levels, but views social interactions from the perspective of embedded cognition rather than as being constitutive of social cognition.     

Situated robotics: from learning to teaching by imitation

This paper presents an approach to imitation learning in robotics focusing on low level behaviours, so that they do not need to be encoded into sets and rules, but learnt in an intuitive way. Its main novelty is that, rather than trying to analyse natural human actions and adapting them to robot kinematics, humans adapt themselves to the robot via a proper interface to make it perform the desired action. As an example, we present a successful experiment to learn a purely reactive navigation behaviour using robotic platforms. Using Case Based Reasoning, the platform learns from a human driver how to behave in the presence of obstacles, so that no kinematics studies or explicit rules are required.     

Some social features of cognition

This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the claim that fixation of belief is radically holistic.     

The social function of imitation in severe dementia

We report the case of Jessie, an individual with severe Alzheimer's disease. Over two sessions, we examine Jessie's spontaneous conversation behaviour and urge to communicate using the ‘still face’ paradigm. Spontaneous and deliberate imitation are also examined to identify their importance in social interactions in severe dementia. Although Jessie has difficulty producing meaningful conversation, she retains the urge to communicate and participate in social interactions. These results confirm the importance of imitation in facilitating and maintaining people with communication problems in the social world. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emulation and mimicry for social interaction: a theoretical approach to imitation in autism

The "broken-mirror" theory of autism argues that dysfunction of the "mirror neuron system" is a root cause of social disability in autism. The present paper aims to scrutinize this theory and, when it breaks down, to provide an alternative. Current evidence suggests that children with autism are able to understand and emulate goal-directed actions, but may have specific impairments in automatic mimicry of actions without goals. These data are not compatible with the broken-mirror theory, but can be accounted for by a new model called EP-M. The EP-M model segments the mirror neuron system into an indirect, parietal route for goal emulation and planning (EP) and a direct occipital-frontal route for mimicry (M). This fractionation is consistent with neuroimaging and behavioural studies of the mirror neuron system in typical children and adults. I suggest that top-down modulation of the direct M route may be dysfunctional in individuals with autism, leading to abnormal behaviours on mimicry tasks as well as other social disabilities.     

From Reading Minds to Social Interaction: Respecifying Theory of Mind

The aim of this paper is to show some of the limitations of the Theory of Mind approach to interaction compared to a conversation analytic alternative. In the former, mental state terms are examined as words that signify internal referents. This study examines children’s uses of ‘I want’ in situ. The data are taken from a corpus of family mealtimes. ‘I want’ constructions are shown to be interactionally occasioned. The analysis suggests that (a) a referential view of language does not adequately account for how mental state terms are used in talk, (b) the dominant methodology for examining children’s understanding of ‘desires’ is based on several problematic assumptions. It is concluded that participation in interaction is a social matter, a consideration that is obscured by Theory of Mind and its favoured methods.     

'Like me': a foundation for social cognition

Infants represent the acts of others and their own acts in commensurate terms. They can recognize cross-modal equivalences between acts they see others perform and their own felt bodily movements. This recognition of self-other equivalences in action gives rise to interpreting others as having similar psychological states such as perceptions and emotions. The 'like me' nature of others is the starting point for social cognition, not its culmination.     

The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. In humans, social cognition includes the ability to mindread, and many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we question the motor theory of social cognition and give reasons for our skepticism.     

Detecting contingency: A key to understanding development of self and social cognition

Abstract:  Detecting contingency between self-produced actions and the consequences plays a crucial role for basic cognitive functions, such as construction of self body-image and tool-use. This paper reviews our recent studies focusing on the temporal aspect of contingency. Three studies concerning the detection of proprioceptive-visual contingency in infants, children and adults are summarized. All of these studies use delayed self-image as a tool to investigate the temporal aspect of contingency detection. Based on the results of these studies and related preceding research, the paper proposes the ubiquity of a contingency detector among the development of self and social interaction.     

The emerging fragile X premutation phenotype: evidence from the domain of social cognition

Fragile X syndrome is a neurodevelopmental disorder that is caused by large methylated expansions of a CGG repeat (>200) region upstream of the FMR1 gene that results in the lack of expression of the fragile X mental retardation protein (FMRP). Affected individuals display a neurobehavioral phenotype that includes a significant impairment in social cognition alongside deficits in attentional control, inhibition and working memory. In contrast, relatively little is known about the trajectory and specificity of any cognitive impairment associated with the fragile X premutation ("carrier-status") (approximately 55-200 repeats). Here, we focus on one aspect of cognition that has been well documented in the fragile X full mutation, namely social cognition. The results suggest that premutation males display a pattern of deficit similar in profile, albeit milder in presentation, to that of the full mutation. However, little evidence emerged for a correlation between CGG repeat length and severity of phenotypic outcomes. The findings are discussed in the context of functional neuroimaging and brain-behaviour-molecular correlates. We speculate that the deficiencies in social cognition are attributable to impairment of neural pathways modulated by the cerebellum.     

Mind,consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs. cognitive science

I would like to thank Steven Crowell from Rice University (Philosophy Department) for helpful comments and suggestions about my discussion of Husserl and other phenomenologists, and Edouard Philippe, also from Rice University (Electrical Engineering Department), for offering me the opportunity to formulate my views on cognitive science and artificial intelligence.