People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth

Although people lie often, and mostly for self-serving reasons, they do not lie as much as they could. The “fudge factor” hypothesis suggests that one reason for people not to lie is that they do not wish to self-identify as liars. Accordingly, self-serving lies should be more likely when they are less obvious to the liars themselves. Here we show that the likelihood of self-serving lies increases with the probability of accidentally telling the truth. Players in our game could transmit sincere or insincere recommendations to their competitors. In line with the fudge factor hypothesis, players lied when their beliefs were based on flimsy evidence and did not lie when their beliefs were based on solid evidence. This is the first demonstration of a new moral hypocrisy paradox: People are more likely to be insincere when they are more likely to accidentally tell the truth.     

First fixations in face processing: The more diagnostic they are the smaller the face-inversion effect

Hills, Ross, and Lewis (2011) introduced the concept that the face-inversion effect may, in part, be carried by the first feature attended to, since the first feature fixated upon is different for upright and inverted faces. An eye-tracking study that directly assesses this hypothesis by using fixation crosses to guide attention to the eye or mouth region of the to-be-presented upright and inverted faces was devised. Recognition was better when the fixation cross appeared at the eye region than at the mouth region. The face-inversion effect was smaller when the eyes were cued than when the mouth was cued or when there was no cueing. The eye-tracking measures confirmed that the fixation crosses attracted the first fixation but did not affect other measures of eye-movements. Furthermore, the location of the first fixation predicted recognition accuracy: when the first fixation was to the eyes, recognition accuracy was higher than when the first fixation was to the mouth, irrespective of facial orientation. The results suggest that the first facial feature attended to is more predictive of recognition accuracy than the face orientation in which they are presented.     

Categorical templates are more useful when features are consistent: Evidence from eye movements during search for societally important vehicles

Unlike in laboratory visual search tasks—wherein participants are typically presented with a pictorial representation of the item they are asked to seek out—in real-world searches, the observer rarely has veridical knowledge of the visual features that define their target. During categorical search, observers look for any instance of a categorically defined target (e.g., helping a family member look for their mobile phone). In these circumstances, people may not have information about noncritical features (e.g., the phone’s color), and must instead create a broad mental representation using the features that define (or are typical of) the category of objects they are seeking out (e.g., modern phones are typically rectangular and thin). In the current investigation (Experiment 1), using a categorical visual search task, we add to the body of evidence suggesting that categorical templates are effective enough to conduct efficient visual searches. When color information was available (Experiment 1a), attentional guidance, attention restriction, and object identification were enhanced when participants looked for categories with consistent features (e.g., ambulances) relative to categories with more variable features (e.g., sedans). When color information was removed (Experiment 1b), attention benefits disappeared, but object recognition was still better for feature-consistent target categories. In Experiment 2, we empirically validated the relative homogeneity of our societally important vehicle stimuli. Taken together, our results are in line with a category-consistent view of categorical target templates (Yu, Maxfield, & Zelinsky in, Psychological Science, 2016. doi: 10.1177/0956797616640237), and suggest that when features of a category are consistent and predictable, searchers can create mental representations that allow for the efficient guidance and restriction of attention as well as swift object identification.     

Reaching while walking: Reaching distance costs more than walking distance

Surprisingly little is known about how people plan and control everyday physical actions, such as walking along and picking up objects. In order to explore this topic, we conducted an experiment in which university students were asked to pick up a common object (a child’s beach bucket) that stood on a table several meters from the participant’s start position. The bucket stood either on the left side, in the middle, or on the right side of the table and, depending on instructions, was to be carried to a farther target whose horizontal position was also varied. The questions were which side of the table the participant would walk along when picking up the bucket and which hand the participant would use to pick up and carry the bucket. Participants, most of whom were righthanded, preferred to walk along the left side of the table and to pick up the bucket with the right hand, although they departed from that preference when the reaching distance across the table was uncomfortable or if the target was too far to the right. The data were well fit with a mathematical model that included a right-hand bias and an estimate of functional distance that expressed the cost of reaching over some distance as approximately twice the cost of walking over the same distance.     

Representation facilitates reasoning: what natural frequencies are and what they are not

A good representation can be crucial for finding the solution to a problem. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (Psychol. Rev. 102 (1995) 684; Psychol. Rev. 106 (1999) 425) have shown that representations in terms of natural frequencies, rather than conditional probabilities, facilitate the computation of a cause's probability (or frequency) given an effect--a problem that is usually referred to as Bayesian reasoning. They also have shown that normalized frequencies--which are not natural frequencies--do not lead to computational facilitation, and consequently, do not enhance people's performance. Here, we correct two misconceptions propagated in recent work (Cognition 77 (2000) 197; Cognition 78 (2001) 247; Psychol. Rev. 106 (1999) 62; Organ. Behav. Hum. Decision Process. 82 (2000) 217): normalized frequencies have been mistaken for natural frequencies and, as a consequence, "nested sets" and the "subset principle" have been proposed as new explanations. These new terms, however, are nothing more than vague labels for the basic properties of natural frequencies.     

Dealing with conflicting information: young children's reliance on what they see versus what they are told

Children often learn about the world through direct observation. However, much of children's knowledge is acquired through the testimony of others. This research investigates how preschoolers weigh these two sources of information when they are in conflict. Children watched as an adult hid a toy in one location. Then the adult told children that the toy was in a different location (i.e. false testimony). When retrieving the toy, 4- and 5-year-olds relied on what they had seen and disregarded the adult's false testimony. However, most 3-year-olds deferred to the false testimony, despite what they had directly observed. Importantly, with a positive searching experience based on what they saw, or with a single prior experience with an adult as unreliable, 3-year-olds subsequently relied on their first-hand observation and disregarded the adult's false testimony. Thus, young children may initially be credulous toward others' false testimony that contradicts their direct observation, but skepticism can develop quickly through experience.     

Who they are and what de se: Burge on quasi-memory

Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.

We are made,not born: Empiricism is existentially useful

The perennial “nativist-empiricist” debate in developmental science has far-reaching relevance in our existence. Two studies conducted under the terror management framework tested whether the empiricist developmental conception serves distal defensive purposes. Experiment 1 highlights the palliative existential effect of the empiricist conception since participants who read an empiricist essay exhibited less death thoughts than participants who read a nativist essay or a control essay. Experiment 2 gives support to the distal defensive function of the empiricist conception by showing that, unlike with the nativist or the control essay, people under mortality salience exhibited a higher need to rely on empiricism than participants in the control pain condition. The existential advantage of empiricism is explained by the fact that human development is shaped by a meaningful cultural blueprint. Our results are discussed in terms of the ontological and existential benefits of contemplating human intrinsic identity, ranging from its biology to its social behaviors as primarily influenced by the cultural environment.     

The bigger they are, the harder they fall: Linking team power, team conflict, and performance

Across two field studies, we investigate the impact of team power on team conflict and performance. Team power is based on the control of resources that enables a team to influence others in the company. We find across both studies that low-power teams outperform high-power teams. In both studies, higher levels of process conflict present in high-power teams explain this effect fully. In our second study, we show that team interpersonal power congruence (i.e., the degree to which team members’ self-views of their individual power within the team align with the perceptions of their other team members) ameliorates the relationship between team power and process conflict, such that when team interpersonal power congruence is high, high-power teams are less likely to experience performance-detracting process conflict.     

Computer viruses: What they are,how they work,how they might get you,and how to control them in academic institutions

A computer virus is a program that replicates itself and spreads to computers with the goal of disrupting or destroying normal computer use. In academic computing, viruses represent a serious problem that costs millions of dollars in losses annually and hinders the free exchange of information so critical to education. Viruses operate in incubation, infection, and destroy phases. The nature, mechanisms, and preventive measures for personal-computer viruses are reviewed. Different procedures are recommended to protect research laboratories, instructional laboratories, and software lending libraries. Tradeoffs between providing adequate protection and not having the security become too burdensome are considered.     

Fondness makes the distance grow shorter: Desired locations seem closer because they seem more vivid

Do appealing locations seem nearer than unappealing locations merely because they are more desirable? We examine the possibility that people represent desirable locations as nearer than equidistant undesirable locations. In three studies, participants represented a variety of locations on a university campus (Study 1) and in the greater New York City area (Studies 2 and 3) as nearer the more positive they felt about those locations. The relationship between positivity and closeness was mediated by the tendency for participants to generate particularly vivid representations of the locations when they evaluated them more positively (Studies 2 and 3). We discuss the theoretical implications of these results for mental construal, motivated perception, and metacognition.     

The higher they are,the harder they fall: The effects of wrongdoer status on observer punishment recommendations and intentionality attributions

In two studies, we explore whether the status of a wrongdoer affects observers’ attributions for the wrongdoer’s actions and opinions about the wrongdoer’s deserved punishment. We find that observers attribute greater intentionality to the actions of high status wrongdoers than the identical actions of low status wrongdoers, and consequently recommend more severe punishments for the former than the latter. Additionally, we find that the relationship between a wrongdoer’s status and observers’ attributions is driven by observers’ perceptions of the wrongdoer’s underlying social motives: high status wrongdoers are presumed to be more interested in their own welfare (self-concerned), and less interested in the welfare of others (other-concerned), than low status individuals. These findings have implications for the psychology of retributive justice, and suggest that punitive reactions may be influenced as much by characteristics of the criminal as they are by characteristics of the crime.     

Response-repetition costs in task switching: how they are modulated by previous-trial response-category activation

A common finding is that there are response-repetition (RR) costs under task switching. Moreover, when the stimulus on the previous trial was congruent then RR costs are usually larger than when it was incongruent. This effect of the previous trial has been explained by assuming that a response category is generally inhibited after the execution of its corresponding response on the previous trial and that the amount of inhibition depends on the activation of the response category. However, up to now it was open which property of the response-category activation on the previous trial is crucial: the absolute activation of the correct response category or the activation difference between the alternative response categories. To differentiate between these two possibilities we compared RR costs after congruent, neutral, and incongruent trials. In two experiments we found similar RR costs after congruent and neutral trials, whereas the RR costs were smaller after incongruent trials. These results support the hypothesis that the amount of response inhibition is determined by the activation differences between the alternative response categories on the previous trial.     

Language is never enough: memories are more than words reveal

In this commentary I discuss the work by Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1998) including some methodological limitations to their study. It is perhaps because of these limitations that the data do not provide support for their linguistic hypothesis concerning the onset of autobiographical memory. The data do, however, address important issues in the study of autobiographical memory, particularly in terms of very long-term retention and reconstruction of unique (and perhaps distinctive) events that are pleasant. This is a welcome change from the typical studies of recall of distinctive life events in which the target event is one that revolves around unpleasant medical procedures. Future research efforts should continue along these lines, although alternative suggestions are made for which theoretical issues need to be addressed and new measures developed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.