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1.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
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Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
2.
Roberta De Monticelli 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):225-242
Each person is perceived by others and by herself as an individual in a very strong sense, namely as a unique individual. Moreover, this supposed uniqueness is commonly thought of as linked with another character that we tend to attribute
to persons (as opposed to stones or chairs and even non-human animals): a kind of depth, hidden to sensory perception, yet in some measure accessible to other means of knowledge. I propose a theory of strong or essential individuality. This theory is introduced by way of a critical discussion of Van Inwagen’s and Baker’s ontologies of persons. Composition
Theory and Constitution Theory are shown to be complementary, in their opposite strong and weak points. I argue that both
theories have unsatisfactory consequences concerning personal identity, a problem which the proposed theory seems to solve
more faithfully both to folk intuitions and the phenomenology of personal life.
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Roberta De MonticelliEmail: |
3.
Jim Stone 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):153-160
Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating
due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example
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Jim StoneEmail: |
4.
Kurt Mosser 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):1-20
Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience
are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s
claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for
“common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly
cannot, provide.
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Kurt MosserEmail: |
5.
Christopher J. G. Meacham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):245-269
This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David
Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account
does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not.
Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed
account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than
those of Lewis’ account.
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Christopher J. G. MeachamEmail: |
6.
7.
Joke Bruinsma-de Beer 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,55(2):167-174
In this article the author discusses the differences between pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. She clarifies the specific identity of pastoral care on the basis of Henning Luther’s theology. He distinguishes different anthropological presuppositions in pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. Consequently, she demonstrates the relevancy of Luther’s theology for today’s Practical Theology.
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Joke Bruinsma-de BeerEmail: |
8.
Chris Heathwood 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):137-142
Jonathan Westphal’s recent paper attempts to reconcile the view that propositions about the future can be true or false now
with the idea that the future cannot now be real. I attempt to show that Westphal’s proposal is either unoriginal or unsatisfying.
It is unoriginal if it is just the well-known eternalist solution. It is unsatisfying if it is instead making use of a peculiar,
tensed truthmaking principle.
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Chris HeathwoodEmail: |
9.
H. E. Baber 《Sophia》2008,47(2):149-160
It is difficult to reconcile claims about the Father's role as the progenitor of Trinitarian Persons with commitment to the
equality of the persons, a problem that is especially acute for Social Trinitarians. I propose a metatheological account of
the doctrine of the Trinity that facilitates the reconciliation of these two claims. On the proposed account, ‘Father’ is
systematically ambiguous. Within economic contexts, those which characterize God's relation to the world, ‘Father’ refers
to the First Person of the Trinity; within theological contexts, which purport to describe intra-Trinitarian relations, it
refers to the Trinity in toto-thus in holding that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father we affirm that the Trinity
is the source and unifying principle of Trinitarian Persons. While this account is solves a nagging problem for Social Trinitarians
it is theologically minimalist to the extent that it is compatible with both Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism,
and with heterodox Modalist and Tri-theist doctrines as well. Its only theological cost is incompatibility with the Filioque
Clause, the doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son—and arguably that may be a benefit.
相似文献
H. E. BaberEmail: |
10.
Thomas Sattig 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):179-195
Four-dimensionalists offer a unified picture of various puzzles about identity over time, including the puzzle of fission,
the puzzle of constitution and the puzzle of undetached parts. What unifies the four-dimensionalist approaches to these puzzles
is the possibility of temporal overlap—the possibility for distinct continuants to share a common temporal part, or stage.
I claim that the unified picture is inconsistent, if there are informative criteria of identity over time. I will show that
while temporal overlap is compatible with four-dimensionalist criteria of diachronic composition, temporal overlap is incompatible
with any four-dimensionalist criteria of diachronic identity.
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Thomas SattigEmail: |
11.
Stacy Lee Burns 《Human Studies》2009,32(2):109-131
This paper examines the intersection of technical law and common sense reasoning in small claims arbitration, a distinctive
and increasingly prevalent kind of legal work. Following (Garfinkel, Ethnomethodology’s program: Working out Durkheim’s aphorism, 2002), the study explores the “reform of technical reason” and what a “just outcome” means by focusing on the arbitration of actual
small claims cases and how technical-legal and non-technical/informal resources are brought into alignment to produce dispute
resolution. The arbitrator elicits discussions that establish consensual and commonplace formulations of “the case,” formulations
that foreshadow its disposition as technical matters of law. The research demonstrates how formal structures of equity, evenhandedness,
and decisions without bias have their production in vivo, and how a just and fair course becomes a “just outcome.”
相似文献
Stacy Lee BurnsEmail: |
12.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
相似文献
Patricia SheridanEmail: |
13.
Matteo Morganti 《Axiomathes》2009,19(1):73-85
In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly
enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical
purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing
features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject
them.
相似文献
Matteo MorgantiEmail: |
14.
Hans-Ulrich Hoche 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):389-409
From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which
an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach
in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and
his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical
causation.
相似文献
Hans-Ulrich HocheEmail: |
15.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
相似文献
Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |
16.
Manfred Kupffer 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):225-238
Markus Werning attempts to refute Quine’s thesis that meaning is indeterminate. To this purpose he employs Hodges’ theorem
about extensions of cofinal meaning functions. But the theorem does neither suffice to solve Quine’s problem nor the problem
Werning mistakenly identifies with Quine’s. Nevertheless it makes sense to employ the methods used in Werning’s paper with
regard to Quine’s thesis, only that they tell in favour of the thesis instead of against it.
相似文献
Manfred KupfferEmail: |
17.
Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Sophia》2007,46(3):237-243
According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined
in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical
theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea
are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
18.
Troy Thomas Catterson 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):149-159
Nathan Salmon, in his paper Trans-World Identification and Stipulation (1996) purports to give a proof for the claim that facts concerning trans-world identity cannot be conceptually reduced to
general facts. He calls this claim ‘Extreme Haecceitism.’ I argue that his proof is fallacious. However, I also contend that
the analysis and ultimate rejection of his proof clarifies the fundamental issues that are at stake in the debate between
the reductionist and haecceitist solutions to the problem of trans-world identity. These issues hinge on the ability of modal
logic and possible worlds semantics to draw a hard and fast distinction between the logic and the metaphysics of modal logic.
I shall claim that the considerations in this paper call into question the viability of such a distinction.
相似文献
Troy Thomas CattersonEmail: |
19.
Daniel Giberman 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):297-311
Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity
are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose
facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these
objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies.
The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
相似文献
Daniel GibermanEmail: |
20.
Erin Eaker 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):455-457
This paper raises questions concerning Ted Morris’ interpretation of Hume’s notion of meaning and investigates the private
and public aspects of Hume’s notion of meaning.
相似文献
Erin EakerEmail: |