More human than others? A critique of Cypryańska et al. (2017)

Cypryańska and colleagues offer a critique of existing work on the self-humanizing effect and present some empirical findings motivated by their critique. In this commentary, I question their overly restrictive understanding of self-humanizing and argue that the phenomenon does not stand or fall on a definition based on a strict analogy to the better-than-average effect. I argue that defining self-humanizing exclusively in these terms is inappropriate: It fails to recognize the relationship between self-humanizing and self-enhancement, as well as the primary role of trait valence in comparative self-ratings. Finally, I observe that Cypryańska et al.’s empirical findings are highly consistent with past work rather than offering the deep challenge that the authors suppose.     

The Value of Research Methods in Psychotherapy Research: A Reply to the Commentary of Dr Norton

Norton's commentary on our article has prompted us to think further about the purpose of psychotherapy research. We agree with his suggestion that researchers have much work to do to understand when and for whom interventions are most efficacious. We hope that our field will make progress in this regard. In this reply, we further describe why we believe careful attention to research methods, such as those highlighted in our article, is key to making progress in psychotherapy research.     

Of Whistleblowers,Investigators, and Judges

Needleman's (1993) reply to our article in this journal (Emhart, Scarr, & Geneson, 1993) is a good example of the tactics he uses to deflect attention from questions of his scientific misconduct. Rather than address the many doubts about his scientific conduct, he attempted to focus readers' attention on (a) the motives and character of colleagues who question his research, (b) legitimate debates in the research literature on low-level lead effects on children, and (c) testimonials by colleagues who cannot know about misconduct in his research. He did not address our major thesis-that procedures by which investigations of scientific misconduct are carried out require revision. Our experiences as whistleblowers were used to illustrate the need for change. Needleman's reply illustrates how he has dealt with the series of investigations of his scientific misconduct-with sarcasm and innuendoes about the honesty and character of investigators, portrayed as conspirators with the lead industry (and newspaper columnists?) to bring him down. For more details of his obfuscation, see Scarr (1993), Emhart (1993), and Ernhart and Scarr (in press).     

Reply to Rowe

In our reply to Rowe, we explain why most of what he criticizes is actually the product of his misunderstanding our argument. We begin by showing that nearly all of his Part 1 misconceives our project by defending a position we never attacked. We then question why Rowe thinks the distinction we make between motivational and virtue intellectualism is unimportant before developing a defense of the consistency of our views about different desires. Next we turn to Rowe??s criticisms of our account of the prudential paradox and show these criticisms to rest on a misunderstanding. We close with some remarks about the implausibility and textual problems Rowe faces in denying that Socrates recognized a role for painful punishments.     

A lifelong attempt to understand and assess personality

The author recounts the story of his life and career in clinical psychology from 1917 to 2003. He offers hypotheses about parts of his personal life that may have predisposed him to develop a special interest in assessing personality, discusses formative influences on his particular approach to the topic, and describes the settings in which and some of the colleagues with whom he participated in some principal pieces of research on this aspect of psychology.     

Perceptual reports vs recognition responses: A reply to Parks

Parks (1968) objects to the interpretation offered by Haber and Nathanson (1968), especially with respect to the following condition: S responds to a figure seen oscillating behind a narrow slit that it is foreshortened and also reports that he has a percept only of what is visible in the slit at any instance. Parks argues from these two responses that S must actually have a percept of most or all of the figure, a conclusion denied by the authors. This reply goes to some length to reiterate a distinction between knowledge of a stimulus gained from a percept and that gained from recognizing or constructing what the figure must be, based upon memory of previous percepts and past experience. Parks fails to make this distinction in his reply, and thus equates what S says he knows with what S actually sees. Therefore, this experiment still provides little support for any postretinal storage of the type Parks proposes.     

Fairness heuristic theory is an empirical framework: a reply to Arnadóttir

In this article on fairness heuristic theory, we point out some important flaws in Arnadóttir's (2002) claim that fairness heuristic theory is "not empirical," by which Arnadóttir meant that theory's predictions are knowable a priori, and are not contingent upon circumstances. To this end, we demonstrate that empirically testing effects predicted by fairness heuristic theory was and is important because this showed that the theory's propositions are not necessarily knowable a priori and are contingent upon circumstances. This implies that, according to Arnadóttir's definition, fairness heuristic theory clearly is an empirical framework. It would have been helpful if Arnadóttir had studied the fairness literature more thoroughly (as this would have easily revealed fairness heuristic theory to be not knowable a priori and to be contingent upon circumstances) and also if she had pointed out which of our studies fail to follow her line of reasoning. Our reply was written not as an attempt to defend fairness heuristic theory as we applaud, indeed are honored by, attempts to scrutinize our work in progress. Our only aim here was to point at some important flaws in the Arnadóttir article, because we think these will hamper rather than advance the science of psychology of justice.     

In search of a new paradigm for cultural psychology

It is my privilege to be invited to write a response to K.S. Yang's reply to my critique of the methodology he used in his empirical research on individual modernity in Taiwan (Hwang, 2003). Yang's reply consists of three parts: The first part provides a quick overview of the methodology used in his individual traditionality and modernity (T/M) research in Taiwan. The second part presents his reply to my methodological criticisms. The third part is a plea for more and better individual T/M research in Asia. My response consists of three corresponding sections, although I will concentrate on the second part of Yang's text.     

Reply to Skow

We have argued against a standard way of defining Humean supervenience about laws, and in favor of an alternative definition. Skow says that our argument against the standard definition makes a big mistake. He is right about this. But that mistake is correctable. Skow also argues that our alternative definition is seriously flawed. We think he is wrong about this.     

In defense of hard-line replies to the multiple-case manipulation argument

I defend a hard-line reply to Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Pereboom accuses compatibilists who take a hard-line reply to his manipulation argument of adopting inappropriate initial attitudes towards the cases central to his argument. If Pereboom is correct he has shown that a hard-line response is inadequate. Fortunately for the compatibilist, Pereboom’s list of appropriate initial attitudes is incomplete and at least one of the initial attitudes he leaves out provides room for a revised hard-line reply to be successfully mounted against the multiple-case argument.     

Does contextual strength modulate the subordinate bias effect? A reply to Kellas and Vu

In their reply to Binder and Rayner (1998), Kellas and Vu (1999) raised questions about the criteria we used to exclude items from the Kellas, Martin, Yehling, Herman, and Vu (1995) stimulus set. In this reply, we further document these criteria and also address the issue of local versus published norms. We continue to believe that the stimulus set used by Kellas et al. (1995) was problematic. We also address the issue of strength of context, a concept used in earlier research that dealt with the subordinate bias effect. We argue that the contexts used by Kellas et al. (1995) were no stronger than the contexts previously used that established this effect. Therefore, we continue to think that our finding that context does not eliminate the subordinate bias effect is valid.     

Think crisis–think female: Further evidence

Many studies have demonstrated that interpersonally oriented leadership abilities such as being empathetic, supporting work relationships, or explicitly stating an interest in helping others are particularly relevant in crisis contexts. Since these leadership abilities coincide with stereotypically feminine roles and traits, it has been proposed that a “think crisis–think female” association may exist (Ryan, Haslam, Hersby, & Bongiorno, 2011). In a field study (N = 301 workers and managers) we examined this association and identified two relevant factors that may hinder the acceptance of female leaders and stereotypically feminine characteristics in crisis management: instrumental (male) leadership role models and sexist attitudes. In doing so, we provide new insights into the “think crisis–think female” relationship and illustrate the potential implications of this occurrence for gender studies and for research into work and organizational psychology.     

Reply to Reviews of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg

I reply here to reviews by three inspiring thinkers, Ethel Person, Susan Sands, and Allan Schore who, though uniquely different from one another in their conceptual frames of reference, share a sensibility as clinicians and creative scholars that has led them to engage and appreciate my work in depth while enriching it with their individual perspectives. Ethel Person's review is meaningful to me for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we think very much alike about “how we are” with patients despite the diversity in our families of origin. Her thinking, which extends the boundaries established by any one school of thought, transcends doctrine, especially that of “technique.” I am equally grateful to Susan Sands, whose review stimulated a dialogue between us about the similarities and differences in our views of the analyst's personal role in enactments with severe trauma survivors and whether there is reason to distinguish between life-threatening and developmental trauma. My reply to Allan Schore's review satisfies a long-standing wish to engage with him in dialogue about what he refers to in his review as “a remarkable overlap between Bromberg's work in clinical psychoanalysis and my work in developmental neuropsychoanalysis, a deep resonance between his treatment model and my regulation theory” (this issue, p. 755). In my reply I comment from my own vantage point on how our shared commitment to an interpersonal and intersubjective perspective—my interpersonal/relational treatment model and his “Interpersonal Neurobiology” led us to arrive at overlapping views on developmental trauma, attachment, the dyadic regulation of states of consciousness, and dissociation.     

A future for community psychology practice

Community psychology has never really looked at its practice as a profession, though many of us as students came to the field with high expectations that we could learn how to make a difference in communities. This article discussed what I think about community psychology practice and how I have tried to approach it. I thank and recognize several people: Paul Florin for his colleagueship, friendship and his contributions to what I have done in the field; Tom Wolff for never letting me give up on the field; Bob Newbrough for his consistent support, encouragement and as my teacher; and Julian Rappaport for his comments on an earlier draft. I thank my colleagues at Rutgers for helping make the dream come true. This article is dedicated to students, past, present, and future.     

THE ANALYST AT WORK: TWO SESSIONS WITH ALBA

In this paper, the author presents clinical material that relates to two sessions with a patient called Alba. This analytic work, being of a somewhat unusual character, lends itself to discussion, the author feels, since the technical choices made are undoubtedly very personal and he believes many colleagues might have done things differently. The author endeavours to enrich the account of the sessions with his concomitant thoughts, so as to supply colleagues with the elements, atmosphere and developments of his internal workshop.     

The role of the ‘other’ in national identity: exploring the context‐dependence of the national ingroup stereotype

Analysts from a range of disciplines (especially sociology and social anthropology) highlight the role of the ‘other’ in the construction and definition of national identity. Recently some social psychologists have come to emphasize the inherently relational nature of identity. Drawing upon these recent investigations, the present paper reports a field study investigating the context‐dependent nature of group identity. Using a modified version of the Katz–Braly task, British subjects (n=240) stereotyped two national groups: Americans and British. They did so in two conditions. In the ‘one‐group’ conditions, subjects rated either of the two groups. In the ‘two‐group’ conditions, they rated one whilst also considering the other. Following Oakes, Haslam and Turner (1994) we predicted that whereas subjects' stereotypes of the national outgroup (the Americans) would be unaffected by this manipulation, their stereotype of the national ingroup (the British) would be affected. This prediction was confirmed. We also predicted that the national ingroup stereotype obtained in the ‘two‐group’ condition would be one which was defined in contrast to the American ‘other’ which constituted the comparative context. Using a measure which takes into account the applicability of ingroup‐defining terms to both the ingroup and the outgroup (the diagnosticity measure of stereotyping proposed by McCauley and Stitt, 1978) we show that the ingroup identity definition produced in this condition did indeed differentiate the British from the Americans. The significance of these data for those concerned with the application of social psychological theory to real‐life social problems is discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Some thoughts on essence placeholders, interactionism, and heritability: reply to Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011)

In the target article (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011), we provided a social-cognitive framework which identified genetic essentialist biases and their implications. In their commentaries, Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011) indicated their general agreement with this framework but highlighted some important points for consideration. Haslam suggested that neuroessentialism is a comparable kind of essentialist bias and identified similarities with the genetic essentialism framework. In response, we acknowledge similarities but also identify qualitative and quantitative differences between genetic essentialism and other kinds of essentialist biases. Turkheimer challenged us to extend our discussion to address the question of how should people respond to genetic etiological information, critiqued the use of heritability coefficients, and identified a new construct (1 - rMZ), which may be termed a free-will coefficient. In response, we emphasize the need to transform interactionist explanations from being empty platitudes to becoming the default conceptual framework; we wholeheartedly accept his critical view of heritability coefficient estimates (but acknowledge a more limited utility for them); and we are intrigued by his conceptual interest in identifying free-will coefficients yet warn against falling into pitfalls similar to those that were stumbled into in the past.     

Was Babbage's Analytical Engine intended to be a mechanical model of the mind?

In the 1830s, Charles Babbage worked on a mechanical computer he dubbed the Analytical Engine. Although some people around Babbage described his invention as though it had authentic mental powers, Babbage refrained from making such claims. He does not, however, seem to have discouraged those he worked with from mooting the idea publicly. This article investigates whether (1) the Analytical Engine was the focus of a covert research program into the mechanism of mentality; (2) Babbage opposed the idea that the Analytical Engine had mental powers but allowed his colleagues to speculate as they saw fit; or (3) Babbage believed such claims to be fanciful, but cleverly used the publicity they engendered to draw public and political attention to his project.     

美德是幸福的前提吗？

幸福研究方兴未艾,但当今研究着重于幸福的心理描述性层面,而通常忽视了幸福概念中的规范性或者评价性层面。在孔子和亚里士多德等哲学家眼中,美德是幸福的前提。心理学实证研究发现,实践美德行为,如志愿、捐助等活动能够使人获得幸福。同时,研究也发现,人们倾向于认为具有美德的人会更加幸福。虽然实证研究能够说明美德与幸福具有关系,但是在美德与幸福的因果联系确定上,以及美德对于幸福来说是否是工具性的问题上,还需要更多的研究。     

Computational theories of vision

This exciting and original book describes the work of David Marr and his colleagues at MIT on the computational theory of vision, particularly the early stages of shape analysis. Although much of the theorising is frankly speculative and not certain to survive without major modification, it sets new standards of rigour in its formal approach and is certain to have a stimulating effect upon the field. Sadly, Marr's death from leukaemia at the age of 35 means that he will not himself be able to take part in the further development of his ideas, but the book itself will exert an important influence for some time to come. The first point to make, for those who may already have attempted Marr's lengthy and difficult research papers, is that the book is clearly and entertainingly written: It can be tackled by the non-specialist who wishes to see why Marr's work has caused such interest in the vision community. Despite the very difficult circumstances in which the book must have been written, it is carefully put together and gives a fascinating insight into the way in which the author's ideas developed.