Normativity and context in young children's pretend play

In two studies 3-year-olds’ understanding of the context-specificity of normative rules was investigated through games of pretend play. In the first study, children protested against a character who joined a pretend game but treated the target object according to its real function. However, they did not protest when she performed the same action without having first joined the game. In the second study, children protested when the character mixed up an object's pretend identities between two different pretend games. However, they did not protest when she performed the same pretend action in its correct game context. Thus, the studies show that young children see the pretence–reality distinction, and the distinction between different pretence identities, as normative. More generally, the results of these studies demonstrate young children's ability to enforce normative rules in their pretence and to do so context-specifically.     

The role of experience and discourse in children's developing understanding of pretend play actions

The present work investigated the development of an explicit understanding of pretend play actions. Study 1 revealed a long décalage between earlier implicit understanding of pretence as an intentional activity and a later more explicit understanding. Study 2 was a training study. It tested for two factors – systematic pretence experience and explicit pretence discourse – that may be important in development from early implicit to later explicit pretence understanding. Two training groups of 3.5‐year‐old children received the same pretence experiences involving systematic contrasts between pretending, really performing and trying to perform actions. In the ‘explicit’ group, these experiences were talked about with explicit ‘pretend to’ and ‘pretend that’ language. In the ‘implicit’ group no such discourse was used, but only implicit discourse in talking about pretence versus real actions. The two training groups were compared with a control group that received functional play experience. After training, only the explicit group showed improvement in their explicit pretence understanding. In none of the groups was there any transfer to tasks tapping mental state understanding, false belief (FB) and appearance‐reality, (A‐R). The findings are discussed in the context of current theories about the developmental relations between pretence, discourse, and mental state understanding.     

Young children's understanding of desire formation

Two studies examined preschoolers' appreciation of how mental states arise. In Study 1, children aged 3 to 5 (24 at each age) better understood perception-generated beliefs (e.g., that looking in a certain location generates a belief about the location's content) and attitude-generated desires (e.g., that positive experiences with an activity generate a desire to partake of the activity again) than physiology-generated desires (e.g., that not eating for a long time generates a desire for food). In Study 2, 4- and 5-year-olds (48 at each age) better understood the effects of quantity of experience (e.g., eating a lot vs. a little) than of time of experience (eating just now vs. a long time ago) on physiological states and desires. The findings suggest that whether children reason in more advanced fashion about desires or beliefs depends on which aspects of these mental states are considered.     

Young children's understanding of diversity in pretense

Four studies probed preschoolers' understanding of diversity in the domain of pretense. In Study 1, 3- and 4-year-olds were shown video skits in which two characters pretended different things with the same object. To assess preschoolers understanding that the mind is involved in pretense, thought bubbles were superimposed over the actors' heads. Results of this study indicated that both 3- and 4-year-olds appreciate the potential for diversity in pretense, and understand pretense to be a mental activity. Results of Study 2 replicate Study 1, and argue against alternative explanations for participants' good performance in that study. Studies 3 and 4 compared the unique contributions made by dialogs and thought bubbles and revealed that 3-year-olds relied more on actors' mental contents than on their actions or dialogs when reasoning about pretense. Results of the studies are discussed in terms of children's developing understanding of the subjective and mental aspects of pretense, and the implications of this understanding for the development of their understanding of mind more generally.     

Young children's understanding of cultural common ground

Human social interaction depends on individuals identifying the common ground they have with others, based both on personally shared experiences and on cultural common ground that all members of the group share. We introduced 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children to a culturally well‐known object and a novel object. An experimenter then entered and asked, ‘What is that?’, either as a request for information or in a recognitory way. When she was requesting information, both 3‐ and 5‐year‐olds assumed she was asking about the novel object. When she seemed to recognize an object, 5‐year‐olds assumed she was referring to the culturally well‐known object. Thus, by 3 years of age, children are beginning to understand that they share cultural common ground with other members of their group.     

Young children's understanding of violations of property rights

The present work investigated young children’s normative understanding of property rights using a novel methodology. Two- and 3-year-old children participated in situations in which an actor (1) took possession of an object for himself, and (2) attempted to throw it away. What varied was who owned the object: the actor himself, the child subject, or a third party. We found that while both 2- and 3-year-old children protested frequently when their own object was involved, only 3-year-old children protested more when a third party’s object was involved than when the actor was acting on his own object. This suggests that at the latest around 3 years of age young children begin to understand the normative dimensions of property rights.     

Young children's understanding of belief constraints on intention

One important characteristic of rational action is that our intentions should be consistent with our beliefs. That is, an intention to perform an action should normally be accompanied by a belief that the action will in fact be performed, and be supported by other relevant beliefs. Thus, if the intention is unfulfilled it will have been accompanied by false beliefs. Two studies examined whether 3-year-olds understand these belief constraints on intention. Children were shown films in which actors displayed great surprise and sadness at their failure to bring about the outcomes they intended and expected. They were then questioned about the actors' unfulfilled intentions and false beliefs. In both studies their understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent, and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs. Nevertheless, they also revealed considerable understanding of the beliefs underpinning intentions and, in Study 2, their performance in terms of such beliefs was significantly better than that on standard false-belief tasks. Three-year-olds thus appear to have a threshold understanding of the role of belief in intentional action.     

Young children's practical deceptions and their understanding of false belief

This paper deals with young children's understanding of false belief and their behaviour in situations of deception. It is argued that it is unsurprising that children under the age of 4 fail traditional false belief tests; and yet that children aged 2–3 do implement deceptive behaviours. To achieve compatibility, a particular category of deceptive acts (deceptive acts where awareness of the dupe's erroneous belief plays no role) is detailed. Deceptive behaviours are treated as belonging to the category of pretend behaviours. Some developmental considerations, concerning the links between deception and false belief are put forward.     

Young children's understanding of multiple object identity: appearance, pretense and function

Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).     

Young children's difficulty with inhibitory control in a social context1

Abstract: The authors’ prior research has documented that young children's behaviors in the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task can be influenced by their observation of another person performing the task and has suggested that young children committed perseverative errors in a social context. The present study explored whether children who committed perseverative errors in the social context also committed perseverative errors in the standard DCCS task. Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were given the standard DCCS and the observation version of the DCCS, and the relationship between them was examined. The results showed that the correlation between these two tasks was significant. Furthermore, 4‐year‐old children displayed more difficulty in the observation version than in the standard DCCS, whereas 3‐year‐olds did not. The results are discussed in terms of the development of inhibitory control and social cognition.     

The effect of comparative context upon stereotype content: children's judgments of ingroup behavior

This study addresses self-categorization theory's contention that stereotype content varies as a function of the comparative context within which a given group is considered. A sample of 5-, 7- and 10-year-old children (n = 192) made judgments about gender ingroup behavior in one of two comparative contexts: either adults of the same sex as self or children of the opposite sex. Specifically, judgments were either of the perceived stereotypicality or central tendency of 12 types of behavior. Both types of judgment were found to differ as a function of comparative context in ways predicted by self-categorization theory. However, contrary to prediction, there was no effect of age on the extent of stereotype variability.     

The kindergarten path effect revisited: children's use of context in processing structural ambiguities

Research with adults has shown that ambiguous spoken sentences are resolved efficiently, exploiting multiple cues--including referential context--to select the intended meaning. Paradoxically, children appear to be insensitive to referential cues when resolving ambiguous sentences, relying instead on statistical properties intrinsic to the language such as verb biases. The possibility that children's insensitivity to referential context may be an artifact of the experimental design used in previous work was explored with 60 4- to 11-year-olds. An act-out task was designed to discourage children from making incorrect pragmatic inferences and to prevent premature and ballistic responses by enforcing delayed actions. Performance on this task was compared directly with the standard act-out task used in previous studies. The results suggest that young children (5 years) do not use contextual information, even under conditions designed to maximize their use of such cues, but that adult-like processing is evident by approximately 8 years of age. These results support and extend previous findings by Trueswell and colleagues (Cognition (1999), Vol. 73, pp. 89-134) and are consistent with a constraint-based learning account of children's linguistic development.     

Adult modelling facilitates young children's generation of novel pretend acts

The present work investigated the effect of modelling on children's pretend play behaviour. Thirty‐seven children aged between 27 and 41 months were given 4 min of free play with a dollhouse and associated toy props (pre‐modelling phase). Using dolls, an experimenter then acted out a series of vignettes involving object substitutions, imaginary play and attribution of properties. Children were subsequently provided with an additional 4 min free play (post‐modelling phase). Consistent with past research, more pretence was exhibited after modelling than before. Furthermore, in the post‐modelling phase, children were as likely to generate their own novel pretence as they were to copy the actions demonstrated by the experimenter. They also increased the number of novel symbolic acts involving imaginary play from the pre‐ to the post‐modelling phase. This study highlights how young children will not only imitate a model's demonstration of pretend acts but also use this demonstration to catalyze the creation of their own pretence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The development of pretend language: Toward an understanding of the child's theory of mind

Is has been suggested that there exists a linkage between the mental representation of pretense, the acquisition of the cognitive internal state lexicon, and the development of theory of mind. Using an empirically derived taxonomy of pretend language, predictions derivable from such a relationship were tested. In three related studies, the pretend lexicons of 4 1/2- to 5-year-old children and the adults who interacted with them in home and school situations were examined for evidence of sophisticated pretend language use, for parallels in child and adult pretend language, and for connections between pretend and other mental state words. Results did not support the hypothesis that pretense and the language associated with it were linked to mental state language acquisition. However, the findings that are reported provide converging evidence for the claim that pretense in young children is a form of acting-as-if behaivor rather than a form of mental represetnational activity.     

Do monsters dream? Young children's understanding of the fantasy/reality distinction

Young children are often thought to confuse fantasy and reality. This study took a second look at preschoolers' fantasy/reality differentiation. We employed a new measure of fantasy/reality differentiation—a property attribution task—in which children were questioned regarding the properties of both real and fantastical entities. We also modified the standard forced‐choice categorization task (into real/fantastical) to include a ‘not sure’ option, thus allowing children to express uncertainty. Finally, we assessed the relation between individual levels of fantasy orientation and fantasy/reality differentiation. Results suggest that children have a more developed appreciation of the boundary between fantasy and reality than is often supposed.     

Young children's learning of size comparison strategies: effect of origami exercises

The authors examined the process of change in size comparison strategies among preschool-age children. Twelve 5- and 6-year-old children were provided with origami exercises and size comparison tasks for 5 days consecutively, and another twelve 5- and 6-year-old children received size comparison tasks only. Children's strategies for the size comparison tasks were analyzed in terms of placement and adjustment. In contrast with the children in the control condition, the children who were provided with exercises in origami increased their use of superimposition and adjustment strategies by 2 dimensions across the 5 days. The authors argue that origami exercises helped the children connect their implicit understanding of relative size with the use of more effective strategies for size comparison.     

The development of sex differences in young children's activities at home: The effect of the social context

Randomly scheduled spot observations of 83 zero to six-year-old American middle-class children were used to investigate factors affecting the development of sex differences in young children's activities in and near their home. Sex and age differences in children's typical play and nonplay activities and in the people with whom they did activities were examined. The results showed that there were fewer sex differences in children's activities, activity partners, and general social settings than expected. Girls spent more time engaged in housework and school-related activities than boys, while boys spent more time in social gross motor play with other children and in self-care activities than girls. Children spent a surprisingly large amount of their time with members of their immediate family — particularly their mother and one other sibling. Boys and girls did not differ, however, in the time they were in settings or doing activities with their father, with their mother, or with same-or mixed-sex child groups.This research was supported by an award to the author from the Wisconsin Alumnae Research Foundation at the University of Wisconsin — Madison. The author would also like to acknowledge the research and editorial assistance of Daniel J. Walsh. In addition, Aletha Huston, Beatrice B. Whiting, and Gary G. Price provided valuable advice on this and earlier versions of this paper.     

Young children's understanding of the context‐relativity of normative rules in conventional games

We investigated young children's awareness of the context‐relative rule structure of simple games. Two contexts were established in the form of spatial locations. Familiar objects were used in their conventional way at location 1, but acquired specific functions in a rule game at location 2. A third party then performed the conventional act at either of the two locations, constituting a mistake at location 2 (experimental condition), but appropriate at location 1 (control condition). Three‐year‐olds (but not 2‐year‐olds) systematically distinguished the two conditions, spontaneously intervening with normative protest against the third party act in the experimental, but not in the control condition. Young children thus understand context‐specific rules even when the context marking is non‐linguistic. These results are discussed in the broader context of the development of social cognition and cultural learning.