General practitioners' perceptions of psychologists: A response to the Medicare changes in Australia

General practitioners (GPs) have historically been at the centre of primary health‐care delivery in Australia, including delivery of mental health‐care services. Recent changes, however, by the Australian Federal government have led to the creation of a number of mental health‐care items provided by psychologists that are now available on the Medicare Benefits Schedule. The aim of the present study was to examine GPs' perceptions of psychologists and the ways in which GPs have responded to these policy changes in making referrals for mental health patients. Nine GPs were interviewed regarding the provision of mental health‐care services. Analysis of the interviews indicated a number of themes including the benefits of the new Medicare policy in increasing accessibility of psychologists, GPs' frustrations with the bureaucracy surrounding the use of this policy, GPs' knowledge about the specific skills and training of psychologists, and the importance of GPs' matching patients and clinicians. Recommendations are made to facilitate the professional and clinical relationship between GPs and psychologists.     

Factors influencing prescribing decisions in the treatment of depression: a social judgement theory approach

The under‐diagnosis and inappropriate treatment of depression in primary care has become a serious public health problem despite the development of many clinical guidelines to guide recognition and treatment of the disorder. This study aims to investigate decision‐making processes and to identify factors which influence general practitioners' (GPs) prescribing decisions and how these factors differ from those the guidelines recommend. Brunswik's lens model, from Social Judgement Theory (SJT), was employed to explore individual treatment decision policies of 40 GPs in the Grampian region of Scotland for 20 case vignettes. These individual policies were then aggregated and compared with those derived from guideline recommendations; important differences emerged between the two in the utilization of cues and there was considerable variation between GPs' policies. Guidelines placed more importance on the duration of symptoms whereas GPs gave weight also to particular symptoms, such as ‘thoughts of suicide’ and ‘sleep disturbance’ and patient treatment preference. GPs prescribed antidepressants at a greater rate than was recommended by the guidelines. The findings have important implications for implementation strategies, which maybe developed to accompany clinical guidelines. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of decision heuristics and overconfidence on multiattribute choice: A process-tracing study

In the present study it was shown that decision heuristics and confidence judgements play important roles in the building of preferences. Based on a dual-process account of thinking, the study compared people who did well versus poorly on a series of decision heuristics and overconfidence judgement tasks. The two groups were found to differ with regard to their information search behaviour in introduced multiattribute choice tasks. High performers on the judgemental tasks were less influenced in their decision processes by numerical information format (probabilities vs. frequencies) compared to low performers. They also looked at more attributes and spent more time on the multiattribute choice tasks. The results reveal that performance on decision heuristics and overconfidence tasks has a bearing both on heuristic and analytic processes in multiattribute decision making.     

The similarity heuristic

Decision makers often make snap judgments using fast‐and‐frugal decision rules called cognitive heuristics. Research into cognitive heuristics has been divided into two camps. One camp has emphasized the limitations and biases produced by the heuristics; another has focused on the accuracy of heuristics and their ecological validity. In this paper we investigate a heuristic proposed by the first camp, using the methods of the second. We investigate a subset of the representativeness heuristic we call the “similarity” heuristic, whereby decision makers who use it judge the likelihood that an instance is a member of one category rather than another by the degree to which it is similar to others in that category. We provide a mathematical model of the heuristic and test it experimentally in a trinomial environment. In this environment, the similarity heuristic turns out to be a reliable and accurate choice rule and both choice and response time data suggest it is also how choices are made. We conclude with a theoretical discussion of how our work fits in the broader “fast‐and‐frugal” heuristics program, and of the boundary conditions for the similarity heuristic. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Empirical tests of a fast-and-frugal heuristic: Not everyone “takes-the-best”

The fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to decision making under uncertainty advocated by Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) has achieved great popularity despite a relative lack of empirical validation. We report two experiments that examine the use of one particular heuristic—“take-the-best” (TTB). In both experiments the majority of participants adopted frugal strategies, but only one-third (33%) behaved in a manner completely consistent with TTB’s search, stopping and decision rules. Furthermore, a significant proportion of participants in both experiments adopted a non-frugal strategy in which they accumulated more information than was predicted by TTB’s stopping rule. The results provide an insight into the conditions under which different heuristics are used, and question the predictive power of the fast-and-frugal approach.     

Successful or unsuccessful search for risk defusing operators: Effects on decision behaviour

In experiments with quasi-realistic risky scenarios instead of gambles, decision makers are less interested in probability information. Often, they actively search for a risk defusing operator (RDO; an action to be performed in addition to a specific alternative and expected to decrease the risk involved). Examples in daily life are insurance and vaccination. In our experiment, the central independent variable was the successful or unsuccessful RDO search. The central dependent variables were choices and information search behaviour. In order to get information about the applied heuristics, a concurrent Thinking Aloud procedure was employed in addition to the method of Active Information Search. Eighty subjects made a choice in two risky scenarios. The findings confirm that the successful search for an RDO for one of the alternatives is an excellent predictor of choice. If the subject does not search for an RDO or the search is unsuccessful, MAXIMIN was the most frequent heuristic.     

动态系统累积变量判断中的关联启发式

关联启发式是指在累积变量判断中, 将存量与流量建立正相关关系, 认为存量变化特征与流量变化特征具有相似性而导致判断偏差的思维模式。在多特征交互及简单动态系统任务判断中, 关联启发式偏差以不同形式的S-F错误表现出来。作为一种内生性的、顽固的思维模式, 对于关联启发式的心理机制提出了客体偏差、特征替代、不充分调整等多种观点解释。影响关联启发式的个体因素和情境因素的研究结果不尽一致。由于关联启发式偏差直接影响人对复杂系统的可持续性决策和行动, 减少偏差策略的研究也已实现起步。本文系统总结和分析了关联启发式研究的发展脉络, 针对澄清关联启发式的发生机制、系统考察关联启发式的影响因素及其相互作用、丰富和深化关联启发式的研究范式、开发减少关联启发式的有效途径等方面, 提出了深化研究的方向和思路。     

Précis of Simple heuristics that make us smart

How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we explore fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules in the mind's adaptive toolbox for making decisions with realistic mental resources. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments. In this précis, we show how simple building blocks that control information search, stop search, and make decisions can be put together to form classes of heuristics, including: ignorance-based and one-reason decision making for choice, elimination models for categorization, and satisficing heuristics for sequential search. These simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data--that is, simplicity leads to robustness. We present evidence regarding when people use simple heuristics and describe the challenges to be addressed by this research program.     

Stability/Instability of Cognitive Strategies Across Tasks Determine Whether Stress Will Affect Judgmental Processes'

Previous research indicates that individuals employ various cognitive heuristics and decision modes in making decisions and judgmental tasks that do not follow an expected value model. It further indicates that several cognitive faculties are affected by stress. The purpose of this study was twofold: first, to examine whether individual differences exist in the use of cognitive heuristics and risk-assessment decision modes; second, to examine whether stress would affect the use of these cognitive strategies. Three versions of a questionnaire measuring the representativeness and availability heuristics, and risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes were administered to three different groups of subjects. Consistent individual differences were only observed in the subscales measuring risk-seeking and risk-aversion modes, but not in the use of the heuristics. In a different group of subjects, exposure to noise and task overload stress increased the use of the representativeness heuristic, but did not alter the use of risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes. These results indicate that the existence of individual differences in cognitive strategies may determine, in part, whether stress will modify judgmental processes.     

Training fast and frugal heuristics in military decision making

Fast and frugal heuristics have been used to model decision making in applied domains very effectively, suggesting that they could be used to improve applied decision making. We developed a fast and frugal heuristic for infantry decisions using experts from the British Army. This was able to predict around 80% of their decisions using three cues. Next, we examined the benefits of learning to use the fast and frugal heuristic by training junior officers in the British Army to apply the heuristic and assessing their accuracy and mental workload when making decisions. Their performance was compared to a control condition of junior officers who applied standard military decision methods. Participants using the fast and frugal heuristic made decisions as accurately as participants in the control condition, but with reduced mental demand. This demonstrates that fast and frugal heuristics can be learnt and are as effective as analytic decision methods.     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Geographic profiling: the fast,frugal, and accurate way

The current article addresses the ongoing debate about whether individuals can perform as well as actuarial techniques when confronted with real world, consequential decisions. A single experiment tested the ability of participants (N = 215) and an actuarial technique to accurately predict the residential locations of serial offenders based on information about where their crimes were committed. Results indicated that participants introduced to a ‘Circle’ or ‘Decay’ heuristic showed a significant improvement in the accuracy of predictions, and that their post‐training performance did not differ significantly from the predictions of one leading actuarial technique. Further analysis of individual performances indicated that approximately 50% of participants used appropriate heuristics that typically led to accurate predictions even before they received training, while nearly 75% improved their predictive accuracy once introduced to either of the two heuristics. Several possible explanations for participants' accurate performances are discussed and the practical implications for police investigations are highlighted. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

群体讨论过程中信息策略的变化

启发式是人类决策的重要特征,然而对于群体分布式加工条件下的启发式研究却是一个困难的任务。本研究利用多特征多选择决策任务与过程跟踪技术,对群体讨论条件下的启发式决策特点进行研究。结果发现,在群体讨论情景下,决策者的信息呈现策略要更加完全,但决策者的信息搜索负荷并没有因此而增加,群体的各成员之间形成了信息策略上的分布式加工,所以在群体工作情景中的表现出相互依赖性与内隐加工机制。     

Outwitting the rational mind: How effortful thinking influences price cognition

Prior research presents mixed findings on how people's degrees of effortful thinking influence their reliance on heuristics and biases. Although the tenets of dual process theory would argue that effortful thinking should attenuate people's reliance on heuristics, a number of contemporary findings suggest otherwise: Effortful thinking may, in fact, enhance biased processing of information in certain instances. This research shows how, in the context of pricing, people's degrees of effortful thinking can amplify their inclination towards biased processing of price information. In five studies (n = 1,339), we find that effortful thinking induces a greater preference for nine‐ending (vs. zero‐ending) prices, and the effect is mainly driven by people's greater propensity for argument‐based decision making. Such predilection to nine‐endings attenuates with lower cognitive effort in processing price information. Moreover, when locus of deliberation shifts from price to quality, consumers' preference for nine‐ending priced options is subdued.     

The influence of information redundancy on probabilistic inferences

Information redundancy affects the accuracy of inference strategies. A simulation study illustrates that under high-information redundancy simple heuristics that rely on only the most important information are as accurate as strategies that integrate all available information, whereas under low redundancy integrating information becomes advantageous. Assuming that people exercise adaptive strategy selection, it is predicted that their inferences will more often be captured by simple heuristics that focus on part of the available information insituations ofhigh-information redundancy, especially when information search is costly. This prediction is confirmed in two experiments. The participants' task was to repeatedly infer which of two alternatives, described by several cues, had a higher criterion value. In the first experiment, simple heuristics predicted the inference process better under high-information redundancy than under low-information redundancy. In the second experiment, this result could be generalized to an inference situation in which participants had no prior opportunity to learn about the strategies' accuracies through outcome feedback. The results demonstrate that people are able to respond adaptively to different decision environments under various learning opportunities.     

Probabilistic Inferences Under Emotional Stress: How Arousal Affects Decision Processes

Many models of decision making neglect emotional states that could affect individuals' cognitive processes. The present work explores the effect of emotional stress on people's cognitive processes when making probabilistic inferences. Two contrasting hypotheses are tested against one another: the uncertainty‐reduction and attention‐narrowing hypotheses of how emotional stress affects decision making. In the experimental study, emotional stress was induced through the use of highly aversive pictures immediately before each decision. Emotional state was assessed by both subjective (state anxiety, arousal, and pleasantness ratings) and objective (skin conductance) measures. The results show that emotional stress impacts decision making; in particular, emotionally aroused participants seem to have focused on the most important information and selected simpler decision strategies relative to participants in a control condition. The results are in line with the attention‐narrowing hypothesis and suggest that emotional stress can impact decision making through limited predecisional information search and the selection of simpler decision strategies. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.