Towards a ‘Non‐Ideal’ Non‐Ideal Theory

This article explores the role that considerations about the feasibility of a political proposal should play at the levels of both ideal and non‐ideal theory. Drawing on recent work in the literature on political feasibility, I begin by describing a ‘constraint‐based’ view of ideal and non‐ideal theory, with feasibility considerations serving different functions depending on whether they are operating at the ideal or non‐ideal level. Taking feasibility seriously at either level presents us with at least two important challenges. Firstly, we need principles which enable us to weigh the value of a proposal's feasibility against its other normatively significant properties, and against those of alternative proposals. Secondly, we need the capacity to gauge the nature of the epistemic constraints which apply to our feasibility assessments themselves. In response to these problems, I propose a ‘narrowing‐down’ approach, focused on developing our capacities to make accurate and reliable judgements about the feasibility of political proposals.     

Non‐Analytic Logic

A logic focusing on the analytic a priori and explicitly rejecting the synthetic a priori ¹ developed in the early decades of the 20th century, largely through the efforts of the Logical Empiricists. This group was very influenced by Wittgenstein's early work Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus. But Wittgenstein himself, later on, departed from the Tractatus in significant ways that the Logical Empiricists did not follow. Wittgenstein came later to accept the synthetic a priori, and out of this insight comes a non‐analytic logic that differs from standard 20th century logic in many distinct ways. This paper details these differences.     

Non‐adjacent Dependencies Processing in Human and Non‐human Primates

Human and non‐human primates share the ability to extract adjacent dependencies and, under certain conditions, non‐adjacent dependencies (i.e., predictive relationships between elements that are separated by one or several intervening elements in a sequence). In this study, we explore the online extraction dynamics of non‐adjacent dependencies in humans and baboons using a serial reaction time task. Participants had to produce three‐target sequences containing deterministic relationships between the first and last target locations. In Experiment 1, participants from the two species could extract these non‐adjacent dependencies, but humans required less exposure than baboons. In Experiment 2, the data show for the first time in a non‐human primate species the successful generalization of sequential non‐adjacent dependencies over novel intervening items. These findings provide new evidence to further constrain current theories about the nature and the evolutionary origins of the learning mechanisms allowing the extraction of non‐adjacent dependencies.     

Non‐Classical Knowledge

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely‐held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single‐premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker‐than‐classical K₃ logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to—whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non‐classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities.     

试析爱德华一世驱逐犹太人的原因

1290年英王爱德华一世对犹太人的驱逐是欧洲历史上发生的首次大规模驱犹事件,凭借犹太人对王权的依附,王室对犹太人严重剥削,导致犹太人对王室财政支持能力下降;犹太人从事放贷业引起中小地主的土地流转,集中到教会和大贵族手中,对王权造成了一定程度的威胁;爱德华一世企图鼓励犹太人改宗,但是犹太人对本民族宗教的坚定信仰使国王的政宗政策以失败而告终;英国国内频繁出现的血祭诽谤案引起普通民众反犹情绪高涨,这一切最终导致爱德华一世驱犹事件的出现,并为欧洲大规模驱犹树立了一个样板。     

Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? Making Choices for Non‐Human Animals

Animals are usually considered to lack the status of autonomous agents. Nevertheless, they do appear to make ostensible choices. This article considers whether, and how, I should respect animals' choices. I propose a concept of volitionality which can be respected if, and insofar as, doing so is in the best interests of the animal. Applying that concept, I (we) will argue that an animals' choices be respected when the relevant human decision maker's capacities to decide are potentially challenged or compromised. For example, it will be best to respect the animals' choice when the human decision maker: (1) lacks accurate knowledge of the animal's subjective experiences; (2) does not know what will lead to desirable experiences or allow for the avoidance of undesirable ones; (3) is biased; (4) is less aware of the animal's specific situation; (5) cannot appreciate all elements comprehensively, including considering any (content‐neutral) value to the animal being allowed to make and implement a choice, such as where a lack of control or liberty would be unpleasant or where an animal would usefully learn from the process of choice‐making; and (6) when the animal's choice is achievable. This additionally suggests that we may often beneficially choose to set up situations that empower animals to make better choices.     

Implicit Attitudes Reflect Associative,Non‐associative,and Non‐attitudinal Processes

It is a common assumption that responses on implicit measures are proxies for automatically activated associations stored in memory. Consequently, explanations for implicit attitude malleability, variability, and prediction have assumed differences in underlying associations. However, a growing body of evidence challenges the assumption that implicit attitude change is driven only by associative processes. This paper reviews evidence from research with the Quadruple Process model on the influence of associative and non‐associative processes on implicit task performance. We also describe recent research on non‐attitudinal processes that do not pertain directly to the attitude object of interest but that, nevertheless, influence implicit task performance. Implications for the interpretation of implicit measures and implicit attitude change are discussed.     

Non‐parametric three‐way mixed ANOVA with aligned rank tests

Research problems that require a non‐parametric analysis of multifactor designs with repeated measures arise in the behavioural sciences. There is, however, a lack of available procedures in commonly used statistical packages. In the present study, a generalization of the aligned rank test for the two‐way interaction is proposed for the analysis of the typical sources of variation in a three‐way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures. It can be implemented in the usual statistical packages. Its statistical properties are tested by using simulation methods with two sample sizes (n = 30 and n = 10) and three distributions (normal, exponential and double exponential). Results indicate substantial increases in power for non‐normal distributions in comparison with the usual parametric tests. Similar levels of Type I error for both parametric and aligned rank ANOVA were obtained with non‐normal distributions and large sample sizes. Degrees‐of‐freedom adjustments for Type I error control in small samples are proposed. The procedure is applied to a case study with 30 participants per group where it detects gender differences in linguistic abilities in blind children not shown previously by other methods.     

Non‐factualism Versus Nominalism

The platonism/nominalism debate in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the question whether numbers and other mathematical objects exist. Platonists believe the answer to be in the positive, nominalists in the negative. According to non‐factualists (about mathematical objects), the question is ‘moot’, in the sense that it lacks a correct answer. Elaborating on ideas from Stephen Yablo, this article articulates a non‐factualist position in the philosophy of mathematics and shows how the case for non‐factualism entails that standard arguments for rival positions fail. In particular, showing how and why non‐factualists reject nominalism illuminates the originality and interest of their position.     

Non‐instrumental voice and extra‐role behaviour

The instrumental power associated with voicing opinions to an authority was manipulated to observe the effects upon subsequent discretionary, extra‐role behaviours. In two experiments, the provision of non‐instrumental voice increased extra‐role behaviours above a no voice condition. Experiment 2 also showed that this relationship was mediated by procedural‐justice perceptions, but not respect from, or social identification with, the group. The implications of these data for current theory, as well as the possible moderating role of social identification, are discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Democracy as Uninformed Non‐Consent

Carol Gould argues that democratic institutions can serve as mechanisms of informed consent or could at least facilitate creating regulations and other structures which facilitate informed consent in bioethics, medicine, and elsewhere. I am sceptical. I argue that democracies cannot serve as vehicles of consent, let alone informed consent. Further, the problems of democratic ignorance and irrationality created significant barriers to democratic deliberation helping to produce better regulations or conditions for informed consent. Democracy is not a good surrogate for consent.     

Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non‐Triviality

This paper outlines a non‐reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non‐trivial truth‐conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non‐trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.     

Non‐epistemic perception as technology

Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non‐epistemic perceptual relation of which feature‐seeing and object‐seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance relations are counterexamples, detailing their case for lurking inferential epistemology. §§3–4 suggest that this strategy fails in many other cases. While there is a computational tale that might be deemed ‘inferential’ in these cases, there is no corresponding tale in epistemic structure, not even if one rejects what Siegel (2017) calls the ‘Reckoning Model’ of inference. §5 offers a more fundamental dilemma. §6 concludes that there is only a technological role for non‐epistemic perception in grounding perceptual knowledge, but allows that it might play a more‐than‐technological role elsewhere.     

Personality in Non‐human Animals

Over the past decade, research on animal personality has flourished in numerous disciplines ranging from Behavioral Ecology and Developmental Psychobiology to Genetics and Comparative Psychology. The broad appeal of animal studies is that, in comparison with human studies, they afford greater experimental control, more options for measuring physiological and genetic parameters, greater opportunities for naturalistic observation, and an accelerated life course. Past research has established that personality (a) exists and can be measured in animals; (b) can be identified in a broad array of species, ranging from squid, crickets, and lizards, to trout, geese, and orangutans; and (c) shows considerable cross‐species generality for some dimensions. The wave of new studies is shedding fresh light on traditional issues in personality research (How do early experiences affect adult personality?), raising novel questions (What are the evolutionary origins of personality traits?) and addressing practical problems (Which dogs are best suited to detecting explosives?).