The role of epistemic and social characteristics in children’s selective trust: Three meta‐analyses

Over the last 15 years, researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the nature and development of children’s selective trust. Three meta‐analyses were conducted on a total of 51 unique studies (88 experiments) to provide a quantitative overview of 3‐ to 6‐year‐old children’s selective trust in an informant based on the informant’s epistemic or social characteristics, and to examine the relation between age and children’s selective trust decisions. The first and second meta‐analyses found that children displayed medium‐to‐large pooled effects in favor of trusting the informant who was knowledgeable or the informant with positive social characteristics. Moderator analyses revealed that 4‐year‐olds were more likely to endorse knowledgeable informants than 3‐year‐olds. The third meta‐analysis examined cases where two informants simultaneously differed in their epistemic and social characteristics. The results revealed that 3‐year‐old children did not selectively endorse informants who were more knowledgeable but had negative social characteristics over informants who were less knowledgeable but had positive social characteristics. However, 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds consistently prioritized epistemic cues over social characteristics when deciding who to trust. Together, these meta‐analyses suggest that epistemic and social characteristics are both valuable to children when they evaluate the reliability of informants. Moreover, with age, children place greater value on epistemic characteristics when deciding whether to endorse an informant’s testimony. Implications for the development of epistemic trust and the design of studies of children’s selective trust are discussed.     

In the absence of conflicting testimony young children trust inaccurate informants

The present research investigated the nature of the inferences and decisions young children make about informants with a prior history of inaccuracies. Across three experiments, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds (total N = 182) reacted to previously inaccurate informants who offered testimony in an object‐labeling task. Of central interest was children's willingness to accept information provided by an inaccurate informant in different contexts of being alone, paired with an accurate informant, or paired with a novel (neutral) informant. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that when a previously inaccurate informant was alone and provided testimony that was not in conflict with the testimony of another informant, children systematically accepted the testimony of that informant. Experiment 3 showed that children accepted testimony from a neutral informant over an inaccurate informant when both provided information, but accepted testimony from an inaccurate informant rather than seeking information from an available neutral informant who did not automatically offer information. These results suggest that even though young children use prior history of accuracy to determine the relative reliability of informants, they are quite willing to trust the testimony of a single informant alone, regardless of whether that informant had previously been reliable.     

Two‐year‐olds are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility

Data from three experiments provide the first evidence that children, at least as young as age two, are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility, and flexibly use these cues to facilitate learning. Experiment 1 revealed that 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds prefer to learn about objects from someone who appears, through non‐verbal cues, to be confident in performing actions on those objects than from someone who appears uncertain when performing actions on those objects. Experiment 2 revealed that when 2‐year‐olds observe only one model perform a single action, either confidently or unconfidently, they do not use the model’s level of confidence in this single instance to influence their learning. Experiment 3 revealed that 2‐year‐olds will use a single model’s level of confidence to guide their learning if they have observed that the model has a history of being either consistently confident or consistently uncertain. These findings reveal that young children selectively alter their learning based on others’ non‐verbal cues of credibility, and underscore the importance of an early sensitivity to socio‐cognitive cues for human learning and development.     

To be or not to be a galaprock: Preschoolers' intuitions about the importance of knowledge and action for pretending

Can someone pretend to be a galaprock without knowing what a galaprock is? Do children recognize that such knowledge is required for pretending? Three studies focusing on the relations among action, knowledge and pretending suggest that children have this understanding by age 4 years. In Study 1, 4‐year‐olds and adults willingly pretended to be moving and unmoving objects but had trouble pretending to be objects that were difficult to represent physically. In Study 2, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds claimed they could not pretend to be an unknown thing, justifying their refusals with mentalistic language indicating their ignorance of the object or its typical actions. In Study 3, 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds predicted that other children who have knowledge of an object unfamiliar to the subjects themselves can nevertheless pretend to be it, whereas those lacking that knowledge cannot. The results add support to the growing literature showing that preschoolers conceptualize pretense as involving mental activity.     

Magical thinking in judgments of causation: Can anomalous phenomena affect ontological causal beliefs in children and adults?

In four experiments, 4‐, 5‐, 6‐ and 9‐year‐old children and adults were tested on the entrenchment of their magical beliefs and their beliefs in the universal power of physical causality. In Experiment 1, even 4‐year‐olds showed some understanding of the difference between ordinary and anomalous (magical) causal events, but only 6‐year‐olds and older participants denied that magic could occur in real life. When shown an anomalous causal event (a transformation of a physical object in an apparently empty box after a magic spell was cast on the box), 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds accepted magical explanations of the event, whereas 9‐year‐olds and adults did not. In Experiment 2, the same patterns of behaviour as above were shown by 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds who demonstrated an understanding of the difference between genuine magical events and similarly looking tricks. Testing the entrenchment of magical beliefs in this experiment showed that 5‐year‐olds tended to retain their magical explanations of the anomalous event, even after the mechanism of the trick had been explained to them, whereas 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds did not. In Experiment 3, adult participants refused to accept magical explanations of the anomalous event and interpreted it as a trick or an illusion, even after this event was repeated 4 times. Yet, when in Experiment 4 similar anomalous causal events were demonstrated without reference to magic, most adults acknowledged, both in their verbal judgments and in their actions, that the anomalous effects were not a fiction but had really occurred. The data of this study suggest that in the modern industrialized world, magical beliefs persist but are disguised to fit the dominant scientific paradigm.     

Children's working understanding of the knowledge gained from seeing and feeling

In three experiments (N = 48 3‐ to 4‐year olds; 100 3‐ to 5‐year olds; 54 4‐year‐olds), children who could see or feel a target toy, recognized when they had sufficient information to answer ‘Which one is it?’ and when they needed additional access. They were weaker at taking the informative modality of access when the choice was between seeing more of a partially visible toy and feeling it; at doing so when the target was completely hidden; and at reporting seeing or feeling as their source of knowledge of the target's identity having experienced both. Working understanding of the knowledge gained from seeing and feeling (identifying the target efficiently) was not necessarily in advance of explicit understanding (reporting the informative source).     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

Early tracking of informant accuracy and inaccuracy

Three‐ and four‐year‐old children (N=131) were tested for their sensitivity to the accuracy and inaccuracy of informants. Children were presented with one of three conditions. In the Accurate‐Inaccurate condition, one informant named objects accurately whereas the other named them inaccurately. In the Accurate‐Neutral condition, one informant named objects accurately whereas the other merely drew attention to them. Finally in the Inaccurate‐Neutral condition, one informant named objects inaccurately whereas the other merely drew attention to them. In subsequent test trials, 4‐year‐olds preferred to seek and accept information in a selective fashion across all three conditions, suggesting that they monitor informants for both accuracy and inaccuracy. By contrast, 3‐year‐olds were selective in the Accurate‐Inaccurate and Inaccurate‐Neutral conditions but not in the Accurate‐Neutral condition, suggesting that they monitor informants only for inaccuracy and take accuracy for granted.     

Young children's understanding of cultural common ground

Human social interaction depends on individuals identifying the common ground they have with others, based both on personally shared experiences and on cultural common ground that all members of the group share. We introduced 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children to a culturally well‐known object and a novel object. An experimenter then entered and asked, ‘What is that?’, either as a request for information or in a recognitory way. When she was requesting information, both 3‐ and 5‐year‐olds assumed she was asking about the novel object. When she seemed to recognize an object, 5‐year‐olds assumed she was referring to the culturally well‐known object. Thus, by 3 years of age, children are beginning to understand that they share cultural common ground with other members of their group.     

Choosing your informant: weighing familiarity and recent accuracy

In two experiments, children aged 3, 4 and 5 years (N= 61) were given conflicting information about the names and functions of novel objects by two informants, one a familiar teacher, the other an unfamiliar teacher. On pre‐test trials, all three age groups invested more trust in the familiar teacher. They preferred to ask for information and to endorse the information that she supplied. In a subsequent phase, children watched as the two teachers differed in the accuracy with which they named a set of familiar objects. Half the children saw the familiar teacher name the objects accurately and the unfamiliar teacher name them inaccurately. The remaining half saw the reverse arrangement. In post‐test trials, the selective trust initially displayed by 3‐year‐olds was minimally affected by this intervening experience of differential accuracy. By contrast, the selective trust of 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds was affected. If the familiar teacher had been the more accurate, selective trust in her was intensified. If, on the other hand, the familiar teacher had been the less accurate, it was undermined, particularly among 5‐year‐olds. Thus, by 4 years of age, children trust familiar informants but moderate that trust depending on the informants’ recent history of accuracy or inaccuracy.     

When do children trust the expert? Benevolence information influences children's trust more than expertise

How do children use informant niceness, meanness, and expertise when choosing between informant claims and crediting informants with knowledge? In Experiment 1, preschoolers met two experts providing conflicting claims for which only one had relevant expertise. Five‐year‐olds endorsed the relevant expert's claim and credited him with knowledge more often than 3‐year‐olds. In Experiment 2, niceness/meanness information was added. Although children most strongly preferred the nice relevant expert, the children often chose the nice irrelevant expert when the relevant one was mean. In Experiment 3, a mean expert was paired with a nice non‐expert. Although this nice informant had no expertise, preschoolers continued to endorse his claims and credit him with knowledge. Also noteworthy, children in all three experiments seemed to struggle more to choose the relevant expert's claim than to credit him with knowledge. Together, these experiments demonstrate that niceness/meanness information can powerfully influence how children evaluate informants.     

Preschoolers continue to trust a more accurate informant 1 week after exposure to accuracy information

To determine whether children retain a preference for a previously accurate informant only in the short term or for long‐term use, 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested in two experiments. In both experiments, children were given accuracy information about two informants and were subsequently tested for their selective trust in the two informants (Experiment 1: immediately, 1 day and 1 week later; Experiment 2: immediately, 4 days and 1 week later). Both age groups preferred to trust the accurate informant not only immediately after receiving accuracy information but also at subsequent time‐points. Children who were immediately able to explicitly identify the accurate informant were significantly more likely to seek and accept information from her 1 week later. However, even when they had not been asked to explicitly identify the accurate informant both age groups still maintained their preference for her. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously choose a previously accurate informant up to 1 week after exposure to information regarding her accuracy.     

On‐line ostracism affects children differently from adolescents and adults

This research examines adults', and for the first time, children's and adolescents' reaction to being ostracized and included, using an on‐line game, ‘Cyberball’ with same and opposite sex players. Ostracism strongly threatened four primary needs (esteem, belonging, meaning, and control) and lowered mood among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds, 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, and adults. However, it did so in different ways. Ostracism threatened self‐esteem needs more among 8‐ to 9‐year‐olds than older participants. Among 13‐ to 14‐year‐olds, ostracism threatened belonging more than other needs. Belonging was threatened most when ostracism was participants' first experience in the game. Moreover, when participants had been included beforehand, ostracism threatened meaning needs most strongly. Gender of other players had no effect. Practical and developmental implications for social inclusion and on‐line experiences among children and young people are discussed.     

Preadolescents' categorization of gender and ethnicity at the subgroup level in memory

The statement matching paradigm was used to examine how 10‐ to 13‐year‐olds categorized adults when both ethnicity and gender varied across targets. Forty‐seven children watched a PowerPoint presentation of a conversation involving two Black men, two Black women, two White men and two White women. Each slide displayed the speaker's picture, name and the statement made. The children then were asked to determine who made each statement. The pattern of errors in their assignments was examined to assess how they spontaneously categorized the adults. More within‐ethnicity within‐gender errors (e.g. assigning a statement made by a White woman to the other White woman) were made than any other type of error. This implies that the targets were categorized at the subgroup level. In contrast to findings for adults, the children did not also categorize at the more global level of gender above and beyond the subgroup categorization.     

Developmental profiles for multiple object tracking and spatial memory: typically developing preschoolers and people with Williams syndrome

The ability to track moving objects, a crucial skill for mature performance on everyday spatial tasks, has been hypothesized to require a specialized mechanism that may be available in infancy (i.e. indexes). Consistent with the idea of specialization, our previous work showed that object tracking was more impaired than a matched spatial memory task in individuals with Williams syndrome (WS), a genetic disorder characterized by severe visuo‐spatial impairment. We now ask whether this unusual pattern of performance is a reflection of general immaturity or of true abnormality, possibly reflecting the atypical brain development in WS. To examine these two possibilities, we tested typically developing 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds and people with WS on multiple object tracking (MOT) and memory for static spatial location. The maximum number of objects that could be correctly tracked or remembered (estimated from the k‐statistic) showed similar developmental profiles in typically developing 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children, but the WS profile differed from either age group. People with WS could track more objects than 3‐year‐olds, and the same number as 4‐year‐olds, but they could remember the locations of more static objects than both 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds. Combining these data with those from our previous studies, we found that typically developing children show increases in the number of objects they can track or remember between the ages of 3 and 6, and these increases grow in parallel across the two tasks. In contrast, object tracking in older children and adults with WS remains at the level of 4‐year‐olds, whereas the ability to remember multiple locations of static objects develops further. As a whole, the evidence suggests that MOT and memory for static location develop in tandem typically, but not in WS. Atypical development of the parietal lobe in people with WS could play a causal role in the abnormal, uneven pattern of performance in WS. This interpretation is consistent with the idea that multiple object tracking engages different mechanisms from those involved in memory for static object location, and that the former can be particularly disrupted by atypical development.     

Can't stop believing: inhibitory control and resistance to misleading testimony

Why are some young children consistently willing to believe what they are told even when it conflicts with first‐hand experience? In this study, we investigated the possibility that this deference reflects an inability to inhibit a prepotent response. Over the course of several trials, 2.5‐ to 3.5‐year‐olds (N = 58) heard an adult contradict their report of a simple event they had both witnessed, and children were asked to resolve this discrepancy. Those who repeatedly deferred to the adult's misleading testimony had more difficulty on an inhibitory control task involving spatial conflict than those who responded more skeptically. These results suggest that responding skeptically to testimony that conflicts with first‐hand experience may be challenging for some young children because it requires inhibiting a normally appropriate bias to believe testimony.     

Opening the cuebox: The information children and young adults generate and rely on when making inferences from memory

We used a cue‐generation and a cue‐selection paradigm to investigate the cues children (9‐ to 12‐year‐olds) and young adults (17‐year‐olds) generate and select for a range of inferences from memory. We found that children generated more cues than young adults, who, when asked why they did not generate some particular cues, responded that they did not consider them relevant for the task at hand. On average, the cues generated by children were more perceptual but as informative as the cues generated by young adults. When asked to select the most informative of two cues, both children and young adults tended to choose a hidden (i.e., not perceptual) cue. Our results suggest a developmental change in the cuebox (i.e., the set of cues used to make inferences from memory): New cues are added to the cuebox as more cues are learned, and some old, perceptual cues, although informative, are replaced with hidden cues, which, by both children and young adults, are generally assumed to be more informative than perceptual cues.     

The development of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant: Evidence from children aged 8–13 years

In social‐cognitive research, little attention has been paid to the developmental course of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor (STIs about the actor) and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant (STTs about the informant). Using a false recognition paradigm, Study 1 investigated the developmental course of STIs and Study 2 investigated the developmental course of STTs, comparing 8‐, 9‐, 10‐, 11‐, 12‐ and 13‐year olds. The results of Study 1 showed that 8‐year olds could make STIs about the actor, and the magnitude of STIs increased from ages 8 to 10 years, stabilised at the age of 10, 11, 12 years, and decreased from ages 12 through 13 years. The results of Study 2 showed that 8‐year olds could make STTs about the informant, and the magnitude of STTs did not vary with age. In all age groups, the magnitude of STIs about the actor was greater than that of STTs about the informant.     

Children's stereotypes of overweight children

The aim of the present study was to assess the content, favourability and generality of perceptions held about overweight children. The research also addressed whether anti‐fat biases change with age and whether they result from a strong association between overweight and bad behaviour, a weak association between overweight and good behaviour or both. Seventy‐three 5‐ to 10‐year‐olds were read aloud a number of short stories containing characters demonstrating high and low athletic, academic, artistic and social abilities. They were then shown eight different pairs of cards; each pair comprised a drawing of an average‐weight and an overweight version of the same child. Participants were then asked to point to the pictures that looked most like the good and bad characters in the stories. The results demonstrated that 5‐ to 8‐year‐olds were significantly less likely to choose an overweight picture to represent the characters with high athletic, academic, artistic and social ability. In contrast, 9‐ to 10‐year‐olds were significantly less likely to choose an overweight figure to represent the characters with high athletic ability, did not differentiate on the basis of weight for the academic and artistic stories, and were significantly more likely to choose an overweight picture as having high social ability.