Cognitive reference points

Two methods were used to test the hypothesis that natural categories (such as colors, line orientations, and numbers) have reference point stimuli (such as focal colors, vertical and horizontal lines, and numbers that are multiples of 10) in relation to which other stimuli of the category are judged. In Experiment I, subjects placed pairs of stimuli into sentence frames consisting of linguistic “hedges” such as “— is essentially—.” Results were that the supposed reference stimuli were most often placed in the second (reference) slot. In Experiment II, the subject placed a stimulus in physical space to represent his feeling of the psychological distance of that stimulus from another spatially fixed stimulus. Results showed that, when supposed reference stimuli were fixed, other stimuli were placed closer to them than vice versa. The results have substantive implications for the understanding of internal structure of categories and methodological implications for the mapping of reference points, quantification of linguistic intuitions, and the assumption of symmetry in psychological distance judgments.     

Cognitive processes in extinction

Human conditioning research shows that learning is closely related to consciously available contingency knowledge, requires attentional resources, and is influenced by language. This research suggests a cognitive model in which extinction consists of changes in contingency beliefs in long-term memory. Laboratory and clinical evidence on extinction is briefly reviewed, and it is concluded that the evidence supports the cognitive position. There is little evidence for a separate, noncognitive conditioning system. The primary implication for neural analysis is that learning and extinction are unlikely to be reducible to direct connections in which one stimulus simply activates or inhibits the memory representation of another. Rather, an adequate neural model will involve the integration of both low-level and high-level systems, including attention, representation of stimulus relations in long-term memory, and a dynamic performance mechanism based on anticipation, not just activation.     

Holistic and analytic processes in the comparison of letters

College students made “same-different” judgments about successively presented pairs of letters whose degree of difference, in terms of the number of line segments out of register, was systematically varied. Reaction time was found to decrease with increases in the degree of difference in “different” responses, as well as to depend on the number of line segments present in the second (probe) letter. “Same” responses were much faster than different responses and were unaffected by the number of segments in the probe letter. This pattern of results suggests analytic (component-by-component) processing of “different” letters and holistic processing of “same” letters. The results have important implications for studies of multi-letter comparisons, in which it is commonly assumed that letter comparisons are holistic in nature.     

Cognitive processes operating in hindsight

The aim of this investigation was to study the cognitive processes involved in the "knew-it-all-along" effect, especially in regard to use of inferential processes. The results of three experiments showed that the magnitude of the phenomenon did not increase with more use of inferential processes. It is proposed that only under misleading circumstances do inferential processes associated with overconfidence increase the magnitude of the phenomenon. For a majority of the tasks introspectively classified as solved by pure guessing, the hindsight phenomenon entirely disappeared whereas "intuition" tasks lead to the strongest bias. The results are generally consistent with the accuracy-assessment model (A. Winman et al. , 1998).     

Cognitive change processes in psychotherapy

Several types of cognitive-behavioral therapy are now practiced that use different sets of theoretical concepts and propose different kinds of change mechanisms. None, however, is directly grounded in experimental research in cognitive and social psychology, and few address basic issues such as the relevance of conscious versus nonconscious cognitive processes and the validity of the self-report data on which therapy depends. Put forward in this article is a model that describes the conscious and nonconscious processing of emotional stimuli and distinguishes between knowledge that is verbally accessible and knowledge that can only be recovered by exposure to situational cues. Also proposed are three mechanisms of cognitive change that involve altering verbally accessible knowledge, the accessibility of nonconscious situational memories, and self-regulatory strategies. These mechanisms are related to the current practices of behavioral and cognitive-behavioral therapists.     

Cognitive processes in the reflective-impulsive cognitive style

In this study, the authors improved the understanding of the cognitive processes underlying the reflective-impulsive cognitive style (RI), which was initially measured by J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, and W. Phillips (1964) on the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT). The authors determined the relationships between the RI style and the cognitive factors, which would be likely to explain different MFFT solving modes-field dependence or independence as a cognitive style, the g factor, the spatial factor, and a metacognitive control index, which the authors developed for this study. The hypotheses were largely based on various studies (J. P. Ancillotti, 1984, 1985; J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, & W. Phillips, 1964; T. Zelniker & W. E. Jeffrey, 1976; T. Zelniker, A. Renan, I. Sorer, & Y. Shavit, 1977). The results are presented separately for each of four groups: (a) reflective individuals, who implement an analytic process and are cognitively mature; (b) impulsive individuals, who use a holistic process and are cognitively immature; (c) fast-accurate individuals, who are capable of implementing both analytic and holistic processes and exhibit cognitive maturity; and (d) slow-inaccurate individuals, who exhibit good metacognitive control but have trouble implementing both types of processing.     

Cognitive and social comparison processes in brainstorming

This brainstorming experiment assessed the extent to which idea exposure produced cognitive stimulation and social comparison effects. One hundred and sixty participants were exposed to either a high or low number of common or unique ideas. The participants’ likelihood of engaging in social comparison processes (high or low) was also manipulated through instructional sets. The results indicated both cognitive stimulation and social comparison effects. Exposure to a high number of ideas and to common ideas enhanced the generation of additional ideas. The effects of exposure to a high number of ideas was greater under high than under low social comparison conditions. Finally, recall of exposed ideas was related to enhanced idea generation. These results are consistent with the social/cognitive influence model of group brainstorming (Paulus, Dugosh, Dzindolet, Putman, & Coskun, 2002).     

Cognitive processes of numerical estimation in children

We tested children in Grades 1 to 5, as well as college students, on a number line estimation task and examined latencies and errors to explore the cognitive processes involved in estimation. The developmental trends in estimation were more consistent with the hypothesized shift from logarithmic to linear representation than with an account based on a proportional judgment application of a power function model; increased linear responding across ages, as predicted by the log-to-lin shift position, yielded reasonable developmental patterns, whereas values derived from the cyclical power model were difficult to reconcile with expected developmental patterns. Neither theoretical position predicted the marked "M-shaped" pattern that was observed, beginning in third graders' errors and fourth graders' latencies. This pattern suggests that estimation comes to rely on a midpoint strategy based on children's growing number knowledge (i.e., knowledge that 50 is half of 100). As found elsewhere, strength of linear responding correlated significantly with children's performance on standardized math tests.     

Cognitive reference points in judgments of symbolic magnitude

Research on speeded symbolic magnitude comparisons indicates that decisions are made more quickly when the magnitudes of the stimuli being compared are relatively close to an explicit or implicit reference point. Alternative explanations of this phenomenon are tested by seeking similar effects in nonspeeded rating tasks. In accord with the predictions of discriminability models, rated magnitude differences between stimuli in the vicinity of a reference point are expanded relative to differences between stimuli far from it. The inferred locations of cities along a west-east axis varies systematically depending on which coast, Pacific or Atlantic, is specified as the reference point. Scales derived from the rating data are correlated with the pattern of reaction times obtained in a comparable speeded comparison task. In addition, the distance between the cities nearest the locale of our subjects is subjectively stretched. Reference point effects are also observed when the form of the comparative specifies an implicit reference point at either end of a continuum of subjective size; however, these effects are very small and do not clearly support a discriminability interpretation. Stronger evidence for discriminability effects is obtained when an explicit reference point is established at an arbitrary size value. An implicit scaling model, related to range-frequency theory, is proposed to account for the influence of reference points on relative discriminability of stimulus magnitudes. The implicit scaling model is used to develop an account of how symbolic magnitudes may be learned and of how habitual reference points can produce asymmetries in distance judgments.     

Cognitive processes and computerized personality assessment

Several implications of the cognitive viewpoint on personality are tested and the predictive validity of cognitive processing variables is assessed with judgements of parents and friends as a criterion measure. Free recall of items was related to cognitive schemas but reaction time during score recall was not. Ease of faking as well as response latency during faking were not related to cognitive schemas. Intra-individual analysis revealed a consistent non-linear relationship between response latency and item score in all conditions of the experiment. Although some cognitive process variables were correlated with the criterion measures, adding these variables to item scores did not always increase the predictive validity.     

Cognitive processes mediating behavioral change.

The present experiment was designed to test the theory that psychological procedures achieve changes in behavior by altering the level and strength of self-efficacy. In this formulation, perceived self-efficacy. In this formulation, perceived self-efficacy influences level of performance by enhancing intensity and persistence of effort. Adult phobics were administered treatments based upon either performance mastery experiences, vicarious experiences., or they received no treatment. Their efficacy expectations and approach behavior toward threats differing on a similarity dimension were measured before and after treatment. In accord with our prediction, the mastery-based treatment produced higher, stronger, and more generalized expectations of personal efficacy than did the treatment relying solely upon vicarious experiences. Results of a microanalysis further confirm the hypothesized relationship between self-efficacy and behavioral change. Self-efficacy was a uniformly accurate predictor of performance on tasks of varying difficulty with different threats regardless of whether the changes in self-efficacy were produced through enactive mastery or by vicarious experience alone.     

Cognitive processes involved in smooth pursuit eye movements

Ocular pursuit movements allow moving objects to be tracked with a combination of smooth movements and saccades. The principal objective is to maintain smooth eye velocity close to object velocity, thus minimising retinal image motion and maintaining acuity. Saccadic movements serve to realign the image if it falls outside the fovea, the area of highest acuity. Pursuit movements are often portrayed as voluntary but their basis lies in processes that sense retinal motion and can induce eye movements without active participation. The factor distinguishing pursuit from such reflexive movements is the ability to select and track a single object when presented with multiple stimuli. The selective process requires attention, which appears to raise the gain for the selected object and/or suppress that associated with other stimuli, the resulting competition often reducing pursuit velocity. Although pursuit is essentially a feedback process, delays in motion processing create problems of stability and speed of response. This is countered by predictive processes, probably operating through internal efference copy (extra-retinal) mechanisms using short-term memory to store velocity and timing information from prior stimulation. In response to constant velocity motion, the initial response is visually driven, but extra-retinal mechanisms rapidly take over and sustain pursuit. The same extra-retinal mechanisms may also be responsible for generating anticipatory smooth pursuit movements when past experience creates expectancy of impending object motion. Similar, but more complex, processes appear to operate during periodic pursuit, where partial trajectory information is stored and released in anticipation of expected future motion, thus minimising phase errors associated with motion processing delays.     

Cognitive processes involved in smooth pursuit eye movements

Ocular pursuit movements allow moving objects to be tracked with a combination of smooth movements and saccades. The principal objective is to maintain smooth eye velocity close to object velocity, thus minimising retinal image motion and maintaining acuity. Saccadic movements serve to realign the image if it falls outside the fovea, the area of highest acuity. Pursuit movements are often portrayed as voluntary but their basis lies in processes that sense retinal motion and can induce eye movements without active participation. The factor distinguishing pursuit from such reflexive movements is the ability to select and track a single object when presented with multiple stimuli. The selective process requires attention, which appears to raise the gain for the selected object and/or suppress that associated with other stimuli, the resulting competition often reducing pursuit velocity. Although pursuit is essentially a feedback process, delays in motion processing create problems of stability and speed of response. This is countered by predictive processes, probably operating through internal efference copy (extra-retinal) mechanisms using short-term memory to store velocity and timing information from prior stimulation. In response to constant velocity motion, the initial response is visually driven, but extra-retinal mechanisms rapidly take over and sustain pursuit. The same extra-retinal mechanisms may also be responsible for generating anticipatory smooth pursuit movements when past experience creates expectancy of impending object motion. Similar, but more complex, processes appear to operate during periodic pursuit, where partial trajectory information is stored and released in anticipation of expected future motion, thus minimising phase errors associated with motion processing delays.     

Cognitive processes in well-defined and ill-defined problem solving

We investigated the relationship between two kinds of problem solving using Kitchener's model of hierarchical cognitive processing. We predicted that performance on well-defined problems (i. e. those with a single, guaranteed solution) would be independent of ill-defined problems (i. e. those with multiple, non-guaranteed solutions). We also predicted that self-reported epistemic beliefs (i. e. assumptions about the nature and acquisition of knowledge) would be related to ill-defined, but not well-defined, solutions. Results confirmed these predictions. We concluded that well-defined and ill-defined problems require separate cognitive processes and that epistemic beliefs play an important role in ill-defined problem solving. These findings supported Kitchener's three-level model of problem solving.