The promise and peril of self-affirmation in de-escalation of commitment

Drawing on the motivated cognition literature, we examine how self-affirmation processes influence self-justification needs and escalation decisions. Study 1 found that individuals with a larger pool of affirmational resources (high self-esteem) reduced their escalation compared to those with fewer affirmational resources (low self-esteem). Study 2 extended these findings by demonstrating that individuals also de-escalated their commitments when they were provided an opportunity to affirm on an important value. Finally, Study 3 found that affirming on traits that were of low relevance (e.g., creativity) to an initial decision reduced escalation, but affirming on decision-relevant traits (e.g., decision-making ability) ironically increased escalation. Across three studies, using three instantiations of self-affirmations and two measures of escalation, the results highlight the potential benefits and costs of using self-affirmation as a vehicle to de-escalate commitment.     

Looking forward to looking backward: the misprediction of regret

Decisions are powerfully affected by anticipated regret, and people anticipate feeling more regret when they lose by a narrow margin than when they lose by a wide margin. But research suggests that people are remarkably good at avoiding self-blame, and hence they may be better at avoiding regret than they realize. Four studies measured people's anticipations and experiences of regret and self-blame. In Study 1, students overestimated how much more regret they would feel when they "nearly won" than when they "clearly lost" a contest. In Studies 2, 3a, and 3b, subway riders overestimated how much more regret and self-blame they would feel if they "nearly caught" their trains than if they "clearly missed" their trains. These results suggest that people are less susceptible to regret than they imagine, and that decision makers who pay to avoid future regrets may be buying emotional insurance that they do not actually need.     

When two are a family: looking backward and looking forward in a group intervention with single‐by‐choice mothers

Objective: We describe a preventive short‐term group intervention with nine single‐by‐choice (SBC) mothers to provide maximal support for parental functioning and to minimize possible emotional and/or developmental difficulties in their children. Method: Dynamically oriented group work (fifteen one‐and‐a‐half‐hour sessions) focused on: elaboration of painful experiences in the peri‐natal period; reducing stress, tension and guilt; helping mothers with problematic aspects of parenting through work on parental self‐image and perceptions of the child and the dyadic interaction; and strengthening their acceptance of the chosen family model. Results: Therapeutic gains described by mothers and facilitators include: reduced tension, anxiety and guilt; improved integration of the mother's parental self‐image and perception of the child; reduced ambivalence in dyadic relationships; strengthening the mother's fantasized triadic relationships; better acceptance of chosen family pattern; mothers' willingness to tell children their birth story. Conclusion: Dynamically oriented preventive group intervention with SBC mothers can identify potential psychological risk factors and help mothers with sensitive aspects of parenting.     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

The Hindsight Bias: The Role of the Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk

The influence of outcome knowledge (Fischhoff, 1975) and the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) on judgments of perceived risk was explored here. This study found that subjects were capable of making relatively appropriate probability estimates for disease, accident, and homicide in foresight, but they made relatively biased estimated in hindsight. The results suggest that hindsight information activates the use of the availability heuristic on peoples' probability estimates of certain misfortune.     

Hindsight Bias and Inferences in Choice: The Mediating Effect of Cognitive Effort

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether inferences about missing attribute information made in a choice context are susceptible to hindsight bias and, more importantly, whether an increase in the amount of cognitive effort expended during the choice process diminishes the hindsight bias effect. The results of two experiments confirm our expectation that the strength of the hindsight bias effect is related to the extent of processing during choice. Hindsight bias is weakest when the subjects work hardest, that is, when the attractiveness of the partially described option is uncertain, when the attribute with missing information is most important, and when the importance of the attribute with missing information is ambiguous.     

The Effects of Expertise on the Hindsight Bias

We present data from three experiments examining the effects of objective and subjective expertise on the hindsight bias. In Experiment 1, participants read an essay about baseball or dogs and then answered questions about the baseball essay to the best of their ability, as if they had not read the essay, or to the best of their ability, although they read about dogs. Participants also completed a quiz about baseball rules and terminology, which was an objective measure of expertise. Results demonstrated that as participants' baseball expertise increased, their inability to act as if they never read the essay also increased; expertise exacerbated the hindsight bias. To test the effects of subjective expertise on hindsight bias and investigate factors underlying the relationship, participants in Experiment 2 ranked five topics in order of expertise and gave feeling‐of‐knowing (FOK) ratings for questions from these topics. Foresight participants then saw each question again and answered the questions; hindsight participants saw the questions and answers and gave the probability they would have known the answers had they not been provided. Hindsight bias increased with subjective expertise as did average FOK ratings. In Experiment 3, we experimentally manipulated perceived expertise but found that neither average FOK ratings nor hindsight bias was affected by experimentally induced expertise. Taken together, the results demonstrate that expertise exacerbates both objective and subjective hindsight bias but that an FOK, which likely exists only when expertise is naturally acquired, is necessary to engender the detrimental effect of expertise on the hindsight bias. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Metacognitive Experiences and Human Judgment: The Case of Hindsight Bias and Its Debiasing

ABSTRACT— Theories of judgment have emphasized the influence of what comes to mind—the content of people's thoughts. But recent research shows that metacognitive experiences accompanying thinking, like a sense of the ease or difficulty with which information comes to mind, qualify the conclusions that people derive from thought content. The case of hindsight bias and attempts to remove that bias (debiasing) illustrate this. After an event outcome is known, people display hindsight bias by exaggerating its inevitability, believing they "knew it all along." The magnitude of hindsight bias varies with the ease or difficulty that known or alternative outcomes come to mind; the usually observed hindsight bias may even reverse when outcomes are difficult to bring to mind or increase when alternatives are difficult to bring to mind. Implications of metacognitive experiences can extend to other biases and their debiasing, as well as to how people make sense of the past more generally.     

The Effects of Feedback Source and Plausibility of Hindsight Bias

Whenever people try to recollect an earlier given estimate after they have received feedback about the true solution, they tend to overestimate what they had known in foresight. This phenomenon is known as “hindsight bias”. This paper reports three attempts to eliminate hindsight bias by labelling the feedback value as another person's estimate (instead of as the solution) and by providing extremely incorrect (instead of the true) values as feedback. Both variations, however alone and in combination failed to reduce hindsight bias. Only when the data were separated according to whether participants considered the feedback value plausible or not did cases of unbiased recollections emerge: Feedback values that were labelled as estimates of another person and found to be implausible did not lead to hindsight bias. This finding argues against the view that hindsight bias is an automatic and unavoidable effect of feedback presentation.     

Hindsight bias and causal reasoning: a minimalist approach

What factors contribute to hindsight bias, the phenomenon whereby the known outcome of an event appears obvious only after the fact? The Causal Model Theory (CMT) of hindsight bias (Nestler et al. in Soc Psychol 39:182–188, 2008a; in J Expl Psychol: Learn Mem Cog 34:1043–1054, 2008b; Pezzo in Mem 11:421–441, 2003; Wasserman et al. in Pers Soc Psychol Bull 17:30–35, 1991) posits that hindsight bias can occur when people have the opportunity to identify potential causal antecedents and evaluate whether they could have led to the outcome. Two experiments incorporating highly controlled minimalist scenarios supported the CMT. As predicted by the CMT, hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the actual outcome better than the alternative outcome, and reverse hindsight bias occurred when the causal factor explained the alternative outcome better than the actual outcome. Moreover, we found new evidence that outcome knowledge alone was insufficient to elicit hindsight bias in the absence of a potential causal antecedent. Implications for future directions in hindsight bias research are discussed.     

A potential peril of pastoral care: Malpractice

The pastoral counselor may be a full-time counselor trained in pastoral care or a clergyman with a congregation, who from time to time serves his flock as a counselor, ministering to the personal needs of his congregation in a manner designated pastoral care or perhaps, more appropriately, pastoral psychotherapy. Once a therapeutic relationship is established, a congregant acquires certain rights and the clergyman, duties. If these duties are breached due to the negligence of the pastoral counselor and this causes the congregant to be damaged in any way, the pastoral counselor may be liable and may be called upon to respond in damages. The cause of action is called malpractice. This paper isolates areas of actual and potential malpractice.Barton E. Bernstein, M.L.A., J.D., is in the private practice of law with Hochberg, Bernstein & Skor, P. C., Dallas, Texas.He has offered professional workshops throughout the United States and Alaska.     

A Comparison of Hindsight Bias in Groups and Individuals: The Moderating Role of Plausibility

We compared the magnitude of the hindsight bias in individuals and groups with the prediction that the plausibility of an outcome would affect the magnitude of the group–individual difference. We provided groups and individuals with outcomes of scientific studies, and asked them to predict the probability of those outcomes as if they did not know the given outcomes and to report their level of surprise at the outcomes. Overall, groups were more prone to hindsight bias than were individuals, but the group–individual difference was present only when the given outcomes were relatively implausible (Study 1). Moreover, this difference was not eliminated even when participants were asked to consider alternative outcomes (Study 2). Implications are discussed.     

The body and language: M. M. Bakhtin on ontogenetic development

James Wertsch has been influential in prompting a cultural turn in developmental psychology. Drawing upon the Russian philologist M. M. Bakhtin, Wertsch advocates a sociocultural approach involving the claim that agents’ development and action are mediated by social systems of signs and symbols. We seek to improve upon Wertsch’s understanding of agency by revisiting Bakhtin and the sociocultural quality of embodied action inherent in the phenomenology addressed in Bakhtin’s early work. In particular, this paper takes issue with the notion of mediation because it implies an approach to language that neglects the phenomenological immediacy of experience that is central to embodied action. This paper uses the early work of Bakhtin as a lens by which an idea that occurs in Bakhtin’s later work - speech genres - can be reinterpreted. Doing so enables us to propose how it is possible to have a sociocultural theory of individual ontogenetic development that includes the phenomenological immediacy of experience.     

Learning by looking: Infants' social looking behavior across the transition from crawling to walking

This study investigated how infants gather information about their environment through looking and how that changes with increases in motor skills. In Experiment 1, 9.5- and 14-month-olds participated in a 10-min free play session with both a stranger and ambiguous toys present. There was a significant developmental progression from passive to active social engagement, as evidenced by younger infants watching others communicate more and older infants making more bids for social interaction. Experiment 2 examined longitudinally the impact of age and walking onset on this progression. The transition to independent walking marked significant changes in how often infants watched others communicate and made active bids for social interaction. Results suggest that infants transition from passive observers as crawlers to active participants in their social environment with the onset of walking.