Second-personal theodicy: coming to know why God permits suffering by coming to know God himself

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - The popularity of theodicy over the past several decades has given rise to a countermovement, “anti-theodicy”, which admonishes...     

Two dissociable aspects of feeling-of-knowing: Knowing that you know and knowing that you do not know

Feeling-of-knowing judgement is traditionally regarded as a unitary cognitive process. However, recent research suggests that knowing that you know (positive feeling-of-knowing) and knowing that you do not know (negative feeling-of-knowing) have different neural substrates (Luo, Niki, Ying, & Luo, 2004 Luo, J., Niki, K., Ying, X. P. and Luo, Y. J. 2004. Knowing that you know and knowing that you don't know: A fMRI study on feeling of knowing (FOK). Acta Psychologica Sinica, 36: 426–443.  [Google Scholar]). In the present study, we used a paradigm adapted from Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) Koriat, A. and Levy-Sadot, R. 2001. The combined contributions of the cue-familiarity and accessibility heuristics to feelings of knowing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27: 34–53. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] to examine whether positive feeling-of-knowing and negative feeling-of-knowing were mediated by distinct cognitive processes. We found that positive and negative feeling-of-knowing were dissociated during immediate feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., preliminary feeling-of-knowing) and delayed feeling-of-knowing judgements (i.e., postretrieval feeling-of-knowing). At the judgement intervals, positive feeling-of-knowing was based on partial recovery of the nonrecalled targets, whereas negative feeling-of-knowing was determined by familiarity with the retrieval cues. Our results suggest that feeling-of-knowing is a heterogeneous process.     

Knowing that you know: an essay on mechanistic metaknowledge

Humans are adept at providing accurate statements of confidence in their perceptual identification and recall memory responses. In spite of this, mechanical pattern-recognition systems and other artificial intelligence devices seldom express response certainty. The purpose of this paper is to show how useful confidence ratings can be in integrating the results of a variety of pattern-recognition systems to produce a single, optimal decision concerning the target to be recognized. We outline several ways neural network pattern-recognition systems could be modified to issue confidence ratings with each classification response. In sketching a mechanical system of confidence ratings we find we have also provided a preliminary framework for understanding human confidence judgments and human metacognition.     

Knowing what we do not know about sexual orientation change efforts

Comments on the original article, "Guidelines for psychological practice with lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients," by the American Psychological Association (see record 2011-19419-001). The present authors notes that the APA has provided a very helpful document for those who do clinical work with individuals experiencing same-sex attractions. Psychologists no doubt need to be familiar with the literature described in these guidelines as a part of ethical practice. However, the present authors register concern regarding how the guidelines address sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE). They focus their critique on how the guidelines portray two issues pertaining to SOCE-effectiveness and harm-and conclude with a proposal to move the discussion forward via science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Knowing that I didn't know: preschoolers' understanding of their own false belief is a predictor of assents to fictitious events

The present study examines the relation between children's theory of mind abilities and their tendency to assent to fictitious events when questioned repeatedly across interviews. Children between the ages of 3 and 6 years were interviewed individually either four or seven times about a fictitious and a real staged event, and in addition given a false belief test as well as a fantasy‐reality distinction test. Children's performance on the false belief task addressing the understanding of their own false belief was a better predictor for assents to false events than was understanding the false belief of another person, age, number of interviews and performance on a fantasy‐reality distinction task. Children's memory for a staged event showed that repeated questions across interviews was related to a decrease in correct assents to having experienced a staged event, an increase in wrong yes‐responses about touch and erroneously mentioning names of children who had not been present during the staged event. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowing and Seeing: Responding to Stroud's Dilemma

Abstract: Barry Stroud suggests that when we want to explain a certain kind of knowledge philosophically we feel we must explain it on the basis of another, prior kind of knowledge that does not imply or presuppose any of the knowledge we are trying to explain. If we accept this epistemic priority requirement (EPR) we find that we cannot explain our knowledge of the world in a way that satisfies it. If we reject EPR then we will be failing to make all of our knowledge of the world intelligible all at once. I respond to this dilemma by questioning EPR and arguing that it is, in any case, a requirement that is satisfied by explanations of our knowledge in terms of non‐epistemic seeing. Since non‐epistemic seeing is not a form of knowing, such explanations show how knowledge of the world can come to be out of something that is not knowledge of the world.     

Knowing when you don't know enough: Children's judgements about ambiguous information

Two experiments were carried out to find out whether young children's failure to realise when messages are ambiguous is specific to verbally transmitted information about a person's intended meaning. In Experiment 1, children judged whether they had been told/shown enough to identify which one of a set of cards the experimenter had chosen. In one game the experimenter gave verbal messages about her chosen cards, and in a second game, she gave visual messages. With ambiguous visual messages, relevant parts of cards were physically covered. We expected that this would make it more obvious that the speaker's intended meaning was not being fully conveyed. No difference was found between verbal and visual conditions: correct judgements about message ambiguity occured with the same frequency in both.In Experiment 2, children judged in one game whether they had been told enough about the experimenter's chosen card, as in Experiment 1. In a second game, visual information about a card was not conveyed by the experimenter, Rather, the child operated a pointer, set in a disc with windows, beneath which lay cards. The child judged whether the window showed enough for him/her to tell which card the pointer indicated. Again, correct judgments about ambiguity occured with the same frequency in both games.The results implied that children's failure to realise when verbal messages are ambiguous is but one aspect of a more general failure to realise when one has insufficient information at one's disposal to guarantee a correct interpretation of what the world is like.     

Knowing when to hear aids what to hear

Temporal preparation often has been assumed to influence motor stages of information processing. Recent studies, however, challenge this notion and provide evidence for a facilitation of visual processing. The present study was designed to investigate whether perceptual processing in the auditory domain also benefits from temporal preparation. To this end, we employed a pitch discrimination task. In Experiment 1, discrimination performance was clearly improved when participants were temporally prepared. This finding was confirmed in Experiment 2, which ruled out possible influences of short-term memory. The results support the notion that temporal preparation enhances perceptual processing not only in the visual, but also in the auditory, modality.