Abstracta Are Causal

Philosophia - Many philosophers think all abstract objects are causally inert. Here, focusing on novels, I argue that some abstracta are causally efficacious. First, I defend a straightforward...     

We Are a Religious People; We Are a Vengeful People

We evaluate the relation between religiousness and vengeance using multiple indicators of religiousness (religious orientation and church variables) and behavioral as well as self-reports of vengeance. Results from hierarchical regression analyses revealed that intrinsic religious orientation was negatively and extrinsic religious orientation positively related to self-reports of revenge but not to behavioral indicators of revenge. Only quest orientation was related to behavioral indicators of revenge with those higher on quest setting relatively lower levels of shock following a provocation and giving more money to an obnoxious confederate. Of the church variables, the number of religious activities was negatively and frequency of monetary donations positively related to self-reported vengeance. Only frequency of monetary donations, however, was uniquely related to one of the behavioral indicators of revenge, level of shock, with those who give more frequently also retaliating with higher levels of shock.     

Why Zombies Are Inconceivable

I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they must involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, cannot. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess.     

Are there lexicons?

Many models of the processing of printed or spoken words or objects or faces propose that systems of local representations of the forms of such stimuli—lexicons—exist. This is denied by partisans of the distributed-representation connectionist approach to cognitive modelling. An experimental paradigm of key theoretical importance here is lexical decision and its analogue in the domain of objects, object decision. How does each theoretical camp account for our ability to perform these two tasks? The localists say that the tasks are done by matching or failing to match a stimulus to a local representation in a lexicon. Advocates of distributed representations often do not seek to explain these two tasks; however, when they do, they propose that patterns of activation evoked in a semantic system can be used to discriminate between words and nonwords, or between real objects and false objects. Therefore the distributed-representation account of lexical and object decision tasks predicts that performance on these tasks can never be normal in patients with an impaired semantic system, nor in patients who cannot access semantics normally from the stimulus domain being tested. However, numerous such patients have been reported in the literature, indicating that semantic access is not needed for normal performance on these tasks. Such results support the localist form of modelling rather than the distributed-representation approach.     

Commentary: All Relationships Are Difficult: Research Relationships Are No Exception

This comment on the preceding set of papers seeks to evaluate them as a cohesive set, postulate some questions the authors might ask each other, and highlight themes and issues. Issues associated with relationships between researchers of different backgrounds and relationships between theories and methods from different traditions are particularly difficult.     

Are Counterpossibles Epistemic?

It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explained by distinguishing an epistemic and a metaphysical reading of counterfactuals. Such an explanation must answer why we tend to neglect the distinction of the two readings. By way of an answer, I offer a generalized pattern for explaining nonvacuity intuitions by a stand‐and‐fall relationship to certain indicative conditionals. Then, I present reasons for doubting the proposal: nonvacuists can use the epistemic reading to turn the table against vacuists, telling apart significant from spurious intuitions. Moreover, our intuitions tend to survive even if we clear‐headedly intend a metaphysical reading.