Is An Agreement An Exchange of Intentions?

Abstract: Margaret Gilbert has argued that an agreement is not exchange of promises, since no such exchange plays all the roles she claims are distinctive of agreements. After briefly discussing the notion of intention and the principles governing intentions, I argue that a certain type of exchange of intentions – in which one person forms a conditional intention to act if the other does, and the other forms an unconditional intention to act on the presumption that the first will do what they have said – plays all these roles, and so conclude that an agreement is in fact an exchange of intentions.     

The development of the intention to study of pupils from different social backgrounds in non-traditional pathways to higher education

In this paper we investigate whether and if so why different pathways to higher education (HE) have an effect on the development of the intention to study and its motivational factors of pupils from different social backgrounds. In Germany as well as in many other countries, non-traditional pathways—mostly vocational oriented schools, but also comprehensive schools—lead to eligibility for HE. Drawing on the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen in Organ Behav Human Decis Process 50:179–211, 1991); Fishbein and Ajzen (Belief, attitude, intention and behaviour. An introduction to theory and research, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, 1975) and empirical results, we assume that the intention to study and motivational factors (=?attitudes towards HE, the perceptions of expectations of relevant others, control beliefs) of pupils in vocationally oriented pathways develop less favourably than those of pupils in comprehensive schools, and that for pupils in vocationally oriented pathways the effects of social backgrounds on intentions and motivational factors become stronger due to school-type specific college-going cultures. Our database consists of the responses of 7133 pupils in comprehensive schools and vocationally oriented two-year and three-year pathways to HE at the beginning (t1) and the end (t2) of upper secondary education. We use Propensity Score Matching to disentangle selection and socialization effects. Our results show that among vocationally oriented pathways, only two-year pathways divert pupils from HE, partly due to decreasing expectations of relevant others and attitudes towards HE. In contrast, the intention to study and the motivational factors among pupils in direct as well as in three-year vocationally oriented pathways remain stable during upper secondary education. No differential effects of the pathways on pupils from different social backgrounds could be observed. Thus, vocationally oriented pathways do not in general divert their pupils from HE, but if they do so, all pupils are affected regardless of social background.

     

Attention to action and awareness of other minds

We have only limited awareness of the system by which we control our actions and this limited awareness does not seem to be concerned with the control of action. Awareness of choosing one action rather than another comes after the choice has been made, while awareness of initiating an action occurs before the movement has begun. These temporal differences bind together in consciousness the intention to act and the consequences of the action. This creates our sense of agency. Activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex is associated with awareness of our own actions and also occurs when we think about the actions of others. I propose that the mechanism underlying awareness of how our own intentions lead to actions can also be used to represent the intentions that underlie the actions of others. This common system enables us to communicate mental states and thereby share our experiences.     

TAKING ON INTENTIONS

I propose a model of intention formation and argue that it illuminates and does justice to the complex and interesting relationships between intentions on the one hand and practical deliberation, evaluative judgements, desires, beliefs, and conduct on the other. As I explain, my model allows that intentions normally stem from pro-attitudes and normally control conduct, but it is also revealing with respect to cases in which intentions do not stem from pro-attitudes or do not control conduct. Moreover, it makes the connection between forming an intention and altering one's deliberative framework transparent, and directly accounts for the fact that while intentions can affect how it makes sense for an agent to reason and what it makes sense for her to do, one cannot make an action that one is tempted to perform worth performing simply by forming a related intention.     

Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist?

William Child has said that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to a person's dreams, recent thoughts that he has consciously entertained and other things. I discuss Wittgenstein's comments about these matters in order to show that they do not commit him to an anti-realist view or a realist view. He wished to discredit the idea that when a person reports his dream or his thoughts, or past intentions, the person is reading off the contents of his mind or memory. Reporting what one dreamt or recently thought is not like reporting what one has just read. The language is different, and the criterion of truth is different.
The anti-realist is able to explain why the reports of thoughts, for instance, are "guaranteed" to be true (PI II, 222) by stipulating that the character and existence of the past thought is constituted by an inclination to assert that one had that past thought so the assertion could not be false. This could not be Wittgenstein's view. What does "guarantee" the truth of such an assertion is the fact that the person himself is the principle authority on what he dreamt, thought, and intended, something which "stands fast" for us.
I next consider Crispin Wright's account of Wittgenstein's ideas about intentions and point out that his assumption that person always makes a judgement as to whether his action conforms to his intention is clearly false. And he is wrong in attributing to Wittgenstein the idea that an intention does not have a determinate content prior to its author's judgement about whether the action conforms to the intention, an idea that is obscure. If this were accurate, it would be a mystery why we do anything, or, at least, why our actions ever conform to our intentions.     

A qualitative analysis of the vaccine intention–behaviour relationship: parents’ descriptions of their intentions,decision-making behaviour and planning processes towards HPV vaccination

Objective: The objective of this study is to identify factors influencing the vaccine intention–behaviour relationship. Design: A total of 445 parents who received a brief intervention to promote HPV vaccination were categorized based on their intentions post-intervention (yes/unsure/eventually/never) and subsequent adolescents’ vaccine status (yes/no). Fifty-one of these parents participated in qualitative interviews. Main Outcome Measures: Parents described their intentions, decision-making and planning processes towards vaccination. Framework analysis was used to analyse the data. Results: Parents in the ‘Yes/Yes’ category were knowledgeable about HPV/vaccine, described strong, stable intentions, considered themselves the primary decision-makers about vaccination and said they vaccinated immediately. ‘Yes/No’ parents described strong intentions and thought their adolescent was vaccinated OR described hesitant intentions, seeking advice/agreement from others and noting barriers to vaccination without solutions. ‘Unsure/Yes’ parents described their intentions as strengthening with information from credible sources and identified strategies for overcoming barriers. ‘Unsure/No’ and ‘Eventually/No’ parents had misinformation/negative beliefs regarding vaccination, described being ambivalent or non-supportive of vaccination and cited barriers to vaccination. ‘Never/No’ parents held negative beliefs about vaccination, described strong, stable intentions to NOT vaccinate, deferring the decision to others, and reported no planning towards vaccination. Conclusions: Intention characteristics and planning processes could moderate the vaccine intention–behaviour relationship, potentially serving as targets for future vaccine strategies.     

Moral supervenience

Abstract

It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.     

Prediction,Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity

Shared activity is often simply willed into existence by individuals. This poses a problem. Philosophical reflection suggests that shared activity involves a distinctive, interlocking structure of intentions. But it is not obvious how one can form the intention necessary for shared activity without settling what fellow participants will do and thereby compromising their agency and autonomy. One response to this problem suggests that an individual can have the requisite intention if she makes the appropriate predictions about fellow participants. I argue that implementing this predictive strategy risks derailing practical reasoning and preventing one from forming the intention. My alternative proposal for reconciling shared activity with autonomy appeals to the idea of acting directly on another's intention. In particular, I appeal to the entitlement one sometimes has to another's practical judgment, and the corresponding authority the other sometimes has to settle what one is to do.     

So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency.     

Perceptual dependence: Evidence for an internal threshold

Ss were asked to make two forced-choice discriminations on each trial: in Experiment I, they had to tell on which side of the display a latter pair appeared and whether or not its members were identical; in Experiment II, to say where the pair appeared and whether it consisted of Xs or Os; in Experiment III, to say where a letter appeared and whether it rhymed with E; and in Experiment IV, to say whether a letter pair was presented and whether it was a word. In Experiment III, and for some Ss in Experiment I, the second discrimination was dependent on the first; that is, when the S was wrong on the first, he performed at chance level on the second. In Experiment IV, when Ss indicated that nothing was presented (with confidence), they performed at chance level on the recognition task; thus, recognition was dependent upon some information about the detection task. It is argued that perceptual dependence implies that a threshold state, a state in which the S has no information, exists for the dependent discrimination. One explanation of dependence assumes mediation of the dependent discrimination by a processing stage which succeeds stages mediating the other task.     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.     

Flat intentions – crazy dispositions?

Future-directed intentions, it is widely held, involve behavioral dispositions. But of what kind? Suppose you now intend to Φ at future time t. Are you thereby now disposed to Φ at t no matter what? If so, your intention disposes you to Φ even if around t you will come to believe that Φ-ing would be crazy. And would not that be a crazy intention to have? – Like considerations have led Luca Ferrero and others to believe that only intentions with strong internal conditions are capable of rationality. This paper explores in how far a broadly dispositional view of intention supports their claims. Its first point will come as a surprise: Intentions indeed involve dispositions toward follies in plenty. Natural objections against this bizarre-sounding claim are shown to fail, and standard counterfactual analyses of disposition locutions are shown to underpin it further. However, since the dispositions at issue are pro tanto dispositions, the consequences are not as odd as might be expected: When hedged by reasonable habits to reconsider one’s intentions, dispositions toward follies do not entail any actual crazy behavior. On balance, unconditional intention is therefore found rational after all. Dispositions toward crazy actions need not be crazy dispositions.     

Implementation intentions and imagery: individual and combined effects on prospective memory among young adults

Prospective memory (PM) has been found to benefit from implementation intentions (i.e., “when I see X, I will do Y”). However, to date, it is unclear whether implementation intentions must incorporate imagery in order to produce a positive effect on PM, or whether the verbal statement alone is sufficient. It is also equivocal whether the use of visual imagery alone improves PM, absent an intentional statement. The present study investigated the individual influences of implementation intentions and imagery, as well as their combined effect, on PM. A total of 64 undergraduates were placed into one of four instructional conditions—read-only, implementation intention, imagery, or combined—and were then tested on a laboratory PM task. The results revealed that participants in the implementation intention, imagery, and combined groups completed significantly more PM tasks than did participants in the read-only group, but they did not differ from one another. Combining implementation intentions and imagery, however, did not improve PM performance over either strategy alone. Additionally, the implementation intention and imagery groups outperformed the read-only group on a secondary ongoing digit detection task. The results of this study suggest that implementation intentions do not require imagery to be effective in improving PM, and that imagery alone has positive effects on PM. Finally, the results of the ongoing digit detection task suggest that the use of implementation intentions and imagery might provide for automatic identification and processing of environmental cues.     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings

Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands group action according to my plural subject account of groups, however, one can argue for the appropriateness of feeling guilt just because one's group has acted badly - a feeling that often occurs. In so arguing I sketch the plural subject account of groups, group intentions and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for its members to be jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an important way holistic, not being reducible to a set of personal commitments over which each party holds sway. Parties to a group intention so understood can reasonably see the resulting action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately respond to the action's badness with a feeling of guilt, even when they themselves are morally innocent in the matter. I label the feeling in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims about the nature of guilt feelings are thrown into question by my argument.