Object name learning provides on-the-job training for attention

By the age of 3, children easily learn to name new objects, extending new names for unfamiliar objects by similarity in shape. Two experiments tested the proposal that experience in learning object names tunes children's attention to the properties relevant for naming—in the present case, to the property of shape—and thus facilitates the learning of more object names. In Experiment 1, a 9-week longitudinal study, 17-month-old children who repeatedly played with and heard names for members of unfamiliar object categories well organized by shape formed the generalization that only objects with similar shapes have the same name. Trained children also showed a dramatic increase in acquisition of new object names outside of the laboratory during the course of the study. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and showed that they depended on children's learning both a coherent category structure and object names. Thus, children who learn specific names for specific things in categories with a common organizing property—in this case, shape—also learn to attend to just the right property—in this case, shape—for learning more object names.     

Going With the Flow: Preschoolers Prefer Nondissenters as Informants

ABSTRACT— In two experiments, 3- and 4-year-olds were tested for their sensitivity to agreement and disagreement among informants. In pretest trials, they watched as three of four informants ( Experiment 1 ) or two of three informants ( Experiment 2 ) indicated the same referent for an unfamiliar label; the remaining informant was a lone dissenter who indicated a different referent. Asked for their own judgment, the preschoolers sided with the majority rather than the dissenter. In subsequent test trials, one member of the majority and the dissenter remained present and continued to provide conflicting information about the names of unfamiliar objects. Children remained mistrustful of the dissenter. They preferred to seek and endorse information from the informant who had belonged to the majority. The implications and scope of children's early sensitivity to group consensus are discussed.     

On the bounded rationality of gender stereotyping in fame judgments

The false‐fame effect is the phenomenon that familiar names are falsely judged famous more often than unfamiliar names. M.R. Banaji and A.G. Greenwald ( 1995 ) demonstrated a gender bias in the false‐fame effect: In line with existing gender stereotypes, the false‐fame effect was larger for male than for female names. A more general explanation for gender biasing in fame judgments is based on cognitive availability. Name gender could be used as an ecologically valid cue when making fame judgments. If the relevant universe of famous names contained more male than female names, a gender bias in fame judgments should be observed, if it contained more female names, the gender bias should be reversed. Indeed, this pattern could be demonstrated experimentally, and we argue that it is not compatible with an account that draws on gender stereotyping but with one based on cognitive availability. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What’s in the name? Categorical perception for unfamiliar faces can occur through labeling

The conditions under which categorical perception (CP) occurs for unfamiliar faces are unclear. Although CP is generally found only for familiar faces, it has been reported for unfamiliar faces after brief training (Levin & Beale, 2000) or even without any learning of the original faces (Campanella, Hanoteau, Seron, Joassin, & Bruyer, 2003). Three experiments investigated whether CP can be observed for an unfamiliar morphed face continuum without preexposure to the endpoints of the continuum (Experiment 1); with brief exposure to the endpoints (Experiment 2); or with exposure to named endpoints (Experiment 3). CP was always observed for matched pairs of famous faces. However, CP for unfamiliar faces was induced only when participants observed names paired with the endpoint faces before the start of the experiment. The results suggest that CP effects for unfamiliar faces can be observed extremely rapidly when clear category labels are presented.     

Mental representation in visual/haptic crossmodal memory: evidence from interference effects

Two experiments used visual-, verbal-, and haptic-interference tasks during encoding (Experiment 1) and retrieval (Experiment 2) to examine mental representation of familiar and unfamiliar objects in visual/haptic crossmodal memory. Three competing theories are discussed, which variously suggest that these representations are: (a) visual; (b) dual-code—visual for unfamiliar objects but visual and verbal for familiar objects; or (c) amodal. The results suggest that representations of unfamiliar objects are primarily visual but that crossmodal memory for familiar objects may rely on a network of different representations. The pattern of verbal-interference effects suggests that verbal strategies facilitate encoding of unfamiliar objects regardless of modality, but only haptic recognition regardless of familiarity. The results raise further research questions about all three theoretical approaches.     

Mental representation in visual/haptic crossmodal memory: evidence from interference effects

Two experiments used visual-, verbal-, and haptic-interference tasks during encoding (Experiment 1) and retrieval (Experiment 2) to examine mental representation of familiar and unfamiliar objects in visual/haptic crossmodal memory. Three competing theories are discussed, which variously suggest that these representations are: (a) visual; (b) dual-code—visual for unfamiliar objects but visual and verbal for familiar objects; or (c) amodal. The results suggest that representations of unfamiliar objects are primarily visual but that crossmodal memory for familiar objects may rely on a network of different representations. The pattern of verbal-interference effects suggests that verbal strategies facilitate encoding of unfamiliar objects regardless of modality, but only haptic recognition regardless of familiarity. The results raise further research questions about all three theoretical approaches.     

Talking emotions: vowel selection in fictional names depends on the emotional valence of the to-be-named faces and objects

One prestudy based on a corpus analysis and four experiments in which participants had to invent novel names for persons or objects (N?=?336 participants in total) investigated how the valence of a face or an object affects the phonological characteristics of the respective novel name. Based on the articulatory feedback hypothesis, we predicted that /i:/ is included more frequently in fictional names for faces or objects with a positive valence than for those with a negative valence. For /o:/, the pattern should reverse. An analysis of the Berlin Affective Word List – Reloaded (BAWL-R) yielded a higher number of occurrences of /o:/ in German words with negative valence than in words with positive valence; with /i:/ the situation is less clear. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants named persons showing a positive or a negative facial expression. Names for smiling persons included more /i:/s and fewer /o:/s than names for persons with a negative facial expression. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants heard a Swahili narration and invented pseudo-Swahili names for objects with positive, neutral, or negative valence. Names for positive objects included more /i:/s than names for neutral or negative objects, and names for negative objects included more /o:/s than names for neutral or positive objects. These finding indicate a stable vowel-emotion link.     

Remembering the names of unfamiliar animals: keywords as keys to their kingdom

Three experiments were conducted in which the face – name mnemonic technique was applied to learning the names of unfamiliar animals. In all three experiments, mnemonically instructed students outperformed ‘own best method’ controls on animal name‐recognition tests when prompted by the animals' pictures. In addition, mnemonic students remembered more animal names than did controls when they were shown previously unseen variations of the studied animals (Experiments 2 and 3). The present results illustrate the effectiveness of associative mnemonic strategies in facilitating people's memory for unfamiliar pictorial stimuli in both their original and varied representations. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Artifacts and natural kinds: children's judgments about whether objects are owned

People's behavior in relation to objects depends on whether they are owned. But how do people judge whether objects are owned? We propose that people expect human-made objects (artifacts) to be more likely to be owned than naturally occurring objects (natural kinds), and we examine the development of these expectations in young children. Experiment 1 found that when shown pictures of familiar kinds of objects, 3-year-olds expected artifacts to be owned and inanimate natural kinds to be non-owned. In Experiments 2A and 2B, 3-6-year-olds likewise had different expectations about the ownership of unfamiliar artifacts and natural kinds. Children at all ages viewed unfamiliar natural kinds as non-owned, but children younger than 6 years of age only endorsed artifacts as owned at chance rates. In Experiment 3, children saw the same pictures but were also told whether objects were human-made. With this information provided, even 3-year-olds viewed unfamiliar artifacts as owned. Finally, in Experiment 4, 4- and 5-year-olds chose unfamiliar artifacts over natural kinds when judging which object in a pair belongs to a person, but not when judging which the person prefers. These experiments provide first evidence about how children judge whether objects are owned. In contrast to claims that children think about natural kinds as being similar to artifacts, the current findings reveal that children have differing expectations about whether they are owned.     

Learning names for materials: Factors constraining and limiting hypotheses about word meaning

Children's ability to learn new words quickly (Carey, 1978; Dickinson, 1984b; Heibeck & Markman, in press) indicates that they have strategies for constraining hypotheses about word meaning. The initial hypotheses children entertain about the meaning of words that name materials were examined in two studies. The first study examined the effects of linguistic constraint supplied by count/mass syntactic information and of conceptual constraints—Object Bias for Solids (i.e., words applied to solids name objects, not materials; Soja, Carey, & Spelke, 1985), and Substance Bias for Nonsolids (i.e., words applied to nonsolids name materials). A second study investigated the effects of providing more explicit information about word meaning by including the phrase “made of” when words were presented. In both studies, 16 children, aged 3, 4, and 5, were introduced to an object or material and told a name for it in phrases that varied the information provided. They then were shown two items and asked to indicate which was an example of the presentation stimulus. Mass syntax was somewhat effective in helping children map words to material concepts, but conceptual constraints were more important. Children of all ages were poor at learning names for materials when the word referred to unfamiliar objects made of unfamiliar materials, but the phrase “made of” helped reduce the effect of the Object Bias for Solids among 5-year-olds. Age-related developments suggest that acquisition of material names also is affected by improving access to material concepts.     

What's in a shape? Children represent shape variability differently than adults when naming objects

Children and adults often generalize a word to objects of the same shape. However, the shape properties on which generalization is based are unknown. We investigated the degree to which two shape dimensions were represented categorically by children and adults when learning names for objects. Multidimensional scaling techniques were used to establish the perceptual similarity of two sets of objects in Experiment 1. In Experiments 2 and 3, children (from 2;8 to 4;5 years of age) and adults participated in two tasks in which they learned a novel name for an exemplar. We then examined how often the novel name was generalized to different objects and to line drawings of the objects. In one task, participants generalized the names from memory; in a second task the exemplar was in front of the participant during generalization. Adults accepted names more often to objects that fell "within" the proposed shape boundaries than to objects that fell "across" the boundaries. Children, however, were just as likely to generalize names to novel objects that fell within as to objects that crossed the boundaries.     

Word learning and phonetic processing in preschool-age children

Consonants and vowels have been shown to play different relative roles in different processes, including retrieving known words from pseudowords during adulthood or simultaneously learning two phonetically similar pseudowords during infancy or toddlerhood. The current study explores the extent to which French-speaking 3- to 5-year-olds exhibit a so-called “consonant bias” in a task simulating word acquisition, that is, when learning new words for unfamiliar objects. In Experiment 1, the to-be-learned words differed both by a consonant and a vowel (e.g., /byf/-/duf/), and children needed to choose which of the two objects to associate with a third one whose name differed from both objects by either a consonant or a vowel (e.g., /dyf/). In such a conflict condition, children needed to favor (or neglect) either consonant information or vowel information. The results show that only 3-year-olds preferentially chose the consonant identity, thereby neglecting the vowel change. The older children (and adults) did not exhibit any response bias. In Experiment 2, children needed to pick up one of two objects whose names differed on either consonant information or vowel information. Whereas 3-year-olds performed better with pairs of pseudowords contrasting on consonants, the pattern of asymmetry was reversed in 4-year-olds, and 5-year-olds did not exhibit any significant response bias. Interestingly, girls showed overall better performance and exhibited earlier changes in performance than boys. The changes in consonant/vowel asymmetry in preschoolers are discussed in relation with developments in linguistic (lexical and morphosyntactic) and cognitive processing.     

Event-related potential (ERP) indices of infants' recognition of familiar and unfamiliar objects in two and three dimensions

We measured infants' recognition of familiar and unfamiliar 3-D objects and their 2-D representations using event-related potentials (ERPs). Infants differentiated familiar from unfamiliar objects when viewing them in both two and three dimensions. However, differentiation between the familiar and novel objects occurred more quickly when infants viewed the object in 3-D than when they viewed 2-D representations. The results are discussed with respect to infants' recognition abilities and their understanding of real objects and representations. This is the first study using 3-D objects in conjunction with ERPs in infants, and it introduces an interesting new methodology for assessing infants' electrophysiological responses to real objects.     

Do young and old preschoolers exhibit response bias due to different mechanisms? Investigating children's response time

Previous studies have suggested that younger preschoolers exhibit a yes bias due to underdeveloped cognitive abilities, whereas older preschoolers exhibit a response bias due to other factors. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the response latency to yes-no questions pertaining to familiar and unfamiliar objects in 3- to 6-year-olds. The 3-year-olds exhibited a strong yes bias for both objects, and their response latency was significantly shorter than that of the 6-year-olds. The 4- and 5-year-olds did not exhibit any response bias, whereas the 6-year-olds exhibited a nay-saying bias (a response bias to say “no”) for unfamiliar objects. Overall, children’s response bias scores were stronger for familiar objects than for unfamiliar objects. The results suggest that 3-year-olds exhibit a yes bias automatically, but 5- and 6-year-olds are sensitive to question context.     

Children's haptic and cross-modal recognition with familiar and unfamiliar objects

Five-year-old children explored multidimensional objects either haptically or visually and then were tested for recognition with target and distractor items in either the same or the alternative modality. In Experiments 1 and 2, haptic, visual, and cross-modal recognition were all nearly with familiar objects; haptic and visual recognition were also excellent with unfamiliar objects, but cross-modal recognition was less accurate. In Experiment 3, cross-modal recognition was also less accurate than within-mode recognition with familiar objects that were members of the same basic-level category. The results indicate that children's haptic recognition is remarkably good, that cross-modal recognition is otherwise constrained, and that cross-modal recognition may be accomplished differently for familiar and unfamiliar objects.     

The emotional impact of faces (but not names): Face specific changes in skin conductance responses to familiar and unfamiliar people

Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs) to familiar and unfamiliar names and faces were recorded from independent groups of subjects, using two different presentation designs: the first employing fewer familiar than unfamiliar items (Tranel, Fowles, and Damasio, 1985) and the second employing equal numbers of familiar and unfamiliar items. In both designs, familiar faces were responded to significantly more strongly than unfamiliar faces, whereas for names there was no difference in responses to familiar and unfamiliar stimuli. Faces produced significantly larger overall SCRs than names in the unequal familiar/unfamiliar ratio design, but this effect was not observed in the equal ratio design. The results are discussed with particular reference to those previously published by Tranel et al. (1985) and in relation to work both on covert recognition in prosopagnosia and on one of the delusional misidentification syndromes known as the Capgras delusion. This study was carried out with generous support from the EJLB Foundation (Canada) and the Wellcome Trust.