Preserving informational separability and violating decisional separability in facial perception and recognition

The holistic encoding hypothesis (M. J. Farah, K. D. Wilson, M. Drain, & J. N. Tanaka, 1998) proposes that faces are encoded and used in perception and cognition as relatively undifferentiated wholes. A previous study (M. J. Wenger & E. M. Ingvalson, 2002) found very little support for the strong version of this hypothesis and instead found evidence that shifts in decisional criteria may be important. This study provides a replication and stronger test of those findings, demonstrating consistent violations of decisional separability and preservation of informational separability in both immediate perception and delayed recognition.     

Searching for the minimal essential information for skilled perception and action

Summary A common concern for both cognitive/computational and ecological/dynamical models of human motor control is the isolation of the minimal essential information needed to support skilled perception and action. In perception isolating essential features of the optic flow field, which are reliably informative regarding the nature of current events, from nonessential features provides a valuable step towards understanding how the computational complexity of perceptual information processing may be reduced to manageable levels and how relatively direct linkages of low dimensionality may be established between information and control variables. Likewise, in the study of action, discrimination of the movement features that remain immutable (invariant?) across changes in task conditions from the variables that are situationally determined provides a principled insight into the structural framework upon which skilled movement is built. Controversy abounds, however, in the study of perception and action as to whether features isolated as informative and immutable are centrally represented (in the form of a template or program) or are rather directly picked up (in the case of perceptual variables) or are simply an emergent consequence of the underlying dynamics (in the case of action variables). In this paper some examples of putative minimal essential information sources in perception and action are provided, strategies for uncovering such sources are discussed, and attention is directed, with the use of some recent data collected on natural skills, to some systematic expert-novice differences in the utilization of essential information and control variables. Expert-novice differences are highlighted because of the insight they may provide regarding the nature of perceptual-motor skill acquisition.     

The Separation of Action and Perception and the Issue of Affordances

Michaels's (2000) reassessment of the relation between action and perception is endorsed. In alignment with Milner and Goodale (1995), she proposed a separation between action (i.e., control of movement) and perception (i.e., the explicit knowledge of environmental properties, including animal-referential ones), the separation being based on the reliance on different optical variables. However, how should the concept of affordances be incorporated into this scheme? We present data showing that affordances, both when perceived and acted on, are not susceptible to optical illusions. Because action and perception are distinguished on the basis of information used, but are also proposed to interact, it is hypothesized that, dependent on the task goal, "information for action" may be used in perception, and "information for perception" may be used in action. Participants may become more attuned to information for action when perception serves to acquire explicit knowledge about what the environment affords for action.     

PSYCHOPHYSICAL RELATIONS IN VISUAL PERCEPTION OF LENGTH, AREA AND VOLUME

E kman , G., and J unge , K. Psychophysical relations in visual perception of length, area and volume. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1961, 2 , 1–10. — Subjective length, area and volume as functions of the corresponding stimulus variables were studied in three experiments. The exponents of the psychophysical power functions scattered around 1 for perception of 'real' space. For perspective drawings of cubes and spheres, however, the exponents were about 0.75. From a further analysis of the data it was tentatively concluded that perspective and shadow are insufficient cues to visual volume, and that the subjective scale reflects perception of area rather than volume, especially in the case of small stimuli.     

Grasping the diagonal: controlling attention to illusory stimuli for action and perception

Since the pioneering work of [Aglioti, S., DeSouza, J. F., & Goodale, M. A. (1995). Size-contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand. Current Biology, 5(6), 679-685] visual illusions have been used to provide evidence for the functional division of labour within the visual system-one system for conscious perception and the other system for unconscious guidance of action. However, these studies were criticised for attentional mismatch between action and perception conditions and for the fact that grip size is not determined by the size of an object but also by surrounding obstacles. Stoettinger and Perner [Stoettinger, E., & Perner, J., (2006). Dissociating size representations for action and for conscious judgment: Grasping visual illusions without apparent obstacles. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 269-284] used the diagonal illusion controlling for the influence of surrounding features on grip size and bimanual grasping to rule out attentional mismatch. Unfortunately, the latter objective was not fully achieved. In the present study, attentional mismatch was avoided by using only the dominant hand for action and for indicating perceived size. Results support the division of labour: Grip aperture follows actual size independent of illusory effects, while finger-thumb span indications of perceived length are clearly influenced by the illusion.     

Psychophysical test for the independence of perception and action

Research has suggested that perception and action are independent (see M. A. Goodale & A. Haffenden, 1998). The authors used the Ebbinghaus illusion to test this hypothesis in 2 experiments. Verbal reports of perceived size were compared with maximum grip aperture during grasping (Experiment 1) and manual reports of perceived size (Experiment 2). A multidimensional signal detection analysis was used to distinguish among the possible interactions between the two processes in each experiment (H. Kadlec & J. T. Townsend, 1992a, 1992b). In Experiment 1, the percepts were independent, and there were no interactions between processes for verbal and visuomotor responses. In Experiment 2, the percepts associated with verbal and manual reports were independent, but the processes interacted at the levels of the stimulus information and the decision rules used to transform each percept into a response.     

The Relationship Between Marital Characteristics,Marital Interaction Processes,and Marital Satisfaction

Structural Equation Modeling techniques were used to clarify the relationship between marital characteristics, marital processes, and the dependent variable—marital satisfaction—in a sample of 201 participants who were in 1st marriages. The Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS; G. B. Spanier, 1976) and the Enriching and Nurturing Relationship Issues, Communication and Happiness Inventory (ENRICH; D. H. Olson, D. G. Fournier, & J. M. Druckman, 1987) provided scales to measure marital interaction processes and marital satisfaction. A new instrument, the Characteristics of Marriage Inventory (CHARISMA; J. R. Rosen‐Grandon & J. E. Myers, 2001), was developed using factor analysis to determine which marital characteristics were statistically significant. Structural equation modeling identified a path model wherein 6 marital interaction processes had a statistically significant influence on marital satisfaction when mediated by 3 latent factors of marital characteristics (love, loyalty, and shared values) and 2 moderating variables (length of marriage and gender of participant).     

Insight, rumination, and self-reflection as predictors of well-being

Dispositional private self-focused attention variables such as insight, internal self-awareness (ISA), and self-reflectiveness (SR) have been found to relate to well-being. The present study sought to determine which dispositional private self-focused attention variables have the most predictive power for subjective well-being as measured by the Satisfaction With Life Scale (E. Diener, R. A. Emmons, R. J. Larsen, & S. Griffin, 1985) and for a eudaemonic form of well-being as measured by the Psychological Well-Being Scale (C. D. Ryff, 1989). A total of 121 college student participants completed an online version of the Self-Consciousness Scale-Revised, the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire, the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale, the Satisfaction With Life Scale, and the Psychological WellBeing Scale. Results of a multivariate regression analysis using the Self-Consciousness Scale-Revised's (M. F. Scheier & C. S. Carver, 1985) subfactors of SR and ISA, the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire's (P. D. Trapnell & J. D. Campbell, 1999) subscales of Rumination and Reflection, and the Self-Reflection and Insight Scale's (A. M. Grant, J. Franklin, & P. Langford, 2002) Self-Reflection and Insight subscales revealed that the Insight subscale was the only statistically significant predictor (a positive predictor) for all 6 dimensions of psychological well-being. Insight was also the only significant positive predictor for satisfaction with life. The Rumination subscale was a significant negative predictor for 3 dimensions of psychological well-being, and the Reflection subscale was a significant positive predictor for 1 dimension. Implications of dispositional self-awareness variables and their relation to dimensions of well-being are discussed.     

Action,prediction, and temporal awareness

The brain needs to track changes in the relation between action and effect. In two experiments, participants made voluntary keypress actions. In an adaptation phase, these actions were followed after a fixed interval by a tone. During a subsequent test phase, the duration of the interval was unexpectedly changed. We used time perception as an implicit marker of the experience of participants' control over the effect, and confirmed a temporal binding between actions and effects. On test trials, participants perceived tones to occur as shifted towards their time of occurrence in the preceding adaptation phase. Therefore, the perceived time of a tone was partly based on learning of an internal prediction, rather than on the time of actual sensory input. This predictive model is rapidly updated over a few trials (Experiment 1), and requires attention to the tones (Experiment 2). The brain learns action–effect relations. This predictive learning influences the perception of effects, and underlies some temporal illusions associated with action.     

Transsaccadic perception of saccade target and flanker objects

To account for location-dependent and location-independent preview benefits in transsaccadic object perception, J. M. Henderson (1994) and J. M. Henderson and M. D. Anes (1994) proposed a dual-route model in which both episodic object representations and long-term memory representations store information across a saccade. Four experiments are reported in which the dual-route model was assessed. Preview benefits for saccade target objects were found to be location independent, whereas preview benefits for flanker objects were location dependent. These results support a single-route, 2-stage model of transsaccadic object perception. First, preattentive object files are set up to parse a set of attentional and/or saccade targets from peripheral vision, causing location-dependent preview benefits. Second, 1 object is attentionally selected for further processing, activating long-term memory representations and resulting in location-independent preview benefits.     

The joint role of trained,untrained, and observed actions at the origins of goal recognition

Recent findings across a variety of domains reveal the benefits of self-produced experience on object exploration, object knowledge, attention, and action perception. The influence of active experience may be particularly important in infancy, when motor development is undergoing great changes. Despite the importance of self-produced experience, we know that infants and young children are eventually able to gain knowledge through purely observational experience. In the current work, three-month-old infants were given experience with object-directed actions in one of three forms and their recognition of the goal of grasping actions was then assessed in a habituation paradigm. All infants were given the chance to manually interact with the toys without assistance (a difficult task for most three-month-olds). Two of the three groups were then given additional experience with object-directed actions, either through active training (in which Velcro mittens helped infants act more efficiently) or observational training. Findings support the conclusion that self-produced experience is uniquely informative for action perception and suggest that individual differences in spontaneous motor activity may interact with observational experience to inform action perception early in life.     

A new look at sensory attenuation. Action-effect anticipation affects sensitivity, not response bias

The systematic association of an action that a person performs with its sensory effects is thought to attenuate that person's perception of the effect of the action. However, whether learned sensorimotor contingencies truly affect perception, rather than just inducing a response bias, has yet to be determined. The experiment presented in this article comprised two parts: an action-effect association phase and a test phase, during which the actions' perceptual effects were tested. During the association phase, specific actions (left-key and right-key presses) were associated with specific visual effects (tilted Gabor patches). In the test phase, participants' left-key presses and right-key presses triggered the onset of a low-contrast tilted Gabor patch in 50% of trials (no stimulus was presented on the remaining 50% of trials). Participants were required to report the presence or absence of this tilted Gabor patch. Our results showed that participants' sensitivity (d') to the Gabor patches was reduced by 10% when the patches were triggered by the action they had previously been associated with. This finding indicates that a person's action does not induce a response bias (c), but changes the perception (d') of the learned action effect.     

The relationship between emotional intelligence and ego defense mechanisms

The author examined the relationship between the components of emotional intelligence (perception of emotion, affect regulation, and emotional knowledge) and personality factors associated with adaptation, represented by the hierarchical model of defense mechanisms (M. Bond, S. Gardner, J. Christian, & J. Sigal, 1983). Bivariate correlation analyses yielded mixed results; the adaptive defense styles were correlated with overall emotional intelligence but not with the emotional perception and regulation components, as was hypothesized. Emotional knowledge was correlated with both adaptive and maladaptive defense styles and with general intelligence, as was expected. Implications for counseling and psychoeducational interventions are suggested.     

RELATIONS BETWEEN PREDICTION- AND ESTIMATION-RESPONSES IN CUE-PROBABILITY LEARNING AND TRANSFER

B auer M arianne Relations between prediction- and estimation-responses in cue-probability learning and transfer. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1972, 13 , 198–207. —Comparisons were made between prediction- and estimation-responses, preceded by training with different types of responding and when task probabilities were shifted. The main results were: ( a ) differential effects of procedure of learning and shift in task structure on predictions and estimates support the hypothesis of two different processes, ( b ) estimates as indicators of probability learning reflect traits assumed to characterize the perception process, viz. sensitivity to shifts in probabilities, and robustness against influence from procedure of learning, and ( c ) prediction-responses were affected in the direction of more extreme responses by simultaneous estimation, which result strengthens the supposition that probability estimates are insufficient as indicators of the complete perception process in a prediction task.     

Responsibility and perfectionism in OCD: an experimental study

Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suggest a number of different variables that may play a role in the development and maintenance of obsessive compulsive symptoms [Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., & Ladouceur, R. (1996) Correcting faulty appraisals of obsessional thoughts. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 433-446]. This study's aim was to verify the effect of perfectionism and excessive responsibility on checking behaviors and related variables. Twenty-four moderately perfectionistic subjects (MP) and 27 highly perfectionistic subjects (HP) were submitted to a manipulation of responsibility (low and high). After each manipulation, they had to perform a classification task during which checking behaviors were observed. Results indicate that more checking behaviors (hesitations, checking) occurred in the high responsibility condition than in the low responsibility condition for subjects of both groups. After executing the task in the high responsibility condition, HP subjects reported more influence over and responsibility for negative consequences than MP subjects. These results suggest that high perfectionistic tendencies could predispose individuals to overestimate their perceived responsibility for negative events. Furthermore, perfectionism could be conceived as playing a catalytic role in the perception of responsibility. Results are discussed according to cognitive models of OCD.     

What subjective experiences determine the perception of falling asleep during sleep onset period?

Sleep onset is associated with marked changes in behavioral, physiological, and subjective phenomena. In daily life though subjective experience is the main criterion in terms of which we identify it. But very few studies have focused on these experiences. This study seeks to identify the subjective variables that reflect sleep onset. Twenty young subjects took an afternoon nap in the laboratory while polysomnographic recordings were made. They were awakened four times in order to assess subjective experiences that correlate with the (1) appearance of slow eye movement, (2) initiation of stage 1 sleep, (3) initiation of stage 2 sleep, and (4) 5 min after the start of stage 2 sleep. A logistic regression identified control over and logic of thought as the two variables that predict the perception of having fallen asleep. For sleep perception, these two variables accurately classified 91.7% of the cases; for the waking state, 84.1%.     

The Relationship Between Emotional Intelligence and Ego Defense Mechanisms

The author examined the relationship between the components of emotional intelligence (perception of emotion, affect regulation, and emotional knowledge) and personality factors associated with adaptation, represented by the hierarchical model of defense mechanisms (M. Bond, S. Gardner, J. Christian. & J. Sigal, 1983). Bivariate correlation analyses yielded mixed results; the adaptive defense styles were correlated with overall emotional intelligence but not with the emotional perception and regulation components, as was hypothesized. Emotional knowledge was correlated with both adaptive and maladaptive defense styles and with general intelligence, as was expected. Implications for counseling and psychoeducational interventions are suggested.     

Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action

This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.     

The influence of action observation on action execution: Dissociating the contribution of action on perception,perception on action,and resolving conflict

For more than 15 years, motor interference paradigms have been used to investigate the influence of action observation on action execution. Most research on so-called automatic imitation has focused on variables that play a modulating role or investigated potential confounding factors. Interestingly, furthermore, a number of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have tried to shed light on the functional mechanisms and neural correlates involved in imitation inhibition. However, these fMRI studies, presumably due to poor temporal resolution, have primarily focused on high-level processes and have neglected the potential role of low-level motor and perceptual processes. In the current EEG study, we therefore aimed to disentangle the influence of low-level perceptual and motoric mechanisms from high-level cognitive mechanisms. We focused on potential congruency differences in the visual N190 ? a component related to the processing of biological motion, the Readiness Potential ? a component related to motor preparation, and the high-level P3 component. Interestingly, we detected congruency effects in each of these components, suggesting that the interference effect in an automatic imitation paradigm is not only related to high-level processes such as self-other distinction but also to more low-level influences of perception on action and action on perception. Moreover, we documented relationships of the neural effects with (autistic) behavior.