On the role of depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty

This essay considers the role of depersonalization in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. While there has been a modest amount of interest in depersonalization from a phenomenological perspective, a critical exploration of the theme of depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking itself remains overlooked (cf. Varga (Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 19:2, 103-113, 2012); Colombetti and Ratcliffe (Emotion Review, 4:2, 145-250, 2012). This is an oddity, given that the theme of depersonalization proves instructive in Merleau-Ponty’s account of the constitution of the subject, and appears within Phenomenology of Perception at key points in his thinking (Merleau-Ponty 2012). This paper serves as a critical exposition of the role of depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. I proceed in three ways. In the first instance, I provide an overview of depersonalization, addressing its salient characteristics, which includes: a feeling of disturbed bodily subjectivity; a diminishment of affective feeling; and a corresponding and overarching sense of unreality, carrying with it a sense of estrangement. In the main part of the paper, I consider the articulation of depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty, especially as it figures in Phenomenology of Perception. My claim is that depersonalization can be best captured as an expression of Merleau-Ponty’s idea of ambiguity. I conclude by considering to what extent Merleau-Ponty’s account of depersonalization corresponds with the medical understanding of the condition.     

Zero-variable theories in the analysis of social phenomena

Are the background and context of complex social behaviour neglected in theory-building? This sweeping question is handled here in a highly specific way. First, the character of the everyday ‘explainer's’ theories is examined, and it is found that the explainer's accounts of social behaviour can go in different directions. These directions, which are regarded here as opposite ends of a continuum, are: (1) the explainer takes into account the manifold personal and contextual factors that bear on psychological accompaniments of behaviour; (2) the person whose behaviour is to be explained is first categorized (e.g. ‘aggressive type’), whereby reference to the category then serves as the explanation. While an optimistic view of progress in psychological theorizing (cf. Lewin, 1931; Wegner and Vallacher, 1977) would lead one to think that the scientific psychologist would steer away from such simplified, ‘aggressive type’ explanations, a glance at widespread, current accounts of complex social behaviour reveals that these modes of explaining are indeed a dominant mode. The primary aspects of this paper are then devoted to several observations on this direction of theorizing, and it is proposed that such theorizing (a) reduces one's theory to a list of behaviours; (b) results in no antecedent, psychological variables; (c) depends on a trivial, circular form of research for support; (d) develops in the direction of trying to claim all of the variation within the behaviour realm being studied; and (e) precludes theoretical integration, in that the criterion of success within such endeavours is the uniqueness of the theorist's own classification system.     

Phase analysis of burnout and other psychological phenomena

Phase analysis appears to have the potential to increase knowledge and improve ameliorative solutions for burnout. This article explored potential uses of the phase models of burnout and social and practical implications of the phases. The use of phase analysis to increase understanding of other psychological phenomena such as anxiety, citizenship behavior, and hardiness is introduced.     

Imaginary companions, fantasy twins, mirror dreams and depersonalization.

Illustrative case material is presented to demonstrate genetic linkages between the presence of imaginary companions or fantasy twins and extensive mirror play in childhood and early adolescence, and the appearance of mirror dreams and depersonalization in later adolescence and adulthood. The defensive splitting of the self-representations observable in these phenomena is viewed as a means of warding off castration anxiety and anxiety about object loss, anxieties which arise because of conflicts primarily centering on intense aggressive drive derivative wishes. Formulations about depersonalization are discussed.     

A qualitative analysis of sensory phenomena induced by perceptual deprivation

Previous studies have shown that misperceptions and illusory experiences can occur if sensory stimulation is withdrawn or becomes invariant even for short periods of time. Using a perceptual deprivation paradigm, we created a monotonous audiovisual environment and asked participants to verbally report any auditory, visual or body-related phenomena they experienced. The data (analysed using a variant of interpretative phenomenological analysis) revealed two main themes: (1) reported sensory phenomena have different spatial characteristics ranging from simple percepts to the feeling of immersion in a complex multisensory environment and (2) the active contribution of the perceiver where participants report engaging in exploratory processes even when there is nothing to find. Detailed analysis of the qualitative data further showed that participants who reported more perceptual phenomena were more likely to report internal bodily sensations, move more during the experiment and score higher on the Revised Hallucination Scale than those reporting fewer percepts explicitly linking perceptual deprivation to somatic phenomena. The results demonstrate how the variety of sensory experiences induced by perceptual deprivation can give further insight into the factors mediating conscious awareness and may suggest ways in which the brain imposes meaning on the environment under invariant sensory conditions.     

Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation improves depersonalization: a case report

Depersonalization disorder is a poorly understood and treatment-resistant condition. This report describes a patient with depersonalization disorder who underwent six sessions of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation on the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation produced a 28% reduction on depersonalization scores.     

Developmental depersonalization: the prefrontal cortex and self-functions in autism

The human self model suggests that the construct of self involves functions such as agency, body-centered spatial perspectivity, and long-term unity. Vogeley, Kurthen, Falkai, and Maieret (1999) suggest that agency is subserved by the prefrontal cortex and other association areas of the cortex, spatial perspectivity by the prefrontal cortex and the parietal lobes, and long-term unity by the prefrontal cortex and the temporal lobes and that all of these functions are impaired in schizophrenia. Exploring the connections between the prefrontal cortex and the construct of self, the present article extends the application of the self model to autism. It suggests that in contrast to schizophrenia, agency and spatial perspectivity are probably preserved in autism, but that, similarly to schizophrenia, long-term unity is probably impaired. This hypothesis is compatible with a model of neuropsychological dysfunction in autism in a neural network including parts of the prefrontal cortex, the temporal lobes, and the cerebellum.     

Structural analysis of subjective categorical data

A general approach to the analysis of subjective categorical data is considered, in which agreement matrices of two or more raters are directly expressed in terms of error and agreement parameters. The method provides focused analyses of ratings from several raters for whom ratings have measurement error distributions that may induce bias in the evaluation of substantive questions of interest. Each rater's judgment process is modeled as a mixture of two components: an error variable that is unique for the rater in question as well as an agreement variable that operationalizes the true values of the units of observation. The statistical problems of identification, estimation, and testing of such measurement models are discussed.The general model is applied in several special cases. The most simple situation is that underlying Cohen's Kappa, where two raters place units into unordered categories. The model provides a generalization and systematization of the Kappa-idea to correct for agreement by chance. In applications with typical research designs, including a between-subjects design and a mixed within-subjects, between-subjects design, the model is shown to disentangle structural and measurement components of the observations, thereby controlling for possible confounding effects of systematic rater bias. Situations considered include the case of more than two raters as well as the case of ordered categories. The different analyses are illustrated by means of real data sets.The authors wish to thank Lawrence Hubert and Ivo Molenaar for helpful and detailed comments on a previous draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to Jens Möller und Bernd Strauß for the data from the 1992 Olympic Games. We thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on an earlier draft.     

Emotional memory and perception of emotional faces in patients suffering from depersonalization disorder

Previous work has shown that patients with depersonalization disorder (DPD) have reduced physiological responses to emotional stimuli, which may be related to subjective emotional numbing. This study investigated two aspects of affective processing in 13 patients with DPD according to the DSM‐IV criteria and healthy controls: the perception of emotional facial expressions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise) and memory for emotional stimuli. Results revealed a specific lack of sensitivity to facial expression of anger in patients, but normal enhancement of memory for peripheral aspects of arousing emotional material. The results are consistent with altered processing of threat‐related stimuli but intact consolidation processes, at least when the stimuli involved are potently arousing.