Yu and your mind

This note is a brief reply to the main argument of Qiuen Yu: 1992, Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind,Synthese 90, 145–79.     

First impressions: making up your mind after a 100-ms exposure to a face

People often draw trait inferences from the facial appearance of other people. We investigated the minimal conditions under which people make such inferences. In five experiments, each focusing on a specific trait judgment, we manipulated the exposure time of unfamiliar faces. Judgments made after a 100-ms exposure correlated highly with judgments made in the absence of time constraints, suggesting that this exposure time was sufficient for participants to form an impression. In fact, for all judgments-attractiveness, likeability, trustworthiness, competence, and aggressiveness-increased exposure time did not significantly increase the correlations. When exposure time increased from 100 to 500 ms, participants' judgments became more negative, response times for judgments decreased, and confidence in judgments increased. When exposure time increased from 500 to 1,000 ms, trait judgments and response times did not change significantly (with one exception), but confidence increased for some of the judgments; this result suggests that additional time may simply boost confidence in judgments. However, increased exposure time led to more differentiated person impressions.     

Knowing your heart and your mind: The relationships between metamemory and interoception

Humans experience a unified self that integrates our mental lives and physical bodies, but many studies focus on isolated domains of self-knowledge. We tested the hypothesis that knowledge of one’s mind and body are related by examining metamemory and interoception. We evaluated two dimensions of metamemory and interoception: subjective beliefs and the accuracy of those beliefs compared to objective criteria. We first demonstrated, in two studies, that metamemory beliefs were positively correlated with interoceptive beliefs, and this was not due to domain-general confidence. Finally, we showed that individuals with better metamemory accuracy also had better interoceptive accuracy. Taken together, these findings suggest a common mechanism subserving knowledge of our cognitive and bodily states.     

Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind

This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional relations rather than by their physical constituents. Furthermore, it has been claimed that functionalism entails a version of extended cognition which is sufficiently radical as to be obviously false. I survey the debate and propose several ways of avoiding this conclusion, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the hypothesis of extended cognition from the related notion of the extended mind.     

Vivisecting the religious mind: Religiosity and motivated social cognition

The relation between motivated social cognition and the religiosity dimensions, which Wulff (1991, 1997) described (Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic), was investigated in a Flemish speaking Belgian student sample (N=330). The Need for Closure Scale (NFC, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) was used to measure motivated social cognition and the Post-Critical Belief Scale (Duriez et al., 2000) was used to measure Wulff's religiosity dimensions. Although NFC was expected to relate to the Literal vs. Symbolic dimension only, results also revealed a relation between NFC and the Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence dimension. However, whereas the former relationship is due to the NFC facets, Discomfort with Ambiguity and Closed-Mindedness, the latter relation can be attributed to the facets, Order and Structure and Predictability. Results obtained in a second Flemish speaking Belgian student sample (N=392) confirm these findings. Thus, apparently, whereas religious belief as such seems to be associated with a preference for order and structure as well as predictability, it is those who deal with religious content in a literal way who are incapable of dealing with alternative opinions.     

Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections

It is widely recognized that people sometimes use theory-of-mind judgments in moral cognition. A series of recent studies shows that the connection can also work in the opposite direction: moral judgments can sometimes be used in theory-of-mind cognition. Thus, there appear to be cases in which people's moral judgments actually serve as input to the process underlying their application of theory-of-mind concepts.     

Asserting your mind: Interruptions extremize consumer choices

Interruptions prevail in the retail environment, especially during consumer decision-making. However, scant research has examined whether and how interruptions that suspend decisions affect consumer choices. We posit that interruptions heighten the consumers' preference certainty, which leads to a choice extremity effect—consumers choose their preferred products even more and their unpreferred products even less. Six experiments provide convergent evidence for the choice extremity effect and the underlying process. Study 1a shows that interruptions lead to choice extremity with a vice product (i.e., chips). Study 1b confirms the effect in the context of incentive-compatible choices. Study 2 replicates the choice extremity effect with a virtue product (i.e., yogurts). Study 3 further tests the robustness of the effect with a decision-related interruption. Study 4 shows that preference certainty mediates the effect of interruptions on choice extremity and rules out the level of arousal and task involvement as alternative accounts. Using a moderation approach, Study 5 shows that the choice extremity effect disappears when consumers have high self-concept clarity. The present study contributes to research on interruptions, preference certainty, and consumer choices and provides implications for marketers.     

Social cognition after head injury: sarcasm and theory of mind

Closed head injury (CHI) is associated with communication difficulties in everyday social interactions. Previous work has reported impaired comprehension of sarcasm, using sarcastic remarks where the intended meaning is the opposite of the sincere or literal meaning. Participants with CHI in the present study were assessed using two types of sarcastic items, those with a directly opposite meaning and those with an indirect, non-literal but not directly opposite meaning. The CHI group was differentially poorer at comprehending sarcastic versus sincere remarks, although type of sarcastic materials did not influence performance. Errors involved not only literal interpretations, but also incorrect non-literal interpretations. Theory of mind (mentalising) was also assessed by comparing comprehension of human actions with control physical events. The CHI group was selectively impaired on the mentalising component of this task, and mentalising scores correlated with sarcasm comprehension. The implications of the findings for our understanding of impaired sarcastic comprehension after acquired brain injury are discussed.     

读心的比较研究：非人灵长类与人类在心理理论上的异同点及其解释

利用非人灵长类开展比较研究是探索心理理论本质、起源和进化动因的重要途经。大量实证研究显示非人灵长类可以表现出一些基础心理理论成分,包括联合注意、意图理解和一级观点采择,这表明心理理论在灵长类动物的进化谱系中具有进化连续性。然而,非人灵长类无法像人类一样达成二级观点采择和错误信念理解,潜心智化假说、替代表征假说、最小限度心理理论假说和意识关系假说试图对此差异进行解释。尽管视角与具体内容不同,但这些假说都强调,非人灵长类无法对其他个体关于外部世界的心理信念形成表征,信念表征是非人灵长类与人类读心能力的重要分界点。未来研究需要重点澄清共享意图、语言机制以及社会生态环境因素与心理理论产生的相互影响作用。     

Superdupersizing the mind: extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat

The hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) contends that parts of the world outside of the head partly comprise the vehicles of representation and mind. I consider and reject recent efforts to defend EC from the problem of “cognitive bloat.”     

Outwitting the rational mind: How effortful thinking influences price cognition

Prior research presents mixed findings on how people's degrees of effortful thinking influence their reliance on heuristics and biases. Although the tenets of dual process theory would argue that effortful thinking should attenuate people's reliance on heuristics, a number of contemporary findings suggest otherwise: Effortful thinking may, in fact, enhance biased processing of information in certain instances. This research shows how, in the context of pricing, people's degrees of effortful thinking can amplify their inclination towards biased processing of price information. In five studies (n = 1,339), we find that effortful thinking induces a greater preference for nine‐ending (vs. zero‐ending) prices, and the effect is mainly driven by people's greater propensity for argument‐based decision making. Such predilection to nine‐endings attenuates with lower cognitive effort in processing price information. Moreover, when locus of deliberation shifts from price to quality, consumers' preference for nine‐ending priced options is subdued.     

Sexually selective cognition: beauty captures the mind of the beholder

Across 5 experimental studies, the authors explore selective processing biases for physically attractive others. The findings suggest that (a). both male and female observers selectively attend to physically attractive female targets, (b). limiting the attentional capacity of either gender results in biased frequency estimates of attractive females, (c). although females selectively attend to attractive males, limiting females' attentional capacity does not lead to biased estimates of attractive males, (d). observers of both genders exhibit enhanced recognition memory for attractive females but attenuated recognition for attractive males. Results suggest that different mating-related motives may guide the selective processing of attractive men and women.     

The more your mind wanders,the smaller your attentional blink: An individual differences study

The present studies investigate the hypothesis that individuals who frequently report experiencing episodes of mind wandering do so because they under-invest attentional/executive resources in the external environment. Here we examined whether self-reported instances of mind wandering predict the magnitude of the “attentional blink” (AB) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task, since a prominent view is that the AB derives from an over-investment of attention in the information stream. Study 1 demonstrates that subjective reports of mind wandering in a sustained attention task have a negative predictive relation with respect to the magnitude of the AB measured in a subsequent RSVP task. In addition, using the Spontaneous and Deliberate Mind Wandering Questionnaire in Study 2, we were again able to show that trait-level mind wandering in everyday life negatively predicts AB magnitude. We suggest that mind wandering may be the behavioural outcome of an adaptive cognitive style intended to maximize the efficient processing of dynamic and temporally unpredictable events.