Limiting logical pluralism

In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI). I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and (most relevantly to logical pluralism) required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.

     

A dialogical route to logical pluralism

This paper argues that adopting a particular dialogical account of logical consequence quite directly gives rise to an interesting form of logical pluralism, the form of pluralism in question arising out of the requirement that deductive proofs be explanatory.

     

Metalinguistic negotiation and logical pluralism

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one right logic. A particular version of the view, what is sometimes called domain-specific logical pluralism, has it that the right logic and connectives depend somehow on the domain of use, or context of use, or the linguistic framework. This type of view has a problem with cross-framework communication, though: it seems that all such communication turns into merely verbal disputes. If two people approach the same domain with different logics as their guide, then they may be using different connectives, and hence talking past each other. In this situation, if we think we are having a conversation about “\(\lnot A\)”, but are using different “\(\lnot \)”s, then we are not really talking about the same thing. The communication problem prevents legitimate disagreements about logic, which is a bad result. In this paper I articulate a possible solution to this problem, without giving up pluralism, which requires adopting a notion of metalinguistic negotiation, and allows people to communicate and disagree across domains/contexts/frameworks.

     

What logical pluralism cannot be

Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.     

Variations on intra-theoretical logical pluralism: internal versus external consequence

Philosophical Studies - Intra-theoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaning-invariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland (Australas J Philos 91(2):355–373, 2013)....     

A note on direct products and ultraproducts of logical matrices

In this contribution we shall characterize matrix consequence operation determined by a direct product and an ultraproduct of a family of logical matrices. As an application we shall describe finite consequence operations with the help of ultrapowers.     

A note on mathematical models for learning

It is shown that a rational learning curve developed by Estes for paired associate learning is a special case of a more general function. The latter is the product of two functions and assumes that the discovery and fixation aspects of learning are independent. The indications are that the form of one of the functions has not been tested sharply by Estes in the paired associate learning setting.     

Correction to: Variations on intra-theoretical logical pluralism: internal versus external consequence

Philosophical Studies - In the original publication of the article, in Definition 4, the sixth line which reads as     

A corrective note on O'Donohue and Szymanski's study of logical analysis and REBT's use of empirical hypothesis testing as well as logical analysis

This article acknowledges the contribution of O'Donohue and Szymanski's study showing that the logical analysis of irrational beliefs that rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT) favors may be more effective than the empirical hypothesis testing that cognitive therapy (CT) favors. It points out, however, that logical analysis and empirical hypothesis testing include overlapping concepts and procedures. REBT, though favoring logical analysis, actually uses empirical hypothesis testing too.     

Dialectical pluralism: A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology

A theoretical conceptualization of pluralism in psychology called dialectical pluralism is proposed in this paper. It is argued that this approach provides an effective and efficient basis for scientific progress in psychology. Three primary components of dialectical pluralism are developed. First, drawing on Royce's constructive dialectics, it is contended that tension between competing theories should be sustained in the hope of producing evaluative or integrative solutions. Second, the unity-disunity debate in psychology is reframed as a continuum and it is argued that oscillating periods of convergent and divergent pluralism would provide a productive model for scientific progress. Finally, intercontextualism is discussed as the underlying philosophical foundation for dialectical pluralism. This alternative to both mainstream psychology's positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as competing positions that may be more contextualist in orientation, is expounded as the justification for this new conceptualization. In particular, the limits of a methodological unity based on positivist-empiricist foundations, as well as of a pragmatic pluralism based on contextualist foundations, are both addressed by intercontextualism. As a result, dialectical pluralism may provide a middle ground between these two distinctive factions within psychology, while alleviating the fragmentation of the discipline.     

Gradable adjectives: A defence of pluralism

This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a ‘pluralist’ approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the group-indexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory.     

A note on notes: note taking and containment

In extreme situations of massive projective identification, both the analyst and the patient may come to share a fantasy or belief that his or her own psychic reality will be annihilated if the psychic reality of the other is accepted or adopted (Britton 1998). In the example of' Dr. M and his patient, the paradoxical dilemma around note taking had highly specific transference meanings; it was not simply an instance of the generalized human response of distracted attention that Freud (1912) had spoken of, nor was it the destabilization of analytic functioning that I tried to describe in my work with Mr. L. Whether such meanings will always exist in these situations remains a matter to be determined by further clinical experience. In reopening a dialogue about note taking during sessions, I have attempted to move the discussion away from categorical injunctions about what analysis should or should not do, and instead to foster a more nuanced, dynamic, and pair-specific consideration of the analyst's functioning in the immediate context of the analytic relationship. There is, of course, a wide variety of listening styles among analysts, and each analyst's mental functioning may be affected differently by each patient whom the analyst sees. I have raised many questions in the hopes of stimulating an expanded discussion that will allow us to share our experiences and perhaps reach additional conclusions. Further consideration may lead us to decide whether note taking may have very different meanings for other analysts and analyst-patient pairs, and whether it may serve useful functions in addition to the one that I have described.     

多元表征假设：概念表征机制的新观点

传统的认知主义认为概念表征是与主体的感知系统无关的抽象符号。而具身理论则认为,概念表征以主体的感觉、知觉运动系统为基础的,感知系统在概念表征中具有中心作用。然而,具身性假设无法恰当的解释抽象概念表征这一问题。这种局限性说明主体的概念系统可能具有多元表征机制：既包括感知表征以加工与身体经验相关的具体知识,也包括抽象符号表征以加工与身体经验无关的抽象知识。来自病理学、认知神经科学和行为实验的实证研究证明了不同类型的概念会涉及不同的表征机制,证实了多元表征存在的合理性。今后的研究应探讨各种表征机制之间的关系等问题。     

A vision of dialogical pluralism in psychology

This paper argues for dialogical approach to pluralism in psychology. We argue that human psychology is both ontologically and epistemologically pluralistic and advocate an integrated approach to disciplinary pluralism based on mutual, dialogical engagement among psychology's diverse traditions. A framework for such dialogical engagement is developed from the standpoint of a hermeneutic understanding of pluralism. Some possibilities for implementing a dialogical approach to pluralism, in terms of intra-disciplinary boundary-work and oppositional contrasts among psychology's diverse traditions, are then considered as ways of promoting disciplinary integration through dialogue.