The cross-culturally disordered self: A self-psychological study and treatment

The psychotherapeutic treatment of a young woman whose development was thwarted by patriarchal, sexist, familial, and cultural contexts is presented and discussed. The history, dream material, and symptomotology indicate developmental deficits from which derived a lack of cohesive, individual selfhood as well as narcissistic vulnerabilities manifested by a high propensity for shame. The author posits a view of patriarchy as acculturating women subjectively to experience themselves on an unconscious fantasy level as appendages of men, thus depriving them of genuine and authentic selfhood. This perspective is used as a lens through which this woman's experience in two patriarchal cultures can be empathically understood. The case enables us to examine how the process of acculturation in patriarchal contexts can interfere with women's capacity to develop a strong sense of self and allows us to consider whether and how human development is culturally determined.     

The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum

The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self.     

Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence

The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for someone’s persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person’s entire past in his present being and potentiality.     

Investing in the real me: Preference for experiential to material purchases driven by the motivation to search for true self-knowledge

One mechanism underlying the hedonic benefits of experiential purchases is that one’s core self is more centrally reflected in experiential purchases. However, little is known about whether people consume experiential purchases as a means of discovering their true self. The present research explored the possibility that people value experiential purchases as a potential tool for understanding their true self. Consistent with the hypothesis, Study 1 demonstrated that experiential purchases were perceived to be a more valuable source of gaining knowledge about one’s true self compared to material purchases. Using correlational methods, Study 2 found that the motivation to search for true self-knowledge positively predicted preference for experiential purchases over material purchases. Finally, Study 3 showed a causal effect of motivation to search for true self-knowledge on a tendency to prefer experiential purchases to material purchases. Implications and future directions for well-being research and marketing are discussed.     

Introduction to Diving Beneath the Waves: In Memory of Tom Ravenette

Recent explorations of the relationship between narrative and self, particularly those tied to social constructionism, have served as a valuable corrective to the still prevalent tendency in psychology to divorce the self from its social surround. Yet certain of these explorations, by privileging the social over the individual, have led to a vision of selfhood that is problematic in its own right. Specifically, it is argued that, even though the "tools" employed in the construction of selfhood are social in nature, the configurational acts through which this construction occurs are better conceived in poetic terms, as imaginative labor seeking to give form and meaning to experience. In considering the poetic construction of selfhood, this article attempts to articulate further the relationship between narrative and self, the cultural dimension of personal experience, and the importance of the idea of narrative for expanding the scope of psychological knowledge.     

Discussion of Robert Grossmark's Case of Pamela

The author discusses Robert Grossmark's “Case of Pamela” from the perspective of developmental (relational) trauma and offers the view that Pamela's remarkable growth as well as the stunning power of the clinical process that made it possible is best illuminated from the vantage point of self-states, dissociation, affect dysregulation, and the dread of annihilation. The phenomenon of pathological narcissism, which in a classical idiom would be a central concept in describing Pamela's personality organization, is here formulated relationally in a self-state context. That is, each self-state, to the extent that it is protectively dissociated from others becomes, inherently, an island of narcissism and is what narcissism truly means. In the face of trauma, each island of selfhood operates to obliterate, automatically, the felt invasion of otherness from parts of the self that hold alternative views of “self-truth,” as well as from an other in real life—a separate person with a mind of his or her own. As each narcissistic island of Pamela's selfhood was recognized and accepted as valid in its own terms by Robert, the experiential wholeness of Pamela's sense of self began to be restored. The clinical process through which this was accomplished is seen by the author as the expansion and enrichment of Pamela's overarching self-coherence through her gradual representation of Robert's “otherness” as part of each self-representation. This in turn allowed the restoration of safe, communicative interchange between the formerly dissociated self-state islands of narcissistic insularity.     

Wave of Memory

This article explores theories of selfhood by juxtaposing them against an individual's lived experience. As Ronald Manheimer reflects upon his friendship with Hildegard, a student from one of the classes that he taught at a senior center in Olympia, Washington, he compares this experience with that described by various theories of selfhood. Building on the linguistic self, the narrative self, and the relational self, Manheimer posits a self that exists through time within a network of relationships, not a fixed determined self, but a dynamic self, subject to revision and reimagining.     

Sense of identity in advanced Alzheimer’s dementia: A cognitive dissociation between sameness and selfhood?

We looked at whether sense of identity persists in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and if its profile remains the same between two examinations. A specifically designed protocol was administered to 16 AD patients in the mild to severe stages of dementia and to 16 matched healthy controls, both living in the same institution. We showed that sense of identity was broadly preserved in AD patients. The patterns of their responses were similar to those of controls, and remained consistent over a two-week period. However, some qualitative characteristics of sense of identity in AD patients differed significantly from those of controls, suggesting that AD patients may not be able to update their self-knowledge, probably because of their episodic memory deficit. These results are discussed in the light of both current models of the self and philosophical concepts such as sameness and selfhood.     

If I am only my genes, what am I? Genetic essentialism and a Jewish response

With the advent of the Genetic Age comes a unique new set of problems and ethical decisions. There is a tendency to take the scientific developments presented by modern genetics at face value, as if the science itself were value-neutral and not influenced by cultural and religious images. One example of the fallout of the Genetic Age is the development of a "genetic self," the idea that our essential selfhood lies in our genes. It is important to understand the assumptions of the Genetic Age, the development of genetic selfhood, and the broader cultural trends and assumptions that underlie modern genetic thinking. It is equally important, however, to shape a reaction to the concept of a genetic self. Judaism has long carried on a unique discussion about the nature of selfhood in different times and places and about the relation of the corporeal self to the essential self. Insights from Judaism therefore may help to craft a reaction to the modern genetic self that incorporates the best of modern genetics as well as the integrity of a more transcendent selfhood.     

KIERKEGAARD ON PATIENCE AND THE TEMPORALITY OF THE SELF: The Virtues of a Being in Time

This paper examines Kierkegaard's discussion of patience in some of his Upbuilding Discourses , and its connection with his understanding of the nature of selfhood as it appears both in the Discourses and in The Sickness unto Death . That understanding stresses that selfhood is not simply given, but is a task to be achieved—although a task that can only be achieved by the self that is formed in the process of undertaking it. For Kierkegaard, an account of the self that recognizes its essential temporality must give a crucial role to patience as a virtue necessary for the formation and maintenance of personal identity. However, although the self is essentially temporal for Kierkegaard, it is also essentially such as to participate in eternity, and this complexity and tension in his concept of the self gives his understanding of patience a particular character—one that presents an important challenge to some of the dominant assumptions of recent and contemporary philosophy in both the analytic and the continental traditions.     

The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: a psychological perspective

The paper argues that Zahavi's defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. "identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena", and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object "feels" like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through time give rise to intractable problems.     

Identity and the self. The importance of recent developmental research for the psychoanalytic theory of the self]

Recent findings from research on human development have implications for the psychoanalytic concepts of self and identity. The emerging feeling of selfhood appears to be the precipitate of finely tuned interactive regulations involving mother and child. Similarly, early mirroring processes are shown to have a fundamental significance for the experimental structure of self and identity. The author discusses the new meanings acquired by the identity concept as a result of these investigations. He describes the elementary psychic structures of identity as well as the subordinate regulatory function of the sense of identity.     

Empathy as intersubjectivity: resolving Hume and Smith’s divide

Although empathy is arguably an important factor to consider in moral education, the concept itself has consistently stood on tenuous ground. In this essay, I claim that our adherence to ontological dualism and discrete subjectivity have problematized our comprehension of empathy. I propose that our understanding is limited by our understanding of selfhood. If the self were defined as intersubjective, along the lines of Merleau-Ponty, then empathy’s ambiguities would dissipate. After reconceptualizing empathy in light of intersubjectivity, I call for pedagogical relations that are aligned with developmental research, which provides further support for adhering to an alternative conception of the phenomenon.     

Theology and the Fragmentation of the Self

Modern Christian anthropology frequently adopts from socio-cultural theory the thesis that modern selfhood is fragmented. This 'fragmentation thesis' should be placed within a framework which sees modernity not as homogeneous but as stranded. Four conflicting construals of modern selfhood can be discerned: the bestowed self, the rational self, the boundless self and the effective self. In promoting versions of the bestowed self through communitarian and Trinitarian ideas, contemporary theological anthropology often fails to meet the challenges posed by other construals of selfhood, or to take seriously lessons learnt from contemporary forms of Christianity like the evangelical–charismatic upsurge.     

A continuing sense of self in the lived experience of dementia

ABSTRACT

Diagnosis with dementia often leads to an overwhelming fear of loss of self, which is assumed in the social discourse about the condition. After my own diagnosis with dementia in 1995, I reflected on this fear from a Christian theological perspective and was nonetheless able to discover a sense of hope. Highlighting what remains in dementia, as seen through the lens of the lived experience, provides a counter-story to the views of outside observers, which have dominated the literature to date. Although people with dementia experience a change in their cognitive sense of self, there are still important aspects of self that remain, which are: a sense of being an embodied self, in relationships with others and with God, and being able to find meaning in the present moment. By demonstrating that people living with dementia have a continuing sense of self, the aim is to prompt improved pastoral care and ministry.     

Reflections on research and learning from the patient: the art and science of what we do

Over three decades ago, John Bowlby argued for psychoanalysis to seek beyond its own parameters if it was to maintain its claim to be a science. Since then there has been a wealth of relevant research from various fields. While this has been instrumental in the development of my own work, this paper concerns learning from the patient. The paper begins with a premise: interpretative analytic work requires three‐dimensionality (self, other and object). Although interpretative work may be ingrained in our professional identity, this triangulation may or may not exist in our patients in any stable way. The paper continues with a brief developmental account of how early archetypally‐shaped shifts in the infant's field of interest establish the experiential components of three‐dimensionality. From there, observational and clinical material with a toddler and a young boy describe how early relational deficits hindered their capacities for three‐dimensionality. Yet both were able to engage with the therapist and to become active in the creation of three‐dimensionality within their own minds. Implied in this work are considerations for working with patients for whom interpretations do not work. Michael Fordham's comments on ‘working out of the self’ are linked with the art of what we do.     

Between Minimal Self and Narrative Self: A Husserlian Analysis of Person

The distinction between minimal self and narrative self has gained ground in recent discussions of selfhood. In this article, this distinction is reassessed by analysing Zahavi and Gallagher’s account of selfhood and supplementing it with Husserl’s concept of person. I argue that Zahavi and Gallagher offer two compatible and complementary notions of self. Nevertheless, the relationship between minimal self and narrative self requires further clarification. Especially the embeddedness of self, the interplay between passivity and activity, and the problems of uniqueness and persistence are better understood with Husserl’s analysis of person and its central concepts of position-taking, habitualities, and overall style. The embeddedness of self is elucidated by outlining how person is related to its environment, to other people, and to its past. This relational notion of self is both passively constituted and actively shaped: person mediates between minimal self characterized by perspectival ownership and narrative self based on authorship.     

The Development of Identity. A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of the Self as Subject

In this paper an argument is presented, suggesting that the concept of identity articulated by Erikson and reflected in ordinary pretheoretical understanding includes, as a central feature, a special experience of self, namely, the experience of a unified psychological "essence," from which superficial characteristics of the person are differentiated. However, as is shown through a close analysis of various identity measures, this subjective experiential aspect is typically neglected in identity research, including the many studies that were guided by the identity status paradigm. A new approach is then presented, aimed at recapturing the subjective meaning of identity, by viewing identity as a modality of the self as subject and as characterized by specific experiences of agency, unity, otherness, and individuality. In an effort to empirically ground this approach, a typology of identity experience, derived from Loevinger′s ego development stages, is described. Several studies are then reviewed, that confirm the viability of this typology and illustrate the advantages of studying identity from the perspective of the self as subject.     

When stepping outside the self is not enough: A self-distanced perspective reduces the experience of basic but not of self-conscious emotions

Despite recent increased interest in self-conscious emotions, few studies have investigated their regulation. The current research examines the effectiveness of self-perspective in regulating negative self-conscious (guilt, shame) versus basic (anger, sadness) emotions. We predict that adopting a distanced perspective on the self would attenuate the experience of anger and sadness, as previous research has shown (e.g., Kross et al., 2005). However, because the experience of self-conscious emotions involves self-evaluation as well as the evaluation of the self from the perspective of others, a self-distanced perspective may enable these emotions and fail to attenuate the experience of shame and guilt. As predicted, a self-distanced perspective attenuated feelings of sadness and anger, but not of shame and guilt. These findings suggest the appraisal of the experienced emotion (i.e., whether it involves self-evaluations and/or the perspective of others) may influence the effectiveness of emotion-regulation strategies.     

The Scientific Self: Reclaiming Its Place in the History of Research Ethics

How can the history of research ethics be expanded beyond the standard narrative of codification—a story that does not reach back beyond World War II—without becoming so broad as to lose all distinctiveness? This article proposes a history of research ethics focused on the “scientific self,” that is, the role-specific identity of scientists as typically described in terms of skills, competencies, qualities, or dispositions. Drawing on three agenda-setting texts from nineteenth-century history, biology, and sociology, the article argues that the “revolutions” these books sought to unleash were, among other things, revolts against inherited conceptions of scientific selfhood. They tried to redefine the scientific self in their respective fields of inquiry by advocating particular catalogs of virtues or character traits. These ideals of selfhood, their contested nature notwithstanding, translated into practice in so far as they influenced hiring and selection policies and found their way into educational systems. The project of reclaiming the scientific self as an important subject of study in the history of research ethics is not an antiquarian pursuit, but related to an ethical question faced by scientists today: How are their scientific selves being shaped by funding schemes, research evaluation protocols, and academic hiring policies?