Inference making and linking both require thinking: Spontaneous trait inference and spontaneous trait transference both rely on working memory capacity

Past research suggests that spontaneous trait inference (STI) and spontaneous trait transference (STT) may reflect different cognitive processes, the former being inferential and the latter associational. The present research was designed to explore whether either or both of these processes involve thinking that occupies cognitive capacity. Four studies suggest that reductions in available cognitive capacity reduce both STI and STT effects, both on measures of savings in relearning (which reflect the strength of trait associations with a person) and on trait ratings measures (which reflect the strength of trait inferences made about a person). Similar results were obtained using an individual difference measure of cognitive capacity. Although these results suggest that STI and STT are similar, in that both exhibit interference from reductions in cognitive capacity, other results, such as halo effects in trait ratings, support previous assertions that their underlying processes are distinct.     

Professed impressions: What people say about others affects onlookers’ perceptions of speakers’ power and warmth

During a conversation, it is common for a speaker to describe a third-party that the listener does not know. These professed impressions not only shape the listener’s view of the third-party but also affect judgments of the speaker herself. We propose a previously unstudied consequence of professed impressions: judgments of the speaker’s power. In two studies, we find that listeners ascribe more power to speakers who profess impressions focusing on a third-party’s conscientiousness, compared to those focusing on agreeableness. We also replicate previous research showing that speakers saying positive things about third parties are seen as more agreeable than speakers saying negative things. In the second study, we demonstrate that conscientiousness-power effects are mediated by inferences about speakers’ task concerns and positivity-agreeableness effects are mediated by inferences about speakers’ other-enhancing concerns. Finally, we show that judgments of speaker status parallel judgments of agreeableness rather than of power, suggesting that perceivers use different processes to make inferences about status and power. These findings have implications for the literatures on person perception, power, and status.     

What will Phil do next? : Spontaneously inferred traits influence predictions of behavior

Past research has shown that perceivers intentionally may make trait inferences about others and use this information to make predictions about these others' future behaviors. Other research has also shown that people can make trait inferences without intent—that is, spontaneously. However, one unexplored avenue is whether spontaneous trait inferences (STI), affect how perceivers predict others' will behavior. Three studies explored this issue. Results from Studies 1 and 2 showed that: (1) exposure to trait-implicative behaviors describing an actor influences subsequent behavior predictions made about the actor in a trait-consistent manner, and (2) predictions occurred regardless of behavior recall, implying that the behavior predictions were derived from prior trait inferences and not from behavior recall. Results from Study 3 bolstered this conclusion by showing that behavior predictions were similar regardless of whether subjects were explicitly instructed to make inferences or not, but that a manipulation known to interfere with inference generation (lie detection instructions) muted behavior predictions. Results from Study 3 also suggested that the prediction effects had both automatic and controlled components, and that reductions observed in the lie detection condition of Study 3 were caused by alterations in the automatic influence of trait knowledge to the behavior predictions. These results suggest that STI may be causal inferences about the actors' dispositions.     

Agreement between informant and self-reported personality in depressed older adults: what are the roles of medical illness and cognitive function?

In a sample of 77 dyads, involving depressed patients at least 50 years of age and their family or friends (informants), patient illness burden and cognitive decline were associated with self-informant rating discrepancies for facets of Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) Openness and Extraversion. Informant judgments about Neuroticism and Conscientiousness were not associated with illness burden or cognitive function, underscoring the potential utility of risk-detection strategies that rely on informant-report in these two domains. Findings suggest the need for research on how patient illness severity and cognitive function affect how friends and family use or misuse information when making judgments about older depressed patients.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

Self-informant Agreement for Personality and Evaluative Person Descriptors: Comparing Methods for Creating Informant Measures

Little attention typically is paid to the way self-report measures are translated for use in self-informant agreement studies. We studied two possible methods for creating informant measures: (a) the traditional method in which self-report items were translated from the first- to the third-person and (b) an alternative meta-perceptual method in which informants were directed to rate their perception of the targets' self-perception. We hypothesized that the latter method would yield stronger self-informant agreement for evaluative personality dimensions measured by indirect item markers. We studied these methods in a sample of 303 undergraduate friendship dyads. Results revealed mean-level differences between methods, similar self-informant agreement across methods, stronger agreement for Big Five dimensions than for evaluative dimensions, and incremental validity for meta-perceptual informant rating methods. Limited power reduced the interpretability of several sparse acquaintanceship effects. We conclude that traditional informant methods are appropriate for most personality traits, but meta-perceptual methods may be more appropriate when personality questionnaire items reflect indirect indicators of the trait being measured, which is particularly likely for evaluative traits.     

"The referents of trait inferences: The impact of trait concepts versus actor-trait links on subsequent judgments": Retraction of Stapel, Koomen, and van der Pligt (1996)

Reports the retraction of "The referents of trait inferences: The impact of trait concepts versus actor-trait links on subsequent judgments" by Diederik A. Stapel, Willem Koomen and Joop van der Pligt (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996[Mar], Vol 70[3], 437-450). This retraction follows the results of an investigation into the work of Diederik A. Stapel (further information on the investigation can be found here: https://www.commissielevelt.nl/). The Drenth Committee has found evidence of fraud, leading to the conclusion that fraud is most likely in the data supplied by Diederik A. Stapel. His co-authors were unaware of his actions and were not involved in the collection of the likely fraudulent data. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1996-03014-002.) The authors investigated the hypothesis that when trait inferences refer to abstract behavior labels they act as a general interpretation frame and lead to assimilation in subsequent judgments of an ambiguous target, whereas when they refer to a specific actor-trait link they will be used as a scale anchor and lead to contrast. Similar to G. B. Moskowitz and R. J. Roman's (see record 1992-31124-001) study, participants who were instructed to memorize trait-implying sentences showed assimilation, and participants who were instructed to form an impression of the actors in these sentences showed contrast. However, exposure to trait-implying sentences that described actors with real names and were accompanied with photos of the actors resulted in contrast under both memorization and impression instructions (Experiment 1). Furthermore, contrast ensued when trait-implying sentences were accompanied with information that suggested a person attribution, whereas assimilation ensued when that information suggested a situation attribution, independent of processing goals (Experiment 2). These findings are interpreted as support for referent-based explanations of the consequences of trait inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Differential consequences of trait inferences: a direct test of the trait-referent hypothesis

The hypothesis was investigated that when trait inferences refer to abstract behaviour labels (i.e. ‘conceited’) they act as a general interpretation frame and lead to assimilation in subsequent judgments of an ambiguous target, whereas when they refer to specific actor—trait links (i.e. ‘Peter is conceited’) the activated information is likely to be used as a scale anchor and contrast effects are more likely. Compared to previous studies investigating the consequences of trait inferences, this ‘trait-referent’ hypothesis was tested in a relatively direct way. Target judgments of participants instructed that trait-implying sentences described a ‘behaviour’ showed assimilation, whereas judgments of participants instructed that these sentences described a ‘person’ showed contrast.     

Different developmental patterns of simple deductive and probabilistic inferential reasoning

In three studies, we examined simple counterexample-based and probabilistic reasoning in children 6, 7, and 9 years of age. In the first study, participants were asked to make conditional (if-then) inferences under both categorical (certain or uncertain) and probabilistic instructions. Results showed that 6-year-olds respond to both forms of inference in similar ways, but whereas probabilistic conditional inferences showed little development over this period, categorical inferences clearly improved between 6 and 7 years of age. An analysis of the children's justifications indicated that performance under categorical instructions was strongly related to counterexample generation at all ages, whereas this was true only for the younger children for inferences under probabilistic instructions. These findings were replicated in a second study, using problems that referred to concrete stimuli with varying probabilities of inference. A third study tested the hypothesis that children confused probability judgments with judgments of confidence and demonstrated a clear dissociation between these two constructs. Overall, these results show that children are capable of accurate conditional inferences under probabilistic instructions at a very early age and that the differentiation between categorical and probabilistic conditional reasoning is clear by at least 9 years ofage. These results are globally consistent with dual-process theories but suggest some difficulties for the way that the analytic-heuristic distinction underlying these theories has been conceptualized.     

Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait inferences

We present four experiments in which participants were exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and goals. Results from a false recognition task with varying response deadlines revealed heightened activation of goal inferences already within a 350 ms response deadline. In contrast, trait inferences were made only when there was no response deadline, and when the behavior also implied a goal. These results indicate that spontaneous inferences on goals are often encoded more strongly in memory and are reactivated much more quickly in comparison with spontaneous trait inferences. Moreover, spontaneous trait inferences are often facilitated when an inference is first made on the goal of the behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent developmental and neuroscientific evidence on social inferences, and current theories on impression formation.     

Perceived entitativity,stereotype formation,and the interchangeability of group members

The authors investigated the effects of perceived entitativity of a group on the processing of behavioral information about individual group members and the extent to which such information was transferred to other group members. The results of 3 experiments using a savings-in-relearning paradigm showed that trait inferences about a group member, based on that member's behavior, were stronger for low entitative groups and for collections of individuals. However, the transference of traits from 1 group member to other members of the group was stronger for high entitative groups. These results provide strong evidence that the perception of high entitativity involves the abstraction of a stereotype of the group and the transfer of that stereotype across all group members. Implications for group impression formation and stereotyping are discussed.     

Person organization with a memory set: are spontaneous trait inferences personality characterizations or behaviour labels?

Recent research on impression formation has demonstrated that perceivers can categorize the action of target actors in terms of the traits that those behaviours represent, and that they do so in a spontaneous fashion, with neither the intent of categorizing nor the awareness of categorizing. This has resulted in a discussion about what these inferences refer to. Are they simple summaries of the behaviour without implications for the personalities of the people enacting those behaviours, or are they inferences about the target's disposition? The current experiment uses a procedure from the person memory literature to establish that these inferences are in fact references to the qualities of the target actors. Set size effects demonstrate that perceivers are organizing their inferred traits in person nodes; the person serves as the superordinate cue to which inferences are attached. This not only provides evidence that inferences formed spontaneously refer to the personality characteristics of the target, but also provides the first evidence of person organization under simple instructions to memorize stimulus information. The implications of the richness of the target information for spontaneously forming person inferences and for person organization in general are discussed.     

The good, the strong, and the accurate: preschoolers' evaluations of informant attributes

Much recent evidence shows that preschoolers are sensitive to the accuracy of an informant. Faced with two informants, one of whom names familiar objects accurately and the other inaccurately, preschoolers subsequently prefer to learn the names and functions of unfamiliar objects from the more accurate informant. This study examined the inference process underlying this preference. We asked whether preschoolers make narrow inferences about informants, broader trait-based inferences, or more global evaluative inferences. We further asked what inferences preschoolers make about a potential informant based on distinctions in the unrelated domain of physical strength. The results indicate that preschoolers make relatively narrow inferences when observing individual differences in accuracy even though they are prone to global evaluative inferences when observing individual differences in strength. Preschoolers’ burgeoning understanding of others as expert language users may underlie their selective endorsement of a more accurate informant.     

When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences

Do people make trait inferences, even without intentions or instructions, at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information? Tulving's encoding specificity paradigm (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) was adapted for two recall experiments. Under memory instructions only, subjects read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, subjects recalled each sentence under one of three cuing conditions: (a) a dispositional cue (e.g., generous), (b) a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or (c) no cue. Recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Subjects were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, these results indicate that subjects unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. This suggests that attributions may be made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events.