Sankara's doctrine of Māyā

Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of māyā which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by ‘superimposition’. Māyā, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self‐explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy.     

Candanbālā's hair: Fasting, beauty, and the materialization of Jain wives

Jain discourse on the body provides us with an opportunity to examine complex choreographies of ritual acts, which materialize the Jain body. The incipient moment of moving into womanhood is a key place for the materialization of wifely bodies. In order to understand this materialization, we must consider the ways in which discourses (here of wife-hood and nun-hood) shape the transition of Jain young women's bodies into the expected bodies (wives). The acceptance of the performative nature of the body among Jains allows us to examine the ways that Jain young women negotiate the seemingly contradictory discourses of wife-hood and nun-hood into bodies constitutive of both. Body practices suggest ways to explore the intersection of competing discourses and to destabilize the boundaries between them. In the Candanbālā Fast, Jain ritualized hair practices manifest the bodies (shaved nun and the luxurious long-haired bride) more overtly and the focus on the reiteration of the presence and discourse of loose, lovely hair enables these young women to negotiate the terrain of these seeming poles while maintaining the stated virtue of the celibate nun and the promise of the sexual and fertile wife.     

The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

The early Yogācāra theory of no-self

ABSTRACT

I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external objects are formed. In addition, I argue that non-imaginative wisdom can be regarded as an experience during which the CS of the self does not function, such that one only possesses pure sensations without perceptions of external objects. After the repeated experience of non-imaginative wisdom, the CS of the self is changed to the purified CS of no-self. It still supports interactions with the external world, but in a way that does not allow the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love) to arise.

Abbreviations: MS: Mahāyānasa?graha; TS: Tri??ikā-kārikā; TSN: Trisvabhāvanirde?a; VVS: Vi??atikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi     

The Rādhāsoāmī Theory of Subtle Body as an Expression of Religious Inclusivism

This article looks at the yogic theory of subtle body as a hermeneutical and pedagogical tool used by the Rādhāsoāmī (rādhāsvāmī) tradition to construct an inclusivist strategy for appropriating other religious systems. When constructing the theory of surat-?abd-yoga, the Rādhāsoāmīs took the ha?ha yoga of the Nāths as a vital reference point. While rejecting the corporeal techniques of ha?ha yoga, they remained influenced by the Nāth theory of subtle body. A thorough modification and expansion of this theory enabled the Rādhāsoāmīs to construct a historiosophy based on a hierarchy of religious paths. The article discloses various manifestations of the inclusivist strategy in Rādhāsoāmī thought, establishes its historical and structural determinants, and examines the process of development of the theory of subtle body into a hermeneutical tool for interpreting rival paradigms of yoga in a manner that portrays them as inferior.

     

The paradox of negation in Nāgārjuna's philosophy

This essay discusses the paradox of the Nāgārjunian negation as presented in his Vigrahavyāvartani. In Part One it is argued that as the Naiyāyika remarks, Nāgārjuna's speech act ‘No proposition has its own intrinsic thesis’ seemingly contradicts his famous claim that he has no negation whatsoever. In Parts Two and Three I consider the traditional as well as modem responses to this paradox and offer my own. I argue that Nāgārjuna's speech act does not generate a paradox for two reasons: (a) the equivalence thesis of the kind‐?P = ?P is obviously false; and (b) since Nāgārjuna's speech act is situated in the dialogical/conversational universe of discourse as opposed to the argumentative/systematic universe of discourse, the teaching of the non‐intrinsic thesis of all statements that it purports, holds for all statements in its class, including itself. Lastly, it is argued that even though the Nāgārjunian speech act is not a negation situated in the argumentative universe of discourse, it serves both philosophical and soteriological purposes.     

Rāgabodha: A Śābdabodha-Based Framework for a Theory of Rāga

In Indian knowledge traditions, Vyākaraṇa describes the rules for the formation (prakṛti-pratyaya-vibhāga) and use of correct words (sādhuśabda). The Vākya (sentence) is postulated as the primary unit of communication. “śābdabodha” deals with the cognition of sentential meaning. Similarly, in Indian music, every rāga has a lexicon and grammar (rāga-lakṣaṇa): a rāga only allows some notes and not others, and it has rules for constructing phrases—notes to be highlighted, notes to end phrases on, ornamentation, etc. These phrases of the rāga are comparable to “vākya” which when presented with due regard to certain other considerations generate an apprehension of the rāga (rāgabodha). During presentation of a rāga, an artist aims to evoke the rāga-cchāyā or rāga-svarūpa and also an emotive state in the listener. There is a cognitive aspect to the informed listening of a rāga that is parallel to linguistic communication. We seek to understand how these parallels work between śābdabodha and rāgabodha. We postulate that the conditions of expectancy (ākāṅkśā), logical consistency (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) in combination with the theory of sphoṭa provide a framework to explain how a rāga is expounded and cognised.

     

The development and use of the eight precepts for lay practitioners,Upāsakas and Upāsikās in Theravāda Buddhism in the West

Sometimes translating religious texts brings us up against the problem of scatological language. The author examines this problem in relation to a story of a former life of the Buddha and explores a variety of avenues for guidance on how to render gūtha ‘shit’ into English. This includes looking at Buddhist monastic law, which does not necessarily give us the guidance we might expect, and how the existing translation of this source of guidance illustrates the very problem in hand. The textual history and context of the story precludes some otherwise useful strategies for determining our translation and the best guide to the translator's hand in this instance turns out to be humour. The author makes a case that, employed judiciously, humour could become a useful hermeneutic tool for drawing meaning from religious literature. Along the way the author also reflects on the influence of the social context of the translator, including changes in British obscenity law, and on the possibility that academia is unconsciously constrained by unexamined assumptions of ‘decency’. Buddhist attitudes to language are also touched upon.     

The Religious Function of Jaina Philosophy:AnekāntavādaReconsidered

This paper considers the socio-religious rationale for the Jaina theory of the non-one-sided nature of reality (anekāntavāda). In doing so it rejects the received view thatanekāntavāda's exclusive function is to promote non-violence at the intellectual level. Instead it advances a model which emphasizes the way in whichanekāntavādasustains a real connection between karmic matter and the soul (jīva) and so maintains the rationale for identity defining ascetic practice. The social and religious dangers of one-sided (ekānta) views for the Jaina tradition are demonstrated by a consideration of the Digambara teacher Kundakunda's idiosyncratic use of the two truths model of reality.     

The Arabico-Islamic background of Al-Fārābī's logic

This paper examines al-Fārābī's logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background and attempts to conceptualize what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī's main problems and goals, I shall attempt to reformulate the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) in terms of the ontological and formal characteristics that Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussed the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of AL, I will further propose three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī's logic, in terms of which I will attempt to redefine it: the logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle's logic could be built upon AL, which has a nature contrary to logic. The present paper also contributes to examining our traditional research habits in Arabic studies.     

Vijñaptimātratā and the Abhidharma context of rarly Yogācāra

Contemporary accounts of early Mahāyāna Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the Abhidharma of non‐Mahāyāna schools such as the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda. This paper attempts to locate early Yogācāra philosophical speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates. Certain key Yogācāra concepts such as ālayavijñāna, vijñapti‐mātratā and citta‐mātra are discussed insofar as they relate to pre‐existing concepts and issues found in the Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika schools, with specific reference to the Abhidharmako?a and the corresponding bhāsya of Vasubandhu. Finally, some remarks are made about the, benefits of approaching the history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic position to the early Yogācāra literature.     

Whitehead's doctrine of objectification and Yogācāra Buddhism's theory of the three natures

IntroductionNa¯ga¯rjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself, points out in his famous Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ that ‘The Buddha's teachings of the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth’ (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie at the very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological and soteriological discourses in the Ma¯dhyamika tradition revolve around ideas concerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the concept that all phenomena possess dual characteristics—conventional and ultimate. The former, defined as the mode of phenomenal appearance, is the conventional truth; while the latter, defined as the ultimate mode of being, is the ultimate truth. This paper examines the ways in which these two truths are related from the Tibetan Pra¯sangika Ma¯dhyamika perspective, and argues that there are two radically distinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting the issues surrounding them. It does so by comparing the ccounts of Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge's (hereafter Go rampa 1429-1489 A.D.), and focuses on the way in which the two truths are related. It will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truths constitute a ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘different conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), whereas for Go rampa, the truths are separate in a way that is ‘incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad) or identity.     

Celebrating Heritage,Promoting Tourism,and Relocating Svāmī Vivekānanda: A Study of the Vivekananda Rock Memorial

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Svāmī Vivekānanda’s (1863–1902) relationship with his guru Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa (ca. 1836–1886),...     

Vedic and devotional waters: The Jalabheda of vallabhācārya

Summary Bhāvas, or comprehensive states of mental and emotional awareness, manifest different guṇas, or attributes, of the Lord. These attributes are wholly composed of saccidānanda, but due to variations in their bearers (ādhāra), which is to say in the antaḥkaraṇa of different speakers and listeners, they are affected, expressed, and experienced differently. In this way, bhāvas cannot exist without the Lord’s divine attributes, nor can they exist in the absence of the individual jīva. They are eternal because they belong to the Lord but become meaningful only because the individual through the senses can realize them. They thus serve as a fulcrum between the human and divine, and it is at this delicate point of balance that līlā is played out.     

The incarnated icon of Ṣaydnāyā: light and shade

The shrine of the Virgin Mary in the Syrian town of ?aydnāyā is an important Levantine Christian centre and one of the principal Christian pilgrimage sites in the Middle East, second only to the holy city of Jerusalem during the Middle Ages. This study's intent is to examine in detail, and to provide a key for interpreting, the major incongruity emerging through a comparison of the two main textual traditions regarding the shrine: the Christian-Arabic and the Latin-Western. The dissimilarity is constituted by the significant divergences concerning the representation of the miracle of the incarnation traditionally ascribed to the icon of the Virgin venerated in ?aydnāyā, which is essentially omitted in the Christian-Arabic sources. I argue that a key to the understanding of this reticence can be provided by an analysis of the heretical character ascribed to this particular miracle in Islamic theological thought and of the consequent threat it posed to the survival of the shrine itself. That being the primary focus of the investigation, the article also explores some aspects of the cultural and historical vicissitudes and crises of the cult of the shrine in the West from the fourteenth century onwards which, despite the great number of academic works dedicated to this subject, have remained unclear to this day. More specifically, I argue that apparently aporematic elements on the textual level can be interpreted logically by examining the central role played by the Knights Templar in the cult's material and cultural diffusion and by taking into account the connection of the shrine's decay with the order's downfall. The present analysis focuses almost exclusively on the medieval period as being the most significant for the formation and development of the cult of the shrine.