Atheism in religious clothing? Accounting for atheist interventions in the public sphere

In this paper I review several recent attempts to recast atheism in religious form in Canada, the US and the UK. First, several atheists have argued for the redefinition of atheism as a creed deserving of religious protections from the state. Second, various atheist ‘churches’ have gained publicity in recent years, in part due to their appropriation of the Protestant church format and the rhetoric of religious association. Both of these expressions of atheism stand in marked contradiction to older forms of atheism which emerged in response to (and rejection of) Christianity in the West, and they also stand in contrast to popular forms of atheism today, of the kind espoused by Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins. As a result, the cases reviewed here represent the ways in which contemporary atheist movements constitute several different counterpublics, and they mark a significant change in the state’s acknowledgement of atheism as a positive form of belief.     

Advocating for Atheist Clients in the Counseling Profession

Atheism is a controversial topic, with individuals who identify as atheist reporting high rates of discrimination. Despite increasing literature discussing religious/spiritual views and beliefs, few scholarly discussions of atheism in the counseling field can be found. Counselors need to be made aware of the issues facing atheist clients and educated on the best interventions to use in collaborative work with clients. Counselors should also be prepared to advocate for atheist clients in multiple domains. This article aims to explore the relevant literature around atheism, identify implications for counselors, and provide a path to advocacy for counselors in their work with atheist clients.     

审视无神论研究与宣传教育的中国路径

无神论是从哲学上否定神的客观实在性,而不以否定宗教的客观功能为使命。以为无神论宣传教育就是充当反宗教政治工具的看法是对无神论作用、定位的夸大和意义理解的窄化。如果能在这样一种认识的延长线上去设置无神论在社会主义核心价值体系中的坐标,我们将重新审视如何建构一条无神论研究与宣传教育的中国路径,同时为在实践中坚持和发展马克思主义宗教观开辟新的契机。     

Editorial: minding the (explanatory) gap

‘I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran’, says the robust and bluff believer, Francis Bacon, as the studio manager reaches to switch off the sound on his Elizabethan cultural perceptions, ‘than that this universal frame is without a mind... God never wrought miracle, to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it...’. ‘It is true’, he goes on, ‘that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion’. Bacon assumes that the atheist rejects ‘religion’, not just belief in God: no middle term is readily available to him. There is a lingering nuance that ‘atheism’ is ‘shallow’ in its rejection of ‘religion’, which we can register, and even deploy, without thereby endorsing theism: can now insist that the rejection of theism is not yet atheism. Or can we? This is familiar enough stuff for Buddhists, who seem typically in their ‘non-theism’ to represent an agnosticism of indifference rather than of perplexity. But we need to recall why it might seem contentious, and revisiting the scene of religious perplexity can be salutary, since religious dialogue is not apologetic opposition but imaginativeengagement.     

Exploring identities between the religious and the secular through the attendees of an ostensibly ‘Atheist Church’

The Sunday Assembly has a complex relationship with atheism and religion. It holds events which look and feel like religious worship, but uses this format to create a ‘godless congregation’. Described as an ‘atheist church’ by the media, members prefer to talk about inclusive communities. If the Sunday Assembly simultaneously embraces and rejects both atheism and religion, then how do attendees identify and describe themselves? We add to the growing literature exploring identities between the religious and the secular, presenting a qualitative study based on interviews with Sunday Assembly attendees. We interrogate three concepts: non-religion, the secular sacred and indifferentism to examine how the identity of Sunday Assembly attendees can be better understood. Our findings show that a significant number of attendees publicly identify as indifferent towards religion, while privately maintaining a more strongly non-religious identity, thus suggesting that for Sunday Assembly attendees, inclusivity is imperative.     

An apology for the “New Atheism”

In recent years, a series of bestselling atheist manifestos by Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens has thrust the topic of the rationality of religion into the public discourse. Christian moderates of an intellectual bent and even some agnostics and atheists have taken umbrage and lashed back. In this paper I defend the New Atheists against three common charges: that their critiques of religion commit basic logical fallacies (such as straw man, false dichotomy, or hasty generalization), that their own atheism is just as “faith-based” as the religious beliefs they criticize, and that their expressed disrespect for religious belief is immoral.     

A Short Story about the Übermensch: Vladimir Solov'ëv's Interpretation of and Response to Nietzsche's Übermensch

From the 1890s on, the atheist philosopher F. Nietzsche exerted a profound and enduring impact on Russian religious, cultural, and social reality. The religious philosopher V.S. Solov'ëv perceived Nietzsche's thought as an actual threat to Russian religious consciousness and his own anthropological ideal of Divine Humanity. He was especially preoccupied with the idea of the Übermensch since sometwo decades before the Nietzschean Übermensch was popularized in Russia, Solov'ëv had already developed his own interpretation of the sverkhchelovek.     

Religious and Spiritual Beliefs of Physicians

The aim of this study is to describe religious and spiritual beliefs of physicians and examine their influence on the decision to pursue medicine and daily medical practice. An anonymous survey was e-mailed to physicians at a large, multidisciplinary tertiary referral center with satellite clinics. Data were collected from January 2014 through February 2014. There were 2097 respondents (69.1 % men), and number of practicing years ranged from ≤1 to ≥30. Primary care physicians or medical specialists represented 74.1 %, 23.6 % were in surgical specialties, and 2.3 % were psychiatrists. The majority of physicians believe in God (65.2 %), and 51.2 % reported themselves as religious, 24.8 % spiritual, 12.4 % agnostic, and 11.6 % atheist. This self-designation was largely independent of specialty except for psychiatrists, who were more likely report agnosticism (P = 0.003). In total, 29.0 % reported that religious or spiritual beliefs influenced their decision to become a physician. Frequent prayer was reported by 44.7 % of physicians, but only 20.7 % reported having prayed with patients. Most physicians consider themselves religious or spiritual, but the rates of agnosticism and atheism are higher than the general population. Psychiatrists are the least religious group. Despite the influence of religion on physicians’ lives and medical practice, the majority have not incorporated prayer into patient encounters.     

Plantinga and probabilistic atheism

Conclusion Plantinga underestimates the prospects for probabilistic atheism. He employs a flawed mathematical rendition of the atheist's crucial claim, (1) and he misunderstands the utility (1) would have for the atheist.     

A more dangerous enemy? Philo’s “confession” and Hume’s soft atheism

While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper, I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess. His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive. I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft” and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions.     

Religion,Secular Humanism,and Atheism: Multi‐Institutional Politics and the USAFA Cadets’ Freethinkers Group

The recent emergence of atheist movements despite marginalization and distrust by a majority of Americans has been explained as a successful deployment of identity politics, but scholars have less often considered the importance of how identity and power intersect with political opportunity occurring within organizational and religious fields. Analyzing the case of the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) Cadet Freethinkers Group, we demonstrate that although it encountered opportunity in the organizational shock of the 2004 USAFA proselytism controversy, this opportunity was not a blank check, but instead afforded some possibilities for action and not others. Freethinkers’ actions to secure official recognition were limited by (1) their low placement in the chain of command and (2) a collective identity inclusive of secular humanism and atheism, which did not produce enough unity to take collective actions risking punishment, and created ambiguity vis‐à‐vis religion that allowed USAFA administrators to accept or deny their institutional membership claims through appeal, respectively, to functional or substantive definitions of religion.     

Embodied Disbelief: Poststructural Feminist Atheism

“I quite rightly pass for an atheist,” Jacques Derrida announces in Circumfession. Grace Jantzen's suggestion that the poststructuralist critique of modernity can also be trained on atheism helps us make sense of this playfully cryptic statement: although Derrida sympathizes with the “idea” of atheism, he is wary of the modern brand of atheism, with its insistence on rationally arranging—straightening out—religion. In this paper, I will argue that poststructural feminism, with its focus on embodied epistemology, offers a way to re‐explain Derrida's “I rightly pass,” and also to carry it forward. Poststructural feminist atheism leads us through Derrida to an embodied disbelief drawing on three dimensions of poststructural feminism: feminist epistemology and material feminism, relationality, and affect theory.     

HOW CAN SCIENCE HELP RELIGION TOWARD OPTIMAL BENEFIT FOR SOCIETY?

Abstract. The dispute between theism and atheism has centered on whether there exists any entity that may be referred to as God and on how to explain life and the universe. As a consequence of this dispute and of the power of scientific explanations, religion may end up having less impact on society. The situation makes the following questions relevant: What are the advantages and disadvantages for society of downgrading religion? If the net effect of religion is considered to be positive, is it possible to counteract this trend? Moreover, examining the benefits of religion raises a further question: Is it possible to influence theology toward a stance with optimal utility for society? As a scientist writing from an atheist perspective, I argue that religion has a potential for serving society and that this advantage need not necessarily be sacrificed on the altar of science.     

Atheists

Atheists represent an inconspicuous minority, identifiable only by their disbelief in God(s). Despite being highly stigmatized and disliked, until recent scientific endeavors, little has been known about this group including why they don't believe, how many people are atheists, and why they trigger intense reactions. Thus, this paper aims to synthesize what is known about atheists (so far) and to help explain the widespread negative attitudes and prejudice towards atheists; the possible cognitive, motivational, and cultural origins of disbelief; and the unique challenges facing the study of religious disbelievers. To do so, we will explore current findings in psychological research on atheism by considering the complex interactions of cultural learning, motivations, and core cognitive processes. Although significant scientific progress has been made in understanding the factors underlying atheism, there remains much to be explored in the domain of religious disbelief.     

Research Note: Sociology and the Study of Atheism

Historically, atheism has been neglected by the social sciences. This fact, in the light of the recent upsurge of popular and media interest in the subject, is particularly unfortunate. Rectifying this is, however, not a straightforward task: studies devised for exploring religion cannot, for example, reliably be used to investigate its lack. This research note presents findings from a preliminary survey, administered to Oxford University students in November 2007; it was specifically designed with the study of atheism and related issues in mind. In addition to revealing the religious attitudes and beliefs of students at a modern British university, the survey yields a number of significant results regarding contemporary atheism and unbelief.     

Mind Attribution to Gods and Christians in the Chinese Cultural Context

Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, this research examined whether and how culture-based religion affects mind attribution to gods and Christians in a religious priming paradigm. When attributing mind to gods in Study 1, participants in the religious priming condition attributed more agency to gods than those in the neutral condition. When attributing mind to human religious targets in Study 2, religious participants in the religious priming condition attributed more experience to a Christian target than those in the neutral condition, while atheist participants in the religious priming condition attributed less experience to a Christian target than those in the neutral condition. In addition, religious participants in the religious priming condition attributed more experience to an atheist target than those in the neutral condition. Taken together, mind attribution to religious targets varied on agency and experience, and showed its own cultural features in China.     

Secularity and Irreligion in Cross‐National Context: A Nonlinear Approach

As part of the conversation about the characteristics and scope of secularization in contemporary society, the implications of low levels of self‐defined atheism and explicit rejection of religion in nations with low levels of religious beliefs are not yet sufficiently explored. In response, this study uses aggregated data from the World Values Survey, the European Values Study, and Cross‐National Socio‐Economic and Religion Data from the Association of Religion Data Archives to investigate the relationships between nonbelief, atheism, and lack of confidence in churches or religious organizations. Regression findings show a concave curvilinear relationship between secularity (measured as the percentage of the population that does not believe in God) and irreligion (measured as (1) the percentage of self‐defined atheists in a country and (2) the percentage of individuals in a country who have no confidence at all in religious organizations). In other words, this study suggests that nonbelief is associated with an increase in self‐defined atheism and the lack of confidence in religious organizations, but that this effect wanes the more secular a society is. The findings further highlight the complexity of nonreligiosity and imply that a linear association cannot be assumed between measures of secularization, secularity, and irreligion.     

Personality Ratings Are Influenced by Religious Stereotype and Ingroup Bias

A religious prosociality stereotype exists such that religiosity and prosociality are presumed to be positively associated, as evidenced by proxy measures such as personality traits. However, studies using self- and peer-ratings of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness have not simultaneously controlled for the religiosity of the participant and the target. One hundred and sixty students completed measures of religiosity in a prescreening survey. Later, participants rated an array of targets, including a Christian and an atheist, on adjectives corresponding to Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Regardless of participant religiosity, atheist targets were rated as being lower in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness relative to those labeled as Christians. This bias was greater for highly religious participants. This effect was mediated by perceptions of the morality of the target independent of participants' broader attitudes concerning the target's religious group. Implications are discussed.     

Russification as a factor in religious conversion. Making Lenin roll over in his grave

The Soviet project was as thoroughly atheist as any geopolitical system seen on the world stage. Yet in a way that V.I. Lenin could have never imagined, one of the main objectives of Soviet authorities has now become a significant factor in Central Asian Muslims converting to Christianity. Russification is the term normally used to describe the social process, whereby non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union became acculturated into Russian patterns of life, thought and worldview during the Soviet era. The result was that many Muslims inhabited both Soviet/Russian and Muslim cultural space, thus creating a new cultural identity that facilitated religious conversion away from Islam. This field research report uses the lens of personal conversion stories to examine some aspects of this phenomenon. Also, the range of personal experiences points towards the need to understand Russification as a spectrum of acculturation.