Persistent high self-focus after failure and low self-focus after success: the depressive self-focusing style

Two studies were conducted to assess the spontaneous self-focusing tendencies of depressed and nondepressed individuals after success and failure. Based on a self-regulatory perseveration theory of depression, it was expected that depressed individuals would be especially high in self-focus after failure and low in self-focus after success. The results of Experiment 1 suggested that immediately after an outcome, both depressed and nondepressed individuals are more self-focused after failure than after success. This finding led us to hypothesize that differences between depressed and nondepressed individuals in self-focus following success and failure emerge over time. Specifically, immediately following an outcome, both types of individuals self-focus more after failure because of self-regulatory concerns. However, over time, depressed individuals persist in higher levels of self-focus after failure than after success, whereas nondepressed individuals shift to the opposite, more hedonically beneficial pattern. The results of Experiment 2 provided clear support for these hypotheses. Theoretical implications of these results were discussed.     

Interpersonal betrayal and cooperation: effects on self-evaluation in depression

Despite numerous studies demonstrating that depressed people are generally self-critical, little is known about interpersonal stressors that may activate or increase this negative self-evaluation. In this study, the effect of interpersonal betrayal and cooperative social interaction on self-evaluation processes in depressed and nondepressed women was assessed. Depressed subjects who experienced interpersonal betrayal were more critical of their performance on a subsequent task than were nondepressed subjects or depressed subjects who had experienced a cooperative interaction. Depressed subjects in the betrayal condition also behaved more aggressively toward their betraying partner than did nondepressed betrayed subjects. Depressed subjects were more critical of their own personality characteristics than were nondepressed subjects, regardless of condition. Results suggest that some negative cognitive schema among depressed persons may be altered by interpersonal factors, although it is not clear whether such effects are secondary to increases in self-criticism after conflict or to decreases in self-critical tendencies after positive interaction. Given the variability in results with different measures of self-evaluation, researchers are urged to use multiple, diverse measures of self-evaluation in future efforts to study variability in self-appraisal.     

Learned helplessness, depression, and the attribution of failure.

Depressed and nondepressed college students received experience with solvable, unsolvable, or no discrimination problems. When later tested on a series of patterned anagrams, depressed groups performed worse than nondepressed groups, and unsolvable groups performed worse than solvable and control groups. As predicted by the learned helplessness model of depression, nondepressed subjects given unsolvable problems showed anagram deficits parallel to those found in naturally occurring depression. When depressed subjects attributed their failure to the difficulty of the problems rather than to their own incompetence, performance improved strikingly. So, failure in itself is apparently not sufficient to produce helplessness deficits in man, but failure that leads to a decreased belief in personal competence is sufficient.     

Maternal depression and its relationship to life stress,perceptions of child behavior problems,parenting behaviors,and child conduct problems

This study examined the relationship of reported maternal depression to prior and current life stressors, and to mother perceptions of child adjustment, parenting behaviors, and child conduct problems. Forty-six depressed mothers and 49 nondepressed mothers and their clinic-referred children (aged 3-8 years) participated. Depressed mothers were more critical than nondepressed mothers, but the behavior of children of depressed and nondepressed mothers showed no significant differences. Depressed mothers were more likely to have experience child abuse, spouse abuse, or more negative life events than nondepressed mothers. Maternal reports of stress related to mother characteristics and to negative life events were the most potent variables discriminating depressed from nondepressed mother families.     

Affective valence and memory in depression: dissociation of recall and fragment completion.

Depressed (n = 16) and nondepressed (n = 16) subjects' memory for affectively valenced words was assessed by an explicit test (free recall) and an implicit test (word fragment completion). Under free-recall instructions, depressed subjects recalled significantly more negatively valenced than positively valenced words, whereas the opposite pattern was observed in nondepressed control subjects. These results replicate those previously reported in the literature. The differential effect of word valence was absent, however, when memory was tested implicitly: Depressed and nondepressed subjects exhibited equivalent priming of positive and negative words. These data are discussed in terms of Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews's (1988) model of depression.     

Depressive realism and clinical depression

Depressive realism suggests that depressed individuals make more accurate judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts. However, most studies demonstrating this phenomenon were conducted in nonclinical samples. In this study, psychiatric patients who met criteria for major depressive disorder underestimated control in a contingent situation and were consistently more negative in their judgments than were nondepressed controls. Depressed patients were less likely than their nondepressed counterparts to overestimate control in a noncontingent situation, but largely because they perceived receiving less reinforcement. Depressed patients were no more likely to use the appropriate logical heuristic to generate their judgments of control than their nondepressed counterparts and each appeared to rely on different primitive heuristics. Depressed patients were consistently more negative than their nondepressed counterparts and when they did appear to be more “accurate” in their judgments of control (as in the noncontingent situation) it was largely because they applied the wrong heuristic to less accurate information. These findings do not support the notion of depressive realism and suggest that depressed patients distort their judgments in a characteristically negative fashion.     

Depression,self-focus,and social interaction

The accuracy of depressed and nondepressed subjects' perceptions of their own and a social interactional partner's performance was investigated. Twenty depressed and twenty nondepressed college students participated in dyadic interactions and then rated their own and their partner's social behavior. The interactions were also rated by objective coders. Depressed subjects were differentiated from nondepressed subjects on several measures by both the coders and the subjects. Depressed subjects' self-ratings were correlated with the coders' ratings more often than were the nondepressives' ratings, suggesting depressives provided more accurate self-observations. Contrary to prediction, depressives were also more accurate in judging their partner's behavior. Depressives experienced heightened levels of self-focused attention, but this attentional focus did not mediate the relationship between depression level and self-accuracy. Finally, an analysis of the verbal statements suggests that performance differences between depressives and nondepressives may be a function of the quantity, rather than the quality, of the verbal production.     

Processing of ambiguous and unambiguous feedback by depressed and nondepressed college students: schematic biases and their implications for depressive realism

Explored schematic processing as a mechanism for predicting (a) when depressed Ss would be negative relative to nondepressed Ss and (b) when depressed and nondepressed Ss would show biased or unbiased (i.e., "realistic") processing. Depressed and nondepressed Ss performed multiple trials of a task under conditions in which the two groups held either equivalent or different schemas regarding this task. Ss received either an unambiguous or objectively normed ambiguous feedback cue on each trial. In full support of schematic processing, depressed Ss showed negative encoding relative to nondepressed Ss only when their schemas were more negative, and both depressed and nondepressed Ss showed positively biased, negatively biased, and unbiased encoding depending on the relative feedback cue-to-schema match. Depressed and nondepressed Ss' response latencies to unambiguous feedback also supported the occurrence of schematic processing. We discuss the methodological, treatment, and "realism" implications of these findings and suggest a more precise formulation of Beck's schema theory of depression.     

Social context and perceived task difficulty as mediators of depressive self-evaluation

This study examined two separate, but potentially interactive, influences on depressive self-evaluation: social context and perceptions of task difficulty. First, it was hypothesized that, if negative self-evaluations of depressed individuals are motivated by a desire to elicit attention and sympathy from others, depressed subjects should evaluate themselves more negatively than nondepressed subjects in a public setting, but not when they make self-evaluative judgments in private. Second, it was hypothesized that negative self-evaluation results from a bias to perceive tasks as being intrinsically easy, i.e., if a task is easy, a given score would be evaluated more poorly than if the task were difficult. It was found that the self-evaluations of depressed subjects were influenced by the social context, but not always in a negative direction. Depressed subjects did not differ from nondepressed subjects when performance evaluations were made in private. In a public condition, depressed subjects evaluated themselves more negatively than nondepressed subjects following an easy task, but evaluated themselves more positively following a difficult task. Depressed subjects did not evidence a bias to perceive tasks as being intrinsically easy. Depressed subjects did rate the tasks to be more difficult for themselves than they thought they would be for others and this expectancy was predictive of negative self-evaluation. These results were discussed in terms of alternative self-presentation motives and theories of social cognition. Self-evaluation often involves social comparison and researchers need to attend to the potentially complex interactions among social and cognitive processes.I would like to thank Deborah Davis and Paul Westerholm for their help in data collection, Ruth Maki for her statistical expertise, and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments. Portions of this paper were presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, 1989.     

Attributional style and self-control behavior in depressed and nondepressed children and their parents

Do the reformulated model of learned helplessness and the self-control model apply to clinically depressed children? Are the related cognitive patterns specific to depression? Are the cognitive deficits associated with depression learned from one's parents? To address these questions this investigation examined three groups of children (ages 8–12) and their parents: nonclinic (n =25),nondepressed clinic (n=22),and depressed clinic (n=15).Children were diagnosed depressed on the basis of Kiddie-SADS interview data. Depressed clinic children self-reported more depression, had a more depressive attributional style, and had more self-control problems. There were more depressed mothers in the clinic than in the nonclinic sample. Depressed clinic children had more depressed mothers than did nondepressed clinic children. There were no differences among the three groups of parents in their cognitive patterns. No relationship was found between the attributional style and self-control behavior of children and their parents.     

Examining the world of the depressed: do depressed people prefer others who are depressed?

Two studies were conducted to examine the interpersonal world of the depressed person. In Study 1, depression levels and perceptions of depressed and nondepressed people and their best friend were assessed to test the hypothesis that depressed Ss have best friends who are themselves more depressed than the best friends of nondepressed Ss. The hypothesis was confirmed, suggesting that depressed persons may prefer others who also tend toward depression. To examine this possibility, in Study 2 depressed and nondepressed college students spoke with one another in either depressed-depressed, nondepressed-depressed, or nondepressed-nondepressed pairs. It was found that depressed Ss felt worse than nondepressed Ss after speaking with nondepressed targets, but not after speaking with depressed targets. There were no differences in liking or in perceived similarity between the groups. Implications for the social world of the depressed person are discussed.     

Learned helplessness,depression and the perception of reinforcement

Depressed and nondepressed subjects were given escapable, inescapable, or no noise. Then, their perceptions of reinforcement contingencies in skill and chance tasks were assessed. Depressed-no noise and nondepressed-inescapable noise subjects exhibited smaller decreases in expectancy following failure in skill, but not in chance, than nondepressed-no noise subjects. So, depression and inescapable noise both produced perception of failure in skill as response-independent. Contrary to predictions, neither depression nor inescapable noise had a significant effect on increases in expectancy after success. These results partially support the learned helplessness model of depression which claims that a belief in independence between responding and reinforcement is central to the etiology and symptoms of depression in man.     

Depression, realism, and the overconfidence effect: are the sadder wiser when predicting future actions and events?

Do depressed individuals make more realistic judgments than their nondepressed peers in real world settings? Depressed and nondepressed Ss in 2 studies were asked to make predictions about future actions and outcomes that might occur in their personal academic and social worlds. Both groups of Ss displayed overconfidence, that is, they overestimated the likelihood that their predictions would prove to be accurate. Of key importance, depressed Ss were less accurate in their predictions, and thus more overconfident, than their nondepressed counterparts. These differences arose because depressed Ss (a) were more likely to predict the occurrence of low base-rate events and (b) were less likely to be correct when they made optimistic predictions (i.e., stated that positive events would occur or that aversive outcomes would not). Discussion focuses on implications of these findings for the depressive realism hypothesis.     

Specifying the Nature of Social Skill Deficits Associated With Depression

According to the social skill deficit theory of depression, people who lack social skills are unable to obtain positive social reinforcement and thus become depressed. However, past research is replete with mixed findings on the social skill-depression relationship. The present research was designed to overcome two prominent shortcomings in this research: poor operationalizations of social skill and constraining experimental procedures. In Study 1, 67 depressed and 74 nondepressed subjects engaged in an unstructured interaction with knowledge that they were being videotaped. In Study 2, 40 depressed and 61 nondepressed subjects were surreptitiously videotaped as they waited with another student for a study to begin. Analyses of subjects' social skill in these interactions indicated that depression is associated with a partial social skill deficit, most notable in terms of excessive social anxiety, low motivation to communicate with others, low social expressivity, and diminished behavioral involvement in Study 2. Partners of depressed subjects also showed low behavioral involvement in Study 2. However, on some aspects of social skill, depressed subjects appeared no different from their nondepressed peers. Depressed subjects' social skill was most deficient when they were given no instruction to interact and had no knowledge that they were being recorded.     

Depression, self-focused attention, and expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others

In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.     

Depression and interpersonal attraction: the role of perceived similarity

We hypothesized that depressed individuals are generally viewed as dissimilar and that this perceived dissimilarity contributes to negative reactions to the depressed. In addition, we hypothesized that if perceived similarity affects liking of depressed individuals, then nondepressed subjects should prefer nondepressed targets, but depressed subjects should not share this preference. To test these hypotheses, depressed and nondepressed subjects received information about two targets, both either depressed or nondepressed, one attitudinally dissimilar and one attitudinally similar. They were then asked to fill out an attraction measure and an interest in meeting measure for each target. The results clearly supported the primary hypotheses, demonstrating that nondepressed subjects preferred nondepressed targets and perceived them as more similar than depressed targets, and that this preference for nondepressed targets is not shared by depressed subjects. Tests of supplementary hypotheses also confirmed that depressed subjects perceive their best friends as being more depressed and more dissimilar than do nondepressed subjects. The implications of these findings for the social world of the depressed were discussed.     

Negative and positive cognition in depressed and nondepressed chronic-pain patients

Several studies have suggested that depressed pain patients evidence more cognitive distortion than nondepressed pain patients and healthy controls. Although these studies have generally supported notions relating cognitive distortion to depressive functioning, other aspects of dysfunctional cognition have not been assessed in the chronic-pain population. The present study examined negative and positive automatic thoughts and attributional style in depressed pain patients, nondepressed pain patients, and healthy controls. Depressed chronic-pain patients were found to exhibit significantly more negative automatic thoughts than nondepressed pain patients and healthy controls. Conversely, nondepressed chronic-pain patients reported significantly more positive automatic thoughts than did depressed patients and healthy controls. No significant differences were found for attributional style. These results suggest that different cognitive-behavioral interventions might be considered for depressed compared to nondepressed chronic-pain patients.