Acting with Feeling from Duty

A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action's manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent's reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an emotion can determine an action's manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions in moral action.     

The training of future scientists

Just as active observation is an essential quality, for all abstractive work depends upon it, the desire for an ever‐deeper understanding of the world is another.

Play is essential, especially in that it develops the child's thirst for knowledge.

Experience leads to intuition for results, especially through geometry. Independence of mind is an essential quality for a researcher.     

Psychopathy,frustration, and reactive aggression: The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex

Psychopathy is a developmental disorder marked by emotional hyporesponsiveness and an increased risk for instrumental and reactive aggression. The increased risk for reactive aggression is the focus of the current paper. It will be argued that the increased risk for reactive aggression does not relate to an increased sensitivity to threatening stimuli since psychopathy is associated with a reduced sensitivity to threat. Instead, it is argued that the increased risk for reactive aggression relates to an increased risk for frustration; i.e., the emotional state following the performance of an action in the expectation of a particular reward and not receiving this reward. Two impairments seen in psychopathy would increase the risk for frustration and consequent potential reactive aggression; impairments in stimulus‐reinforcement learning and reversal learning. It is argued that both are known consequences of impairment in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, one of the regions principally implicated in psychopathy.     

Catastrophic Conditions in Couple Systems

SUMMARY

A presentation of case studies forms the focus for an exploration of the discovery of an abortion or adoption used as the management of an unwelcome pregnancy which occurred in the context of the marital system. Managing an impasse in the middle phase of therapy in each case led to the emergence of information which then allowed the therapist to work with the couple system to alleviate the core situation out of which presenting problems emanated. In these cases the unwelcome pregnancy had the potential to be cataclysmic to the couple system. Therefore, the possibility that a couple is concealing an abortion or an adoption should be considered by couples' therapists when there is little or no response to usual strategies for change. The reason for concealment is immaterial. What is paramount is that the therapist bring the event to the fore of treatment and work with a couple to put closure on what is generally an unresolved issue.     

Cascaded versus noncascaded models of lexical and semantic processing: the turple effect

The density of the orthographic neighborhood surrounding an item has been shown to have an inhibitory effect for nonwords in a lexical decision experiment. Four experiments are reported investigating whether a similar pattern holds for a semantic categorization task (animal vs. non-animal). In the first experiment, no effects of neighborhood density were found for nonexemplars, whether they were words or nonwords. The absence of any inhibitory effect for nonwords implies that close orthographic neighbors are ignored. However, the second experiment showed that if the nonword has a neighbor that is an animal name (eg., turple), an interference effect is observed, implying that neighbors do exert an effect if they have the right semantic properties. The same items showed no additional interference in lexical decision. These results suggest the involvement of semantic properties very early in the processing cycle. A cascaded processing system monitoring activation in semantic features can explain these results, but cannot explain the frequency effect observed for nonexemplar words or the fact that variation in density is irrelevant when one of the neighbors is an exemplar. It is argued that existing models of semantic categorization must be extended to accommodate these results.     

Ego Constriction

The terms ego constriction, ego inhibition, and ego restriction have not been clearly differentiated in their usage in the literature. In this paper a rationale for "ego constriction" as an entity distinct from both ego inhibition and ego restriction is given, despite its clear similarities to each. In a person with an ego inhibition, the ego inhibits a part of its own functioning because a particular function is linked to an unacceptable impulse. It is an internalized conflict. The person with an ego restriction, in contrast, avoids psychological pain triggered from an area in the outside world by restricting activity in that area. Like each of these problems but different, a person with an ego constriction first externalizes an internalized conflict associated with important functions or activities. Then, only through a series of particular obligatory steps can the person "overcome" the ego constriction--albeit temporarily. It is noted in this paper that the function of the specified obligatory steps is structurally parallel to the rigid obligatory behavior necessary for genital gratification in the perversions. As the recognition of this distinction arose in the course of an analysis of a mental health professional, something of the necessarily shared nature of analytic work is noticeable, shining through as the background for the work of this paper.     

Error reactivity in self-paced performance: Highly-accurate individuals exhibit largest post-error slowing

Reaction time is typically increased following an erroneous response. This post-error slowing is traditionally explained by a strategic adjustment of response threshold towards more conservative behaviour. A recently proposed orienting account provides an alternative explanation for post-error slowing. According to this account, committing an error evokes an orienting response (OR), which inhibits information processing in the subsequent trial, resulting in slow and inaccurate performance. We tested a straightforward prediction of the orienting account in the context of self-paced performance, adopting an individual-differences approach: Post-error slowing should be larger the less frequent an error is. To this end, participants were classified into three groups differing in overall performance accuracy. Larger post-error slowing and stronger post-error accuracy decrease were observed for the high-accuracy group than for the two other groups. Practice pronounced the post-error accuracy decline, especially for the high-accuracy group. The results are consistent with the orienting account of post-error slowing but are problematic for accounts based on strategic evaluation mechanisms.     

Evolutionary Guidance System: A Community Design Project

The Evolutionary Guidance System (EGS) is a holistic and inclusive model for designing self-organizing social systems. Such a model must be driven by evolutionary values articulated by the members of the system. The small community is an ideal context for the "growing" of an Evolutionary Guidance System. This paper describes the creation of an EGS in a community organization. The rational for the activity is to bring harmony and build community among the members of the organization and, at the same time, to reach out and include the larger community. This organization can provide a model for other organizations in the town, and the ultimate goal is to install an EGS as a nongovernmental design system for the town.     

Topics and cases for online education in engineering

When considering offering online education for engineering ethics instruction, making choices necessary for the effective development and delivery of an engineering ethics curriculum is an important first step. Selecting the topics and types of cases for the most effective ethics education of engineering students is a vital step in preparing an effective program. Examples are presented for topics which are considered good candidates for online presentation, and the adaptability of these topics for web-based instruction is discussed. Types of cases which are useful in engineering ethics education are presented. Methods of teaching applied ethics, as well as ideas for web-based ethics course design are suggested. The market for web-based instruction is discussed.     

Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

Error reactivity in self-paced performance: Highly-accurate individuals exhibit largest post-error slowing

Reaction time is typically increased following an erroneous response. This post-error slowing is traditionally explained by a strategic adjustment of response threshold towards more conservative behaviour. A recently proposed orienting account provides an alternative explanation for post-error slowing. According to this account, committing an error evokes an orienting response (OR), which inhibits information processing in the subsequent trial, resulting in slow and inaccurate performance. We tested a straightforward prediction of the orienting account in the context of self-paced performance, adopting an individual-differences approach: Post-error slowing should be larger the less frequent an error is. To this end, participants were classified into three groups differing in overall performance accuracy. Larger post-error slowing and stronger post-error accuracy decrease were observed for the high-accuracy group than for the two other groups. Practice pronounced the post-error accuracy decline, especially for the high-accuracy group. The results are consistent with the orienting account of post-error slowing but are problematic for accounts based on strategic evaluation mechanisms.     

Ontology-free modal semantics

The problem with model-theoretic modal semantics is that it provides only the formal beginnings of an account of the semantics of modal languages. In the case of non-modal language, we bridge the gap between semantics and mere model theory, by claiming that a sentence is true just in case it is true in an intended model. Truth in a model is given by the model theory, and an intended model is a model which has as domain the actual objects of discourse, and which relates these objects in an appropriate manner. However, the same strategy applied to the modal case seems to require an intended modal model whose domain includes mere possibilia.Building on recent work by Christopher Menzel (Nous 1990), I give an account of model-theoretic semantics for modal languages which does not require mere possibilia or intensional entities of any kind. Menzel has offered a representational account of model-theoretic modal semantics that accords with actualist scruples, since it does not require possibilia. However, Menzel's view is in the company of other actualists who seek to eliminate possible worlds, but whose accounts tolerate other sorts of abstract, intensional entities, such as possible states of affairs. Menzel's account crucially depends on the existence of properties and relations in intension.I offer a purely extensional, representational account and prove that it does all the work that Menzel's account does. The result of this endeavor is an account of model-theoretic semantics for modal languages requiring nothing but pure sets and the actual objects of discourse. Since ontologically beyond what is prima facie presupposed by the model theory itself. Thus, the result is truly an ontology-free model-theoretic semantics for modal languages. That is to say, getting genuine modal semantics out of the model theory is ontologically cost-free. Since my extensional account is demonstrably no less adeguate, and yet is at the same time more ontologically frugal, it is certainly to be preferred.Special thanks to Brian Chellas, Charles Chihara, Harry Deutsch, Bernard Linsky, Kirk Ludwig, Christopher Menzel and Gila Sher for helpful discussion. My thanks also to an anonymous referee for this Journal for kind words and attention to detail. Portions of this paper were presented at the 1993 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy in Toronto, and at the 1994 conference of the Association for Symbolic Logic in Gainesville, Florida. Thanks to all who attended those sessions.     

A test for conditional independence between response time and accuracy

An important distinction between different models for response time and accuracy is whether conditional independence (CI) between response time and accuracy is assumed. In the present study, a test for CI given an exponential family model for accuracy (for example, the Rasch model or the one‐parameter logistic model) is proposed and evaluated in a simulation study. The procedure is based on the non‐parametric Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. As an illustrative example, the CI test was applied to data from an arithmetics test for secondary education.     

Estimating the imputed social cost of errors of measurement

If a loss function is available specifying the social cost of an error of measurement in the score on a unidimensional test, an asymptotic method, based on item response theory, is developed for optimal test design for a specified target population of examinees. Since in the real world such loss functions are not available, it is more useful to reverse this process; thus a method is developed for finding the loss function for which a given test is an optimally designed test for the target population. An illustrative application is presented for one operational test.This work was supported in part by contract N00014-80-C-0402, project designation NR 150-453 between the Office of Naval Research and Educational Testing Service. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.     

Responsibility for Testimonial Belief

According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial speaker rather than the audience, and so it isn’t clear that testimonial knowers are appropriately creditable for the truth of their beliefs. I argue that the credit view of knowledge can be saved from Lackey’s objection by focusing on the way in which testimonial knowledge is the result of an essentially social epistemic ability. While there is indeed a sense in which a testimonial knower is only partially epistemically responsible for her testimonial belief, this is consistent with the truth of her belief being creditable to her in another sense. The truth of her belief is most saliently explained by, and hence is fully creditable to, an essentially social epistemic ability, an ability that is only partially seated in the knowing subject.     

Falling From Grace: Understanding an Ethical Sanctioning Experience

Although an ethical sanction is viewed as an incredibly stressful event for professional counselors, the experience of being sanctioned is not well known. This article provides an overview of the sanctioning process, a discussion of professional silence, and a case example of a sanctioning experience for a counselor. The sanctioning experience is described in a 3‐stage response sequence and is illustrated with journal entries from a sanctioned counselor. Response interventions for each stage are suggested, and implications for the counseling profession are offered.     

Intentional Objects

The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object.     

Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism

Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does not act freely and is not morally responsible for what she does. It is then claimed that any agent??s coming to be in the same psychic state through a deterministic process is no different in any relevant respect from the pertinent manner of manipulation. Hence, it is concluded that compatibilists?? proposed sufficient conditions for free will and moral responsibility are inadequate, and that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. One way for compatibilists to resist certain manipulation arguments is by appealing to historical requirements that, they contend, relevant manipulated agents lack. While a growing number of compatibilists advance an historical thesis, in this paper, I redouble my efforts to show, in defense of nonhistorical compatibilists like Harry Frankfurt, that there is still life left in a nonhistorical view. The historical compatibilists, I contend, have fallen shy of discrediting their nonhistorical compatibilist rivals.