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1.
MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism relies crucially on a distinctive moral particularism, for which morality and rationality
are fundamentally tradition-constituted. In light of this, some have detected in his work a moral relativism, radically in
tension with his endorsement of a Thomist universalism. I dispute this reading, arguing instead that MacIntyre is a consistent
universalist who pays due attention to the moral-epistemic importance of traditions. Analysing his teleological understanding
of rational enquiry, I argue that this approach shows how it is possible, dialectically, to reconcile the particularity of
our starting-points with the assertion of universal truths. What MacIntyre offers, I contend, is a moral universalism that
avoids the pitfalls of its liberal counterpart, and invites an important meta-theoretical shift with respect to the scope
for toleration and social critique and toleration in contemporary pluralist society. 相似文献
2.
In this paper I argue that there are in fact external relations in Russell’s sense. The level at which we are forced to acknowledge
them is, however, not the level of relations between concrete individual objects. All relations of this kind, which I will
call “inter-individual” relations, can be construed as supervenient on the monadic properties of their terms. But if we pursue
our ontological analysis a little bit deeper and consider the internal structure of a concrete individual, then we will inevitably
find irreducible external relations. I mean for example the relation of instantiation (in the frame of a realist’s theory)
or that of concurrence (in the frame of a trope theory). I will show that such “intra-individual” relations – the relations
that make up the internal structure of a concrete individual out of more primitive metaphysical “building blocks” like universals
or tropes – could not (even in principle) be construed as supervenient.
I should like to thank David Frost for brushing up my English and the Austrian Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research (FWF) for the financial support. 相似文献
3.
Ian Underwood 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(2):265-283
Baxter (Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes an ingenious solution to the problem of instantiation based on his theory of cross-count identity. His idea is
that where a particular instantiates a universal it shares an aspect with that universal. Both the particular and the universal
are numerically identical with the shared aspect in different counts. Although Baxter does not say exactly what a count is,
it appears that he takes ways of counting as mysterious primitives against which different numerical identities are defined. In contrast, I defend the idea—suggested,
though not quite endorsed, by Baxter himself—that counts are independent dimensions of numerical identity. Different ways
of counting are explained by the existence of these different sorts of identity (i.e., counts). For the instantiation of a
universal by a particular, I propose one dimension concerned with the individuation of particulars (the p-count) and another
dimension concerned with the individuation of universals (the u-count). On that basis, I give a clear definition of cross-count
identity that explains its asymmetrical nature (i.e., the fact that particulars instantiate universals, but not vice versa).
I extend the theory to a third dimension—that of time, or the t-count—and thereby defend Baxter’s ideas on change, and the
contingency of instantiation. Baxter (Mind 97(388):575–582, 1988; Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes the related idea of composition as (cross-count) identity. Parts are individually cross-count identical with the
wholes that they constitute, and they collectively share all aspects across counts with those wholes. I propose an innovation
by which totality is shared distinctness across counts. The theory applies to both the totality of particulars that instantiate any given universal, and the totality
of parts that constitute any given whole. I argue that this has several advantages over Armstrong’s view, which is based on
a dubious external totalling relation. I also argue that Armstrong’s theory of numbers (or quantities) as internal relations ought to be rejected in favour of
an account based on identity and distinctness. The paper concludes with a careful analysis of external relations in Baxter’s
framework. I argue that we must recognise one further dimension of identity in order to differentiate between, e.g., the aspects
of Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise and Abelard insofar as he loves Isobel. Each of these aspects is identical with Abelard
and identical with loving-by, yet they must be in some way distinct. I therefore propose the r-count, in which multiple distinct relational properties
are the very same relation (-part). The existence of these four independent dimensions explains the fact that particulars,
universals, relations, and times are fundamentally different sorts of things in the ontology. Each is individuated with respect
to a different dimension of identity. 相似文献
4.
Mikel Burley 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2010,67(2):81-94
This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch.
These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death
vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness
appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some others, requires
no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. 相似文献
5.
Kyung-Man Kim 《Human Studies》2011,34(4):393-406
Although the success of Habermas’s theory of communicative action depends on his dialogical model of understanding in which
a theorist is supposed to participate in the debate with the actors as a ‘virtual participant’ and seek context-transcendent
truth through the exchange of speech acts, current literature on the theory of communicative action rarely touches on the
difficulties it entails. In the first part of this paper, I will examine Habermas’s argument that understanding other cultural
practices requires the interpreter to virtually participate in the “dialogue” with the actors as to the rationality of their
cultural practice and discuss why, according to Habermas,such dialogue leads to the “context-transcendent truth”. In the second
part, by using a concrete historical example, I will reconstruct a “virtual dialogue” between Habermas and Michael Polanyi
as to the rationality of scientific practice and indicate why Habermas’s dialogical model of understanding based on the methodology
of virtual participation cannot achieve what it professes to do. 相似文献
6.
Bradley Rives 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):211-238
This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I
take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for
facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the
rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about
rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’
are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’
treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s
claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course
between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations,
but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality.
相似文献
Bradley RivesEmail: |
7.
Chad Carmichael 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):373-389
In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals. 相似文献
8.
Croom AM 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2012,46(1):90-117
Aesthetic non-cognitivists deny that aesthetic statements express genuinely aesthetic beliefs and instead hold that they work
primarily to express something non-cognitive, such as attitudes of approval or disapproval, or desire. Non-cognitivists deny
that aesthetic statements express aesthetic beliefs because they deny that there are aesthetic features in the world for aesthetic
beliefs to represent. Their assumption, shared by scientists and theorists of mind alike, was that language-users possess
cognitive mechanisms with which to objectively grasp abstract rules fixed independently of human responses, and that cognizers
are thereby capable of grasping rules for the correct application of aesthetic concepts without relying on evaluation or enculturation.
However, in this article I use Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to argue that psychological theories grounded
upon this so-called objective model of rule-following fail to adequately account for concept acquisition and mastery. I argue
that this is because linguistic enculturation, and the perceptual learning that’s often involved, influences and enables the
mastery of aesthetic concepts. I argue that part of what’s involved in speaking aesthetically is to belong to a cultural practice of making sense of things aesthetically, and that it’s within a socio-linguistic community, and that community’s practices, that such aesthetic
sense can be made intelligible. 相似文献
9.
The idea of the “nation” has played only a small role in modern political philosophy because of its apparent irrationalism
and amoralism. David Miller, however, sets out to show that these charges can be overcome: nationality is a rational element
of one’s cultural identity, and nations are genuinely ethical communities. In this paper I argue that his project fails. The
defence against the charge of irrationalism fails because Miller works within a framework of ethical particularism which leads
to a position of metaethical relativism. A consequence of this relativism is that a community’s moral principles and boundaries
of exclusion cannot be rationally justified to those constructed as “outsiders”. The defence against the charge of amoralism
fails because Miller does not so much provide an argument to show that nations are ethical communities as assume they are;
we are therefore left without resources to discriminate between ethical and unethical nations. I apply these problems to Miller’s
treatment of the question of immigration, arguing that it shows that his version of “liberal” nationalism has a tendency to
collapse towards a conservative position on such issues. This should not give us any great confidence that the nation, as
Miller presents it, should be embraced by modern political philosophy.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
10.
Nathaniel Goldberg 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):261-280
Donald Davidson used triangulation to do everything from explicate psychological and semantic externalism, to attack relativism
and skepticism, to propose conditions necessary for thought and talk. At one point Davidson tried to bring order to these
remarks by identifying three kinds of triangulation, each operative in a different situation. Here I take seriously Davidson’s
talk of triangular situations and extend it. I start by describing Davidson’s situations. Next I establish the surprising
result that considerations from one situation entail the possibility that at any one time one language is partially untranslatable
into another. Because the possibility is time-indexed, it need not conflict with Davidson’s own argument against the possibility
of untranslatability. I derive the result, not to indict Davidson, but to propose a new kind of triangulation, the reconciliation
of untranslatability, which I investigate. Insofar as triangulation is central to Davidson’s views, getting a handle on his
various triangular situations is key to getting a handle on his contributions to philosophy. Insofar as those contributions
have enriched our understanding of how language, thought, and reality interrelate, extending Davidson’s model promises to
extend our understanding too.
相似文献
Nathaniel GoldbergEmail: |
11.
Mark Chekola 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):51-78
The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual
core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views
of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness
as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a
high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness.
So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are
also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life. 相似文献
12.
13.
Brian Weatherson 《Synthese》2009,166(2):333-357
I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism”. The core of the view is that which
proposition is (semantically) expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of (among other things) the speaker’s
context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed
as true by one assessor and false by another. 相似文献
14.
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I
treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the
fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of
this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function
as reasons for action presupposes the possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that
such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’
presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally
flawed.
For their constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the
following: Clare Chambers, Roger Crisp, Cécile Fabre, Paul Kelly, David Lloyd-Thomas. Thanks also go to Res Publica’s two anonymous referees. 相似文献
15.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
16.
Patrick Lenta 《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(3):271-274
Putnam's internal realism attempts to overcome both radical subjectivism and metaphysical realism. While he agrees with subjectivists that we understand the world through conceptual schemes, Putnam rejects their ‘anything goes’ relativist conclusions, arguing that states and properties of the external world co-determine our understanding of the world, and that some theories are more rational to accept than others. Theories, in other words, while they can't be expected to correspond ‘absolutely’ to the external world, can nevertheless be objective-for-us. When theorising about rationality, however, Putnam runs into problems, claiming that the criteria of rational acceptability, determining the choice of conceptual schemes, are a set of historically evolving cultural norms. This causes a slide into subjectivism and relativism. In this paper, I argue that the main tenet of internal realism – the possibility of an objectivity-for-us – can be maintained. Taking a naturalistic approach, I defend the view that both the conceptual tools and the epistemic values making up our conceptual schemes are ultimately grounded in our genetically determined cognitive apparatus. The conceptual schemes mediating our understanding of the world, therefore, are not merely contingent cultural products but, to an important extent, necessary biological products. In this regard, although Putnam explicitly rejects any attempts to naturalise reason, I argue that it is precisely such a naturalistic approach that provides his internal realism with the necessary backing. 相似文献
17.
Sandra Lapointe 《Synthese》2010,174(2):263-281
This paper is aimed at understanding one central aspect of Bolzano’s views on deductive knowledge: what it means for a proposition
and for a term to be known a priori. I argue that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolzano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the
latter. In particular, Bolzano believes that meaning is determined by implicit definition, i.e. the fundamental propositions
in a deductive system. I go into some detail in presenting and discussing Bolzano’s views on grounding, a priori knowledge and implicit definition. I explain why other aspects of Bolzano’s theory and, in particular, his peculiar understanding
of analyticity and the related notion of Ableitbarkeit might, as it has invariably in the past, mislead one to believe that Bolzano lacks a significant account of a priori knowledge. Throughout the paper, I point out to the ways in which, in this respect, Bolzano’s antagonistic relationship to
Kant directly shaped his own views. 相似文献
18.
James DiCenso 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):161-179
This paper engages Freud’s relation to Kant, with specific reference to each theorist’s articulation of the interconnections
between ethics and religion. I argue that there is in fact a constructive approach to ethics and religion in Freud’s thought,
and that this approach can be better understood by examining it in relation to Kant’s formulations on these topics. Freud’s
thinking about religion and ethics participates in the Enlightenment heritage, with its emphasis on autonomy and rationality,
of which Kant’s model of practical reason is in many ways exemplary. At the same time, Freud advances Kantian thinking in
certain important respects; his work offers a more somatically, socially, and historically grounded approach to the formation
of rational and ethical capacities, and hence makes it more compatible with contemporary concerns and orientations that eschew
the pitfalls of ahistorical idealist orientations. 相似文献
19.
Cheng-hung Tsai 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):331-341
One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is
a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that. In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how
view in which knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of practical knowledge, like an agent’s non-propositional knowledge
of counting. In this paper I argue, first, that Hanna misunderstands Dummett’s conception of knowledge of linguistic rules,
and, second, that Dummett’s considerations of practical knowledge of language pose a problem for Hanna’s knowledge-how view.
At the end of the paper, I briefly sketch an account of practical knowledge of language that meets the requirements set by
Dummett. 相似文献
20.
Michael Heidelberger 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):467-482
The term “historical epistemology” can be read in two different ways: (1) as referring to a program of ‘historicizing’ epistemology,
in the sense of a critique of traditional epistemology’s tendency to gloss over historical context, or (2) as a manifesto
of ‘epistemologizing’ history, i.e. as a critique of radical historicist and relativist approaches. In this paper I will defend
a position in this second sense. I show that one can account for the historical development and diversity of science without
disavowing the relevance of a (normatively understood) epistemology and without denying the existence of human cognitive universals
across historical and cultural differences. In support of my thesis, I draw on cognitive scientific research on causal and
symbolic cognition, arguing that causal understanding constitutes a basic part of science, which, in the course of its development,
becomes more and more superimposed by a culturally and historically variable symbolic superstructure. 相似文献