Forgiveness and the Holocaust

This paper considers whether we have any reason to forgive the perpetrators of the most terrible atrocities, such as the Holocaust. On the face of it, we do not have reason to forgive in such cases. But on examination, the principal arguments against forgiveness do not turn out to be persuasive. Two considerations in favour of forgiveness are canvassed: the presence of rational agency in the perpetrators, and the common human nature which they share with us. It is argued that the presence of rational agency does not generate a reason to forgive. However, our common human nature may be sufficient to provide such a reason, and evidence for its general reason-giving power can be seen in phenomena such as vicarious shame, and the moral significance which we attach to the notion of crimes against humanity. A reason for forgiveness based on common human nature will not be a strong one, but a weak reason still has some force.     

Forgiveness and recidivism

The teaching of Jesus on limitless forgiveness is a difficult one with which to reckon, especially when an offense is repeated again and again (recidivism), sometimes by the same offender. This article finds in the gospel of Matthew (Matt. 18:15–17) and Paul's letters to the Corinthians (I Cor 5:2–11 and II Cor 2:5–8) a model of forgiveness that is assertive, confrontative and direct in style, pastoral in application and reconciling in spirit.Dr. Donnelly (Ph.D. Claremont Graduate School) is an Associate Professor of Theology and Spirituality at St. John's University, New York, and a Visiting Lecturer at Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey. She has published over a dozen articles on the subject of forgiveness and reconciliation as well as two books:Learning to Forgive (Macmillan 1979; Abingdon, 1982) andPutting Forgiveness into Practice (Argus, 1982).     

Forgiveness and Standing

Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical literature on this topic has made little progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be “articulate” and “uncompromising.” I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi’s proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing.