Ecological Psychology and Social Psychology: Continuing Discussion

What form would an ideal merger of ecological and social psychology take? Is that ideal attainable? Many researchers and theorists are working to answer these questions. Charles (2009, 2011a) offered insights from E. B. Holt, one of James J. Gibson’s mentors, who argued that minds—mental kinds, processes, states, etc.—are observable aspects of the environment. Phrasing that in Ecological terms, the minds of other organisms are specified in the structure of ambient energy extended over time and space; they are directly perceivable by a properly attuned organism. Ecological Psychology enhances Holt’s story, by brining to the table a sophisticated theory of direct perception; Holt enhances the Ecological story by brining to the table a sophisticated theory about the nature of minds. The two combine to form the long-sought ideal merger. Thus, I claimed, Ecological Psychology will either rediscover its roots, or go through the trouble of re-creating them. This paper further develops those ideas, by presenting a simpler version of the argument, suggesting easy ways of dismissing that argument, and addressing the concerns expressed by Castro and Lafuente (2011).     

The (Old) New Realism: What Holt Has to Offer for Ecological Psychology

As Ecological Psychology pushes into new areas, success will be made easier by a rediscovery its theoretical history, in particular the “New Realism”, lead in part by E. B. Holt. Three New Realists tenants seem particularly relevant: (1) we experience reality, (2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Though the two groups differ in terms of their conception of perception, and what can be perceived, their conceptions are related in very insightful ways. Further, the comparison reemphasizes the extent of unique empirical claims ecological psychologists make, and grounds those claims within a larger framework for psychology as a whole. This makes obvious the need for further work on the mathematics of invariants, the physiological mechanisms of information extraction, and the behaviors of perception.

Situating Coordination and Cooperation Between Ecological and Social Psychology

The major thrust of this analysis is to demonstrate the value of making ecological psychology more social while recognizing that for this to occur, social psychology must become more ecological in the sense that its key concepts must be treated in an embodied manner. I elaborate these propositions by focusing on establishing differences between coordination and cooperation. I then explore a range of relationships between them from a social psychological perspective. To accomplish this integration, which uses the commitment to reciprocity as a joint organizing principle, I use three complementary models—dynamical systems, effectivities-affordances, and a role-rule model of social commitment. Key aspects of the analysis involve (1) elaborating the meaning of Turvey's (1990) Turvey, M. T. 1990. Coordination. American Psychologist, 45: 938–954. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] proper-relations view of coordination and (2) demonstrating the particular relevance of roles and trust as unifying concepts. From this perspective, coordinations occur between roles, rather than individuals, at the level of team play. Team play, in turn, is shown to depend on trust. And trust, in turn, is related to perceptions of dependability, thereby illustrating a critical intersection of ecological and social psychology.     

具身社会认知：认知心理学的生态学转向

具身社会认知是具身认知同社会认知对话的产物,这种对话从三个维度展开,即具身自我认知、具身人际认知、具身群体认知。本研究不仅论证了具身认知的视角提高了传统社会认知心理学的生态效度,而且从进化心理学、镜像神经元视角对具身社会认知的现象进行了探析。具身社会认知作为一种研究思潮,面临着许多挑战：(1)具身社会认知是对行为主义研究范式的回归;(2)具(体)身(体)是社会认知过程的一种附带现象。     

Critical Psychology: What It Is and What It Is Not

Critical psychology alerts us to the limitations of mainstream research in the discipline, and it promises to put 'social' issues on the agenda in the whole of psychology. A starting point of the stance of critical psychological research is that the claims that psychologists make about human beings often seem to vanish almost as quickly as they are discovered. People, a group or culture do not behave or think like the model would predict, and, more importantly, we find that our awareness, our reflection on a process described by a psychologist changes that process. It is in the nature of human nature to change, to change as different linguistic resources, social practices, and representations of the self become available, and for human nature to change itself as people reflect on who they are and who they may become. That means that any attempt to fix us in place must fail. But it will only fail in such a way that something productive emerges from it if we do something different, and one place to do something different is in psychology. We need to step back and look at the images of the self, mind and behaviour that psychologists have produced, the types of practices they engage in, and the power those practices, those 'technologies of the self' have to set limits on change. When we appreciate this, we can start to look at what psychologists might do instead as part of a genuinely critical approach.     

Reaching Higher in Community Psychology: Social Problems, Social Settings, and Social Change

Forty years after the founding of community psychology, we have yet to deliver on the full promissory note of our birth, where we were poised to address social problems, social settings, and social change. Despite some success, we are at risk for selling ourselves short, for dying out in the discipline of psychology, and for failing to improve the common good. Given changes in demographics and in the safety net, the problem of entrenched disparities is even more urgent—in perception of the other, in the provision of opportunities for development, and in outcomes. Envisioning and enabling will be critical as we work with unified purpose toward a cumulative science where failure will not be predictable.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the mid-west ECO Conference in Community Psychology held in Saugatuck, Michigan, October 2004.     

Social Psychology,War and Peace: Towards a Critical Discursive Peace Psychology

In this paper, I make two related arguments: that peace psychology and social psychological peace research should give greater attention to discourse, and that critical discursive approaches in social psychology should explore matters of international military conflict, an area which has hitherto been somewhat neglected in this tradition of work. These arguments are developed in relation to debates concerning the nature and status of psychological ‘science’, and the neglect of language in social and peace psychology. To illustrate the possibilities of a critical discursive approach, research on the discursive function of ‘peace’ is discussed. In conclusion, it is suggested that a critical discursive perspective enables analysts to interrogate a range of assumptions underpinning militaristic ideologies.     

Psychology: Is It Applied Enough?

The question “Is psychology applied enough?” can be regarded in two ways. In the first place, it could refer to the distinction “pure versus applied science”, and the reproach that modern scientific experimental psychology has little to offer to the practitioner. It is argued that this distinction has lost much of its topicality in modern science, and certainly with respect to psychology. In this sense “applied psychology” is an outmoded notion. Secondly, it could refer to the question whether psychology is utilised enough in dealing with the great many pressing problems in modern society. And it is shown that this question cannot be answered in the affirmative. Too often psychological aspects of problems escape notice and too often potential psychological contributions are neglected in governmental and organisational decision‐making, also in cases where such a contribution would prove valuable indeed. A number of reasons for such a neglect are discussed and some ways of improvement are suggested. La question de savoir si la psychologie est suffisamment appliquée peut être abordée de deux façons. Elle peut d’abord renvoyer à la distinction entre science fondamentale et science appliquée et à la critique selon laquelle la psychologie expérimentale moderne a peu à offrir au praticien. Nous pensons que cette distinction a perdu beaucoup de son actualité, surtout en psychologie. Dans ces conditions, la « psychologie appliquée » est une notion désuète. Ensuite, cette question peut faire référence au fait de savoir si la psychologie est suffisamment exploitée dans le traitement des nombreux problèmes sociaux qu’il est urgent de résoudre. Il apparaît qu’il n’est pas possible de répondre par l’affirmative. Trop souvent, les dimensions psychologiques des problèmes passent inaperçues et les contributions potentielles de la psychologie sont négligées dans les décisions gouvernementales et organisationnelles, même quand cet apport serait manifestement précieux. On analyse les raisons de cette négligence et l’on suggère quelques pistes en vue d’une amélioration.     

Social Psychologists and Social Psychology

Abstract

(Witkin, H. A., Hertzman, M., Machover, K., Meissner, P. B., &; Wapner, S. Personality Through Perception. New York: Harper, 1954. Pp. 571.) Reviewed by Murray H. Sherman.     

Narrative, Memory and Social Representations: A Conversation Between History and Social Psychology

This paper explores relations between narrative, memory and social representations by examining how social representations express the ways in which communities deal with the historical past. Drawing on a case study of social representations of the Brazilian public sphere, it shows how a specific narrative of origins re-invents history as a useful mythological resource for defending identity, building inter-group solidarity and maintaining social cohesion. Produced by a time-travelling dialogue between multiple sources, this historical narrative is functional both to transform, to stabilise and give resilience to specific social representations of public life. The Brazilian case shows that historical narratives, which tend to be considered as part of the stable core of representational fields, are neither homogenous nor consensual but open polyphasic platforms for the construction of alternative, often contradictory, representations. These representations do not go away because they are ever changing and situated, recruit multiple ways of thinking and fulfil functions of identity, inter-group solidarity and social cohesion. In the disjunction between historiography and the past as social representation are the challenges and opportunities for the dialogue between historians and social psychologists.     

"It Could Be Us!": Cognitive and Social Psychological Factors in UK National Lottery Play

This study examines the cognitive and social psychological factors underlying UK National Lottery play. A total of 384 respondents were asked about their own lottery playing behaviours, their knowledge of lottery odds and their beliefs about the role of skill, chance, luck and optimism in lottery play. Using hypothetical scenarios, respondents were also asked to rate the likelihood of winning the lottery jackpot (matching all six numbers) with number combinations reflecting different levels of apparent randomness, previous matches, near misses and prize size manipulations. Frequency of lottery play was found to be positively correlated with age, income, Instants scratchcard play, gambling on horse/greyhound racing, the football pools, and bingo as well as with beliefs about skill, luck and optimism. Frequency of lottery play was negatively correlated with general education and estimate of relative win likelihoods based on the perceived randomness of number combinations. Planned contrasts revealed that compared to individual (non‐syndicate) players, syndicate lottery players played more regularly and gambled more on the football pools. Results are discussed in the light of current cognitive theories surrounding the misperception of probability and their relation to lottery play and in the need for future models to recognise the social factors inherent in syndicate‐based lottery participation.     

Bridging History and Social Psychology: What, How and Why

This special issue aims to bridge history and social psychology by bringing together historians and social psychologists in an exercise of reading and learning from each other??s work. This interdisciplinary exercise is not only timely but of great importance for both disciplines. Social psychologists can benefit from engaging with historical sources by being able to contextualise their findings and enrich their theoretical models. It is not only that all social and psychological phenomena have a history but this history is very much part of present-day and future developments. On the other hand historians can enhance their analysis of historical sources by drawing upon the conceptual tools developed in social psychology. They can ??test?? these tools and contribute to their validation and enrichment from completely different perspectives. Most important, as contributions to this special issue amply demonstrate, psychology??s ??historical turn?? has the potential to shed a new light on striking, yet underexplored, similarities between contemporary public spheres and their pre-modern counterparts. This issue thereby calls into question the dichotomy between traditional and de-traditionalized societies??a distinction that lies at the heart of many social psychology accounts of the world we live in. The present editorial will introduce and consider this act of bridging history and social psychology by focusing on three main questions: What is the bridge made of? How can the two disciplines be bridged? and Why we cross this interdisciplinary bridge? In the end a reflection on the future of this collaboration will be offered.