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1.
We discuss explanation of an earlier event by a later event, and argue that prima facie cases of backwards event explanation
are ubiquitous. Some examples: (1) I am tidying my flat because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow. (2) The scarlet pimpernels
are closing because it is about to rain. (3) The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon. We then look at various
ways people might attempt to explain away these prima facie cases by arguing that in each case the ‘real’ explanation is something
else. We argue that none of the explaining-away strategies are successful, and so any plausible account of explanation should
either make room for backwards explanation, or have a good story to tell about why it doesn’t have to.
相似文献
Daniel NolanEmail: |
2.
Melissa Frankel 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):409-413
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley
is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict,
and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
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Melissa FrankelEmail: |
3.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
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Jeff WisdomEmail: |
4.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
5.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
相似文献
Don LoebEmail: |
6.
J. L. Dowell 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):19-46
Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate
the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion
of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument
for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on
a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking
Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions
as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies
with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other
words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.
相似文献
J. L. DowellEmail: |
7.
Robert Huseby 《Res Publica》2008,14(1):1-18
Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources
of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected
group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility
can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both interpretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy
for amending this problem.
相似文献
Robert HusebyEmail: |
8.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
9.
Roger Foster 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):187-204
I argue that the reflections on language in Adorno and Heidegger have their common root in a modernist problematic that dissected
experience into ordinary experience, and transfiguring experiences that are beyond the capacity for expression of our language.
I argue that Adorno’s solution to this problem is the more resolutely “modernist” one, in that Adorno is more rigorous about
preserving the distinction between what can be said, and what strives for expression in language. After outlining the definitive
statement of this problematic in Nietzsche’s early epistemological writings, I outline Heidegger’s solution and subsequently
Adorno’s critique of Heidegger. Finally, I argue that situating Adorno within the modernist problem of language and expression
is crucial for making sense of his philosophy as a form of critical theory.
相似文献
Roger FosterEmail: |
10.
David Phillips 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):457-468
I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
相似文献
David PhillipsEmail: |
11.
Bas van der Vossen 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):299-302
In this paper I respond to Bernd Krehoff’s article ‘Legitimate Political Authority and Sovereignty: Why States Cannot Be the
Whole Story’. I criticize Krehoff’s use of Raz’s theory of authority to evaluate the legitimacy of our political institutions.
Krehoff argues that states cannot (always) claim exclusive authority and therefore cannot possess exclusive legitimacy. Although
I agree with his conclusion, I argue that the questions of legitimacy and (Razian) authority are distinct and that we need
to focus more on the former in order to really support and defend Krehoff’s conclusions.
相似文献
Bas van der VossenEmail: |
12.
Antony Duff 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):277-281
Richard Dagger (in this issue) provides perhaps the most persuasive version of a ‘fair play’ theory of criminal punishment,
grounded in an attractive liberal republican political theory. But, I argue, his version of the theory still faces serious
objections: that its explanation of why some central mala in se are properly criminalised is still distorting, despite his
appeal to the burdens of ‘general compliance’; and that it cannot adequately explain (as it should explain) the differential
seriousness and wrongfulness of different kinds of crime.
相似文献
Antony DuffEmail: |
13.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
相似文献
Phillip MontagueEmail: |
14.
Lefteris Farmakis 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):41-53
Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change.
In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided
due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency
are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s
picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and
Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.
相似文献
Lefteris FarmakisEmail: |
15.
Peter Alward 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):235-255
In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis
of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the “problem of the essential indexical” reveals
is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and
an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses
both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.
相似文献
Peter AlwardEmail: |
16.
Per Sandin 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):153-167
This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two
versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer’s communitarian version and Brian Orend’s prudential one. I investigate
first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that
a version of Walzer’s doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the
doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend’s version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that
his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
相似文献
Per SandinEmail: |
17.
Simon Roberts-Thomson 《Res Publica》2008,14(2):69-82
The institution of slavery is an unjust institution. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation of why it is unjust.
I argue that slavery is unjust because it makes it impossible for slaves to realise both their interest in self-respect and
their interest in being at home in the world. Furthermore, I argue that this explanation of the injustice of slavery also
provides us with an argument for political equality.
相似文献
Simon Roberts-ThomsonEmail: |
18.
Dorothée Legrand 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):67-87
The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that
one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other
hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness
of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree,
however about which modes of givenness are involved.
相似文献
Dorothée LegrandEmail: URL: http://dorotheelegrand.googlepages.com |
19.
Mark Owen Webb 《Sophia》2009,48(1):35-42
A philosophical theory of religion ought to meet four criteria: it should be extensionally accurate, neutral, phenomenological,
and non-circular. I argue that none of the popular theories of religion meet all these criteria, and that, in particular,
the extensional accuracy criterion and the non-circularity criterion can’t be met without sacrificing extensional accuracy.
I conclude that, therefore, religions do not form a kind, and so, there is no such thing as religion.
相似文献
Mark Owen WebbEmail: |
20.
Evan Selinger 《Human Studies》2008,31(1):27-41
Recent debates about the Grameen Bank’s microlending practices depict participating female borrowers as having fundamentally
empowering or disempowering experiences. I argue that this discursive framework may be too reductive: it can conceal how technique
and technology simultaneously facilitate relations of dependence and independence; and it can diminish our capacity to understand
and assess innovative development initiatives.
相似文献
Evan SelingerEmail: |