Visual illusions and direct perception: Elaborating on Gibson's insights

Gibson argued that illusory pictorial displays contain “inadequate” information (1966, p. 288) but also that a “very special kind of selective attention” (p. 313) can dispel the illusion–suggesting that adequate perceptual information could in fact be potentially available to observers. The present paper describes Gibson's treatment of geometrical illusions and reviews pertinent empirical evidence. Interestingly, Gibson's insights have been corroborated by recent findings of inter- and intra-observer variability in susceptibility to visual illusions as a function of culture, learning and task. It is argued that these findings require a modification of the general Gibsonian principle of perception as the detection of specifying information. Withagen and Chemero's (2009) evolutionary motivated reconceptualization of perception predicts observers' use of both specifying and non-specifying information and inter- and intra-observer variability therein. Based on this reconceptualization we develop an ecological approach to visual illusions that explains differential illusion effects in terms of the optical variable(s) detected.     

Classes,collections, and distinctive features: Alternative strategies for solving inclusion problems

This study analyzed the strategies that children ages 5 through 8 years used on two modified versions of Inhelder and Piaget's (The early growth of logic in the child. New York: Norton, 1964) class inclusion task. In two experiments, children were tested on Wilkinson's (Cognitive Psychology, 1976, 8, 64–85) “percept” inclusion task in which distinctive features marked both supraordinate and subclasses. It was hypothesized that children who fail standard Piagetian inclusion tasks succeed on the “percept” task by counting and comparing mutually exclusive features rather than using features as markers for classes and subclasses. The hypothesis was supported by children's performances on “percept” tasks in which solutions based on feature counting conflicted with solutions based on consideration of class inclusion relations. In two other experiments, children answered part-whole and part-part comparison questions in which both terms were described as classes and/or subclasses, or in which one of the two terms was described as a collection (e.g., a bunch of grapes). These experiments contrasted Markman and Seibert's (Cognitive Psychology, 1976, 8, 561–577) “organization” hypothesis that the greater psychological integrity of collections facilitates reasoning on part-whole comparison problems with the hypothesis that the faciltative effect results from the “large number” connotation of collective nouns. Results on collection problems in which parts were described as collections supported the “large number” hypothesis. Results were discussed in terms of their implications for Piaget's theory.     

The golden section and an algebraic model of ethical cognition

In experimental investigations related to Kelly's theory of constructs (1955. The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton) a special constant was discovered. It was found that subjects on the average choose a positive over a negative pole with the probability 0.62. (Adams-Webber and Benjafield 1973. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science5, 234–241). The same constant was also found in other experiments related to the choice of elements marked “good” and “bad.” Benjafield and Adams-Webber (1976. British Journal of Psychology67, 11–15) hypothesized that the precise value of this constant coincides with “golden section” ≈0.6180. In this paper it is shown that if we suppose that the subjects actualize mechanisms of choice described by the algebraic model of ethical cognition (which was constructed without any relation to the constant 0.62), then the existence of this constant is mathematically explained. Under very broad assumptions its value is 0.625, and under more constrained conditions it is equal to the golden section ratio precisely.     

Perception: A HyperCard stack for demonstrating visual perceptual phenomena

Perception is a HyperCard stack that allows users to explore visual illusions and other perceptual phenomena on the Apple Macintosh. The stack contains over 20 demonstrations of intersecting line illusions, size and shape illusions, subjective contours, color assimilation, and so forth. As a presentation tool for classroom or laboratory demonstrations, Perception offers three unique features for displaying visual phenomena: (1) the capability to “dissolve” the inducing elements of an illusion in order to show the objective state of affairs, (2) the ability to quickly reverse the inducing elements of an illusion and therefore the effects of the distortion, and (3) animation of the various components of an illusion to produce continuous distortions in-real time. These features are illustrated with use of the Orbison, Titchener, Hering, and Wundt illusions. Use of the stack reveals two interesting and unanticipated findings: (1) an apparent size distortion in the central square of the Orbison illusion as it moves back and forth across the background of concentric rings, and (2) perceptual aftereffects that arise when the inducing elements of the Titchener, Hering, or Wundt illusion is dissolved.     

Discrete dynamic choice: An extension of the choice models of thurstone and luce

The present paper deals with the extension of two well-known static discrete choice theories to the dynamic situation in which individuals make choices at several points in (continuous) time. A dynamic version of Luce's Axiom, “independence from irrelevant alternatives”, is proposed and some of its implications are derived. In the static case Yellott (J. Math. Psych. 1977, 15, 109–146) and others have demonstrated that an independent random utility model generated from the extreme value distribution exp(?e^?ax?b) becomes equivalent to Luce's Axiom. Yellott also introduced an axiom called “invariance under uniform expansions of the choice set”, and he proved that within the class of random utility models with independent identically distributed utilities (apart from a location shift) this axiom is equivalent to Luce's Axiom. These results are extended to the dynamic situation and it is shown that if the utility processes are expressed by so-called extremal processes the corresponding choice model is Markovian. A nonstationary generalization is proposed which is a substantial interest in applications where the parameters of the choice process are influenced by previous choice experience or by time-varying exogenous variables. In particular, it is demonstrated that the nonstationary model is Markovian if and only if the joint choice probabilities at two points in time have a particular form. Thus, the paper provides a rationale for applying a specific class of Markov models as the point of departure when modelling mobility processes that involve individual discrete decisions over time.     

Perceptual Error,Conjunctivism, and Husserl

Claude Romano (2012) and Andrea Staiti (2015) have recently discussed Husserl’s account of perception in relation to debates in current analytic philosophy between so-called “conjunctivists” and “disjunctivists”. Romano and Staiti offer strikingly different accounts of the nature of illusion and hallucination, and opposing readings of Husserl. Romano thinks hallucinations and illusions are fleeting, fragile phenomena, while Staiti claims they are inherently retrospective phenomena. Romano reads Husserl as being committed to a form of conjunctivism that Romano rejects in favour of a version of disjunctivism. Staiti, by contrast, claims that, from a Husserlian viewpoint, conjunctivism and disjunctivism are equally untenable. I suggest that both Romano and Staiti offer implausible accounts of illusions and hallucinations, and deliver premature verdicts on Husserl in relation to the analytic debates on perception.     

Moral judgment: Theory and research on differences between males and females

That men and women differ in their moral orientations is a commonly held stereotype. The view that men are morally superior can be found in the writings of philosophers and psychologists (most notably Freud). Recently, Carol Gilligan (Harvard Educational Review, 1977, 47, 431–517) has entered this discussion bringing to it what she calls a “different [woman's] voice.” In this paper, the theory of an ethic of care is described and contrasted with Kohlberg's morality of justice. The empirical support for Gilligan's claim that men and women differ in their moral orientations is examined and a discussion of Gilligan's contribution to an integrated theory of morality is offered.     

A model of three-choice discrimination learning under complete and incomplete feedback conditions

The Bower and Trabasso model of concept identification was extended to cover problems in which three stimuli were presented simultaneously and S pointed to the one he thought was correct. The E gave complete feedback by indicating the correct stimulus, or incomplete feedback by saying “correct” or “wrong.” The model accurately accounted for the significant difference in total errors between the two feedback conditions by incorporating process assumptions reflecting the logical difference in information content of the two types of feedback. Using a single set of parameter estimates, the model made satisfactory quantitative predictions of several statistics for both feedback conditions. Some deviations from the model's predictions were found in the length of terminal error runs, indicating that Ss were possibly using memory more extensively than posited by the model.     

A maximum likelihood hierarchical disaggregate model for predicting choices of individuals

The absence of operational disaggregate lexicographic decision models and Tversky's observation that choice behavior is often inconsistent, hierarchical, and context dependent motivate the development of a maximum likelihood hierarchical (MLH) choice model. This new disaggregate choice model requires few assumptions and accommodates the three aspects of choice behavior noted by A. Tversky (1972, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 9, 341–367). The model has its foundation in a prototype model developed by the authors. Unlike the deterministic prototype, however, MLH is a probabilistic model which generates maximum likelihood estimators of the aggregate “cutoff values.” The model is formulated as a concave programming problem whose solutions are therefore globally optimal. Finally, the model is applied to data from three separate studies where it is demonstrated to have superior performance over the prototype model in its predictive performance.     

Locus of control,perceived responsibility for prior fate,and helping behavior

One-hundred-and-sixty adolescents participated in two studies designed to investigate the relationship between $\text{I}\text{E}$ and helping behavior as mediated by the perceived cause of another's need. In the first study, Ss were given the opportunity to help, either “indirectly” or “directly,” a supervisor who had been over- or underpaid in a prior similar task. Internals helped more in the “direct” help than the “indirect” help conditions but their helping behavior and their perceptions of their supervisors were not consistent. The perceptions of the externals were relatively consistent with their greater help of the “overpaid” supervisor. In study 2, the Ss were given additional information to increase the possibility of their making causal attributions as a function of the supervisor's prior fate. Once again, the external subjects' helping behavior reflected their perception of their supervisor's merit. The internal subjects exhibited relatively little helping behavior regardless of their supervisors' prior fate or perceived competence.     

Attitudes and illusions: Herbert Leyendecker’s phenomenology of perception

In this paper, I discuss aspects of Herbert Leyendecker’s 1913 doctoral dissertation, Towards the Phenomenology of Deceptions (Zur Phänomenologie der Täuschungen), which he defended in 1913 at the University of Munich. Leyendecker was a member of the Munich and Göttingen Phenomenological Circles. In my discussion of his largely neglected views, I explore the connection between his ideas concerning “attitudes” (Einstellungen), e.g., of searching for, observing, counting, or working with objects, and the central topic of his text, perceptual illusions, thematized by Leyendecker as a kind of perceptual “deception” (Täuschung). Indeed, Leyendecker argues that a change of attitude is a necessary aspect of an illusion. I argue that Leyendecker’s use of the notion of attitude in accounting for illusions is problematic; yet I also suggest that his ideas are not devoid of philosophical interest, in relation to current debates.

     

Fairness and preference

Two equity models were evaluated by fitting them to subjects' judgments of the fairness of payment distributions to “self” and “other” under hypothetical work situations. Neither the E. Walster, G. W. Walster, and E. Berscheid (Equity: Theory and Research, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978) equity formulation nor Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear model adequately accounted for the fairness judgments regardless of whether self worked more or less than other. Subjects also were asked to indicate their most preferred payment distributions and these preferences were significantly different from the fairness judgments. Results suggested that fairness judgments were influenced by a bias in the direction of overpayment to self.     

The relationship between goals,performance, success,self-image,and involvement under different organization climates

This is an attempt to test the following causal chain of relationships: →support←goals→performance→success→self-image→involvement→future goals as hypothesized in Hall's (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1971, 6, 50–76) model of the development of work involvement. It was further hypothesized that there would be more evidence for the existence of this “success cycle” in an organization with a climate of high support and feedback than in an organization with lower levels of support and feedback. Data were collected near the beginning and end of the school year in two primary schools and analyzed with correlations and path analysis. The hypotheses received moderate support. As expected, more evidence for the success cycle was found in the high-support school. In the high-support organization, the person's own goals correlated with success, while in the lower-support school, the person's self-image was the main correlate of success.     

A reversed Ebbinghaus–Titchener illusion in bantams (Gallus gallus domesticus)

A disk surrounded by smaller disks looks larger, and one surrounded by larger disks looks smaller than reality. This visual illusion, called the Ebbinghaus–Titchener illusion, remains one of the strongest and most robust illusions induced by contrast with the surrounding stimuli in humans. In the present study, we asked whether bantams would perceive this illusion. We trained three bantams to classify six diameters of target disks surrounded by inducer disks of a constant diameter into “small” or “large”. In the test that followed, the diameters of the inducer disks were systematically changed. The results showed that the Ebbinghaus–Titchener figures also induce a strong illusion in bantams, but in the other direction, that is, bantams perceive a target disk surrounded by smaller disks to be smaller than it really is and vice versa. Possible confounding factors, such as the gap between target disk and inducer disks and the weighted sum of surface of these figural elements, could not account for the subjects’ biased responses. Taken together with the pigeon study by Nakamura et al. (J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process 34:375–387 2008), these results show that bantams as well as pigeons perceive an illusion induced by assimilation effects, not by contrast ones, for the Ebbinghaus–Titchener types of illusory figures. Perhaps perceptual processes underlying such illusory perception (i.e., lack of contrast effects) shown in bantams and pigeons may be partly shared among other avian species.     

Are children any more logical than monkeys on the five-term series problem?

Six-year-old children were tested on several versions of the five-term transitivity problem as used by B. O. McGonigle and M. Chalmers (1977, Nature (London), 267, 694–696) with squirrel monkeys as subjects. Both binary and triadic versions of the tests were administered in both verbal and nonverbal modes to help determine whether or not any major procedural differences between the monkey version and that used conventionally in research with children might account for the monkey's apparently nonlogical solution of the problem. The main result is that children showed very similar response profiles to that of monkeys in all the conditions used. In addition, “labeling”, direct seriation, and “association” post-tests suggest that nonlogical strategies can underwrite ostensibly impeccable transitive “reasoning” in child as well as monkey.     

Compounds,confounds, and models in developmental information processing: A reply to Trabasso and Foellinger

A point by point examination of Trabasso and Foellinger's paper shows their criticisms of my 1970 work to be based on errors of fact (regarding the data I reported) and errors of method (regarding proper procedures for model evaluation). Factual errors are refuted by summarizing crucial data reported in 1970 but ignored by my critics. Errors of method are refuted by contrasting my $\text{CSVI}\text{BE}$ model and data with Trabasso and Foellinger's model and data in the light of the scientific epistemology of model evaluation. The issues of “general” versus “local” models, their “empirical scope,” “number of empirical parameters,” and “simplifying assumptions” are examined. Five ways of evaluating models are distinguished, and in all five my 1970 model is shown to be superior to that of Trabasso and Foellinger. The 1970 data (in light of the controls built into the CSVI task) and new unreported data exhibiting developmental step functions confirm the model of a developmental growth of M (mental energy, working memory), which occurs concurrently with and independently from the growth of executive/control structures. Executive growth alone cannot explain the obtained results.     

The relative contributions of predictiveness and salience in flavor aversion learning

Two experiments investigated the relative influence of cue predictiveness and stimulus salience on flavor aversion learning. In the first study experimental subjects experienced a nonsalient strawberry flavor and a different, more salient flavor prior to illness on each of the first three conditioning trials; the nonsalient strawberry and salient lemon were paired with illness on the fourth trial. This treatment resulted in a strong aversion to the strawberry flavor and on aversion to the lemon flavor. In contrast, animals which had experienced only a single pairing of strawberry, lemon, and illness acquired a strong aversion to lemon and no aversion to strawberry, while animals which had experienced only the pairing of different flavors and illness on each of the first three trials developed a strong aversion to both strawberry and lemon. Experiment 2 replicated the results of the experimental condition of the first study but also included a “blocking” condition in which subjects received three strawberry and illness pairings prior to a strawberry-lemon-illness pairing. Subjects in the blocking condition developed only a weak aversion to strawberry, and this aversion did not block the development of a strong lemon aversion. Apparently, in order for a nonsalient flavor cue to block the acquisition of an aversion to a more salient cue, the nonsalient flavor must not only be paired with illness but also be more predictive of illness than the more salient flavors also paired with illness. The data were discussed in terms of the R. A. Rescorla and A. R. Wagner's associative model (1972, in Classical conditioning II: Current research and theory, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts), R. A. Rescorla's catalytic model (1982, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,8, 131–141), and N. J. Mackintosh's attentional model (1975, Psychological Review,82, 276–298) of conditioning.     

“John thinks that Mary thinks that…” attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children

Understanding of second-order belief structures by 5- and 10-year-old children was assessed in acted stories in which two characters (John and Mary) were independently informed about an object's (ice-cream van's) unexpected transfer to a new location. Hence both John and Mary knew where the van was but there was a mistake in John's second-order belief about Mary's belief: “John thinks Mary thinks the van is still at the old place”. Children's understanding of this second-order belief was tested by asking “Where does John think Mary will go for ice cream?” Correct answers could only be given if John's second-order belief was represented, since all shortcut reasoning based on first-order beliefs would have led to the wrong answer. Results suggested unexpected early competence around the age of 6 and 7 years, shown under optimal conditions when inference of second-order beliefs was prompted.     

Majority influence,minority influence and conversion behavior: A replication

A recent experiment by Moscovici and Personnaz (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 1980, 16, 270–282) showed that whereas a majority produces merely compliance, or a change in the individual's verbal responses, a minority induces conversion, or a true change in one's subjective judgments. Because of the theoretical significance of these findings and because of their inconsistency with data from other experiments, an exact replication and extension of this experiment was performed. There was no evidence of compliance in any social influence condition. Instead, and in contrast to Moscovici and Personnaz, both a majority and a minority produced “conversion” behavior. Subjects' behavior is interpreted as the expression of an improved perception, resulting from a heightened level of attention to the object of judgment under social influence conditions.     

Varieties of Pictorial Illusion

This article focuses on a potentially perplexing aspect of our interactions with pictorial representations (including film, paintings, pictures, drawings, photographs, even video games): in some cases, it seems that visual representations can play tricks on our cognitive faculties. We may either come to believe that objects represented in pictures are real or perhaps perceive them as such. The possibility of widespread pictorial illusions has been oft discussed, and discarded, in the aesthetics literature. I support this stance. However, the nature of the illusion is more complicated than is usually considered. I argue that there are five different types of potential illusions and present reasons for rejecting each. I also explore in detail the most persistent illusion: the “object recognition perceptual illusion thesis,” which states that we undergo a perceptual illusion while viewing pictorial representations simply in virtue of seeing objects in the representation. I contend that a rejection of this thesis depends on the nature of perceptual content, an issue with far‐reaching consequences in aesthetics.