Dyslexic and typical-reading children use vowel digraphs as perceptual units in reading

Digraphs are graphemes that are composed of two letters like the “ou” in “soup”. We hypothesized that the serial-reading strategy of dyslexic readers might interfere with the processing of digraphs. We used a letter-detection task to compare the processing of vowel digraphs in dyslexic and typical-reading children. Both groups were found to be slower in detecting a letter within a vowel digraph than in detecting a letter of a single-letter grapheme. The slower response to target letters embedded in a digraph was position independent in both groups. We also found that dyslexic children did not differ from typical-reading children in the detection of letters in words. These results indicate that typical-reading and dyslexic children process vowel digraphs as perceptual units and that dyslexic children do not show impairments in this early visual process.     

Fragment and schema models for recall

Two general conceptualizations of recall may be distinguished. One holds that recall is sub-served by memory traces in which representations of different aspects of external events are linked directly to each other. The other holds that these representations are connected via a mediating concept. Formalizations of these views are provided by two theories examined by Ross and Bower (1981a): the “fragment” and “schema” models, respectively. Ross and Bower found that patterns of cued recall of clusters of words with a common theme were predicted well by the schema model, but not by the fragment model. Two experiments reported here show that the reverse is true if the clusters of words are selected randomly. Ross and Bower also considered separately a third theory, the “horizontal” model. However, the horizontal model is shown here to be a constrained form of the fragment model. Another constrained form of the fragment model, termed the “link” model, is introduced and is shown to provide an account of encoding as well as of retrieval that, although it is outstandingly parsimonious, is also approximately accurate. Finally, it is shown that the memory structures characterized by the fragment model may be interpreted as either graphs or digraphs: that is, networks with either bidirectional or unidirectional connections between nodes.     

Seeking the Pathos of God in a Secular Age: Theological Reflections on Mystical Experience in the Twentieth Century

Our current context is a “moving” and unstable one. We are facing not only a time of change, but what Pope Benedict XVI terms “an epochal change.” The impact of this transformation upon religion is unmistakable. In this article I reflect on one aspect of this impact: the one that affects and transforms the experience of God, also called mystical experience. I explore the concept of experience, trying to give a more precise idea of what we understand by mystical experience. I then reflect on the importance of mystical biographies and narratives to theology, including the particular characteristics that emerge when this narrative is about the mystical experiences of twentieth‐century people of faith. I present the specific “case” of Dorothy Day as an exemplification of mystical experience. I conclude with several reflections about how human beings find the way towards God in our secular.     

Cree Conceptions of Cognitive Competence

The study of cognitive competence in various cultures has shifted from examining “general intelligence” (very often only in terms known to Western cultures), to a concern for indigenous conceptions of what it means to be a capable person in that culture. Ethnographic techniques elicited the range of Cree terms for such general competence. With a sample of 60 Cree adults in Northern Ontario (stratified by age and sex), we obtained card sorts for 20 terms (piles sorted on basis of similarity), and semantic differential ratings (on 12 bipolar adjective dimensions), for two of the terms. A two-dimensional solution was obtained using Multidimensional scaling. On one dimension there was a cluster of core terms (e.g. wise, thinks hard, pays attention, respectful, good sense of direction) at one end, and three other terms (stupid, crazy, “backwards knowledge”) at the other. On the second dimension, a pair of terms translated as “mentally tough” (with implications of perseverance, stamina, bravery) was at one end, and two other terms (understands new things, religious) were at the other. The term for “lives like a white person” was opposite the core cluster of terms for Cree competence. Ratings of the two terms (“wise” and “understands new things”), indicate that both are associated with: Taking time, good, hard-working, careful, patient, self-sufficient, strong, developing, bush-related, and easy to see. These results indicate some clear differences from Western notions of intelligence as being fast, analytic and without social or moral dimensions.     

Outliers and Influential Observations in Exponential Random Graph Models

We discuss measuring and detecting influential observations and outliers in the context of exponential family random graph (ERG) models for social networks. We focus on the level of the nodes of the network and consider those nodes whose removal would result in changes to the model as extreme or “central” with respect to the structural features that “matter”. We construe removal in terms of two case-deletion strategies: the tie-variables of an actor are assumed to be unobserved, or the node is removed resulting in the induced subgraph. We define the difference in inferred model resulting from case deletion from the perspective of information theory and difference in estimates, in both the natural and mean-value parameterisation, representing varying degrees of approximation. We arrive at several measures of influence and propose the use of two that do not require refitting of the model and lend themselves to routine application in the ERGM fitting procedure. MCMC p values are obtained for testing how extreme each node is with respect to the network structure. The influence measures are applied to two well-known data sets to illustrate the information they provide. From a network perspective, the proposed statistics offer an indication of which actors are most distinctive in the network structure, in terms of not abiding by the structural norms present across other actors.     

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

In this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.     

Semantic and Moral Luck

The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either.     

Coping within couples: adjustment two years after forced geographic relocation

Is our understanding of how individuals adjust to stressful life events increased when we analyze their adjustment in ways that recognize that these individuals are also married couples? The data used to answer this question came from a unique “natural experiment” occasioned by the forced evacuation of the Israeli settlement of Ophira under the terms of the Camp David Accords. We found that the adjustment of individuals within couples became more similar across the relocation, that is, couples adapted as a “family system.” This occurred because the coping skills of one member of the couple “drove” the adjustment of both partners.     

Systematically identifying implicit theories in male and female intimate partner violence perpetrators

This review systematically examines the empirical literature to determine the support available for seven proposed Implicit Theories (ITs) held by heterosexual male and female perpetrators of intimate partner violence. Based on previous literature that has hypothesized and identified ITs in intimate partner violence (IPV) and other types of offenders, we suggest six potential ITs likely to be held by men and women: “Opposite sex is dangerous”, “Relationship entitlement”, “General entitlement”, “Normalization of relationship violence”, “Normalization of violence”, and “It's not my fault”. We suggest one extra IT held by male perpetrators: “I am the man”. Electronic databases were searched from 1980 onwards, using predetermined relevant key words, to identify IPV research that has examined factors associated with each of the proposed seven ITs. Support was found for the existence of all seven ITs, but it differed in terms of strength, mainly due to the dearth or poor quality of empirical research on specific areas, especially in female perpetrated IPV. Implications for treatment and future directions are discussed.     

Frühe Störungen aus der Sicht zunehmender Mentalisierung

The term “mentalization” describes the capacity to judge other humans in terms of their mental activities such as wishes, hopes, beliefs and intentions, as well as the ability to think about one’s own thinking. Mentalization and reflective function are equivalent to each other. They play an important role in selforganization, impulse control, and affect regulation. Mentalization develops during approximately the first five years of life on the basis of attachment in Bowlby’s sense. Around the 9th month of life the child begins to understand her mother as an intentional agent. Mirroring by the mother, in a way of reproducing the child’s state of mind but in a slightly different “marked” manner, enables the child to establish a second “objectified” representation of her condition besides her primary unreflected one. Consequences of lacking, unmarked, or distorted mirroring for later narcissistic or borderline personality are discussed. The child begins now thinking, i.e. playing with representations, but the state of brain development allows to conceive of only one reality. Internal world and external reality appear undistinguishably identical. This is called the “equivalence mode” of psychic functioning. As-if-games open, in a further developmental step, the possibility of including a second reality, namely a pretended one. This is called the “pretend mode” of psychic functioning. At age four to five the child has reached the capacity to take multiple realities into consideration, to take the perspective of an other and to decentrate. She now has a “theory of mind”. Patients with early disturbances have reached this stage only partially. They may also regress to one of the earlier modes of psychic functioning as a consequence of stress or trauma. The knowledge of these early mechanisms helps to identify and understand them when they appear in our clinical practice.     

Creative Reading in the Information Age: Paradoxes of Close and Distant Reading

This article reflects on transformations of modes of reading in an information age, asking what “creative reading” entails in information‐intensive, multimodal environments. We currently face the challenge of the development of reading strategies that oscillate between “close” and “distant” reading. For years, these reading strategies have been a topic of debate between practitioners of Digital Humanities on the one hand, and “traditional” humanists on the other. This ongoing polemics presents reading methods in an unnecessarily polarized manner. I argue that creativity research can be operationalized to come to a more productive model to characterize the ways we read in an information age. I show that the “schism” between close and distant reading is structured around a number of apparent paradoxes that I unravel such as hyper‐ and deep attention/attention and distraction, and convergence and divergence. The paradox of creativity resides in the fact that we find convergence in divergence and vice versa, that the two by definition intertwine. Building on these concepts, I propose a model that considers reading in terms of scale variance. I suggest the humanities turn to creativity research and the interrelations between divergent‐exploratory and convergent‐integrative thinking (Lubart), for a conceptual framework that will allow us to train students on all levels how to read (and how and when not to read), in an information age.     

For a cognitive neuroscience of concepts: Moving beyond the grounding issue

Cognitive neuroscience research on conceptual knowledge often is discussed with respect to “embodiment” or “grounding.” We tried to disentangle at least three distinct claims made using these terms. One of these, the view that concepts are entirely reducible to sensory-motor representations, is untenable and diminishing in the literature. A second is the view that concepts and sensory-motor representations “interact,” and a third view addresses the question of how concepts are neurally organized—the neural partitions among concepts of different kinds, and where these partitions are localized in cortex. We argue that towards the second and third issues, much fruitful research can be pursued, but that no position on them is specifically related to “grounding.” Furthermore, to move forward on them, it is important to precisely distinguish different kinds of representations—conceptual vs. sensory-motor—from each other theoretically and empirically. Neuroimaging evidence often lacks such specificity. We take an approach that distinguishes conceptual from sensory-motor representations by virtue of two properties: broad generality and tolerance to the absence of sensory-motor associations. We review three of our recent experiments that employ these criteria in order to localize neural representations of several specific kinds of nonsensory attributes: functions, intentions, and belief traits. Building on past work, we find that neuroimaging evidence can be used fruitfully to distinguish interesting hypotheses about neural organization. On the other hand, most such evidence does not speak to any clear notion of “grounding” or “embodiment,” because these terms do not make clear, specific, empirical predictions. We argue that cognitive neuroscience will proceed most fruitfully by relinquishing these terms.     

A Critical Appraisal of Amish Studies’ De Facto Paradigm, “Negotiating with Modernity”

The predominant paradigm for Amish research over the past three decades has been “negotiating with modernity” (NWM). NWM explains how the Amish as a distinctive American culture and religion have overcome the threats modernity poses to their existence. This article argues that NWM has been accepted and replicated uncritically and without empirical testing due to properties making it inherently untestable. We first synthesize the central NWM literature, as the paradigm has never been fully constructed in one place. We then call attention to two sets of impairments that prevent empirical tests. First, the perspective contains several logical fallacies and terminology problems. NWM reifies “the Amish” as its unit of analysis; creates circular variable relationships (the Amish are Amish because they are not something else); employs terms problematically, notably “modernity” and “modernization”; dichotomizes phenomena; and is grounded in no particular theoretical tradition. Second, we argue that the production of knowledge within core NWM literature has not been sufficiently substantiated. Data collection procedures and methodological strategies are unclear or undefined and scientific peer review is relatively low. We conclude by suggesting more promising theoretical directions for Amish studies.     

On truth and reference in postmodern science

Abstract:

If the defenders of typical postmodem accounts of science (and their less extreme social-constructivist partners) are at one end of the scale in current philosophy of science, who shall we place at the other end? Old-style metaphysical realists? Neo-neo-positivists? … Are the choices concerning realist issues as simple as being centered around either, on the one hand, whether it is the way reality is “constructed” in accordance with some contingent language game that determines scientific “truth”; or, on the other hand, whether it is the way things are in an independent reality that makes our theories true or false? If, in terms of realism, “strong” implies “metaphysical” in the traditional sense, and “weak” implies “non-absolutist” or “non-unique”, what - if anything - could realism after Rorty’s shattering of the mirror of nature still entail? In accordance with my position as a model-theoretic realist, I shall show in this article the relevance of the assumption of an independent reality for postmodern (philosophy of) science - against Lyotard’s dismissal of the necessity of this assumption for science which he interprets as a non-privileged game among many others. I shall imply that science is neither the “child” of positivist philosophy who has outgrown her mother, freeing herself from metaphysics and epistemology, nor is science, at the other end of the scale, foundationless and up for grabs.     

Laws,causality and the intentional explanation of action

Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis, which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.     

Accessing the Eternal: Dreaming "The Dreaming" and Ceremonial Performance

Australian Aboriginal cosmology is centered on The Dreaming, which has an eternal nature. It has been referred to as “everywhen” to articulate its timelessness. Starting with the assumption that “waking” reality is only one type of experienced reality, we investigate the concept of timelessness as it pertains to the Aboriginal worldview. We begin by questioning whether in fact “Dreaming” is an appropriate translation of a complex Aboriginal concept, then discuss whether there is any relationship between dreaming and The Dreaming. We then discuss Aboriginal ceremonial performance, during which actors are said to become Dreaming Ancestors, using as a frame of reference the “flow” experience explicated by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi together with Alfred Schutz's “mutual tuning‐in relationship.”     

The varieties of agential powers

The domain of agential powers is marked by a contrast that does not arise in the case of dispositions of inanimate objects: the contrast between propensities or tendencies on the one hand, and capacities or abilities on the other. According to Ryle, this contrast plays an important role in the “logical geography” of the dispositional concepts used in the explanation and assessment of action. However, most subsequent philosophers use the terms of art “power” or “disposition” indiscriminately in formulating central metaphysical claims about human agency, assuming that an adequate account of inanimate dispositions can safely be used for such purposes. As a result, the distinctive features of propensities and capacities drop out of view. This is bound to obscure distinctions of crucial importance to the understanding of human agency. In order to show this, I undertake to articulate some central differences between propensities and capacities. Propensities and capacities have a different relation to value, as well as a concomitant difference in their metaphysical structure. The argument points to an explanation of why the distinction between propensities and capacities does not arise in the case of non‐agential powers. This explanation takes us back to questions about the nature of human agency.     

Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech

G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, “ I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd”. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates “the logic of assertion”. Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one “expresses belief” that is consistent with the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to explain the absurdity. Wittgenstein also observes that “under unusual circumstances”, the sentence, “It’s raining but I don’t believe it” could be given “a clear sense”. Why does the absurdity disappear from speech in such cases? Wittgenstein further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than belief. In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that, with the exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly consistent with both Moore’s approach and Wittgenstein’s.