Making Sense of Sense Containment

Proposition 5.122 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (‘If p follows from q, the sense of [p] is contained in the sense of [q]’) has been the source of much puzzlement among interpreters, so much so that no fully satisfactory account is yet available. This is unfortunate, if only because the containment account of logical consequence has a venerable tradition behind it. Pasquale Frascolla’s interpretation of proposition 5.122 is based on a valid argument and one true premise. However, the argument explains sense containment only in an indirect way, leaving some crucial questions unanswered. Besides, Frascolla does not address the issue of how to make sense containment notationally perspicuous, an essential theme in Wittgenstein’s reflections. In this paper, we elaborate on Frascolla’s account by looking at the issue through the Tractarian notion of logical space. Our analysis shows that, for containment to be fully appreciated, one should adopt a negative perspective on the notion of sense (which is taken into consideration also by Wittgenstein), in line with the exclusionary theory of conceptual content, as labelled by Ian Rumfitt. Besides this, we introduce and discuss two methods—one envisaged by Wittgenstein himself—for making sense containment notationally perspicuous.     

Making Sense of Spin

‘Spin’ is a pejorative term for a ubiquitous form of communication. Spin is viewed by many as deceptive, and by others as bending or twisting the truth. But spin need not be deceptive and the metaphors are less than clear. The aim here is to clarify what spin is: spin is identified as a form of selective claim‐making, where the process of selection is governed by an intention to bring about promotional perlocutionary effects. The process of selection may pertain to aspects of some situation or phenomenon; or to the lexis used in making the claims. Not all selective promotional communication is spin. Spin involves a distinctive kind of dissociation between the speaker's first‐order interpretation and the constructed interpretation or claim offered to others. With these clarifications in place the discussion turns to the complex connections between spin, truthfulness and deception. Aspect‐selective spin can be truthful, and it need not be deceptive in its intentions or effects, but may risk deceiving audiences. Lexical spin is less readily truthful, and both forms of spin prudentially require a distinctive kind of concealment of the speaker's intentions. The account developed here does not address normative questions about whether, or how, spin might be wrong, but aims to provide a clear and adequate account of spin as a basis for addressing normative questions about spin.     

Making Sense of Truth-Makers

This essay argues that propositions are made true by facts. A proposition is the sense expressed by a statement (sentence token used to make a truth claim). Facts are positive or negative constitutive properties of the domain of discourse (usually the actual world). The presence of horses is a positive constitutive property of the world; the absence of unicorns is a negative one. This notion of constitutive properties accords well with the Hume-Kant claim that existence is not a property of any individual said to exist. While Frege held existence to be a property of concepts and Russell held it to be a property of propositional functions, our view sees existence as a property of a domain of discourse. To say that Native Dancer exists is simply to say that the world is characterized by the presence of Native Dancer; to say that Pegasus does not exist is to say the world is characterized by the absence of Pegasus. Such properties of presence and absence are facts. Facts make true propositions true; nothing makes false propositions false (they simply fail to be made true). Facts are not items in the world; they are (constitutive) properties of the world.     

Making Sense of Emergence

Philosophical Studies -     

Making Sense of Self-Esteem

Sociometer theory proposes that the self-esteem system evolved as a monitor of social acceptance, and that the so-called self-esteem motive functions not to maintain self-esteem per se but rather to avoid social devaluation and rejection. Cues indicating that the individual is not adequately valued and accepted by other people lower self-esteem and motivate behaviors that enhance relational evaluation. Empirical evidence regarding the self-esteem motive, the antecedents of self-esteem, the relation between low self-esteem and psychological problems, and the consequences of enhancing self-esteem is consistent with the theory.     

理解弗雷格的专名涵义

论文提出了理解弗雷格专名涵义的一种新的角度:路径观点。这一观点比较吻合弗雷格所坚持的涵义概念的若干特征,解决了弗雷格名称理论的许多极具争议的问题,如间接涵义、涵义的本体论,涵义是否有无限多层次。对照克里普克的名称理论及其逻辑背景,论文分析了克里普克及戴维森等人对弗雷格涵义理论的批评,从路径的观点较好地回应了这些批评。     

Making Sense of Moral Realism

The article begins by surveying defences of moral realism and noting the revival of an ontology of 'moral properties'. Such a position tends either to invite accusations of espousing metaphysically 'queer' properties, or to fall back on a weak (e.g. externalist) version of moral realism. Norman attempts to find a way through these difficulties by exploring the idea of 'moral vision', suggesting that this is best understood not as the intuiting of special moral properties but as a matter of 'seeing patterns' in our lives and experiences. Such an account of moral vision can explain how it can be both cognitive and action-guiding.     

Making Sense of Animal Disenhancement

In this paper I look at moral debates about animal disenhancement. In particular, I propose that given the particular social institutions in which such disenhancement will operate, we ought to reject animal disenhancement. I do this by introducing the issue of animal disenhancement and presenting arguments in support of it, and showing that while these arguments are strong, they are unconvincing when we look at the full picture. Viewing animal disenhancement in a context such as high intensity food production, we see that the arguments in support of it fall short of other ethical considerations, leading me to conclude that the moral and pragmatic reasons weigh against animal disenhancement.     

Making Sense of Negative Properties

Few philosophers believe in the existence of so-called negative properties. Indeed, many find it mind-boggling just to imagine such entities. By contrast, I believe not only that negative properties are quite conceivable, but also that there are good reasons for thinking that some such properties actually exist. In this paper, I would like to explicate a concept of negative properties which I think avoids the logical absurdities commonly believed to frustrate theories of negative existences. To do this, I shall deploy a conceptual approach to ontology: I first evaluate the ontological commitments of ordinary negative statements, before I argue that, from the perspective of conceptual analysis, negative properties are no more suspicious than positive properties. In the second part of this paper, I probe the extent to which one can explain the distinction between positive and negative properties in terms of facts about logico-semantical entailment.     

Making Sense of the Philosophy of Sport

Beginning from an earlier claim of mine that there was really no such area of study as the philosophy of sport, Part One of the paper reconsiders the place previously given to David Best’s distinction between purposive sports and aesthetic sports. In light of a famous cricketing event in the 1977 contest between England and Australia (‘The Ashes’), in which Derek Randall turned a cartwheel after taking the winning catch, the paper clarifies that not all aesthetically-pleasing events taking place in sporting competitions can be understood as the aesthetic in sport. Then, in Part Two, the force of the claim that philosophy is one subject is explored. The conclusion is that a focus just on the philosophy of sport is necessarily inappropriate, since it will present the student with only cases from sport to then apply to sport. Rather, one’s understanding must be informed by (much of) the breadth of philosophy. Charles Travis’s view of occasion-sensitivity provides a clear example of appropriately contextual appeal. Part Three of the paper returns to the need for an institutional account of sport, one recognizing that there is no one occasion on which a particular sport is played; and hence no single set of conditions which can uniquely identify that sport. Thus, soccer played with one’s children typically differs from elite soccer: but both are (genuinely) soccer. When one turns to the appreciation of sport (in the light of Stephen Mumford’s excellent Watching Sport: Aesthetics, Ethics and Emotion [2012a]), one recognizes that, in order to genuinely appreciate sport, one cannot detach oneself from the outcome as completely as Mumford’s extreme purist seems to. But reflection on that case may also return us to contextualism by moving us away from attachments to the complete or the exceptionless in our accounts of spectating as of sport: maybe there is no one thing that occurs in all the relevant cases.     

Making Sense of the Role of Assertions

Much of the literature on speech acts and semantics assigns a type of theoretical priority to assertions; many philosophers assume, as Robert Brandom has put it, that assertion is the fundamental speech act. Others take a more pluralistic approach, with many categories interwoven as peers, and no one category as fundamental. I suggest there is a way to embrace a pluralistic approach and explain the importance of assertions without making them fundamental. Their role instead becomes one of supporting connections between other categories, and surprisingly, turns on their unusually broad but very thin pragmatic character.     

Not Yet Making Sense of Political Toleration

A growing number of theorists have argued that toleration, at least in its traditional sense, is no longer applicable to liberal democratic political arrangements??especially if these political arrangements are conceived of as neutral. Peter Jones has tried make sense of political toleration while staying true to its more traditional (disapproval yet non-prevention) meaning. In this article, while I am sympathetic to his motivation, I argue that Jones?? attempt to make sense of political toleration is not successful.     

Stop Making Sense: The Ultimate Fear

This article has been retracted.     

Embodied Knowledge and Making Sense of Prenatal Diagnosis

Open-ended, qualitative interviews with women to whom amniocentesis was offered were analyzed to understand how women made sense of these tests. We found that women, whether tested or not, negotiated with biomedical information. They transformed it through identifiable processes, then wove it with their own instincts and beliefs and with their personal experiences, thereby creating embodied knowledge on which their decisions were based. Women who were and were not tested may have differed from each other when categorized on the basis of a final, binary choice, but they were more alike than unalike in reaching this point. The apparent importance of embodied knowledge suggests the critical role of the listening activities of the genetic counselor and of awareness of the validity and importance of women's complementary ways of knowing and doing in understanding the uses and meanings of prenatal genetic testing.     

Making Sense of Groups,Computers, and Mathematics

In this article, we report the findings of research that was designed to identify factors associated with learning mathematics in groups with computers. The study was influenced by different theoretical perspectives on social interaction and learning mathematics, and we describe how we attempted to integrate these approaches into the research design. To cope with complex data based on eight groups of six students (aged 9-12 years), we developed a methodology that involved moving between quantitative and qualitative approaches in an iterative spiral. In this article, we focus on the patterns of learning associated with two group tasks incorporating the use of Logo. Quantitative analysis of learning measures indicated positive learning gains as a result of the groupwork, with no differences across gender or ability; qualitative and quantitative analysis of process factors pointed to explanations for the differing profiles of success across groups. Although balanced coconstruction at the computer, coupled with the coordination of others' perspectives, was most advantageous for learning conceptually based mathematics, this was not the case with "technology-driven" mathematics, where fragmentation and concentrated work at the computer proved to be more efficient. These findings suggest that detailed specification of the learning goal is crucial when evaluating groupwork within educational settings.