A Lay Perspective on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony1

To understand more about what laypeople think they “know” about eyewitness testimony, 276 jury-eligible university students were asked to indicate what factors they believe affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. In contrast to the large proportion of eyewitness-memory research that concerns system variables, the lay respondents overwhelmingly generated factors related to estimator variables, while system-variable factors such as police questioning and identification procedures were rarely mentioned. Respondents also reported that their own common sense and everyday life experiences were their most important sources of information about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Not only do these results clarify the need for further research on the lay perspective of eyewitness testimony, but they also provide some insight into the way in which many jurors might approach cases involving eyewitness evidence.     

A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony

We compared what 160 U.S. judges, 57 law students, and 121 undergraduates know and believe about factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Judges were no more knowledgeable than were undergraduates, and both groups were less knowledgeable than were law students. For all 3 groups, increased knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with beliefs that might reduce wrongful convictions. Participants in all 3 groups underestimated what potential jurors know about eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that increasing judges' knowledge of eyewitness testimony might help them to reduce wrongful convictions and to more accurately assess when eyewitness experts are needed. The results also suggest that law schools need to do a better job of educating law students about eyewitness testimony.     

What US judges know and believe about eyewitness testimony

In a survey, 160 US judges indicated their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony. Although correct on some issues, judges were often wrong on important issues such as whether at trial eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Increased knowledge was associated with: a willingness to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony at trial; a belief that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors; a reluctance to convict defendants solely from eyewitness testimony; a more accurate estimate of the extent to which wrongful convictions result from eyewitness error; and a belief that judges need more eyewitness training. Additional training about factors and procedures that affect eyewitness accuracy may help judges reduce the number of wrongful convictions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony: A Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors

To compare people's beliefs about eyewitness testimony with expert opinion, 79 college students and community adults filled out a questionnaire in which they reported whether they agreed or disagreed with 21 statements previously used in a survey of eyewitness experts (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989). The results indicated that there was a significant inter-item correlation of agreement rates but that subjects differed from the experts on 15 of these items. For courts seeking to determine the extent to which juries need assistance in their evaluations of eyewitness evidence, these findings offer a tentative list of topics worthy of either expert testimony or cautionary instructions from the judge.     

Swedish Legal Professionals' Opinions on Child and Adult Witness Memory‐reporting Capabilities: Using the Method of Indirect Comparisons

Legal professionals' opinions about the memory abilities of child and adult witnesses are important in the legal process. We surveyed 266 legal professionals (Swedish police, prosecutors, and attorneys) and 33 lay judges about their beliefs about child and adult eyewitnesses' recall and metacognitive abilities. Prior research has usually asked for direct comparisons of children and adults but this may be rare in forensic practice. The respondents completed a story questionnaire (about a 9‐ or 45‐year‐old person witnessing an event), allowing indirect, or researcher‐made, comparisons. In contrast to previous research (direct comparisons), our participants mostly rated children and adults to be on an equal level, but within‐group consensus was low. Also, fairly few differences emerged between the groups' beliefs. Finally, the participants' opinions in our study were less in line with results from eyewitness research, compared with previous research using direct comparisons. Implications for legal and research practice are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always Persuasive1

This study investigates the impact of different types of expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In two hypothetical court cases involving eyewitnesses, expert testimony was presented that was either sample-based (presenting the results of a research program on eyewitness identification) or person-based (presenting information about the particular eyewitness under consideration); the expert either offered causal explanations for his unreliability claim or failed to do so. Two additional control groups (with and without eye-witness identification) were not presented with any expert testimony. The results indicate that subjects who had been confronted with an expert statement made more lenient judgments about the offender but did not discount the eyewitness identification completely. Sample-based information had a moderate impact on the subjects' judgments, regardless of whether or not causal explanations were given. Person-based testimony was the most influential type of expert advice when a causal explanation was provided but the least influential one when no reasons were given. The practical (international differences in admissibility of expert testimony) and theoretical implications (processing of base-rate information) of these findings are discussed.     

Expert psychological testimony on eyewitness reliability before and after Daubert: the state of the law and the science

This article examines the legal and scientific issues inherent in the use of expert psychological testimony on the factors that affect eyewitness reliability. First, the history of the use of such expert testimony is traced. Next, we look at the criteria that state and federal courts have used in determining whether to admit such testimony, as well as the grounds upon which the testimony has been excluded. We then examine the Daubert decision and discuss its implications for the use of expert eyewitness testimony. We conclude by reviewing eyewitness research and research on jury decision-making that is likely to assume new importance in the post-Daubert era.     

Solving the eyewitness problem

Faulty eyewitness testimony is a major source of wrongful convictions. Four solutions are examined to safeguard against mistaken testimony having undue impact: (1) to overturn any conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, (2) to require that an attorney be present at any pretrial identification procedure, (3) to allow an expert to testify during the trial about factors of perception and memory that could affect a witness's accuracy, and (4) to have the judge deliver a cautionary instruction to the jury, admonishing them to carefully scrutinize eyewitness testimony, or to educate them about such testimony. Each alternative is discussed within the context of psychological research and legal cases.     

The Rules of the Game: Forensic Medicine and the Language of Science in the Structuring of Modern Ritual Murder Trials

When ritual murder trials reappeared in central Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they could not be articulated in pre-Reformation language and symbols. Prosecutors, magistrates, trial judges, and police investigators shared an implicit understanding that a new universe of knowledge was in place in which academic experts and practitioners of science defined the boundaries—linguistic and conceptual—of plausible argument and were to be accorded deference. This does not mean that popular beliefs and understandings of Jewish ritual murder suddenly ceased to be disseminated or no longer influenced courtroom proceedings, or that zealous investigators and prosecutors did not pursue their cases armed with a priori assumptions about likely perpetrators and their motives. But cultural material, psychological predispositions, and even narrative accounts built upon eyewitness testimony could never suffice to move either the state to indict or a jury, or a panel of judges, to convict. Whatever nonrational thinking or prejudices may have accompanied it, the modern ritual murder trial was structured by powerful, if implicit, rules of expression and authority: it could only be articulated through the epistemological categories and idioms of a culture that understood itself to be both rational and scientific. What commands our attention, then, in the Tiszaeszlár, Xanten, and other modern ritual murder trials are the processes whereby ritual murder discourse bent—as it were—to the discipline of modernity, as exemplified by the structures and rules of legal procedure, parliamentary politics, mass-circulation journalism, criminology, medicine, and forensic science.     

Procedural injustice,police legitimacy,and officer gender: A vignette‐based test of the invariance thesis

Role congruity theory suggests that gender‐based stereotypes can result in female police officers paying a higher price (i.e., viewed as less legitimate) relative to male officers for mistreating people. The invariance thesis posits that the effect of (un)fair treatment by legal authorities on legal attitudes and beliefs is stable across situations, time, and space. This study tested the invariance thesis by assessing whether the effect of procedural injustice on police legitimacy differed across officer gender. A factorial vignette survey that consisted of two types of citizen‐initiated police encounters was administered to a university‐based sample (N = 525). The results showed that the effect of procedural injustice had a powerful and significant influence on participants' legitimacy perceptions. These effects were consistent regardless of whether the treatment was doled out by a male or a female police officer. The findings provide support for the invariance thesis.     

Judges', lay judges', and police officers' beliefs about factors affecting children's testimony about sexual abuse

The authors examined Swedish judges', lay judges', and police officers' beliefs about factors that may complicate or facilitate children's reports of sexual abuse. Participants (N = 562) rated potential complicating and facilitating factors and freely reported which criteria they considered important when assessing the reliability of child witnesses. The groups had similar opinions regarding which factors are complicating and facilitating. Furthermore, the groups tended to regard emotional factors as more complicating than cognitive factors. When freely reporting criteria that are important when assessing reliability, judges and police officers reported criteria pertaining mainly to the child, whereas lay judges reported mainly criteria pertaining mainly to the police interview. Results indicate that participants believe that children have the capacity to remember and report about abuse but are hindered in doing so by emotional factors. Results also suggest that police officers may underestimate their own influence on the reliability of children's reports.     

“To serve and protect” when expecting to be seen negatively: The relation between police officers' contact with citizens,meta‐stereotyping,and work‐related well‐being

We examined the relationship between contact of police officers with citizens, their (meta‐)stereotypes about citizens, and their work‐related well‐being. Ninety‐three police officers from 4 police stations in low‐ and high‐crime regions in France completed the questionnaire. As expected, negative well‐being of police officers is predicted by negative contact with citizens and their belief that police officers are stereotyped negatively by citizens. Moreover, the relationship between negative contact and negative well‐being was mediated by police officers' beliefs that police officers are perceived negatively by citizens, whereas their perceptions of citizens did not mediate this relationship. Interestingly, level of crime did not influence these relationships. Together, this research shows the important role of beliefs about how one's group is stereotyped when in contact with another group as it may have consequences for people's well‐being.     

What U.S. law enforcement officers know and believe about eyewitness factors,eyewitness interviews and identification procedures

We surveyed 532 U.S. law enforcement officers about eyewitness factors, and how they conduct eyewitness interviews and identification procedures. There were 83 officers from departments that had implemented eyewitness reforms, and 449 officers from departments that had not implemented reforms. Officers from both samples had limited knowledge of eyewitness factors. They also reported conducting interviews and identification procedures in a manner that violated many provisions of the National Institute of Justice's Guide and Training Manual. Although officers in reform departments reported following more correct lineup procedures than officers in non‐reform departments, the two groups did not differ in knowledge of eyewitness factors or in their use of proper interviewing procedures. Only 18% of the reform officers and 1% of the non‐reform officers had both read the Guide and received training based on it. We discuss the implications of the present study for training U.S. law enforcement officers about eyewitness testimony. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From the lab to the police station. A successful application of eyewitness research

The U.S. Department of Justice released the first national guide for collecting and preserving eyewitness evidence in October 1999. Scientific psychology played a large role in making a case for these procedural guidelines as well as in setting a scientific foundation for the guidelines, and eyewitness researchers directly participated in writing them. The authors describe how eyewitness researchers shaped understanding of eyewitness evidence issues over a long period of time through research and theory on system variables. Additional pressure for guidelines was applied by psychologists through expert testimony that focused on deficiencies in the procedures used to collect the eyewitness evidence. DNA exoneration cases were particularly important in leading U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno to notice the eyewitness literature in psychology and to order the National Institute of Justice to coordinate the development of national guidelines. The authors describe their experience as members of the working group, which included prosecutors, defense lawyers, and law enforcement officers from across the country.     

Beliefs about factors affecting the Reliability of eyewitness testimony: A Comparison of judges,jurors and the general public

We surveyed 164 members of the juror pool of the Court of Appeal and a representative sample of 1000 adult Norwegians without juror experience, about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of Norwegian judges. Although the judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than jurors and the general public, all groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Juror experience, in terms of number of times serving as juror, did not correlate with eyewitness knowledge. Consistent with this finding, the knowledge scores of the jurors were similar to the scores of the general public, tested with an abridged seven‐item version of the questionnaire. Comparisons with the results of surveys conducted in the US, indicate similar levels of knowledge among law professionals and jurors in the two countries. Increasing the knowledge of eyewitness testimony among the principal participants in the judiciary system may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Looks like a liar? Beliefs about native and non-native speakers' deception

We examined whether observers' beliefs about deception were affected by a speaker's language proficiency. Laypersons (N = 105) and police officers (N = 75) indicated which nonverbal and verbal behaviors were predictive of native versus non-native speakers' deception. In addition, they provided their beliefs about these speakers' interrogation experiences. Participants believed that native and non-native speakers would exhibit the same cues to deception. However, they did predict that non-native speakers would likely face several challenges during interrogations (e.g., longer interrogations and difficulties understanding the interrogator's questions). Police officers and laypersons also differed in their beliefs about cues to deception and interrogation experiences.     

Lay people's and police officers' attitudes towards the usefulness of perpetrator voice identification

Expert and lay knowledge of factors that affect the identification of a voice is an area of research that is still relatively unexplored. Much more research has focused on eyewitness identification and eyewitnesses' common knowledge. However, results from ‘eyewitnessing’ studies may not be directly applicable to ‘earwitnessing’. The present study examines how knowledgeable British lay people and police officers were concerning earwitness identification performance. One hundred nine participants (i.e. 49 lay people and 60 police officers) responded to a specially designed questionnaire. Results showed respondents to be more knowledgeable than expected, although police officers were no more knowledgeable than the general population. The existence of meta‐knowledge is discussed in relation to previous studies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.