Heidegger’s thinking on the “Same” of science and technology

In this article, we trace and elucidate Heidegger’s radical re-thinking on the relation between science and technology from about 1940 until 1976. A range of passages from the Gesamtausgabe seem to articulate a reversal of the primacy of science and technology in claiming that “Science is applied technology.” After delving into Heidegger’s reflection on the being of science and technology and their “coordination,” we show that such a claim is essentially grounded in Heidegger’s idea that “Science and technology are the Same [das Selbe].” In addition, we argue that, although different ontic epochs can be distinguished in the evolvement of science and/or technology, for Heidegger there is only one unique ontological Epoch of modernity that encompasses various ontic epochs. Therefore, the change from an “epoch of objectivity” to an “epoch of orderability [Bestellbarkeit]” cannot be considered to be an ontological shift. Furthermore, it is not right to ascribe to Heidegger the view that the development of quantum physics signals the beginning of a new ontological Epoch.     

The fragmentation of the religious tradition of the creation,after‐life and morality: Modernity not post‐modernity

Religion asks three central questions: ‘What becomes of us after death?’, ‘How should we lead a moral life?’, and ‘How and why were the universe, life and human beings created?’ In the past, these questions were answered together as part of a single unified narrative. From the mid‐nineteenth century onwards, the growth of modern science and of spiritualism led to a fragmentation of this religious tradition so that the questions are now often asked separately and the answers combined in unexpected ways. This phenomenon is an outgrowth of modernity, not post‐modernity. Post‐modernists have suggested that there has been a recent, new and definitive ending of modernity with a collapse of all dominant grand narratives. Religion is one of the grand narratives supposed to have suddenly unravelled and fragmented in this recent sea‐change, although post‐modernists in general have not bothered to provide the empirical evidence to demonstrate this. The detailed account of the long, slow process of religious fragmentation and the particular role of nineteenth‐century spiritualism given here shows that the post‐modernist thesis does not work for Europe's most important grand narrative—the Christian religion. We can see rather a process of slow unravelling of the origins which go back at the very least to the latter half of the nineteenth century, a time of classic modernity and confidence in progress. This tendency towards fragmentation has continued at least in Europe, but religion persists; it has not experienced the mushroom rise and sudden implosion that has characterised the (until recently) fashionable, grand narratives of the secular intellectuals. We are living in modern, not post‐modern, times.     

INTRODUCTION—RE‐THINKING DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

In this Introduction to “Re‐thinking Dionsyius the Areopagite” it is first explained that the volume sets out to illuminate the contemporary interest in “apophaticism” by close comparison with the original project of the CD. However, given the elusiveness and generativity of the Dionysian tradition, this can only be done adequately by also providing a road‐map of the many historic interpretations of the Dionysian corpus, both East and West. Three constellating themes in the volume are then outlined: 1. The (admittedly divisive) importance of Dionysius for the regeneration of both Roman Catholic and Orthodox contemporary theology, in latter‐day riposte to Kantianism; 2. The significance of Dionysius for suggesting a fluid, post‐modern vision of the self; and 3. The importance of a possible re‐reading of Dionysius's impact on both Lutheran and Tridentine spirituality in the era of early modernity.     

Author's response

The year 1996 was regarded by a considerable part of contemporary literature on global political economy as a definite turning point in modern history. The majority of experts tended to see the starting point of take‐off that year, but others—not a negligible minority—saw omens of disastrous recession and lasting depression. It appears the time has not yet come. The question is now that of the incalculable resultant of runaway (deregulated) forces of the international financial “whirlpool”, of a random process of global, regional and local accumulation of capital. The year 1997 will set in with a foreseeable and calculable agrarian and related cycle and it may find an outlet for accumulated tensions of capital accumulation at the high tide of unemployment (demographic or migratory) wave with unforeseeable and incalculable effects and side‐effects. This will be just the beginning of the end and a Black Weekday still lies ahead of us. There can be no doubt that we live in a transition period but we do not know where this transition leads to. Loose talk about “post‐industrial society”, “post‐modern age” and “postsomething anything” has limited interpretative power. Very few students of social sciences venture to see and verify secular trends in world history.     

Feuerbach's theory of object‐relations and its legacy in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy

This paper focuses on the way in which Feuerbach's attempt to develop a naturalistic, realist remodeling of Hegel's relational ontology, which culminated in his own version of “sensualism”, led him to emphasize the vulnerability of the subject and the role of affectivity, thus making object‐dependence a constitutive feature of subjectivity. We find in Feuerbach the first lineaments of a philosophical theory of object‐relations, one that anticipates the well‐known psychological theory of the same name, but one that also offers a broader metaphysical basis in which all types of “essential objects” are shown to matter to subjectivity. This Feuerbachian theory of object‐relations, the paper then argues, foreshadows a number of important developments in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy. In it can be found an anticipation of Adorno's later theory of mimesis. Equally, this theory already emphasizes the “libidinal” nature of intentionality, in a way that announces Merleau‐Ponty's ontology of the flesh. Finally, the last section of the article proposes a model with which we might reconstruct the way in which object‐relations and self‐relations can be brought together consistently. In this instance, Feuerbach uses concepts that announce Freud's notion of “primary narcissism”. One contemporary philosopher who has proposed a sophisticated model of subjectivity, in which primary narcissism is shown to complement object‐dependence, is Axel Honneth. The last section argues that Feuerbach's full image of subjective identity as reciprocal scaffolding of self‐ and object‐relations reminds strongly of Honneth's core concept of “positive self‐relation”.     

The New Alliance Between Science and Education: Otto Neurath’s Modernity Beyond Descartes’ ‘Adamitic’ Science

Starting from a suggestion of Stephen Toulmin and through an interpretation of the criticism to which Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle, submits Descartes’ views on science, the paper attempts to outline a pattern of modernity opposed to the Cartesian one, that has been obtaining over the last four centuries. In particular, it is argued that a new alliance has to be established between science and education, overcoming Descartes’ banishment against education. In a Neurathian perspective education is a key-moment of the scientific enterprise without which science itself is in danger of going astray and no scientific outlook is promoted in the society at large. Such an anti-Cartesian attitude is a leitmotiv of the whole Neurath’s production and characterizes his fundamental approach to the sense of modernity. For this reasons, despite all its shortcomings, Neurath’s proposal represents a very promising option for a new agenda of the modernity away from Descartes’ spell. By elaborating on Neurath’s (and Dewey’s) insights, the paper puts forward the idea that philosophy of science (such as it was originated by neopositivism in its Reichenbachian version) should give way to an educational philosophy of science which could allow us “to bring the genuine modern into existence”.     

Re-Reading the Post-Kantian Tradition with Milbank

The essay explores the meaning and implications of Milbank's claim that the post‐Kantian presuppositions of modern theology must be eradicated. After defining and locating the post‐Kantian element in the context of Milbank's broader concerns, the essay employs a comparison between Milbank and Barth to draw out the differences between radical orthodoxy and neo‐orthodoxy with respect to the Kantian ideal of “mediation” between theology and culture. The essay concludes with comparisons of Milbank's metanarrative concerning “modern” thought with those offered by Hans Blumenberg and James Edwards. The effect is not only to suggest the apparent arbitrariness of Milbank's account, but also to indicate the evident futility of arguing with Milbank's theological position on the basis of alternative accounts of the post‐Kantian tradition.     

THE DEEP CONDITIONS OF SECULARITY

In modern societies and cultures today, religion is widely perceived as basically even if not merely trivially “optional.” This is a contention strongly advocated by Charles Taylor, most notably in his monumental A Secular Age. Throughout his career, Taylor has made the question of religion in modernity the core of his interests. In his most recent work, A Secular Age, Taylor addresses challenging issues of what he calls the “contemporary spiritual experience” and speaks to “the spiritual hungers and tensions of secular modernity.” I critically consider three aspects of this immensely suggestive if not uncontroversial work: (1) I examine whether there is in fact a possible reversibility or revisability to the so‐called ‘optional’ nature of belief that Taylor thinks is characteristic of the secular age; (2) I scrutinize Taylor's notion of “immediacy” of belief in the same milieu; (3) I interrogate his use of the term “fullness” in delineating the temper of the secular age.     

Embodied Disbelief: Poststructural Feminist Atheism

“I quite rightly pass for an atheist,” Jacques Derrida announces in Circumfession. Grace Jantzen's suggestion that the poststructuralist critique of modernity can also be trained on atheism helps us make sense of this playfully cryptic statement: although Derrida sympathizes with the “idea” of atheism, he is wary of the modern brand of atheism, with its insistence on rationally arranging—straightening out—religion. In this paper, I will argue that poststructural feminism, with its focus on embodied epistemology, offers a way to re‐explain Derrida's “I rightly pass,” and also to carry it forward. Poststructural feminist atheism leads us through Derrida to an embodied disbelief drawing on three dimensions of poststructural feminism: feminist epistemology and material feminism, relationality, and affect theory.     

An introduction to pentecostalisms

Pentecostalism is the result of an interesting amalgamation of different traditions: black and oral cultures, middle‐class and proletarian languages, catholic and evangelical spiritualities. These traditions are contextualized in Western, Latin American, Asian and African contexts which produce a bewildering pluralism. This “post‐modern religion” is not only a challenge to Pentecostal theologians but also to the ecumenical community.     

Together towards Life in the Context of Liquid Modernity

Among the “changed landscapes” identified by the new World Council of Churches mission affirmation Together towards Life is the rapidly advancing secularization evident in the Western world. Growing numbers of people live for goals that are entirely immanent, with apparently no transcendent reference to their lives at all. This presents a new missionary frontier for Christian faith, as Lesslie Newbigin prophetically suggested in the 1980s. Since then, the frontier has strengthened, as disillusionment with Christianity has grown and modernity has taken an ever more liquid form. It has also widened as globalization has taken the free market and its values to almost every part of the world. Together towards Life poses this question: How can we proclaim God's love and justice to a generation living in an individualized, secularized and materialized world? It answers this question first by taking a pneumatological approach to understanding mission and thus talking the language of people immersed in the culture of “liquid modernity” who struggle to connect with heavily institutional religion but yearn for a viable spirituality. It goes on to stress the transformative character of mission, particularly in regard to economic justice and ecological responsibility. It takes a radical direction with its emphasis on the marginalized as agents of mission and the communal nature of Christian witness. In a context of plurality, it fosters an open and adventurous approach, making the “other” a partner in, not an “object” of, mission. At the same time, it calls for bold proclamation of the good news of Christ to meet the personal existential crisis that is a common feature of the late modern world. In these ways, Together towards Life strikes notes that resonate in the context of liquid modernity while also making a call to conversion and transformation. It offers, in short, “challenging relevance.”     

Globalised Religion?: The ‘parliament of the world's religions’ (Chicago 1993) in theoretical perspective

This paper tests the hypothesis that contemporary global and globalised religion as exemplified in the Chicago ‘Parliament of the World's Religions’ of 1993 may be regarded as a resource which is central, rather than marginal to current human concerns in a threatened world. The paper is structured as follows. First, a short personal narrative gives some sense of what happened at the Parliament, and how this affected one of those present. Second, as a means of conveying the scale of the meeting, a brief content analysis and interpretation of the programme shows how (within certain limits) collaboration was made possible. Third, three insights are drawn from current sociology that facilitate an informed, albeit preliminary, evaluation of the Parliament as emancipatory event. These are: i) recent globalisation theory of the world system (Roland Robertson and Peter Beyer); ii) differentiation in a social reality understood as an “economy of signs and space”; (Scott Lash and John Urry); and in) the search for “meta‐theory”; in the “condition of post‐modernity”; (David Harvey). Fourth, some implications of the analysis and interpretation are drawn out which suggest that religion can be understood as a differentiated global resource, an ambiguous, yet dynamic form of ‘cultural capital’ of vital import in an era of post‐materialist value formation. Fifth, in conclusion, it is argued that thus understood the globalised religion represented by the 1993 ‘Parliament of the World's Religions’ has wider implications for the study of contemporary religion and forms of religiosity. Religion returns from the theoretical and cultural periphery (a marginalisation promoted by traditional secularisation theory) into a close relation to the core issues of our time. This is an optimistic interpretation of an event, the significance of which, in the opinion of this writer, should not be underestimated in the evaluation of religion as global resource.     

A GOD THAT COULD BE REAL IN THE NEW SCIENTIFIC UNIVERSE

We are living at the dawn of the first truly scientific picture of the universe‐as‐a‐whole, yet people are still dragging along prescientific ideas about God that cannot be true and are even meaningless (e.g., omniscience) in the universe we now know we live in. This makes it impossible to have a coherent big picture of the modern world that includes God. But we don't have to accept an impossible God or else no God. We can have a real God if we redefine God in light of knowledge no one ever had before. The key question is, “Could anything actually exist in the scientific universe that is worthy of the name, God?” My answer is yes: God is an “emergent phenomenon,” as real as the global economy or the government or the worldwide web, which are all emergent phenomena. But God arose from something deeper: the complex interactions of all humanity's aspirations. An emerging God has enormous implications.     

The psychology of practice and the practice of the three psychologies

The keynote speakers at the 2nd Asian Association for Social Psychology Meetings were asked to clarify the relationship among the three scholarly fields known as cultural psychology, indigenous psychology and cross‐cultural psychology. Are they three names for the same thing? If not are they complementary or antagonistic enterprises? Does one approach subsume the other(s) or make the other(s) possible? What follows is my own general view of the “three psychologies” issue. I suggest that cultural psychology and indigenous psychology are kindred approaches, which differ in significant ways from cross‐cultural psychology. A distinction is drawn between the study of “mentalities” (the proper unit of analysis for cultural and indigenous psychology) and the study of “mind” (a non‐cultural phenomenon). Cultural psychology is a type of interpretive analysis of social practice which asks, “what are the `goals, values and pictures of the world' with reference to which this behavior might be seen as rational?” The essay describes the assumption of rationality and the place of cultural critique in interpretive analysis. Is there any significant difference at all between cultural psychology and indigenous psychology? One aim of cultural psychology (“globalizing the local”) is premised on the view that “indigenous psychologies” may have relevance outside their points of origin. How open is the indigenous psychology movement to the idea that (e.g.) a psychology with a “Chinese soul” might illuminate the psychological functioning of members of non‐Chinese populations?     

Christology and Anti‐Humanism

This article engages the current anti‐humanist or post‐human ethos from the point of view of Christology. Invoking Alain Badiou's claim that “the man of humanism has not survived the twentieth century”, it argues that the death of “the man of humanism” ushers in a situation in which the Christian proposal can be clarified in two crucial ways: (1) Christology is the core of Christian anthropology, and therefore must be the first and last word of the Church's formulation of her answer to the question that is every human life; (2) there is no neutral “human” ground in which the Church can carry on a discourse about “humanism” or “natural law”. The current situation thus forces a theological decision: either the death of man or the God‐Man.     

After justification: Toward a Dalit public Lutheran theology

The aim of this article is to construct a “Dalit public Lutheran theology” as an “after‐justification” conversation, which drafts an agenda for the future of Lutheran theology in the twenty‐first century. In moving toward that construction, I first briefly explain Dalit theology, public theology, and Lutheran theology and shall discuss the rationale for a Dalit public Lutheran theology. From there I propose that Lutheran theology needs to take a contextual, post‐colonial and subaltern turn. Then I discuss the contours of Dalit public Lutheran theology by discussing one of the pivotal doctrine of Luther, “justification by grace through faith,” by engaging in a Dalit public discourse and propose “hospitality by love” as what comes after justification. Finally, I bring out the relevance of such a theology for our present‐day context. The method I employ in this article is subaltern methodology, which is to “read from below” or “read against the grain.” “After justification” is understood as “beyond” the understanding of doctrine of justification, as a forward‐looking public theological understanding of justification, where it finds fecundity and validity.     

MODERN SOVEREIGNTY IN QUESTION: THEOLOGY,DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM

This essay argues that modern sovereignty is not simply a legal or political concept that is coterminous with the modern nation‐state. Rather, at the theoretical level modern sovereign power is inscribed into a wider theological dialectic between “the one” and “the many”. Modernity fuses juridical‐constitutional models of supreme state authority with a new, “biopolitical” account of power whereby natural life and the living body of the individual are the object of politics and are subject to state control (section 1). The origins of this dialectic go back to changes within Christian theology in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. In particular, these changes can be traced to Ockham's denial of the universal Good in things, Suárez's priority of the political community over the ecclesial body and Hobbes's “biopolitical” definition of power as state dominion over life (section 2). At the practical level, modern sovereignty has involved both the national state and the transnational market. The “revolutions in sovereignty” that gave rise to the modern state and the modern market were to some considerable extent shaped by theological concepts and changes in religious institutions and practices: first, the supremacy of the modern national state over the transnational papacy and national churches; second, the increasing priority of individuality over collectivity; third, a growing focus on contractual proprietary relations at the expense of covenantal ties and communal bonds (section 3). By subjecting both people and property to uniform standards of formal natural rights and abstract monetary value, financial capitalism and liberal secular democracy are part of the “biopolitical” logic that subordinates the sanctity of life and land to the secular sacrality of the state and the market. In Pope Benedict's theology, we can find the contours of a post‐secular political economy that challenges the monopoly of modern sovereignty (sections 4–5).     

Pushing dualism to an extreme: On the philosophical impetus of a new materialism

This article discusses the way in which a group of contemporary cultural theorists in whose work we see a “new materialism” (a term coined by Braidotti and DeLanda) at work constitutes a philosophy of difference by traversing the dualisms that form the backbone of modernist thought. Continuing the ideas of Lyotard and Deleuze they have set themselves to a rewriting of all possible forms of emancipation that are to be found. This rewriting exercise involves a movement in thought that, in the words of Bergson, can be termed “pushing dualism to an extreme.” By this movement, Deleuze has stated, “difference is pushed to the limit,” that is, using Colebrook’s words, “difference is shown differing.” The article addresses the ways in which modernity’s dualisms (structured by a negative relation between terms) are traversed, and how a new conceptualization, and ontology, of difference (structured by an affirmative relation) comes to be constituted along the way. New materialism leaves behind all prioritizations (implicitly) involved in modern dualist thinking since a difference structured by affirmation does not work with predetermined relations (e.g., between mind and body) nor does it involve a (counter-)hierarchy between terms. The article makes explicit the methodology of the current-day rise of non-dualist thought, both in terms of its non-classificatory mode of (Deleuzian) thinking and in terms of the theory of the time of thought thus effectuated (Lyotard’s notion of ‘rewriting modernity’ is not a post-modernism). Throughout the article we will engage with an example in order to demonstrate the ontology that is being practiced following this methodology: How does a new (feminist) materialism traverse the sexual dualisms that structure modernist (feminist) thinking? This example also shows how a feminist post-modernism (found in the canonical work of Butler) has remained dualist, and what makes new materialism “new.” Freed from a dualist methodology, the modernist emancipatory project comes to full fruition in new materialism.     

ON THE TENACITY OF CHRISTIAN ANTI‐JUDAISM1

Joachim of Fiore's three ages of Father, Son and Spirit demonstrated that the supersessionist gambit Christianity had introduced against Judaism is a logic any successor can employ. Modernity (cf. modo, “now”) is constituted by a relentless supersessionist logic; the modern issue is less supersessionism than a conflict of supersessionisms. Christianity has repeatedly overspiritualized God's “bodily covenant” with Israel (Wyschogrod). This distortive tendency is intensified in modernity by Christianity's anxiety that it too will appear old/“Jewish” vis‐à‐vis a new New Testament of infinite spiritual freedom (cf. Romanticism.) One corrective would be for Christianity to return to a more Jewish understanding of election.     

The Philosophy of Time

Several leading theologians of the 20th century emphasized the “futurity” of God in their formulation of the relation between Eternity and time. Although the impetus for such proposals was connected to the rediscovery of the centrality of eschatology among biblical scholars, many of these theologians also appropriated (and participated in) a late modern shift in the philosophy of time. This “turn to futurity” created challenges for theological formulations that presuppose the deterministic and linear views of causality dominant in early modernity. However, this shift also provided a new conceptual space within which theologians could retrieve and refigure traditional resources for articulating the intuition that creaturely being (in all its temporal modes) is constituted by the coming of the eternal God.