Can money buy happiness?

Income was negatively associated with the mood states of confusion and tense in a sample of 406 community residents, but controls for age, sex, and education eliminated these associations.     

Does physical attractiveness buy happiness? Women’s mating motivation and happiness

Motivation and Emotion - Given the centrality of physical attractiveness in women’s mate value, we predicted that mating motive salience would increase the weight of physical attractiveness...     

Should happiness guide social policy?

Since the 1970s, and especially since the 1990s, the concept of happiness has grown in importance in both the academic and popular domains. This article focuses on studies that collect empirical data on happiness with the aim of informing public policies that maximise collective happiness. These studies are characterised by two assumptions that are mostly taken for granted: that happiness is a psychological state and that it has a moral and ethical value. In this contribution, I will question this conception of happiness as a social goal from the point of view of political philosophy. I begin by examining the historical origin of the modern political concept of happiness. Following this, I evaluate the principle of happiness maximisation, comparing it to other wide-ranging principles (justice, equity, freedom and plurality), and bringing to the fore some implications of happiness maximisation that place it in conflict with democratic rights and freedoms. Finally, I sum up my line of reasoning and briefly reflect on some proper uses of happiness in public policy.     

Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? [corrected] Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness

Happiness is a key ingredient of well-being. It is thus reasonable to expect that valuing happiness will have beneficial outcomes. We argue that this may not always be the case. Instead, valuing happiness could be self-defeating, because the more people value happiness, the more likely they will feel disappointed. This should apply particularly in positive situations, in which people have every reason to be happy. Two studies support this hypothesis. In Study 1, female participants who valued happiness more (vs. less) reported lower happiness when under conditions of low, but not high, life stress. In Study 2, compared to a control group, female participants who were experimentally induced to value happiness reacted less positively to a happy, but not a sad, emotion induction. This effect was mediated by participants' disappointment at their own feelings. Paradoxically, therefore, valuing happiness may lead people to be less happy just when happiness is within reach.     

Does happiness function like a motivational state?

According to Brehm's intensity of emotion theory, if an emotion has motivational properties, its intensity should be non-monotonically affected by factors similar to those determining the intensity of motivational states. These factors are called deterrents. In the case of emotion, one category of deterrents consists of factors that can potentially interfere with feeling the emotion, such as reasons for not feeling the emotion. Two experiments were carried out to examine whether happiness is a motivational state and, thus, if its intensity is non-monotonically determined by the importance of reasons for not feeling happy. We expected happiness to be reduced by a low importance reason for not feeling happy, to remain high in the presence of a moderately important reason, and to be reduced or eliminated by a very important reason. Both experiments supported the cubic function that results from these expectations, and when the results of the two studies were combined, each of the individual legs of the cubic function was found to be reliable along with the cubic function itself. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

New age advice: ticket to happiness?

The ‘New Age’ movement emerged in the second half of the 20th century and New Age ideas became the vogue in the Western world. New Age is much concerned with personal quality of life and offers both a philosophy of life and various therapeutic practices, presumed to raise happiness. This paper first describes the main recommendations to be found in New Age books. Next it considers the probable effects on happiness of these, by examining both the theoretical plausibility and the empirical conditions of happiness. This paper concludes that several recommendations are likely to produce beneficial consequences. It is argued, however, that the advice will not fit everybody equally well and that some New Age practices may reduce happiness, e.g., practices that undermine a realistic outlook on reality.     

Do you believe happiness can change? An investigation of the relationship between happiness mindsets,well-being,and satisfaction

Three studies (N = 794) examined if beliefs about the malleable nature of happiness (growth mindsets) are associated with well-being and if this well-being had downstream implications for satisfaction with one’s relationships (Studies 1–3), health (Study 3), and job (Study 3). In Study 1 (N = 277), happiness growth mindsets were associated with greater well-being and greater relationship satisfaction. In Study 2 (N = 337), using an experimental paradigm and serial mediation, encouraging growth mindsets led to stronger beliefs in the changeable nature of happiness, which in turn was associated with subjective well-being, and, finally, relationship satisfaction. In Study 3 (N = 180), we replicated the downstream effects of growth mindsets of happiness on well-being and subsequently on relationship satisfaction and extended these serial mediation effects to health and job satisfaction. We discuss the implications of happiness mindsets.     

Why is intelligence associated with stability of happiness?

In the National Child Development Study, life‐course variability in happiness over 18 years was significantly negatively associated with its mean level (happier individuals were more stable in their happiness, and it was not due to the ceiling effect), as well as childhood general intelligence and all Big Five personality factors (except for Agreeableness). In a multiple regression analysis, childhood general intelligence was the strongest predictor of life‐course variability in life satisfaction, stronger than all Big Five personality factors, including Emotional stability. More intelligent individuals were significantly more stable in their happiness, and it was not entirely because: (1) they were more educated and wealthier (even though they were); (2) they were healthier (even though they were); (3) they were more stable in their marital status (even though they were); (4) they were happier (even though they were); (5) they were better able to assess their own happiness accurately (even though they were); or (6) they were better able to recall their previous responses more accurately or they were more honest in their survey responses (even though they were both). While I could exclude all of these alternative explanations, it ultimately remained unclear why more intelligent individuals were more stable in their happiness.     

Is happiness the supreme good? Some philosophical objections

Modern philosophy is characterised by various objections to the Aristotelian conception of happiness as the supreme good of human life. In this paper, I focus on the objections raised by two key thinkers of the modern period, namely Blaise Pascal and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both philosophers formulate important counter- arguments to the teleological claim that happiness is the highest good towards which all human beings naturally direct their efforts. Their target is not any specific definition of happiness as a particular kind of activity, or a particular kind of good. Instead, they express a more fundamental scepticism about the very possibility of happiness being the ultimate end of human life. As I show, Pascal's and Nietzsche's radical point is that, since reason alone can never answer for certain the question of whether or not happiness is the ultimate aim of human existence, philosophy should not concern itself with the question of happiness. The paper has three parts. I first sketch an outline of Pascal's sceptical argument with regard to happiness, and then present his positive definition of happiness, after which I do the same for Nietzsche. The third part is devoted to a critical assessment of their positions in light of an alternative argument developed by John Cottingham.     

Mood over matter: can happiness be your undoing?

Existing empirical literature has typically treated meaning and purpose as identical. Based on previous theoretical propositions of these two constructs as distinct, we hypothesized that meaning (defined as a sense of comprehension and significance in life) and purpose (defined as a sense of goals, aims, and direction in life) would have different predictors and correlates. We utilized a longitudinal design and collected data from 167 cancer survivors at two time points one year apart. Although meaning and purpose were strongly correlated, they had different predictors and correlates. Regression analyses showed Time 2 meaning was predicted by Time 1 spirituality, whereas Time 2 purpose was predicted by Time 1 social support. At Time 2, meaning was positively correlated with posttraumatic growth and negatively with posttraumatic depreciation, whereas purpose was negatively correlated with intrusive thoughts pertaining to cancer. Implications of an understanding of meaning and purpose as distinct constructs are discussed.     

How successfully can we measure well-being through measuring happiness?

Happiness is currently the topic of a wide range of empirical research, and is increasingly becoming the focus of public policy. The interest in happiness largely stems from its connection with well-being. We care about well-being – how well our lives are going for us. If we are happy it seems that, to some extent, we must be doing well. This suggests that we may be able to successfully measure well-being through measuring happiness. The problem is that both happiness and well-being are elusive and their measurement is far from uncontroversial. What exactly does information about happiness tell us about well-being? Is there more to well-being than happiness? If so, to what extent is happiness connected to well-being? These are controversial questions, but answers to them must be given if we are to make progress in the measurement of well-being. I argue that we should view happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being. I call this the Indicator View. According to this view, someone can be doing badly yet be happy insofar as their well-being is improving (and vice versa). More precisely, the Indicator View is the view that happiness is a defeasible indicator of local changes in well-being. Thus, we can successfully measure an important aspect of well-being through measuring happiness. I argue in favour of this view on the basis of an understanding of well-being that is widely acceptable. The Indicator View, therefore, has the potential to unite divided opinion over what happiness research can tell us about well-being.     

The flourishing–happiness concordance thesis: Some troubling counterexamples

The aim of this article is to explore and critique recent aspirations to bridge the traditional divide between subjective and objective accounts of wellbeing through a psychological concordance thesis, according to which flourishing and happiness will, for psychological reasons, go hand in hand. Two varieties of the concordance thesis are explored, one psychological in origin and the other philosophical, with a special focus on the latter (derived from Aristotle) as it makes more radical psychological claims. Counterexamples are provided and discussed of unhappy and not-happy-enough flourishers, and of happy and not-unhappy-enough non-flourishers. The implications of those counterexamples are elicited, with the conclusion being that normative claims about the relative priority of flourishing over happiness (or vice versa) for wellbeing cannot be avoided with impunity. The concordance thesis does not seem to bear scrutiny, at least not as a thesis about ‘psychological necessity’; however, this leaves both a less demanding ‘rule-of-thumb’ concordance thesis, and a host of complementary theses about flourishing and happiness, intact.     

Dispositional happiness and affective forecasting: General or specific effect?

Recent findings suggest that dispositional traits can influence personal affective forecasting. In this study, we investigated the relationship between dispositional happiness and affective prediction about academic performance among undergraduate students. Participants were asked to predict their emotional reactions on a 7-point Likert scale in regard to an important exam’s result two months prior obtaining their results. All the participants were contacted by SMS (Short Text Message) 8 h after the results were available and were requested to rate their actual emotional feelings on the same scale. According to their scores on the subjective happiness scale, participants were assigned into ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ groups. Results show no emotional prediction differences between the two groups for extreme results (i.e. good and bad results). In contrast, happy participants predicted less negative emotional feelings than unhappy ones for moderate results. No differences appear for the emotional feelings assessed the day they received their exam’s scores. These findings support the idea that dispositional happiness is related to emotional prediction and, more particularly, indicate that happiness induces more positive feelings concerning moderate future events, but not for extreme ones. This study suggests that happiness induces a positive view about emotional coping for future intermediate accomplishments only and not a positive view of the future in general.     

“State of happiness”? Petroreligion and petromelancholia in Norway

This article discusses the intersection between the symbol systems of petroculture and religion in development of the Norwegian oil age. The public TV series State of Happiness (2018-now) dramatizes Norway's adventure with oil and gas, beginning in 1969. Drawing parallels to Darren Dochuk's work on the mutual construction of petroculture and American religion in Anointed with Oil, this essay argues that State of Happiness retells the story of Norway's adventure with oil framed by some in terms of salvation, as a blessing and as the arrival of a better, messianic age. The characters in the series negotiate their religious commitments with the enchantments of the emerging petroculture in the Stavanger region, engaging the themes of Advent, Christmas, Baptism, and Trinity.     

Self-presentations of happiness: sincere, polite, or cautious?

Two studies addressed the meaning of expressed happiness in social relationships. In the first study, men expected to interact with a socially desirable or a socially undesirable woman. It was predicted that (a) when about to meet a socially undesirable woman, men would display more happiness publicly than is felt privately and (b) when about to meet a socially desirable woman, men would display less happiness publicly than felt privately. Results supported the former and tended to support the latter prediction. In the second study, the authors predicted that women would mistrust men's expressions of happiness upon meeting them such that (a) unattractive women would suspect men of inflating happiness and (b) attractive women would suspect men of suppressing happiness. Results supported the former but not the latter hypothesis. Taking relationship-specific goals into account appears to be important in determining whether emotion will be accurately conveyed and can be trusted.     

How individualism–collectivism orientations predict happiness in a collectivistic context

We discuss how individualistic/collectivistic orientations of employees predict affective well-being at work, and how this relationship is moderated by the perceptions of spirit of camaraderie in organizations. The sample comprises 161 employees of 109 organizations operating in Portugal, a collectivistic culture. The findings suggest that: (a) collectivistic individuals show higher affective well-being than individualists; (b) this relationship is moderated by the employees’ perceptions of the spirit of camaraderie in their organizations; (c) higher affective well being levels tend to be experienced by collectivists who find working in an organizational context to be rich in spirit of camaraderie, and lower levels of affective well being are expressed by individualists who perceive poor spirit of camaraderie in their working environments. The paper emphasizes that employee happiness can have different bases in different cultures and that individualism/collectivism orientations do not operate in the same way in different cultural and organizational contexts. We are very grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

A premature consensus: are happiness and sadness truly opposite affects?

Within the debate on the structure of affect, a consensus began emerging in the last decade regarding the bipolarity of happiness–sadness. We argue that this consensus is premature. Focusing on the psychometrics of momentary affect, particularly happiness and sadness, and using a simulation study, a large-scale data set, and 2 experiments manipulating affect, we plot a map of affective space that departs from the consensus. One key departure is the finding that happiness and sadness are not bipolar opposites. Another is that nonuniform skewness plays a major role in studies of affective structure, but can be addressed with appropriate analyses.