The Semantics of Anchoring

Previous research has demonstrated that judgmental anchoring effects—the assimilation of a numeric estimate to a previously considered standard—are semantic in nature. They result because the semantic knowledge about the target object that is activated during the comparison with the anchor influences the absolute judgment. In addition to this semantic influence, the numeric anchor value itself may also yield an effect under specific conditions. The present research was designed to examine the relative strength of both mechanisms and explore their boundary conditions. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that semantic anchoring effects are more potent than purely numeric effects. Study 3 further suggests that purely numeric effects only operate if accessible semantic knowledge is inapplicable to the critical judgment so that semantic influences are incapacitated. The implications of these findings are discussed from the perspective of an integrative model which differentiates between two stages of anchoring. Whereas purely numeric influences appear to be limited to the stage of anchor selection, the actual comparison with the target involves more elaborate semantic processes.     

When knowledge matters—differential effects of available knowledge in standard and basic anchoring tasks

The present research examines whether anchoring effects—the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard—depend on judges' available knowledge in the target domain. Based on previous research, I distinguish two types of anchoring effects. Standard anchoring is obtained if judges are explicitly asked to compare the anchor to the target. Basic anchoring results if the accessibility of the anchor is increased prior to judgments about the target. I expected that only basic but not standard anchoring is reduced by providing judges with judgment‐relevant knowledge. Using a standard versus basic anchoring paradigm, 112 participants were confronted with a high versus low anchor before estimating the average price of a German midsize car. Prior to this task, participants were provided with information about prices of cars (relevant knowledge) versus kitchens (irrelevant knowledge). Results demonstrate that this knowledge only influenced the magnitude of basic but not standard anchoring effects. This finding demonstrates that knowledge has differential effects in different types of anchoring. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Subliminal anchoring: Judgmental consequences and underlying mechanisms

Judgmental anchoring—the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard—is an exceptionally ubiquitous effect that influences human judgment in a variety of domains and paradigms. Three studies examined whether anchoring effects even occur, if anchor values are presented subliminally, outside of judges’ awareness. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate such subliminal anchoring effects: judges assimilated target estimates towards the subliminally presented anchor values. Study 3 further demonstrates that subliminal anchors produced a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent target knowledge. The implications of these findings for the ubiquity of judgmental anchoring, its different underlying mechanisms, and comparative information processing are discussed.     

Prior knowledge and subtyping effects in children's category learning

Two experiments examined how 5- and 10-year-old children revise their category representations when exposed to exemplars that are congruent or incongruent with existing knowledge. During training children were presented with exemplars containing features that were congruent or incongruent with children's social stereotypes together with a stereotype-neutral feature. In the knowledge-subtyping condition this neutral feature predicted the stereotype-congruence of the other features. In the knowledge-standard condition the neutral feature was uncorrelated with stereotype-congruence. At test children made judgements about feature co-occurrence within the learned category. In each experiment these judgements were influenced by both stereotypical beliefs and exemplar observation. Stereotypical beliefs, however, had a greater influence on co-occurrence judgements in the knowledge-subtyping than in the standard conditions. In Experiment 2 these effects were shown to generalize to judgements about features that were not presented during training. These results challenge current models of knowledge-based categorization by showing that exemplar structure determines whether novel exemplar features are incorporated into category representations.     

社会判断中的样例激活效应

初步考察了社会判断过程中样例激活效应存在的条件、作用、强度和指向。被试为西北师范大学教育科学学院心理系2年级学生160人。实验结果表明：（1）样例激活效应在强启动和弱启动条件下都存在,而且表现为同化效应。（2）在强启动条件下,样例激活效应表现强烈。进一步讲,正、反样例对高、低效价的靶子都有同化效应,但正面样例对低效价靶子的效应更强;而反面样例对高效价靶子的效应更强。（3）在弱启动条件下,样例效价和靶子效价共同影响着社会判断及其决策过程,样例激活效应明显弱化,具体表现为：①样例激活仅对低效价靶子的判断影响显著,对高效价靶子影响不显著;②从具体样例对高、低效价靶子效应强度的比较看,正面样例对低效价靶子作用更强,反面样例只表现出略微差异。另外,“关联效应”会冲淡样例激活效应     

The impact of training sequence and between-category similarity on unsupervised induction

Studies of supervised categorization often show better learning when examples are presented in random alternation rather than massed by category, but such interleaving impairs learning in unsupervised tasks. The exemplar comparison hypothesis explains this result by assuming that people in unsupervised tasks discover generalizations about categories by comparing individual examples, and that interleaving increases the difficulty of such within-category comparisons. The category invention hypothesis explains the interleaving effect by assuming that people are more likely to merge or aggregate potentially separable categories when they are interleaved, and this initial failure to recognize separate categories then acts as an effective barrier to further learning. The present experiments show that the interleaving effect depends on the similarity or alignability of the presented categories. This result provides evidence in favour of the category invention hypothesis, which expects that highly dissimilar (nonalignable) categories will resist aggregation and hence will not be affected by interleaving. The nonmonotonic pattern of learning, and the interaction between sequence and similarity, observed in the alignable conditions of Experiment 3 were also consistent with category invention, but not with exemplar comparison. Implications are discussed for real-world learning, especially the relationship between exposure and learning and between supervised and unsupervised learning.     

面孔吸引力同化的连续性效应

以往研究表明目标面孔的吸引力评价会偏向背景面孔, 产生同化效应。但同化效应的计算常常是对不同背景下目标面孔吸引力评分进行比较, 并没有考虑目标面孔单独呈现时的吸引力评分, 可能是虚假的同化效应。本文以单独呈现的目标面孔吸引力评分作为基准值计算同化效应, 考察了呈现时间和目标与背景面孔吸引力的差异对目标面孔吸引力评价的影响。结果发现, 个体对目标面孔吸引力的评分会偏向背景面孔的吸引力, 并表现出同化的连续性效应, 即目标和背景面孔的吸引力差异越大, 同化效应越小。     

Induction with uncertain categories: When do people consider the category alternatives?

These three experiments examined how people make property inferences about exemplars whose category membership is uncertain. Participants were shown two categories and a novel exemplar with a feature that indicated that the exemplar was more likely to belong to one category (target) than to the other (nontarget). Participants then made categorization decisions and property inferences about the novel exemplar. In some conditions, property inferences could be made only by considering both target and nontarget categories. In other conditions, predictions could be based on both categories or on the target category alone. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Murphy & Ross, 1994, 2005), we found that many people made predictions based only on consideration of the target category. However, the prevalence of such single-category reasoning was greatly reduced by highlighting the costs of neglecting nontarget alternatives and by asking for inferences before categorization decisions. The results suggest that previous work may have exaggerated the prevalence of single-category reasoning and that people may be more flexible in their use of multiple categories in property inference than has been previously recognized.     

'Everything is relative': Comparison processes in social judgment The 2002 Jaspars Lecture

Any judgment involves a comparison of the evaluated target to a pertinent norm or standard, so that comparison processes lie at the core of human judgment. Despite this prominent role, however, little is known about the psychological mechanisms that underlie comparisons and produce their variable consequences. To understand these consequences, one has to examine what target knowledge is sought and activated during the comparison process. Two alternative comparison mechanisms are distinguished. Similarity testing involves a selective search for evidence indicating that the target is similar to the standard and leads to assimilation. Dissimilarity testing involves a selective search for evidence indicating that the target is dissimilar from the standard and leads to contrast. Distinguishing between these alternative mechanisms provides an integrative perspective on comparison consequences in the realm of social comparison and beyond. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wanted: a new psychology of exemplars.

Present-day exemplar theory faces difficult challenges, and important questions have arisen about the kinds of exemplar effects and processes that are empirically supported, and about the kind of exemplar theory that could still be constructive. One question concerns whether exemplar generalization in memory and categorization is broad and collective--extending to many related exemplars stored in memory--or whether it is focused and singular--extending only to highly similar (nearly identical) exemplars. The present article considers this continuum from broad to narrow generalization. I demonstrate that in prominent memory and category tasks--tasks in which exemplar theory predicts broad generalization--generalization is in psychological reality very tightly focused. These demonstrations could ground a new, productive exemplar theory that is true to psychological process as humans conduct themselves in memory and category tasks. This new psychology may actually reprise the traditional exemplar theory that predated our sophisticated, mathematical exemplar models.     

Preservation of categorical knowledge in Alzheimer's disease: A computational account

Abstract

The distinction between knowledge of specific exemplars and knowledge of their general categories is central to much theorising on the nature of semantic memory. The dissociation between exemplar and category knowledge observed in Alzheimer's Disease (AD) would appear to support this distinction, and to suggest that different neural systems are involved in the representation of exemplar and category knowledge. We review the evidence for preserved category knowledge in the semantic memory impairment of AD, and propose an alternative interpretation, according to which category and exemplar knowledge are both represented in the same distributed neural substrate. The relative preservation of category knowledge is a consequence of the greater frequency, and hence greater robustness, of the representation of attributes shared by all or most members of a category, compared to exemplar-unique attributes. We test and confirm the computational adequacy of this hypothesis in two computer simulations.     

Similarity and dissimilarity as evidence in perceptual categorization

In exemplar models the similarities between a new stimulus and each category exemplar constitute positive evidence for category membership. In contrast, other models assume that, if the new stimulus is sufficiently dissimilar to a category member, then that dissimilarity constitutes evidence against category membership. We propose a new similarity-dissimilarity exemplar model that provides a framework for integrating these two types of accounts. The evidence for a category is assumed to be the summed similarity to members of that category plus the summed dissimilarity to members of competing categories. The similarity-dissimilarity exemplar model is shown to mimic the standard exemplar model very closely in the unidimensional domain.     

Creativity and Imitation: Effects of Regulatory Focus and Creative Exemplar Quality

In creative settings, exposure to creative exemplar products may invite imitation and as such influence creative performance. In understanding creativity, it, therefore, is important to be able to predict imitation of creative exemplar products. Regulatory focus theory can do so, and leads to predictions that deviate from the existing body of knowledge concerning regulatory focus and creativity in the absence of exemplar products. In this study, we proposed that high creative exemplar quality elicits more imitation—and thus lowered creativity—for promotion-focused individuals, whereas creative exemplar quality does not affect the creative process for prevention-focused individuals. To enable a relatively objective measurement of creativity and imitation, these predictions were tested in a laboratory experiment. Results supported predictions, indicating that knowledge about how strongly people engage in imitation in the face of a creative exemplar product leads to more adequate predictions how creative people really are.     

Infants' object category formation and use: Real-world context effects on category use in object processing

Three experiments investigated category formation based on real-world encounters with objects and how that category knowledge functioned as a top-down influence on infants' scene processing. 5-month-old infants received various experiences with exemplars of an object category and then were shown a display containing 2 adjacent novel objects, 1 of which was a novel exemplar of the category. If infants recognized this novel exemplar, they could use category information to determine the boundary between the 2 objects. Only infants who experienced object exemplars in situations that closely mimicked everyday infant experiences with objects successfully parsed the display. Results suggest that regularities in the contexts where infants experience similar objects help infants link their experiences and form object categories that can be used to segregate novel scenes. These results shed light on the real-world process of infant knowledge base formation and on how infants use their knowledge base to segment real-world scenes.     

On the automatic evaluation of social exemplars

The present article focuses on the automatic evaluation of exemplars whose category membership has been learned in the past. Studies 1 and 2 confirmed the hypothesis that once an exemplar has been encoded as a member of a given group, at a later encounter the evaluation associated with the group will be unintentionally retrieved from memory, even when no perceptual cue indicates the exemplar's category membership. Study 3 extended the results to the domain of in-group/out-group differentiation. In addition. Studies 4 and 5 confirmed the hypothesis that stored evaluations can be retrieved and affect responses even when the semantic information on which the evaluations were originally based is no longer available for retrieval. Finally, Study 6 investigated spontaneous approach-avoidance behavior tendencies. Overall, results demonstrate the pervasive effects of person-based representations, and they are discussed in terms of recent models of person perception and out-group discrimination.     

双向背景信息外部锚问题决策的眼动特征

采用正反双向背景信息日常生活外部锚问题,选取64名大学生,运用眼动技术,考察锚值及双向信息对外部锚问题决策的影响。结果发现：高、低锚组锚定效应指数均在0.76以上,且不存在显著差异。回答锚值比较问题时,从锚值向反向信息的眼跳次数和注视时间显著多于向正向信息的眼跳次数和注视时间。回答估计值问题时,从估计值问题向锚值的眼跳次数和注视时间显著多于向双向信息的眼跳次数和注视时间。研究表明,外部锚引起程度较高的锚定效应。反向信息在问题理解及决策中得到更多关注。锚值在回答锚值比较及估计值问题阶段均对决策产生显著影响。支持了选择通达和信息加工负性偏向观点。     

Changing people’s views of outgroups through individual-to-group generalisation: meta-analytic reviews and theoretical considerations

Through individual-to-group generalisation, information about individual members of stigmatised social groups changes the outgroup judgment. This article reports meta-analytic reviews of over 30 years of experimental, lab-based research on individual-to-group generalisation (107 independent tests; 5393 participants). In a first meta-analysis, a positive, medium-size generalisation effect was detected (r = .28, p < .001), reflecting significant generalisation of outgroup exemplar information to the outgroup judgment. This effect was moderated by the number of exemplars and exemplar typicality, with more moderately atypical exemplars maximising generalisation effects. Several other design parameters—including type of control condition, generalisation measures, mode of information provision, type of target outgroup and origin of study—did not moderate the positive generalisation effect. A second meta-analysis investigated the interplay between metacognitions and generalisation and found assimilation effects with metacognitive triggers encouraging exemplar inclusion, and contrast effects with metacognitive cues encouraging exemplar exclusion. These results demonstrate that the same outgroup exemplar can lead to bias reduction or bias exacerbation, depending on available meta-cognitive cues. Findings are discussed in terms of implications for intergroup psychology, generalisation theory and bias reduction interventions.     

Acquisition and generalization of action effects

Three experiments studied the acquisition of action-contingent events (action effects). In a first, acquisition phase participants performed free-choice reactions with each keypress leading to the presentation of either a particular category word (e.g., animal or furniture) or an exemplar word (e.g., dog or chair). In the test phase, choice responses were made to category or exemplar words by using a word-key mapping that was either compatible or incompatible with the key-word mapping during acquisition. Compatible mapping produced better performance than incompatible mapping if the words in the practice and the test phase were the same (e.g., animal M animal), if they had a subordinate-superordinate relationship (e.g., dog M animal), belonged to the same category (e.g., dog M cat), or referred to visually related concepts (e.g., orange M circle). The findings support the assumption that action effects are acquired and integrated with the accompanying action automatically, so that perceiving the effect leads to the priming of the associated response. And, most importantly, they demonstrate that effect acquisition generalizes to other, feature-overlapping events.     

A note on schema and exemplar approaches to motor skill representation in memory

Given the need for a memory representation of well-learned motor skills, a common assumption in motor behavior is that this knowledge is stored in a central, abstracted form. Active production of motor skills has not been used in experimental designs that have provided empirical support for this view of representation, however. Much of the faith in centralized, abstracted forms of memory representation for motor skills is due to the popularity of Schmidt's schema theory, which has adapted the prototype abstraction model from category learning research to the representation of motor skills. Since schema theory was proposed, however, an alternative view that seriously questions the preeminence of the prototype abstraction model for the central representation of knowledge has arisen in the category learning literature. This particular view, termed the specific exemplar model, has led a number of researchers in cognition to develop mixed models that involve both prototypic abstraction and specific exemplar elements. This note, then, identifies what can be perceived as a gap in the empirical knowledge base in motor behavior and discusses the possibility of using the debate about representation for category learning as a stimulus for initiating a similar investigation into the representation of motor skills. A hypothetical specific exemplar model for the memory representation of motor skills is outlined, and possible empirical comparisons between this model and the schema abstraction model are suggested.     

The roles of typicality, instance dominance, and category dominance in verifying category membership

Four experiments examined the relationships between category verification reaction time (RT), exemplar typicality, instance dominance, category selection time (an RT measure of category dominance), and three production measures of category dominance. The category dominance measures were obtained in two experiments for use in two nearly identical category verification experiments. In one category verification experiment, the category name was presented 800 ms before the exemplar name; in the other, the exemplar name preceded the category name by 800 ms. Multiple regression analyses of the yes and no category verification RTs indicated that category dominance produced large and highly significant effects in all conditions, whereas instance dominance produced marginally significant and selective effects. Typicality had no effect beyond its shared effect with the dominance measures except as a possible suppressor variable. Category selection time was the best predictor, although all of the category dominance measures were better predictors than typicality or instance dominance. It is concluded that typicality may be an inappropriate independent variable for RT tasks studying the memory representation of natural-world knowledge.