Motivated to Forgive? Partisan Scandals and Party Supporters

In this study, we investigate how partisan motivations shape voters' reactions to a political scandal by drawing on a unique survey experiment fielded immediately after Justin Trudeau's brownface/blackface scandal broke during the 2019 Canadian election. We thus explore motivated reasoning in real time in a competitive and highly partisan election context. Are voters more willing to forgive politicians for past behavior when their own party leader's impropriety is cued? To what extent do personal interests, such as cross-pressures or electoral concerns, affect the motivation to forgive? Our findings show that partisan-motivated reasoning is overwhelmingly powerful, producing politically biased judgments of politicians implicated in scandals. Furthermore, voters' willingness to forgive scandals is also influenced by “strategic” considerations, in that preferences over which political party wins or loses in the election affect opinions about whether someone should be forgiven or whether the scandal is considered important at all. However, we find no evidence that personal involvement in the issue raised by the scandal conditions partisan motivations. We posit that the environment—in this case, a competitive election—is an important consideration for understanding the extent and limits of partisan-motivated reasoning.     

Finding the Cause: Verbal Framing Helps Children Extract Causal Evidence Embedded in a Complex Scene

In making causal inferences, children must both identify a causal problem and selectively attend to meaningful evidence. Four experiments demonstrate that verbally framing an event (“Which animals make Lion laugh?”) helps 4-year-olds extract evidence from a complex scene to make accurate causal inferences. Whereas framing was unnecessary when evidence was isolated, children required it to extract and reason about evidence embedded in a more complex scene. Subtler framing stating the causal problem, but not highlighting the relevant variables, was equally effective. Simply making the causal relationship more perceptually obvious did facilitate children's inferences, but not to the level of verbal framing. These results illustrate how children's causal reasoning relies on scaffolding from adults.     

The Moral-Psychology of the Common Agent – A Reply to Ido Geiger

Ido Geiger's paper ‘What it is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical Imperative?’ is part of a growing trend in Kant scholarship, which stresses the significance of the rational competence of ordinary human beings. I argue that this approach needs to take into account that the common agent is an active reasoner who has the means to find out what she ought to do. The purpose of my paper is to show how universality already figures in the active reasoning of pre-theoretical agents in the form of a common universalization test. I present textual evidence for this test, and argue that this conception does not present pre-theoretical moral cognition in an overly intellectualistic or mechanistic way. Finally, I discuss how, on the pre-theoretical level, universalization relates to humanity or a rational agent's special status. Universalization is present to common agents in the form of procedures or questions that we ask ourselves, humanity as an awareness of certain particularly blatant violations of duty. These two different modes of cognition of duty are reflected in two different formulae of the Categorical Imperative.     

Neurobiological and memory models of risky decision making in adolescents versus young adults

Predictions of fuzzy-trace theory and neurobiological approaches are examined regarding risk taking in a classic decision-making task--the framing task--as well as in the context of real-life risk taking. We report the 1st study of framing effects in adolescents versus adults, varying risk and reward, and relate choices to individual differences, sexual behavior, and behavioral intentions. As predicted by fuzzy-trace theory, adolescents modulated risk taking according to risk and reward. Adults showed standard framing, reflecting greater emphasis on gist-based (qualitative) reasoning, but adolescents displayed reverse framing when potential gains for risk taking were high, reflecting greater emphasis on verbatim-based (quantitative) reasoning. Reverse framing signals a different way of thinking compared with standard framing (reverse framing also differs from simply choosing the risky option). Measures of verbatim- and gist-based reasoning about risk, sensation seeking, behavioral activation, and inhibition were used to extract dimensions of risk proneness: Sensation seeking increased and then decreased, whereas inhibition increased from early adolescence to young adulthood, predicted by neurobiological theories. Two additional dimensions, verbatim- and gist-based reasoning about risk, loaded separately and predicted unique variance in risk taking. Importantly, framing responses predicted real-life risk taking. Reasoning was the most consistent predictor of real-life risk taking: (a) Intentions to have sex, sexual behavior, and number of partners decreased when gist-based reasoning was triggered by retrieval cues in questions about perceived risk, whereas (b) intentions to have sex and number of partners increased when verbatim-based reasoning was triggered by different retrieval cues in questions about perceived risk.     

Student Inquiry in a Physics Class Discussion

There is a long, rich history of arguments for the importance of involving students in a process of inquiry. For many instructors, however, promoting student inquiry is a difficult agenda to pursue for two reasons. First, there is often tension for instructors between concerns for this agenda and more traditional concerns for the correctness and completeness of students' understanding. Second, it is not easy to recognize when productive student inquiry is taking place. For a teacher in class, what is valuable about the students' participation at any given moment may not be as obvious as what is flawed and ambiguous in their arguments. For this article, I analyze a short excerpt from a high school physics class discussion to consider the value of the students' work as inquiry and to illustrate a teacher's negotiation of the tension between inquiry and traditional content-oriented concerns. In this way, I try to discover the beginnings of science in what the students say and do, rather than to apply criteria from a particular model of scientific reasoning. This exploration for students' knowledge and abilities is offered both as an approach to research on student inquiry and as a mode of instructional practice to support that inquiry.     

Dispossessing Defeat

Higher-order evidence can make an agent doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems rational for the agent to adopt a cautious attitude towards her original conclusion, even in cases where the higher-order evidence is misleading and the agent's original reasons were actually perfectly good. One may think that recoiling to a cautious attitude in the face of misleading self-doubt involves a failure to properly respond to one's reasons. My aim is to show that this is not so. My proposal is that (misleading) higher-order evidence can undermine the agent's possession of her first-order reasons, constituting what I call a dispossessing defeater. After acquiring the higher-order evidence, the agent is no longer in a position to rely competently on the relevant first-order considerations as reasons for her original conclusion, so that such reasons stop being available to her (even if they remain as strong as in the absence of the higher-order evidence). In this way, an agent with misleading higher-order evidence can adopt a cautious stance towards her original conclusion, while properly responding to the set of reasons that she possesses–a set that is reduced due to the acquisition of higher-order dispossessing defeaters.     

Impurism,Practical Reasoning,and the Threshold Problem

I consider but reject one broad strategy for answering the threshold problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge, namely what fixes the degree of probability required for one to know? According to the impurist strategy to be considered, the required degree of probability is fixed by one's practical reasoning situation. I distinguish two different ways to implement the suggested impurist strategy. According to the Relevance Approach, the threshold for a subject to know a proposition at a time is determined by the practical reasoning situations she is then in to which that particular proposition is relevant. According to the Unity Approach, the threshold for a subject to know any proposition whatsoever at a time is determined by a privileged practical reasoning situation she then faces, most plausibly the highest stakes practical reasoning situation she is then in. I argue that neither way of implementing the impurist strategy succeeds and so impurism does not offer a satisfactory response to the threshold problem.     

Do framing effects make moral intuitions unreliable?

I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which is supposed to support this claim. In doing so, I provide a novel suggestion for how to analyze the reliability of intuitions in empirical studies. Analysis of the evidence suggests that moral intuitions subject to framing effects are in fact much more reliable than perhaps was thought, and that Sinnott-Armstrong has not succeeded in showing that noninferential justification has been defeated.     

Implication and reasoning in mental state attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's theory of co-cognition

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.     

Egocentric framing — One way people may fail in a switch dilemma: Evidence from excessive lane switching

To study switching behavior, an experiment mimicking the state of a driver on the road was conducted. In each trial participants were given a chance to switch lanes. Despite the fact that lane switching had no sound rational basis, participants often switched lanes when the speed of driving in their lane on the previous trial was relatively slow. That tendency was discerned even when switching behavior had been sparsely reinforced, and was especially marked in almost a third of the participants, who manifested it consistently. The findings illustrate a type of behavior occurring in various contexts (e.g., stocks held in a portfolio, conduct pertinent for residual life expectancy, supermarket queues). We argue that this behavior may be due to a fallacy reminiscent of that arising in the well-known “envelopes problem”, in which each of two players holds a sum of money of which she knows nothing about except that it is either half or twice the amount held by the other player. Players may be paradoxically tempted to exchange assets, since an exchange fallaciously appears to always yield an expected value greater than whatever is regarded as the player's present assets. We argue that the fallacy is due to egocentrically framing the problem as if the “amount I have” is definite, albeit unspecified, and shows that framing the paradox acentrically instead eliminates the incentive to exchange assets. A possible psychological source for the human disposition to frame problems in a way that inflates expected gain is discussed. Finally, a heuristic meant to avert the source of the fallacy is proposed.     

The evil eye: Eye gaze and competitiveness in social decision making

We demonstrate that a person's eye gaze and his/her competitiveness are closely intertwined in social decision making. In an exploratory examination of this relationship, Study 1 uses field data from a high‐stakes TV game show to demonstrate that the frequency by which contestants gaze at their opponent's eyes predicts their defection in a variant on the prisoner's dilemma. Studies 2 and 3 use experiments to examine the underlying causality and demonstrate that the relationship between gazing and competitive behavior is bi‐directional. In Study 2, fixation on the eyes, compared to the face, increases competitive behavior toward the target in an ultimatum game. In Study 3, we manipulate the framing of a negotiation (cooperative vs. competitive) and use an eye tracker to measure fixation number and time spent fixating on the counterpart's eyes. We find that a competitive negotiation elicits more gazing, which in turn leads to more competitive behavior.     

Multiple Determinants of Framing Referents in Tax Reporting and Compliance

Prospect theory's implications for tax reporting have been investigated primarily by examining taxpayers' risk preferences surrounding two potential reference points: their current cash position and their expectations regarding payments and/or refunds due. Evidence has generally supported the role of cash position in framing reporting decisions while failing to support a similar role for expectations. However, most research examining the role of expectations in framing risky choice has experimentally assigned expectations to decision makers. If expectations become meaningful referents via adaptation, the construct validity of experimentally-assigned expectations is suspect. Using participants' own prior tax filings to determine expectations, we find evidence that expectations and cash position jointly frame the filing decision. Further, consistent with adaptation serving as the mechanism through which expectations frame reporting preferences, we find that the severity of the framing effect attributed to expectations was significantly mitigated when time to adapt to variances from those expectations was allowed.     

Explaining in conversation: Towards an argument model

We examine the proposition that, in ordinary conversation, people are concerned to argue — to justify their claims and to counter potential and actual counter claims. We test out the proposition by analysing explanations in one particular conversation. We attend to the validity claims of what the speakers say, and to the authority with which they say it. Viewed in that light, we find that the majority of what might look like causal attributions turn out to look like argumentative claim-backings. We then go on to flesh out the quasi-pragmatic rules which might help to decide formally whether any given utterance is be er understood as an argument or a causal explanation. These rules revolve around the speaker's apparent intention and the projected relationship between the clauses in what she or he says. All of this takes us a fair way from attribution theory's model of explanation as the reporting of a cause, and we end up with an argumentative model of ordinary explanation.     

Power,Conflict, and Community: How Gendered Views of Political Power Influence Women's Political Ambition

We provide a novel approach to understanding the political ambition gap between men and women by examining perceptions of the role of politician. Across three studies, we find that political careers are viewed as fulfilling power‐related goals, such as self‐promotion and competition. We connect these goals to a tolerance for interpersonal conflict and both of these factors to political ambition. Women's lack of interest in conflict and power‐related activities mediates the relationship between gender and political ambition. In an experiment, we show that framing a political career as fulfilling communal goals—and not power‐related goals—reduces the ambition gap.     

“What Happened Needs to Be Told”: Fostering Critical Historical Reasoning in the Classroom

Scholars often define historical reasoning as constructing defensible interpretations of past events. Drawing on critical theory, this article suggests that it also entails consciously framing one's topic of inquiry. The article examines an instructional unit that aimed to foster this expanded view of historiography. Forty students, ages 14–15, wrote histories of the Vietnam War from 12 primary accounts and compared their depictions to that of their textbook. After participating in the unit, students found the textbook factually accurate yet biased in its pattern of emphasis and omission, a conclusion that aligned with the unit's goal of helping them distinguish empirical integrity from interpretive frame. However, whereas critical theorists view all scholarship as partially subjective, the students sought to achieve objectivity by including “both sides” in their histories. The study suggests that educators should highlight the numerous dilemmas historians face, from framing their topic to selecting and analyzing evidence.     

Backward induction and beliefs about oneself

According to decision theory, the rational initial action in a sequential decision-problem may be found by ‘backward induction’ or “folding back’. But the reasoning which underwrites this claim appeals to the agent's beliefs about what she will later believe, about what she will later believe she will still later believe, and so forth. There are limits to the ‘depth’ of people's beliefs. Do these limits pose a threat to the standard theory of rational sequential choice? It is argued, first, that the traditional solutions of certain games depend on knowledge which exceeds depth limits, and that these solutions therefore cannot be shown rational in the usual sense. Then, for that related reason even ‘folding back’ solutions of one-person problems cannot be! A revision of our notion of rational choice is proposed, analogous to the reliabilist account of knowledge of Goldman and others, by which this paradox is resolved.     

Amplifying and Attenuating Inequity in Collaborative Learning: Toward an Analytical Framework

Abstract

Research on collaborative learning has focused on its potential to foster successful problem solving. Less attention, though, has been given to issues of equity. In this article, we investigate how inequity can become amplified and attenuated within collaborative learning through small interactional moves that accumulate to produce broader patterns of equity or inequity. Our theoretical perspective utilizes Boaler’s notion of relational equity and introduces what we term participatory equity. Research was conducted in a computer science course co-taught by the authors and taken by upper-elementary students. Data sources include audio recordings of students’ collaborative interactions, ethnographic field notes, student work, and student surveys. This article focuses on a single student, Jason, and his dyadic interactions, and builds upon our previous analyses of his interactions with four higher-performing partners. Findings reveal how the interplay between classroom structures and student enactments shaped two types of inequity during collaborative learning. We conclude by discussing implications for theorizing and analyzing equity and inequity, as well as pedagogical considerations for structuring collaborative learning to attenuate inequity.     

Highlights as an Early Predictor of Student Comprehension and Interests

When engaging with a textbook, students are inclined to highlight key content. Although students believe that highlighting and subsequent review of the highlights will further their educational goals, the psychological literature provides little evidence of benefits. Nonetheless, a student’s choice of text for highlighting may serve as a window into her mental state—her level of comprehension, grasp of the key ideas, reading goals, and so on. We explore this hypothesis via an experiment in which 400 participants read three sections from a college-level biology text, briefly reviewed the text, and then took a quiz on the material. During initial reading, participants were able to highlight words, phrases, and sentences, and these highlights were displayed along with the complete text during the subsequent review. Consistent with past research, the amount of highlighted material is unrelated to quiz performance. Nonetheless, highlighting patterns may allow us to infer reader comprehension and interests. Using multiple representations of the highlighting patterns, we built probabilistic models to predict quiz performance and matrix factorization models to predict what content would be highlighted in one passage from highlights in other passages. We find that quiz score prediction accuracy reliably improves with the inclusion of highlighting data (by about 1%–2%), both for held-out students and for held-out student questions (i.e., questions selected randomly for each student), but not for held-out questions. Furthermore, an individual’s highlighting pattern is informative of what she highlights elsewhere. Our long-term goal is to design digital textbooks that serve not only as conduits of information into the reader’s mind but also allow us to draw inferences about the reader at a point where interventions may increase the effectiveness of the material.