Parental Absence and Non-Suicidal Self-Injury: Social Support,Social Constraints and Sense-Making

Given the rise of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) in youth, it is imperative to address understudied correlates that may contribute to NSSI. The primary purpose of the present study was to investigate NSSI in college students (N?=?1703) with or without a history of parental absence. We also examined the relationships between parental absence, interpersonal (i.e., support and social constraint) factors, intrapersonal (i.e., sense-making) factors, and NSSI in our sample of primarily Caucasian/White, heterosexual, single, traditional-aged, female college students. Logistic regression indicated that the odds of reporting NSSI were 5 times higher for participants who had experienced permanent parental absence (e.g., death) compared to those who had not experienced absence. The odds of reporting NSSI were 8.5 and 7.5 times higher for those respondents who had experienced non-permanent parental absence (e.g., parental travel) and both types of parental absence, respectively, when compared to those who experienced permanent parental absence. Social support, social constraint, and sense-making made significant but small contributions to the prediction of NSSI endorsement. Participants who reported experiencing both permanent and non-permanent absence exhibited the highest level (p?<?.001, η²?=?.09) of interpersonal reasons (e.g., to hurt someone) for engaging in NSSI. These findings can serve as a catalyst for future NSSI research (e.g., the potential importance of including parental absence as a background variable). Moreover, the results suggest the possible benefit of continued examination of: (a) the relationship between experiencing both types of parental absence and engagement in NSSI for interpersonal reasons; and (b) social support, sense-making, and social constraint as contributing factors of NSSI endorsement.     

Science as a justification for psychology as a social institution

Psychology seeks to justify its claims to privilege as a social institution largely on the basis of its scientific knowledge claims. These knowledge claims tend to be based on, and to reflect a particular view about the nature of science which is under increasing challenge. This situation is discussed and some of its implications examined.     

Making sense of the lived body <Emphasis Type="Italic">and</Emphasis> the lived world: meaning and presence in Husserl,Derrida and Noë

I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend itself to theories of mind such as Noë’s that emphasize the ways in which sense-making occurs outside the head. But while Derrida’s notion of “contamination” rightly points to an indeterminateness of meaning in an outside, extended, concrete lived world, he ultimately reduces meaning to a structure of signification. This casts indeterminateness in terms of absence, ignoring the presence of non-linguistic phenomena of embodied sense-making central to both the contemporary enactivist program and to the later Husserl, who is able to account for the indeterminateness of meaning in lived experience through his distinction between sense (Sinn) and more exact linguistic meaning (Bedeutung). Husserl’s transcendental theory of meaning also allows for a substantive contribution to sense-making from the side of the perceived object—an aspect missing from Noë’s account. Thus, in contrast to Derrida and to Noë, Husserl accounts for sense-making in terms of both the lived body and the lived world.     

Using a dialectical scientific brief in peer review

This paper presents a framework that editors, peer reviewers, and authors can use to identify and resolve efficiently disputes that arise during peer review in scientific journals. The framework is called a scientific dialectical brief. In this framework, differences among authors and reviewers are formatted into specific assertions and the support each party provides for its position. A literature review suggests that scientists use five main types of support; empirical data, reasoning, speculation, feelings, and status. It is suggested that the scientific dialectical brief format can streamline the review process by facilitating rapid differentiation between stronger and weaker support, so that valuable time can be focused on the better-substantiated claims. The paper concludes with some suggestions for implementation. The author researches, lectures and publishes in the area of physical and social aspects of environmental quality. He is also a practicing architect. This paper is based on a presentation at a workshop, “Advances in Peer Review Research”, American Association for the Advancement of Science Meeting, Baltimore, MD, February 9, 1996.     

Verbal Deficit and Educational Success

ABSTRACT The claim that social class differences in educational success are related to language and language use of a cognitively relevant kind is discussed and criticised.
Various aspects of the relationship between rationality and language are examined and it is argued that the contention that deficiencies in rationality are related to language is an ambiguous one which involves different kinds of claims.
When the claims of verbal deficit theorists have been clarified, it has been found that the weakest of these claims have not been proven, while the strongest are empirically possible but extremely unlikely.     

Triadic awareness predicts partner choice in male–infant–male interactions in Barbary macaques

Social knowledge beyond one’s direct relationships is a key in successfully manoeuvring the social world. Individuals gather information on the quality of social relationships between their group companions, which has been termed triadic awareness. Evidence of the use of triadic awareness in natural contexts is limited mainly to conflict management. Here we investigated triadic awareness in wild Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) in the context of bridging interactions defined as male–infant–male interactions whereby a male (initiator, holder) presents an infant to another male (receiver, non-holder) in order to initiate an affiliative interaction with that male. Analyses based on 1263 h of focal observations on ten infants of one wild social group in Morocco supported the hypothesis that males use their knowledge of the relationship between infants and other adult males when choosing a male as a partner for bridging interactions. Specifically, (i) the number of bridging interactions among holder–infant–receiver triads was positively affected by the strength of the infant–receiver relationship and (ii) when two males were available as bridging partners, a male was more likely to be chosen as the receiver the stronger his social relationship with the infant relative to the other available male. This demonstrates that non-human primates establish triadic awareness of temporary infant–male relationships and use it in a naturally occurring affiliative context. Our results contribute to the discussion about the mechanism underlying the acquisition of triadic awareness and the benefits of its usage, and lend support to hypotheses linking social complexity to the evolution of complex cognition.     

Thinking through enactive agency: sense-making,bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: (i) there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence (ii) all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: (i) these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they (ii) end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of (iii) a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds.     

Knowledge and modality

Kripke claims that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths. These claims challenge the traditional Kantian view that

1. (K)
   All knowledge of necessary truths is a priori and all a priori knowledge is of necessary truths.
    

Kripke’s claims continue to be resisted, which indicates that the Kantian view remains attractive. My goal is to identify the most plausible principles linking the epistemic and the modal. My strategy for identifying the principles is to investigate two related questions. Are there compelling general supporting arguments for (K)? Are there decisive counterexamples to (K)? My investigation uncovers two intuitively plausible principles that are not open to decisive counterexamples but which enjoy no compelling independent support.

     

The how and the when of the social cure: A conceptual model of group- and individual-level mechanisms linking social identity to health and well-being

In this article, we aim at theoretical specification and integration of mechanisms proposed within the Social Identity Approach to Health and Well-being. We differentiate group-level and individual-level effects of shared social identity by distinguishing three different aspects: individual identification, group identification, and individually perceived group identification. We discuss specific group-level mechanisms (i.e., mutual social support and collective self-efficacy) and individual level-mechanisms (i.e., attribution and appraisal processes regarding stressors and resources) for each of the three aspects. A core conclusion is that the positive effects of shared social identity on health and well-being crucially depend on its close relationship with social support, and that although social support is an interindividual phenomenon, it is intraindividual mechanisms—attribution and appraisal—that shape the psychological partnership between social identity and social support. Therefore, we put special emphasis on cross-level interactions between group- and individual-level mechanisms, which have been widely neglected in earlier research.     

Pragmatism and Developmentalism in Brazilian Educational Thought in the 1950s/1960

This article proposes to analyse some aspects of the appropriation of New School thinking in Brazil, particularly Deweyan pragmatism, in the 1950s and 1960s. The analysis is based on the assumption that the developmentalist ideology that punctuated the debate on the economic, political and social restructuring of the country in these two decades constituted fertile ground for the return and expansion of pragmatist thinking amongst Brazilian educators, articulating itself, sometimes in contradictory ways, with this ideology. The focus of the analysis will be on the writings of the group of educators which circulated around the figure of Anísio Teixeira, at the time director of the National Institute for Pedagogic Studies (INEP), an organ linked to the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), which set itself the task of producing research that would support public policy in the field of education, as well as constituting itself as a center for teacher education and the stimulus and development of innovative experiences in the public school system. The appropriation of Deweyan pragmatism, in this context, had a triple perspective: pragmatism as scientific method, implying a specific conception of science, particularly the social sciences, with emphasis on the application of scientific knowledge in the solution of practical problems; as a way of democratic life; and as a synonym for experimentalism, in the sphere of schooling.     

We Value What Values Us: The Appeal of Identity-Affirming Science

Members of the public (Study 1; n =  184) and university students (Study 2; n =  101) evaluated a piece of research and indicated their support for its continuation. The research findings were held constant, but the methods that revealed those findings were attributed to either neuroscience or social science, and the conclusions based on those findings were biased either in favor of men or in favor of women. Study 1 revealed that participants were more positive about research that affirmed their gender identity and that was based on neuroscience rather than social science. Study 2 found this pattern to be apparent in more specialist samples. Indeed, participants with some scientific training were more influenced by research that affirmed the reader's gender identity. Participants with less scientific training, in comparison, were more influenced by the type of science described when making judgments about the value of the research. Contrary to popular claims, this suggests that scientific knowledge alone is no protection against the effects of bias on research evaluation. Implications for the practice and popularization of science are discussed.     

Of science, meta-science, and clinical practice: the generalization of a generalization to a particular

Although science is the most powerful method for advancing knowledge and scientific and statistical formalisms are generally much sounder than impressionistic judgment, advanced methodological training (as it is presently comprised) is often of little direct use to practicing clinicians. Practitioners should be able to identify grossly deficient knowledge claims and clear scientific winners, but beyond this, the trick usually is to determine which scientific authority or authorities on whom to depend, a decision task that is ultimately to be tackled through the type of meta-scientific studies that Faust and Meehl have proposed. In applying scientific knowledge, the clinician usually must choose between the generalization of a scientific generalization to a particular versus the application of a clinical generalization to a particular. Determining the relative power of scientific generalizations developed outside, versus clinical generalizations developed within the setting of application, can be very difficult, and there are few established guides. A more advanced science of generalization, another meta-scientific problem, would allow sounder predictions about application to new domains and could greatly aid the practitioner.     

Of Science,Meta-Science,and Clinical Practice: The Generalization of a Generalization to a Particular

Although science is the most powerful method for advancing knowledge and scientific and statistical formalisms are generally much sounder than impressionistic judgment, advanced methodological training (as it is presently comprised) is often of little direct use to practicing clinicians. Practitioners should be able to identify grossly deficient knowledge claims and clear scientific winners, but beyond this, the trick usually is to determine which scientific authority or authorities on whom to depend, a decision task that is ultimately to be tackled through the type of meta-scientific studies that Faust and Meehl have proposed. In applying scientific knowledge, the clinician usually must choose between the generalization of a scientific generalization to a particular versus the application of a clinical generalization to a particular. Determining the relative power of scientific generalizations developed outside, versus clinical generalizations developed within the setting of application, can be very difficult, and there are few established guides. A more advanced science of generalization, another meta-scientific problem, would allow sounder predictions about application to new domains and could greatly aid the practitioner.     

Epistemic dependence in interdisciplinary groups

In interdisciplinary research scientists have to share and integrate knowledge between people and across disciplinary boundaries. An important issue for philosophy of science is to understand how scientists who work in these kinds of environments exchange knowledge and develop new concepts and theories across diverging fields. There is a substantial literature within social epistemology that discusses the social aspects of scientific knowledge, but so far few attempts have been made to apply these resources to the analysis of interdisciplinary science. Further, much of the existing work either ignores the issue of differences in background knowledge, or it focuses explicitly on conflicting background knowledge. In this paper we provide an analysis of the interplay between epistemic dependence between individual experts with different areas of expertise. We analyze the cooperative activity they engage in when participating in interdisciplinary research in a group, and we compare our findings with those of other studies in interdisciplinary research.     

Science at the Supermarket: Multiplication,Personalization and Consumption of Science in Everyday Life

Which is the kind science’s psychological guidance upon everyday life? I will try to discuss some issues about the role that techno-scientific knowledge plays in sense-making and decision making about practical questions of life. This relation of both love and hate, antagonism and connivance is inscribable in a wider debate between a trend of science to intervene in fields that are traditionally prerogative of political, religious or ethical choices, and, on the other side, the position of those who aim at stemming “technocracy” and governing these processes. I argue that multiplication, personalization and consumption are the characteristics of the relationship between science, technology and society in the age of “multiculturalism” and “multi-scientism”. This makes more difficult but intriguing the study and understanding of the processes through which scientific knowledge is socialized. Science topics, like biotech, climate change, etc. are today an unavoidable reference frame. It is not possible to not know them and to attach them to the most disparate questions. Like in the case of Moscovici’s “Freud for all seasons”, the fact itself that the members of a group or a society believe in science as a reference point for others, roots its social representation and the belief that it can solve everyday life problems.     

The Poverty of Analysis

I argue that philosophy is like science in three interesting and non-obvious ways. First, the claims made by philosophy are synthetic, not analytic: philosophical claims, just like scientific claims, are not guaranteed by the structure of the concepts they involve. Second, philosophical knowledge is a posteriori, not a priori: the claims established by philosophers depend on the same kind of empirical support as scientific theories. And finally, the central questions of philosophy concern actuality rather than necessity: philosophy is primarily aimed at understanding the actual world studied by science, not some further realm of metaphysical modality.     

On the spatiotemporal extensiveness of sense-making: ultrafast cognition and the historicity of normativity

The enactive approach conceives of cognition as acts of sense-making. A requirement of sense-making is adaptivity, i.e., the agent’s capacity to actively monitor and regulate its own trajectories with respect to its viability constraints. However, there are examples of sense-making, known as ultrafast cognition, that occur faster than the time physiologically required for the organism to centrally monitor and regulate movements, for example, via long-range neural feedback mechanisms. These examples open a clarificatory challenge for the enactive approach with respect to how to operationalize monitoring and regulation, and with respect to the temporal scale of sense-making, which has traditionally been limited to the here-and-now in accordance with the axiom of structural determinism. We explore possible responses to this challenge and suggest that this axiom should be explicitly rejected, in particular, we suggest that adaptivity is a property of organism–environment interactions over a time span that includes both present and past conditions. Ultrafast performances are thus no longer a challenge for the enactive approach, because the constitutive basis of their normativity is spatiotemporally extensive. This is in agreement with recent developments in different varieties of enactivism, which all converge toward assigning a constitutive role to an agent’s history of interactions.

     

Education or Indoctrination? The Accuracy of Introductory Psychology Textbooks in Covering Controversial Topics and Urban Legends About Psychology

The introductory psychology class represents the first opportunity for the field to present new students with a comprehensive overview of psychological research. Writing introductory psychology textbooks is challenging given that authors need to cover many areas they themselves may not be intimately familiar with. This challenge is compounded by problems within the scholarly community in which controversial topics may be communicated in ideological terms within scholarly discourse. Psychological science has historically seen concerns raised about the mismatch between claims and data made about certain fields of knowledge, apprehensions that continue in the present “replication crisis.” The concern is that, although acting in good faith, introductory psychology textbook authors may unwittingly communicate information to readers that is factually untrue. Twenty-four leading introductory psychology textbooks were surveyed for their coverage of a number of controversial topics (e.g., media violence, narcissism epidemic, multiple intelligences) and scientific urban legends (e.g., Kitty Genovese, Mozart Effect) for their factual accuracy. Results indicated numerous errors of factual reporting across textbooks, particularly related to failing to inform students of the controversial nature of some research fields and repeating some scientific urban legends as if true. Recommendations are made for improving the accuracy of introductory textbooks.     

The competition-among-relations-in-nominals theory of conceptual combination: implications for stimulus class formation and class expansion

One way in which new concepts are added to the conceptual system is through conceptual combination. The competition-among-relations-in-nominals (CARIN) theory (Gagné & Shoben, 1997) proposes that conceptual combination involves specifying a thematic relation (e.g., noun MADE OF modifier) to link the constituent concepts (e.g., chocolate and bee). This theory claims that relations have different strengths for various concepts that correspond to how often a modifier and relation have been paired in previous encounters with combined concepts and that this relational knowledge strongly affects the ease with which combined concepts can be formed. A mathematical model that incorporates key claims of the theory is presented, and empirical findings that are relevant to evaluating the CARIN theory are reviewed. The parallels between the CARIN theory and approaches to stimulus class formation are also discussed.     

Observing social signals in scaffolding interactions: how to detect when a helping intention risks falling short

In face-to-face interactions, some social signals are aimed at regulating scaffolding processes, by which more knowledgeable people try to help less knowledgeable ones, to enable them to learn new concepts or skills (Vygotsky 1978). Observing face-to-face scaffolding interactions might not only allow us to grasp a large variety of these highly interesting social signals but may also be useful for the sake of scaffolding processes themselves. It often happens, in fact, that the empowering intentions implicit in these processes end up falling short, if the social signals regulating this specific kind of face-to-face interaction are misunderstood. Interestingly, many of these misunderstood aspects are related to the recipient’s role. Indeed, attention is usually focused on the behavior of those imparting the knowledge, while skills already mastered by the learners, as well as their feedback, tend not to be taken as much into account. For the purpose of exploring the often very subtly nuanced social signals regulating on-going scaffolding processes in real-life interactions, an example of a methodological tool is presented: one already used to observe the interactions of dyads of Italian primary school teachers and their pupils, and mothers and their children. The article leads to two main conclusions: that the results of instances of scaffolding may be predicted as to their success or otherwise simply by telescoping crucial social signals during the scaffolding’s initial phases, and that when helpers disregard these signals the effects of their actions may be detrimental or even humiliating for the receivers, notwithstanding the helper’s intentions.