Explanation,updating, and accuracy

There is evidence that people update their credences partly on the basis of explanatory considerations. Philosophers have recently argued that to minimise the inaccuracy of their credences, people's updates also ought to be partly based on such considerations. However, there are many ways in which explanatory considerations can factor into updating, not all of which minimise inaccuracy. It is an open question whether in their updating, people take explanatory considerations into account in a way that philosophers would deem recommendable. To address this question, we re-analyse data from an experiment reported in Douven and Schupbach, “The role of explanatory considerations in updating” (Cognition, 2015).     

Does Freudian Theory Resolve “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”?*

This paper consists of two related parts: I. A detailed critique of Donald Davidson's thesis—in his “The Paradoxes of Irrationality”—that “…any satisfactory [explanatory] view [of irrationality] must embrace some of Freud's most important theses” (p. 290). I argue that this conclusion is doubly flawed: (i) Davidson's case for it is logically ill‐founded, and (ii) its Freudian plaidoyer is also factually false. II. Relatedly, in the second part, I confute the recent arguments given by Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al. to establish that psychoanalytic causal explanations of irrationality are epistemically justified, because they are extensions of the desire‐cumbelief pattern of accounting for intentional actions. As a corollary, it becomes clear that these authors have failed to undermine my epistemological strictures on the foundations of psychoanalysis.     

Observed attention allocation processes in category learning

In two empirical studies of attention allocation during category learning, we investigate the idea that category learners learn to allocate attention optimally across stimulus dimensions. We argue that “optimal” patterns of attention allocation are model or process specific, that human learners do not always optimize attention, and that one reason they fail to do so is that under certain conditions the cost of information retrieval or use may affect the attentional strategy adopted by learners. We empirically investigate these issues using a computer interface incorporating an “information-board” display that collects detailed information on participants' patterns of attention allocation and information search during learning trials. Experiment 1 investigated the effects on attention allocation of distributing perfectly diagnostic features across stimulus dimensions versus within one dimension. The overall pattern of viewing times supported the optimal attention allocation hypothesis, but a more detailed analysis produced evidence of instance- or category-specific attention allocation, a phenomenon not predicted by prominent computational models of category learning. Experiment 2 investigated the strategies adopted by category learners encountering redundant perfectly predictive cues. Here, the majority of participants learned to distribute attention optimally in a cost–benefit sense, allocating attention primarily to only one of the two perfectly predictive dimensions. These results suggest that learners may take situational costs and benefits into account, and they present challenges for computational models of learning that allocate attention by weighting stimulus dimensions.     

A Symbolic Model of the Nonconscious Acquisition of Information

This article presents counter evidence against Smolensky's theory that human intuitive/nonconscious congnitive processes can only be accurately explained in terms of subsymbolic computations carried out in artificial neural networks. We present symbolic learning models of two well-studied, complicated cognitive tasks involving nonconscious acquisition of information: learning production rules and artificial finite state grammars. Our results demonstrate that intuitive learning does not imply subsymbolic computation, and that the already well-established, perceived correlation between “conscious” and “symbolic” on the one hand, and between “nonconscious” and “subsymbolic” on the other, does not exist.     

Comment on Susanna Siegel,The Rationality of Perception

In Susanna Siegel’s compelling presentation of the case for the rationality of perception, a “significant part of the constructive defense” is played by the idea that there are “inferential routes to perceptual experience” (Siegel 2017, p. 94). Inferences, after all, are epistemically evaluable and bear on the rational standing of their conclusions. She argues that an obstacle to accepting this idea is a “Reckoning Model” of inference, and shows by example that we recognize as inferences various familiar kinds of responses to information that do not fit this model. She offers a more general approach to the nature of inference that fits these examples and accommodates inferential routes to perceptual experience. I argue that Siegel needs to say more about the mental processes involved in such inferrings, and how it can be more than merely associative and yet still distinct from Reckoning. Fortunately, a psychologically- and conceptually-grounded distinction between model-free vs. model-based learning and guidance processes can provide a characterization that plays the role Siegel needs.     

“What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu”

Philosophical Studies - What, if anything, do we epistemically owe to each other? Various “traditional” views of epistemology might hold either that we don’t epistemically owe...     

Number gestures predict learning of number words

When asked to explain their solutions to a problem, children often gesture and, at times, these gestures convey information that is different from the information conveyed in speech. Children who produce these gesture‐speech “mismatches” on a particular task have been found to profit from instruction on that task. We have recently found that some children produce gesture‐speech mismatches when identifying numbers at the cusp of their knowledge, for example, a child incorrectly labels a set of two objects with the word “three” and simultaneously holds up two fingers. These mismatches differ from previously studied mismatches (where the information conveyed in gesture has the potential to be integrated with the information conveyed in speech) in that the gestured response contradicts the spoken response. Here, we ask whether these contradictory number mismatches predict which learners will profit from number‐word instruction. We used the Give‐a‐Number task to measure number knowledge in 47 children (M_age = 4.1 years, SD = 0.58), and used the What's on this Card task to assess whether children produced gesture‐speech mismatches above their knower level. Children who were early in their number learning trajectories (“one‐knowers” and “two‐knowers”) were then randomly assigned, within knower level, to one of two training conditions: a Counting condition in which children practiced counting objects; or an Enriched Number Talk condition containing counting, labeling set sizes, spatial alignment of neighboring sets, and comparison of these sets. Controlling for counting ability, we found that children were more likely to learn the meaning of new number words in the Enriched Number Talk condition than in the Counting condition, but only if they had produced gesture‐speech mismatches at pretest. The findings suggest that numerical gesture‐speech mismatches are a reliable signal that a child is ready to profit from rich number instruction and provide evidence, for the first time, that cardinal number gestures have a role to play in number‐learning.     

Effect of positive emotion on consolidation of memory for faces: The modulation of facial valence and facial gender

Studies have shown that emotion elicited after learning enhances memory consolidation. However, no prior studies have used facial photos as stimuli. This study examined the effect of post-learning positive emotion on consolidation of memory for faces. During the learning participants viewed neutral, positive, or negative faces. Then they were assigned to a condition in which they either watched a 9-minute positive video clip, or a 9-minute neutral video. Then 30 minutes after the learning participants took a surprise memory test, in which they made “remember”, “know”, and “new” judgements. The findings are: (1) Positive emotion enhanced consolidation of recognition for negative male faces, but impaired consolidation of recognition for negative female faces; (2) For males, recognition for negative faces was equivalent to that for positive faces; for females, recognition for negative faces was better than that for positive faces. Our study provides the important evidence that effect of post-learning emotion on memory consolidation can extend to facial stimuli and such an effect can be modulated by facial valence and facial gender. The findings may shed light on establishing models concerning the influence of emotion on memory consolidation.     

In search of meaning: Semantic effects on past-tense inflection

Within single-mechanism connectionist models of inflectional morphology, generating the past-tense form of a verb depends upon the interaction of semantic and phonological representations, with semantic information being particularly important for irregular or exception verbs. We assessed this hypothesis in two experiments requiring normal speakers to produce the past tense from a verb stem that takes a regular or exceptional past tense. Experiment 1 revealed significant latency advantages for high- over low-imageability words for both regular verbs (e.g., “lunged” faster than “loved”) and exception items (e.g., “drank” faster than “dealt”); but critically, this effect was significantly larger for exceptions than for regulars. Experiment 2 employed a semantic priming paradigm where participants inflected verb stems (e.g., sit) preceded by related (e.g., chair) or unrelated primes (e.g., jug) and revealed a priming effect in accuracy that was confined to the exception items. Our results are consistent with predictions from single-mechanism connectionist models of inflectional morphology and converge with findings from neurological patients and studies of reading aloud.     

Face recognition algorithms and the other‐race effect: computational mechanisms for a developmental contact hypothesis

People recognize faces of their own race more accurately than faces of other races. The “contact” hypothesis suggests that this “other‐race effect” occurs as a result of the greater experience we have with own‐ versus other‐race faces. The computational mechanisms that may underlie different versions of the contact hypothesis were explored in this study. We replicated the other‐race effect with human participants and evaluated four classes of computational face recognition algorithms for the presence of an other‐race effect. Consistent with the predictions of a developmental contact hypothesis, “experience‐based models” demonstrated an other‐race effect only when the representational system was developed through experience that warped the perceptual space in a way that was sensitive to the overall structure of the model's experience with faces of different races. When the model's representation relied on a feature set optimized to encode the information in the learned faces, experience‐based algorithms recognized minority‐race faces more accurately than majority‐race faces. The results suggest a developmental learning process that warps the perceptual space to enhance the encoding of distinctions relevant for own‐race faces. This feature space limits the quality of face representations for other‐race faces.     

“Bad philosophy” and “derivative philosophy”: Labels that keep women out of the canon

Efforts to include women in the canon have long been beset by reactionary gatekeeping, typified by the charge “That's not philosophy.” That charge doesn't apply to early and mid-analytic female philosophers—Welby, Ladd-Franklin, Bryant, Jones, de Laguna, Stebbing, Ambrose, MacDonald—with job titles like lecturer in logic and professor of philosophy and publications in Mind, the Journal of Philosophy, and Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. It's hopeless to dismiss their work as “not philosophy.” But comparable reactionary gatekeeping affects them, this paper argues, typified by the labels “bad philosophy” and “derivative philosophy.” Virtue and vice epistemology help explain why these women have been neglected and why their own approaches are epistemically virtuous. Their contemporaries and historians are deficient in scholarly virtues in labelling these women's work “bad” or derived from male mentors with no or specious justification. Their disparaged qualities—intellectual humility, modesty, critical self-reflection, disclosing biases—are often epistemic virtues.     

Evidential Preemption

As a general rule, whenever a hearer is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, she will also be justified in assuming that the speaker has formed her belief appropriately in light of a relevantly large and representative sample of the evidence that bears on p. In simpler terms, a justification for taking someone’s testimony entails a justification for trusting her assessment of the evidence. This introduces the possibility of what I will call “evidential preemption.” Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not so as to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that the subsequent disclosure of this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively inoculate an audience against future contrary evidence, and thereby creates an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I will call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios.     

Reflections on relational readings of organizational learning

In this concluding article we further reflect on relational readings of organizational learning and how they can contribute to organization studies and organizing practices. As has been seen, the root metaphor of “organizational learning” takes a variety of forms. These include “product-oriented” pictures such as learning curves, strategy, and business processes, and the generative metaphor of organizational learning as conversations-for-new-possibilities. This special issue highlights the contribution of learning-as-conversations, especially in those organizational instances where the organizing is “in-the-making” and where the creation of a transitional space can be a new meeting ground for participants. In an increasingly globalized world we are more and more in need of the ability to construct such transitional and possibility-enabling practices. It can be a task of work and organizational psychology to contribute ideas and practices for this endeavour.     

The asymmetry and temporal dynamics of incidental letter–location bindings in working memory

Verbal–spatial bindings are integral to routine cognitive operations (e.g., reading), yet the processes supporting them in working memory are little understood. Campo and colleagues [Campo, P., Poch, C., Parmentier, F. B. R., Moratti, S., Elsley, J. V., Castellanos, N., … Maestú, F. (2010). Oscillatory activity in prefrontal and posterior regions during implicit letter-location binding. Neuroimage, 49, 2807–2815] recently reported data suggesting obligatory letter–location binding when participants were directed to remember the letters in a display (of letters in locations), but no evidence for binding when instructed to remember the filled locations. The present study contrasted two explanations for this binding asymmetry. First, it may result from an obligatory dependence on “where” during the representation of “what” information, while “where” information may be held independently of its contents (the strong asymmetry hypothesis). Second, it may constitute a snapshot of a dynamic feature inhibition process that had partially completed by test: the asymmetrical inhibition hypothesis. Using Campo and colleagues’ task with a variable retention interval between display and test, we presented four consonants in distinct locations and contrasted performance between “remember letters” and “remember locations” instructions. Our data supported the strong asymmetry hypothesis through demonstrating binding in the verbal task, but not in the spatial task. Critically, when present, verbal–spatial bindings were remarkably stable, enduring for at least 15 seconds.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

Control blindness: Why people can make incorrect inferences about the intentions of others

There is limited evidence regarding the accuracy of inferences about intention. The research described in this article shows how perceptual control theory (PCT) can provide a “ground truth” for these judgments. In a series of 3 studies, participants were asked to identify a person’s intention in a tracking task where the person’s true intention was to control the position of a knot connecting a pair of rubber bands. Most participants failed to correctly infer the person’s intention, instead inferring complex but nonexistent goals (such as “tracing out two kangaroos boxing”) based on the actions taken to keep the knot under control. Therefore, most of our participants experienced what we call “control blindness.” The effect persisted with many participants even when their awareness was successfully directed at the knot whose position was under control. Beyond exploring the control blindness phenomenon in the context of our studies, we discuss its implications for psychological research and public policy.     

Perceived Similarity in Multiple Categorisation

As the diversity of modern societies becomes more structurally complex, the importance of studying multiple cross-cutting group memberships increases as well. The present study investigates the causes and consequences of perceived similarity in multiple categorisation settings. In a factorial survey with six ethnic groups in Russia (N = 524 participants, 5,036 observations), this study examines the effects of eight real-life social categories (ethnicity, religion, gender, age, education level, proficiency in Russian language, job skill level, and immigration background) on perceived similarity and attitudes. The findings show that ingroup membership on each categorisation dimension increases perceived similarity with the target and that high-status others are evaluated as more similar even by participants who belong to a lower-status group. Findings also suggest that all judgments of targets fall into two clusters, which can be described as “in-group-like” and “out-group-like” others. The implications for information processing in image formation are discussed. Finally, path analysis results indicate that participants’ attitudes towards the target person are mediated by perceived similarity for all categories. These findings provide strong evidence for the large explanatory power of perceived similarity in judgments of others when multiple group memberships are salient.     

Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science

In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.     

Perspective on “in the wild” movement analysis using machine learning

Recent advances in wearable sensing and machine learning have created ample opportunities for “in the wild” movement analysis in sports, since the combination of both enables real-time feedback to be provided to athletes and coaches, as well as long-term monitoring of movements. The potential for real-time feedback is useful for performance enhancement or technique analysis, and can be achieved by training efficient models and implementing them on dedicated hardware. Long-term monitoring of movement can be used for injury prevention, among others. Such applications are often enabled by training a machine learned model from large datasets that have been collected using wearable sensors. Therefore, in this perspective paper, we provide an overview of approaches for studies that aim to analyze sports movement “in the wild” using wearable sensors and machine learning. First, we discuss how a measurement protocol can be set up by answering six questions. Then, we discuss the benefits and pitfalls and provide recommendations for effective training of machine learning models from movement data, focusing on data pre-processing, feature calculation, and model selection and tuning. Finally, we highlight two application domains where “in the wild” data recording was combined with machine learning for injury prevention and technique analysis, respectively.     

Another Defense of Naturalized Ethics

This essay argues against Richard Joyce, using him as an exemplar of a number of writers who purport to show that the best a naturalized ethics can provide are demands that we can hold only as moral agnostics; that is, that no moral claims can be shown to be epistemically warranted, hence no moral claims have the property of “inescapable authority” necessary for real moral discourse or deliberation. The prudent (and “dignified”) course of action is therefore to act as if moral claims had categorical standing, knowing full well that we cannot, in principle, know this. The essay proposes instead that a fully naturalized account of moral reasoning and sentiments, compatible with the commitment to understanding human beings as products of evolutionary processes, can provide “existence imperatives” necessarily implicated in our being social animals. It argues that, on the one hand, we're mistaken in believing that real moral discourse must include imperatives that hold with inescapable authority as a foundation and, on the other, that a naturalistic perspective can offer demands that are authoritative enough to make moral judgment sound.