Social Considerations Related to Adolescent Girls’ Sexual Empowerment: A Response to Lamb and Peterson

We expand on Lamb and Peterson’s (2011) discussion of the influence of social forces on the development of girls’ sexual empowerment. A predominant message from a variety of media in the U.S. is that women are sexual objects controlled by men’s sexual desires. Media messages are bolstered by the sexist treatment of girls and women in everyday society, and by gendered social roles derived from the patriarchal structure of society. We present empirical evidence that societal representations of sexuality in the United States are gendered and promote male control over female sexuality. We review research linking exposure to these sexist messages with the development of self-objectification and attitudes and behaviors supportive of gender stereotyped sexual roles. While many studies are conducted with women rather than girls, researchers are beginning to study these issues in older girls, and some longitudinal data are available. We make suggestions for further research within an ecological framework that would allow the examination of messages from multiple sources within a developmental framework.     

A Psychoanalytic Reader’s Commentary: On Erasure and Negation as a Barrier to the Future

This paper is a psychoanalytically informed critical race theoretical commentary on Daniel Gaztambide’s paper, “A Preferential Option for the Repressed: Psychoanalysis Through the Eyes of Liberation Theology,” which received the 2014 Multiculturalism and Psychoanalysis Award by the NYU Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis’ Committee on Ethnicity, Race, Culture, Class & Language. This discussion is an attempt to utilize psychoanalytic and literary techniques to explore some of the ways psychoanalysis continues to inscribe cultural practices and normative thinking that foreclose opportunities to expand its margins to be more inclusive. I selected one sentence and used it to suggest how it affected this Black American reader who is also a psychoanalyst.     

What Is Sexual Empowerment? A Multidimensional and Process-Oriented Approach to Adolescent Girls’ Sexual Empowerment

Theorists disagree about how to define the concept of empowerment. This disagreement extends to discussions of adolescent girls’ sexual empowerment. Feminists struggle with whether sexual empowerment should be conceptualized as a subjective internal feeling of power and agency or an objective measure of power and control. Defining sexual empowerment as a subjective state may mistakenly equate feelings of agency with cultural and institutional power. Yet, a subjective definition of sexual empowerment is advantageous in that it validates girls’ own experiences and perceptions. This commentary argues that sexual empowerment might best be conceptualized as a continuous and multidimensional construct. This would allow for the recognition of sexual empowerment as a developmental process, and it would allow for the acknowledgement of ambivalent empowerment.     

Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

ABSTRACT

This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.     

How is a Phenomenological Reflection-Model of Self-Consciousness Possible? A Husserlian Response to E. Tugendhat’s Semantic Approach to Self-Consciousness

The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of “primal consciousness” and “reflection,” Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat’s semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory.     

Parental Emotional Response to Children’s Traumas

To better understand how parents react to their child’s trauma exposure and evaluate whether different reactions are related to different types of traumas, 120 parents (79.2% mothers, 18.3% fathers, 2.5% other caregivers) were asked about their emotional reactions related to their child’s self-reported worst trauma. Emotional reactions were assessed with the Parental Emotional Reactions Questionnaire (PERQ). Parents reported high levels of distress and guilt. Furthermore, there was a significant relationship between type of trauma and parents’ overall emotional reactions. Parental distress was equally endorsed among the different trauma groups. Parents of children who experienced intrafamilial violence and extrafamilial sexual abuse reported the highest levels of guilt, and child exposure to intrafamilial violence was associated with higher levels of parental shame.     

On Smilansky’s Defense of Prepunishment: A Response to Robinson

Philosophia - In a 2010 paper published in this journal, Robinson responded to Smilansky’s argument that compatibilists do not have a principled reason to reject prepunishment. Smilansky...     

Author’s Response

This essay aims to reply to the three essays devoted to Systematic Theology, volume 2. Common to all three essays is the conviction that my Trinitarian theology exhibits a kind of unicity that gives rise to inconsistencies of method and worries in matters of doctrine. My reply lays out several forms of unity and details how I hope to present proper uniformity in form and matter of dogmatics. A precis of my underlying Doctrine of Scripture and my forthcoming Christology is appended as well, as these prove central to the essayists' queries about the volume.     

Does Klein’s infinitism offer a response to Agrippa’s trilemma?

The regress of reasons threatens an epistemic agent’s right to claim that any beliefs are justified. In response, Peter Klein’s infinitism argues that an infinite series of supporting reasons of the right type not only is not vicious but can make for epistemic justification. In order to resist the sceptic, infinitism needs to provide reason to think that there is at least one justified belief in the world. Under an infinitist conception this involves showing that at least one belief is supported by an infinite series of supporting reasons. This paper argues that showing this makes problems for the infinitist. The finite minds problem that prevents completion of an infinite series is well documented. This paper examines alternative attempts to provide evidence of infinity that the infinitist might take, whether by using a notion of justification without infinite reasons or by altering the notion of evidence. It concludes that both of these fail and consequently infinitism is unable to offer a solution to Agrippa’s trilemma.     

Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Intinitism"—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.