网络公益平台默认选项设置对个人捐赠意愿的影响及作用机制

本文探讨了在网络公益背景下默认选项金额对个人捐赠意愿的影响及其心理机制。通过4个实验, 本文发现在网络公益平台中将默认选项设置为高金额会显著地减少个人的捐赠意愿, 而感知被操控在该影响过程中起到了中介作用。具体而言, 当公益机构将默认选项的金额设置为高金额(vs. 低金额)时, 人们的被操控感知增强, 进而捐赠意愿降低, 产生了默认效应的反作用。此外, 个体道德认同水平在这一影响中发挥了调节作用。当个体道德认同水平较低时, 高金额默认选项(vs. 低金额默认选项)会降低其捐赠意愿, 而对于道德认同水平较高的个体而言, 他们的捐赠意愿在高/低金额默认选项时不存在显著差异。研究结论推进了默认效应在捐赠决策领域的理论研究, 同时对于当前快速发展的网络公益平台进行捐赠金额的设置具有重要的实践意义。     

默认选项设置的助推效果：来自元分析的证据

默认选项设置指通过设置默认选项以增加人们选择该选项可能性的助推方法, 近年来被越来越多地运用于促进公众积极行为上, 然而这种方法在有效性上却受到了来自公众和学者的质疑。据此, 本研究运用元分析法整合了近几年有关默认选项设置的已有实证研究, 分析该助推手段的有效性, 并进一步考察可能影响其有效性的相关变量。研究共纳入符合要求的原始文献56篇, 含92个研究, 结果发现：(1)默认选项设置的确能有效助推人们的行为; (2)默认选项设置的助推有效性在东、西方文化下存在显著差异, 其在西方文化背景下的助推效果要显著好于其在东方文化背景下的使用; (3)默认选项设置的助推有效性在不同情境应用领域中存在显著差异, 相较于健康和环保领域, 默认选项设置在金钱相关的情境领域下助推效果更好。     

默认选项对赠品选择行为的影响

本研究以买房送家电为情境，通过三个实验探索默认选项对赠品选择行为的影响。实验1和2通过情境实验，分别在不考虑家电成本和考虑家电成本的情况下，考察默认选项对选择行为的影响。两个实验结果均表明，在设置默认选项后，个体倾向于选择默认选项。实验3通过现场实验，采用普通居民作为被试，也发现了默认选项效应。上述结果共同表明，设置默认选项可以影响个体对赠品的选择，既成事实的默认选项对选择行为产生的影响更大。     

负期望条件下的末期效应：情绪动机诱发风险寻求

风险决策中, 末期效应指“个体在重复多轮决策任务的末尾冒险倾向升高”的现象, 但其内在机制尚不明确。三个研究的结果发现, 在实验室环境和自然环境下, 不同期望(负期望值和等期望值)条件下被试在最后一轮的投资均会显著增加, 末期效应稳定出现, 且不受到最后一轮决策前被试所拥有的代币数量的影响。即, 就算在风险选项收益更小的情况下, 被试也会倾向于在最后一轮选择高风险选项, 且这一效应是参照点独立的, 这说明末期效应的出现是源于对情绪满足感的追求。未来研究可从这一点切入, 进一步研究情绪影响风险决策过程的机制。     

行为决策中诱饵效应的认知加工机制

在原选项集中加入一个诱饵选项能够使人们的选择发生改变, 这就是诱饵效应。研究者发现可以通过设置相似诱饵、妥协诱饵、吸引诱饵以及幽灵诱饵等达到诱导决策者选择目标选项的目的。当前, 很多研究探索了诱饵效应的认知加工机制, 有研究者基于启发式加工和分析式加工的视角开展研究, 也有研究者从维度加工和选项加工的视角对此进行探索。诱饵效应的认知加工过程受到年龄、后悔情绪、决策形式以及时间压力等因素的影响。未来的研究需要构建适用于各类诱饵效应的统一的认知加工机制模型, 探索知觉在诱饵效应形成过程中的基础性作用, 探索个体的决策风格对不同类型诱饵效应的影响, 并通过合理利用诱饵效应助推社会发展。     

助推爱心：利用默认选项促进捐赠行为

本研究采用实验室和现场实验的方法检验了默认选项的助推策略是否能够促进慈善捐赠行为。结果发现：（1）相较于把被试费的“保留选项”设置为默认,把“捐献选项”设置为默认时,被试捐献的概率和金额更高;（2）在多个捐款选项情景中,默认选项的设置总体上提高了默认选项被选择的概率;将最大金额选项设置为默认选项有助于提高被试平均捐赠额。这些发现表明,应用默认选项的助推策略能够有效促进人们的捐赠行为。本研究结果对减少募捐成本、提高募捐效率有所启示。     

助推爱心：利用默认选项促进捐赠行为

本研究采用实验室和现场实验的方法检验了默认选项的助推策略是否能够促进慈善捐赠行为。结果发现：（1）相较于把被试费的“保留选项”设置为默认,把“捐献选项”设置为默认时,被试捐献的概率和金额更高;（2）在多个捐款选项情景中,默认选项的设置总体上提高了默认选项被选择的概率;将最大金额选项设置为默认选项有助于提高被试平均捐赠额。这些发现表明,应用默认选项的助推策略能够有效促进人们的捐赠行为。本研究结果对减少募捐成本、提高募捐效率有所启示。     

说服效应的理论模型、影响因素与应对策略

说服效应是指面临说服性信息时, 个体态度发生转变并影响其决策行为的一种现象, 该现象普遍存在于政治选举、生活消费及商业广告等领域, 具有重要的应用价值。说服效应的两个主要理论模型包括双加工模型和自我功效理论。信息源的可信度、情绪、信息框架、社会网络、事件卷入度等是影响说服效应的主要因素。说服效应的应对策略包括公开承诺和自我控制。未来的研究应该从说服效应的产生根源、特征成分及应用领域等方面进行深入地探讨。     

调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制：一个有中介的调节模型

当前,选择超载领域研究的焦点已从验证其是否存在,转向至其何时存在,即边界条件的探讨。本研究基于调节模式理论,分别以决策后悔和延迟选择作为选择超载的指标,开展两个实验探查选择超载存在的调节模式条件及所涉及的内在机制。实验1以决策后悔作指标,运用量表测试法操纵调节模式,初步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与决策后悔的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时体验到更强的后悔情绪,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的决策后悔无显著差异;实验2以延迟选择作指标,通过任务启动法操纵调节模式,进一步探讨调节模式对选择超载的影响及其机制,结果发现调节模式调节了选项集与延迟选择的关系,即对评估模式的个体来说,面对大选项集比小选项集时更倾向于延迟选择,出现了选择超载,而对运动模式的个体而言,两种条件下的延迟选择偏好无显著差异,进一步有中介的调节模型分析表明选择难度可以部分解释这种效应。总之,通过采用不同方法操纵调节模式,选取不同的选择超载指标,数据结果都一致支持：评估模式的个体比运动模式的个体更容易出现选择超载,选择难度在其中发挥着一定的中介作用。     

行为决策中的基线比例忽略：心理机制与影响因素

基线比例忽略是指个体进行决策和判断时不能充分利用或者忽略基线比例而偏好新信息的现象。该现象普遍存在于日常行为与决策的许多领域,尤其显著表现在临床医疗领域,因此对这一现象的研究具有重要的应用价值。目前,基线比例忽略的心理机制主要有双加工理论和因果贝叶斯框架等。基线比例忽略的影响因素主要包括认知能力、年龄、基线比例的表述形式等。未来的研究需要从基线比例忽略的神经机制、影响因素以及应用研究的拓展等方面着手。     

Is Default Logic a Reinvention of Inductive-Statistical Reasoning?

Currently there is hardly any connection between philosophy of science and Artificial Intelligence research. We argue that both fields can benefit from each other. As an example of this mutual benefit we discuss the relation between Inductive-Statistical Reasoning and Default Logic. One of the main topics in AI research is the study of common-sense reasoning with incomplete information. Default logic is especially developed to formalise this type of reasoning. We show that there is a striking resemblance between inductive-statistical reasoning and default logic. A central theme in the logical positivist study of inductive-statistical reasoning such as Hempels Criterion of Maximal Specificity turns out to be equally important in default logic. We also discuss to what extent the relevance of the results of Logical Positivism to AI research could contribute to a reevaluation of Logical Positivism in general.     

A base logic for default reasoning

Based on a close study of benchmark examples in default reasoning, such as Nixon Diamond, Penguin Principle, etc., this paper provides an in depth analysis of the basic features of default reasoning. We formalize default inferences based on Modus Ponens for Default Implication, and mark the distinction between “local inferences” (to infer a conclusion from a subset of given premises) and “global inferences” (to infer a conclusion from the entire set of given premises). These conceptual analyses are captured by a formal semantics that is built upon the set-selection function technique. A minimal logic system M of default reasoning that accommodates Modus Ponens for Default Implication and suitable for local inferences is proposed, and its soundness is proved. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2003 (special issue) by Ye Feng     

Are generalised scalar implicatures generated by default? An on-line investigation into the role of context in generating pragmatic inferences

Recent research in semantics and pragmatics has revived the debate about whether there are two cognitively distinct categories of conversational implicatures: generalised and particularised. Generalised conversational implicatures are so-called because they seem to arise more or less independently of contextual support. Particularised implicatures are more context-bound. The Default view is that generalised implicatures are default inferences and that their computation is relatively autonomous--being computed by some default mechanism and only being open to cancellation at a second stage when contextual assumptions are taken into consideration (i.a.). It is at that second stage where contextual assumptions are considered that particularised implications are computed. By contrast, Context-Driven theorists claim that both generalised and particularised implicatures are generated by the same process and only where there is contextual support (Chierchia, 2004; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000 i.a.). In this paper, we present three on-line studies of the prototypical cases of generalised implicatures: the scalar implicatures 'some of the Fs' > 'not all the Fs' and 'X or Y' > 'either X or Y but not both'. These studies were designed to test the context-dependence and autonomy of the implicatures. Our results suggest that these scalar implicatures are dependent on the conversational context and that they show none of the autonomy predicted by the Default view. We conclude with a discussion of the degree to which such implicatures are purely context-driven and whether an interactionist default position may also be plausible.     

Default Probability

A probability may be called “default” if it is neither derived from preestablished probabilities nor based on considerations of frequency or symmetry. Default probabilities presumably arise through reasoning based on causality and similarity. This article advances a model of default probability based on a featural approach to similarity. The accuracy of the model is assessed by comparing its predictions to the probabilities provided by undergraduates asked to reason about mammals.     

Partitioning default effects: why people choose not to choose

Default options exert an influence in areas as varied as retirement program design, organ donation policy, and consumer choice. Past research has offered potential reasons why no-action defaults matter: (a) effort, (b) implied endorsement, and (c) reference dependence. The first two of these explanations have been experimentally demonstrated, but the latter has received far less attention. In three experiments we produce default effects and demonstrate that reference dependence can play a major role in their effectiveness. We find that the queries formulated by defaults can produce differences in constructed preferences and further that manipulating queries can also mitigate default effects. The experimental context involves two environmentally consequential alternatives: cheap, inefficient incandescent light bulbs, and expensive, efficient compact fluorescent bulbs. Within this context we also measure the impact of each potential rationale for a default effect.     

The development and adoption of controversial default technologies

Default technologies evolve from failure. Within the realm of human behavior, technologies based on the use of aversive contingencies can be conceptualized as default technologies because they come into play when natural contingencies or positive reinforcement fail to produce a desired behavioral outcome. Historical as well as contemporary events suggest that it is a mistake for behavior analysts to advocate for the adoption of aversive technologies. We must, however, continue to play a leading role in the development of such technologies so that they will be used in an appropriate manner. Furthermore, the eventual elimination of aversive technologies will be possible only through continued, careful, and experimental analysis of the contexts of failure in which they are born.     

特征框架效应的心理机制与影响因素

特征框架效应是指当分别以积极框架和消极框架来描述给定情境中某一事物或事件的关键特征时, 一般情况下人们更偏好以积极框架来描述其关键特征的事物或事件的现象。特征框架效应广泛的存在于消费、医学及政治等领域。目前, 它的解释机制主要包括效价加工的认知机制、参照依赖、查询理论以及认知神经机制。它的影响因素主要包括经验、人格特质、计算能力以及认知闭合需要等。未来的研究应该从深入探索特征框架效应的产生根源和影响因素, 拓展其应用研究, 深入探索偏好消极框架下的特征框架效应以及探讨该现象与其它现象之间的关系等五方面展开。     

Indiscriminability as Indiscernibility by Default

Most solutions to the sorites reject its major premise, i.e. the quantified conditional . This rejection appears to imply a discrimination between two elements that are supposed to be indiscriminable. Thus, the puzzle of the sorites involves in a fundamental way the notion of indiscriminability. This paper analyzes this relation and formalizes it, in a way that makes the rejection of the major premise more palatable. The intuitive idea is that we consider two elements indiscriminable by default, i.e. unless we know some information that discriminates between them. Specifically, following Rough Set Theory, two elements are defined to be indiscernible if they agree on the vague property in question. Then, a is defined to be indiscriminable from b if a is indiscernible by default from b. That is to say, a is indiscriminable from b if it is consistent to assume that a and b agree on the relevant vague property. Indiscernibility by default is formalized with the use of Default Logic, and is shown to have intuitively desirable properties: it is entailed by equality, is reflexive and symmetric. And while the relation is neither transitive nor substitutive, it is “almost” substitutive. This definition of indiscriminability is incorporated into three major theories of vagueness, namely the supervaluationist, epistemic, and contextualist views. Each one of these theories is reduced to a different strategy dealing with multiple extensions in Default Logic, and the rejection of the major premise is shown to follow naturally. Thus, while the proposed notion of indiscriminability does not solve the sorites by itself, it does make the unintuitive conclusion of many of its proposed solutions—the rejection of the major premise—a bit easier to accept.