Defending Desire: Scanlon's Anti-Humeanism

In the opening chapter of What We Owe To Each Other , Tim Scanlon produces a sustained critique of a Humean conception of practical reason. Scanlon claims he will argue that unless having a desire just is to see something as a reason, desires play (almost) no role in the explanation or justification of action. Yet his specific arguments against Humeanism all employ a very austere understanding of desire (which he calls the "standard model"), and attempt to show that desires so understood are not up to any explanatory or justificatory task. Since the standard model represents only one understanding of desire (distinct from the "recognition of reasons") his specific arguments cannot establish his stated general thesis. I show how a more robust conception of desire will leave the Humean account safe from Scanlon's specific arguments.     

Meaning and metaphor

Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.     

Sellars and the "Myth of the Given"

Sellars is well known for his critique of the "myth of the given" in his "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the "myth". Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of "presentation" or "givenness" of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars' arguments, particularly those directed at the Theory of Appearing, results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. Moreover, though Sellars is clearly opposed to the view that perceptual experience cannot provide justification for beliefs about perceived objects, I argue that Sellars has failed to shake the intuitive plausibility of that view.     

FREE WILL AND LUCK

I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential.     

The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain

I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke's claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content -a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of perceptual experience that are more likely to be relevant to the claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual. These features are 1) the dependence of a perceived object on the perceptual context in which it is perceived and 2) the dependence of a perceived property on the object it is perceived to be a property of.     

Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-conceptual Content

John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and appreciating his insight into the experiential synthesis of intuition and conception (in particular, its role in grasping objects), I will argue that Edmund Husserl presents an even more comprehensive account of perceptual experience that explains how we experience the contribution of receptivity and sensibility and how they cooperate in perceptual discrimination. Further, it reveals “horizons”—a unique kind of contents, surplus content (rather than independent non-conceptual content)—beyond the synthesis of intuitive and conceptual contents through which objects are grasped. Such horizons play a constitutive role, making experience with its conceptual dimensions and justificatory potential possible; they in no way function like a bare given that is to fulfill some independent justificatory role. Whereas McDowell focuses on how experience does not take place in isolation from the exercise of conceptual capacities, Husserl complements his view by situating experience in a more encompassing whole and by elucidating the surplus-horizons that exceed the conceptual content of experience; play an inseparable, constitutive role within it; and indicate the limits of conceptual comprehension.

How does our search engine “see” the world? The case of amodal completion

This article illustrates a dissociation between the perceived attributes of an object and the ability of those attributes to guide the deployment of attention in visual search. Orientation is an attribute that guides search. Thus, a vertical line will “pop out” amid horizontal distractors. Amodal completion can create perceptually convincing oriented stimuli when two elements appear to form a complete object partially hidden behind an occluder. Previous work (e.g., Rensink &; Enns, Vision Research, 38, 2489–2505, 1998) has shown a preattentive role for amodal completion in search tasks. Here, we show that orientation based on perceptually compelling amodal completion may fail to guide attention. The broader conclusion is that introspection is a poor guide to the capabilities of our internal search engine.     

Emotion and the new epistemic challenge from cognitive penetrability

Experiences—visual, emotional, or otherwise—play a role in providing us with justification to believe claims about the world. Some accounts of how experiences provide justification emphasize the role of the experiences’ distinctive phenomenology, i.e. ‘what it is like’ to have the experience. Other accounts emphasize the justificatory role to the experiences’ etiology. A number of authors have used cases of cognitively penetrated visual experience to raise an epistemic challenge for theories of perceptual justification that emphasize the justificatory role of phenomenology rather than etiology. Proponents of the challenge argue that cognitively penetrated visual experiences can fail to provide the usual justification because they have improper etiologies. However, extant arguments for the challenge’s key claims are subject to formidable objections. In this paper, I present the challenge’s key claims, raise objections to previous attempts to establish them, and then offer a novel argument in support of the challenge. My argument relies on an analogy between cognitively penetrated visual and emotional experiences. I argue that some emotional experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their improper etiologies and conclude that analogous cognitively penetrated visual experiences fail to provide the relevant justification because of their etiologies, as well.     

The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: MT. 5:8 in Augustine's Trinitarian Theology of 400

The essay is an analysis of Augustine's solution to what I identify as the Homoian subordinationist understanding of the Son's visibility. This solution lies in Augustine's (re-)interpretation of Old Testament theophanies, and his doctrine of the vision through Christ of the Trinity at the end-time which Augustine supports by an exegesis of Mt. 5:8. Historically, the issue for Augustine is the connection made between doctrines of the Son's inherent "visibility" before the Incarnation and arguments made both against modalism and in support of subordinationism on the basis of that visibility. For Augustine's own Trinitarian theology, any consideration of a sight or vision of God in, e.g., Old Testament theophanies or the Incarnation necessarily raises questions about "sight" as both sensible and noetic knowledge, the structure of our way(s) of knowing, and the role of faith as the means for purifying the knowing capacity in humanity. The question of the vision of God which Augustine addresses in those early books of de Trinitate which are written around the year four hundred is connected to Augustine's epistemological concerns addressed in a variety of writings written before or contemporary to books I-IV of de Trinitate .     

Beyond common features: the role of roles in determining similarity

Historically, accounts of object representation and perceived similarity have focused on intrinsic features. Although more recent accounts have explored how objects, scenes, and situations containing common relational structures come to be perceived as similar, less is known about how the perceived similarity of parts or objects embedded within these relational systems is affected. The current studies test the hypothesis that objects situated in common relational systems come to be perceived as more similar. Similarity increases most for objects playing the same role within a relation (e.g., predator), but also increases for objects playing different roles within the same relation (e.g., the predator or prey role in the hunts relation) regardless of whether the objects participate in the same instance of the relation. This pattern of results can be captured by extending existing models that extract meaning from text corpora so that they are sensitive to the verb-specific thematic roles that objects fill. Alternative explanations based on analogical and inferential processes are also considered, as well as the implications of the current findings to research in language processing, decision making, and category learning.     

Aggressive driving: the contribution of the drivers and the situation

Aggressive driving is defined in terms of the frustration–aggression model. In that context aggressive driving is a syndrome of frustration-driven behaviors, enabled by the driver's environment. These behaviors can either take the form of instrumental aggression—that allows the frustrated driver to move ahead at the cost of infringing on other road users’ rights (e.g., by weaving and running red lights)—or hostile aggression which is directed at the object of frustration (e.g., cursing other drivers). While these behaviors may be reflective of individual differences in aggression, it is argued that the exclusive focus on the characteristics of the aggressive drivers and how to control them is short-sighted. Instead, this paper proposes a multi-factor approach to the problem. Five studies conducted so far tend to support this approach, by showing that specific aggressive behaviors—such as honking and running red lights—are associated with cultural norms, actual and perceived delays in travel, and congestion. Ergonomics-oriented approaches that involve environmental modifications are proposed.     

Speakers' assumptions about the lexical flexibility of idioms

In three experiments, we examined why some idioms can be lexically altered and still retain their figurative meanings (e.g., John buttoned his lips about Mary can be changed into John fastened his lips about Mary and still mean "John didn't say anything about Mary"), whereas other idioms cannot be lexically altered without losing their figurative meanings (e.g., John kicked the bucket, meaning "John died," loses its idiomatic meaning when changed into John kicked the pail). Our hypothesis was that the lexical flexibility of idioms is determined by speakers' assumptions about the ways in which parts of idioms contribute to their figurative interpretations as a whole. The results of the three experiments indicated that idioms whose individual semantic components contribute to their overall figurative meanings (e.g., go out on a limb) were judged as less disrupted by changes in their lexical items (e.g., go out on a branch) than were nondecomposable idioms (e.g., kick the bucket) when their individual words were altered (e.g., punt the pail). These findings lend support to the idea that both the syntactic productivity and the lexical makeup of idioms are matters of degree, depending on the idioms' compositional properties. This conclusion suggests that idioms do not form a unique class of linguistic items, but share many of the properties of more literal language.     

Perceived control and health

Perceived control (PC) is defined as thebelief that one can determine one’s own internal states and behavior, influence one’s environment, and/or bring about desired outcomes. Two important dimensions of PC are delineated: (1) whether the object of control is located in the past or the future and (2) whether the object of control is over outcome, behavior, or process. A variety of constructs and measures of PC (e.g., efficacy, attribution, and locus of control) are discussed in relation to these dimensions and selected studies are reviewed. The issues, controversies, and limits of the research on perceived control and health are addressed in terms of the antecedents and consequences of perceived control. Investigations should clearly conceptualize the object of perceived control, use measures that match the conceptualization, and when attempting to manipulate control, directly measure perceived control. The relation between PC and health outcomes is complex, and different aspects of PC may interact to affect health outcomes.     

Alston's Anti‐Justificationism as a Strategy to Resolve the Conflict Between Internalism and Externalism

After a justificationist period, William P. Alston has tried to eliminate justification from the epistemology of belief. He introduced a list of epistemic desiderata all of which contribute to the positive status of beliefs and none of which has an exclusive and decisive role so that it could be isolated as the property of being justified. Careful examination reveals, however, that this list includes fewer desiderata than advertised. Truth‐conducive desiderata are most important for Alston, and these are five; during his discussion, however, Alston reduces these desiderata to only one, the reliability of process, which has an externalist character. Besides this desideratum, there is one other group of desiderata, all of which have an internalist character. What Alston has in fact done, then, through the presentation of his anti‐justificationist list, is to separate externalist and internalist elements for the positive status of belief and to give an independent role to each. Since Alston regards the truth‐conducive group as the most important, however, and since he has failed to show a real pluralism in this group, we may conclude that he continues to have a monistic approach to the evaluation of beliefs, which belies his alleged pluralism.     

Audience design affects acoustic reduction via production facilitation

In this article, we examine the hypothesis that acoustic variation (e.g., reduced vs. prominent forms) results from audience design. Bard et al. (Journal of Memory and Language 42:1-22, 2000) have argued that acoustic prominence is unaffected by the speaker's estimate of addressee knowledge, using paradigms that contrast speaker and addressee knowledge. This question was tested in a novel paradigm, focusing on the effects of addressees' feedback about their understanding of the speaker's intended message. Speakers gave instructions to addressees about where to place objects (e.g., the teapot goes on red). The addressee either anticipated the object, by picking it up before the instruction, or waited for the instruction. For anticipating addressees, speakers began speaking more quickly and pronounced the word the with shorter duration, demonstrating effects of audience design. However, no effects appeared on the head noun (e.g., teapot), as measured by duration, amplitude, and perceived intelligibility. These results are consistent with a mechanism in which evidence about addressee understanding facilitates production processes, as opposed to triggering particular acoustic forms.     

Perceived control and health

Perceived control (PC) is defined as thebelief that one can determine one’s own internal states and behavior, influence one’s environment, and/or bring about desired outcomes. Two important dimensions of PC are delineated: (1) whether the object of control is located in the past or the future and (2) whether the object of control is over outcome, behavior, or process. A variety of constructs and measures of PC (e.g., efficacy, attribution, and locus of control) are discussed in relation to these dimensions and selected studies are reviewed. The issues, controversies, and limits of the research on perceived control and health are addressed in terms of the antecedents and consequences of perceived control. Investigations should clearly conceptualize the object of perceived control, use measures that match the conceptualization, and when attempting to manipulate control, directly measure perceived control. The relation between PC and health outcomes is complex, and different aspects of PC may interact to affect health outcomes.     

Features,as well as space and time,guide object persistence

What role do surface features (e.g., color) play in the establishment and maintenance of episodic representations of objects (object files)? Mitroff and Alvarez (2007) showed that stimuli that were linked by a continuous spatiotemporal history yielded object-specific preview benefits—a standard index of object files—whereas stimuli linked only by shared surface features did not. Here, it is shown that abruptly changing the features of an object that has been established on the basis of spatiotemporal history can disrupt object-specific preview benefits (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, under some conditions, feature match alone can give rise to the preview benefits (Experiment 3). These results indicate that surface features, as well as spatiotemporal factors, play an important role in establishing and maintaining episodic object representations.     

Self-generated persuasion: effects of the target and direction of arguments

Previous research has revealed that self-persuasion can occur either through role-playing (i.e., when arguments are generated to convince another person) or, more directly, through trying to convince oneself (i.e., when arguments are generated with oneself as the target). Combining these 2 traditions in the domain of attitude change, the present research investigated the impact on self-persuasion of the specific target of one's own persuasive attempt (i.e., others vs. oneself). We found that the efficacy of self-persuasion depended on whether people believed that they would have to put more or less effort in convincing the self or others. Specifically, we found opposite effects for self-generated arguments depending on whether the topic of persuasion was proattitudinal or counterattitudinal. Across 4 studies, it was shown that when the topic of the message was counterattitudinal, people were more effective in convincing themselves when the intended target of the arguments was themselves versus another person. However, the opposite was the case when the topic was proattitudinal. These effects were shown to stem from the differential effort perceived as necessary and actually exerted in trying to produce persuasion under these conditions.     

Willusionism,epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will

While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the thesis that there is empirical evidence for a thoroughgoing skepticism with regard to free will that is based on the claim that mental states are epiphenomena. The paper discusses four arguments for willusionism that in some form or other appeal to epiphenomenalism and argues that three of them can be discarded relatively easily. The fourth one, based on Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation and his claim that free will is an illusion because the feeling of conscious will is epiphenomenal with regard to the corresponding voluntary actions, is dealt with in more detail. The overall verdict is negative: there is no empirical evidence for any kind of epiphenomenalism that would warrant the claim that free will is an illusion. Whatever it is that makes free will the object of contention between neuroscience and philosophy, epiphenomenalism provides no reason to think that free will is an illusion.