少年儿童道德行为动机特征的心理分析

目的和方法少年儿童的行为,由于其道德动机不同,就会具有不同的道德意义。要給少年儿童的行为以正确的道德評价,就应当洞察他們行为的道德动机。在儿童道德行为的心理特征的研究中,有很多是由研究者編拟一些故事,其中叙述某些有具体內容的道德行为,叫儿童判断或評价,从而揭示他們某种道德行为的心理特征。由研究者提供的道德故事,对儿童来說,是一种假設的行为情境,而不是他們实际的行为     

ANTIFOUNDATIONALISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE

The problem of developing a moral philosophy of medicine is explored in this essay. Among the challenges posed to this development are the general mistrust of moral philosophy and philosophy in general created by post-modernist philosophical and even anti-philosophical thinking. This reaction to philosophical systematization is usually called antifoundationalism. I distinguish different forms of antifoundationalism, showing that not all forms of their opposites, foundationalism, are alike, especially with regards to claims made about the certitude of moral thought. I conclude that we are correct to mistrust absolutist principles in a moral philosophy of medicine, but can find some center within the practice of medicine itself for a moral foundation.     

ONENESS AND SELF‐CENTEREDNESS IN THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WANG YANGMING

Rather than “selfishness,” a more accurate and revealing interpretation of Wang's use of siyuis “self‐centeredness.” One of the main goals in Wang's model of moral cultivation was to attain a state devoid of self‐centered desires. Wang relied a great deal on the exercise and cultivation of an emotional identification and feeling of oneness with others. In this paper, I first provide a brief summary of the role of Wang's concept of siyu in his moral psychology. I then examine key passages in Wang's writings that reveal his nuanced understanding of siyu and, along the way, I draw on empirical research in psychology to help illuminate the significance of Wang's view of siyu to his overall model of moral cultivation.     

SOCIOLOGISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE*

In a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, (Why) should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, (Why) should we–rather than I–act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening. Sociologism appears as the authoritarian solution to the problem of rationality in works of Polanyi and Kuhn; a variant of it appears as a liberal theory in the studies of Popper and his former students who, however, do not offer any positive theory of what to believe or do; rather, they offer a negative theory of what to reject. They view this as a better solution to the problem of rationality, if not even a better formulation of it (not what and why should I/we etc., but what and why should I/we not etc.).     

文化哲学中的黑色存在

本文探讨文化哲学和黑色存在之间的一些关系，广义而言是指非洲哲学与文化哲学之间的关系。这一关系还意味着许多这种讨论都是元哲学的——即关于哲学的——尽管其自身的哲学意义有待展开。