Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Person memory and judgment

Two general types of information about a person are considered in this article: One pertains to specific behaviors a person has manifested, and the other refers to more abstract personality dispositions or behavioral tendencies. A theoretical model of person memory that incorporates both types of information is developed. The model accounts for a large number of factors that are known to affect the recall of social information, the making of interpersonal judgments, and the relation between what is recalled and the judgments that are made. A major strength of the model is its applicability to a wide range of person memory and judgment phenomena that are observed in several different experimental paradigms.     

The role of prior knowledge in explaining hypothetical events

Having subjects explain a hypothetical future event biases their subjective likelihood estimates for that event. However, Sherman, Zehner, Johnson, and Hirt (1983, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1127–1143) found that the biasing effects of an explanation task were reduced when subjects formed an initial impression based on the information (prior to the explanation task). Nonetheless, there are no doubt many factors that may influence subjects' ability to form strong initial impressions. The present studies address two of these factors. Experiment 1 used both subjects who were knowledgeable and unknowledgeable (naive) about a stimulus domain (football). Experiment 2 used only knowledgeable subjects, but gave these subjects information about unfamiliar teams and players. Subjects first read information about teams in an upcoming game and were then asked to explain a hypothetical victory by one team. They then made judgments about the actual future game and recalled the information. Only knowledgeable subjects given an initial impression set and given information that was easily integrated with past knowledge were able to resist the explanation bias. All other subjects demonstrated judgments that were strongly biased in the direction of the outcome explained. An examination of the relation between judgment and recall implied that knowledgeable and naive individuals differed in the ways they made judgments.     

Perceiving individuals and groups: expectancies, dispositional inferences, and causal attributions

Two experiments investigated differences in forming impressions of individual and group targets. Experiment 1 showed that when forming an impression of an individual, perceivers made more extreme trait judgments, made those judgments more quickly and with greater confidence, and recalled more information than when the impression target was a group. Experiment 2 showed that when participants were forming an impression of an individual, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors spontaneously triggered causal attributions to resolve the inconsistency; this was not the case when the impression target was a group. Results are interpreted as reflecting perceivers' a priori assumptions of unity and coherence in individual versus group targets.     

Sentence processing deficits in two Cantonese aphasic patients

This paper reports the performances of two Cantonese aphasics on tasks examining their sentence processing deficits. The data on sentence comprehension show that thematically noncanonical sentences, full passives, and subject-gap sentences present greater difficulty to these patients than canonical sentences, truncated passives, and object-gap sentences, respectively. These patterns are consistent with previous observations on Chinese aphasics and are expected given the structural differences between Chinese and English. In a Cantonese grammaticality judgment test, a set of structures are identified that can elicit clear judgments from normal subjects and aphasics, contrary to the claim that grammaticality judgments in Chinese are probabilistic and fragile. Most interestingly, the patients' overall performance patterns reveal a double dissociation between sentence comprehension and judgment of sentence well-formedness, suggesting that the two tasks are supported by independent processing mechanisms.     

Effects of social influences and waiting on time judgment

Utilizing social judgment theory, the relationships of three social cues to time judgment under low physical temporal-cue conditions were explored. These social influences were as follows: being free to interact with another person, being told by the experimenter to expect to wait a specified period of time, and seeing another person's time judgment. 72 college students, randomly assigned to conditions of free social interaction (alone-interactive) and of waiting expectancy (expected-unexpected), made time estimates after 4 min., 7 sec. Each person under interactive conditions made another judgment after seeing a partner's judgment. Mean estimation was lower alone than under interactive conditions and lower under expected than unexpected waiting conditions. Under interactive conditions, correlations were positive between the individual's first and second judgments, between the partners' second judgments, and between the individual's second and the partner's first judgments. Social cues may influence time judgment.     

After-affects: How automatic evaluations influence the interpretation of subsequent, unrelated stimuli

Findings from three experiments suggest that participants’ automatic evaluations of subliminally presented objects influenced how they interpreted subsequent, unrelated objects. Participants defined homographs (Experiment 1), categorized objects and people (Experiment 2), and made person judgments (Experiment 3) that all could be disambiguated in either a positive or negative way. Participants’ responses to the ambiguous targets were evaluatively consistent with their automatic evaluations of preceding, semantically unrelated objects. The findings suggest that one’s automatic evaluations can influence deliberate judgments of subsequent stimuli, even when the only shared dimension between the initially evaluated objects and the judged objects is an evaluative one. The implications of these findings are discussed with regard to possible mechanisms of evaluative priming as well as previous research concerning evaluative priming effects on social judgment.     

Does ethnicity matter? The impact of stereotypical expectations on in-service teachers’ judgments of students

Ethnic minority students face many disadvantages in school, which might be due in part to teachers’ stereotypical expectations and attitudes. Dual process theories of impression and judgment formation specify person information that confirms or disconfirms stereotypical expectations as determinants of how judgments are formed. While expectation-confirming information should result in stereotype-based judgments, expectation-disconfirming information should lead to more information-integrating processes. Moreover, attitudes should also be affected in a positive way when a person encounters expectation-disconfirming information. The current study experimentally investigated these hypotheses with regard to stereotypical expectations about ethnic minority students. Eighty-three experienced teachers were randomly divided into four different groups. One group judged a below-average ethnic minority student (confirming) and another group a below-average ethnic majority student. Two other groups judged either an above-average ethnic minority (disconfirming) or ethnic majority student. When assessing a below-average student, teachers judged the confirming ethnic minority student as less proficient in language than the ethnic majority student. These differences could not be found for mathematical achievement or between the above-average ethnic minority and majority students. Attitudes toward ethnic minority students were not affected in the expected way. Findings are discussed with respect to their implications for future research.     

Remembering,understanding, and representation

Starting with the facts that not everything that is understood is remembered, and that not everything that is remembered is understood. this paper urges that models of language processing should be able to make a distinction between comprehension and memory. To this end. a case is made for a spreading activation process as being the essential ingredient of the comprehension process. It is argued that concepts activated during comprehension not only restrict the search set for candidate concepts to be used in a top-down fashion, they also constitute part of an episodic representation that can come to be p e of long-term memory. The way in which these representations atrophy is discussed, as is the way in which their idiosyncratic components are eliminated in producing representations in semantic memory. Some observations on the comprehension and memory of text are made and arguments are presented to show how intrusions and omissions in recall can be handled. Some existing experimental data is reanalyzed in terms of the proposed model and alternative interpretations consistent with the model are shown to be possible.     

Text cohesion and metacomprehension: Immediate and delayed judgments

In three experiments, we examined comprehension judgments made after a piece of text had been read. We propose that such metacognitive judgments are based on the content of working memory at the exact moment of assessment. Generally speaking, this working metacognition hypothesis is in agreement with Koriat's cue utilization approach, which implies that different elements of information will be available (and used) depending on the moment at which a judgment is made. More specifically, our hypothesis focuses on the management of working memory during reading as a cause for cue (un)availability. In support of these views, the results of Experiment 1 showed that a cohesion manipulation affecting the comprehension of specific paragraphs influences judgments only on these paragraphs, and not on judgments on the whole text. In Experiment 2, we showed that an interfering task that takes place just before this paragraph judgment is made wipes out this cohesion effect. Experiment 3 showed, on the other hand, that the whole-text judgment may, nevertheless, be affected by text cohesion, provided that the readers keep an access to the text when the judgment is made. These results support the idea that working memory management makes different cues available for metacognitive ratings at different delays.     

Social stereotypes and judgments of individuals: An instance of the base-rate fallacy

Social stereotypes may be defined as beliefs that various traits or acts are characteristic of particular social groups. As such, stereotypic beliefs represent subjective estimates of the frequencies of attributes within social groups, and so should be expected to “behave like” base-rate information within the context of judgments of individuals: specifically, individuating target case information should induce subjects to disregard their own stereotypic beliefs. Although the results of previous research are consisten with this prediction, no studies have permitted normative evaluation of stereotypic judgments. Because the hypothesis equates base rates and stereotypes, normative evaluation is essential for demonstrating equivalence between the base-rate fallacy and neglect of stereotypes in the presence of individuating case information. Two experiments were conducted, allowing for normative evaluation of effects of stereotypes on judgments of individuals. The results confirmed the hypothesis and established the generalizability of the effect across controversial and uncontroversial, socially desirable and socially underirable stereotypic beliefs. More generally, an examination of the differences between intuitive and normative statistical models of the judgment task suggest that the base-rate fallacy is but one instance of a general characteristic of intuitive judgment processes: namely, the failure to appropriately adjust evaluations of any one cue in the light of concurrent evaluations of other cues.     

Anchoring,Activation, and the Construction of Values

Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which decision makers are systematically influenced by random and uninformative starting points. While anchors have been shown to affect a broad range of judgments including answers to knowledge questions, monetary evaluations, and social judgments, the underlying causes of anchoring have been explored only recently. We suggest that anchors affect judgments by increasing the availability and construction of features that the anchor and target hold in common and reducing the availability of features of the target that differ from the anchor. We test this notion of anchoring as activation in five experiments that examine the effects of several experimental manipulations on judgments of value and belief as well as on measures of cognitive processes. Our results indicate that prompting subjects to consider features of the item that are different from the anchor reduces anchoring, while increasing consideration of similar features has no effect. The anchoring-as-activation approach provides a mechanism for debiasing anchoring and also points to a common mechanism underlying anchoring and a number of other judgment phenomena.     

Information about expert decision and post‐decision distortion of facts of own decision

Cognitive representations of decision problems are dynamic. During and after a decision, evaluations and representations of facts change to support the decision made by a decision maker her‐ or himself (Svenson, 2003). We investigated post‐decision distortion of facts (consolidation). Participants were given vignettes with facts about two terminally ill patients, only one of whom could be given lifesaving surgery. In Study 1, contrary to the prediction, the results showed that facts were distorted after a decision both by participants who were responsible for the decisions themselves and when doctors had made the decision. In Study 2 we investigated the influence of knowledge about expert decisions on a participant's own decision and post‐decisional distortion of facts. Facts were significantly more distorted when the participant's decision agreed with an expert's decision than when the participant and expert decisions disagreed. The findings imply that knowledge about experts' decisions can distort memories of facts and therefore may obstruct rational analyses of earlier decisions. This is particularly important when a decision made by a person, who is assumed to be an expert, makes a decision that is biased or wrong.     

专业背景、主观印象和情绪对量刑决策的影响

为了考察司法决策者对案件当事人的主观印象如何影响刑罚决策及情绪在其中的作用,本研究要求法律与非法律专业被试对案情相同但对案件当事人的主观印象不同的刑事案件进行刑罚强度决策,并要求被试对犯罪行为所引发的情绪强度进行评定。研究结果发现,被试对施害人的消极印象比积极印象条件下产生更强的愤怒和厌恶情绪,更少的同情情绪,同时,给予的刑罚更重;被试对受害人的积极印象比消极印象条件下,低年级组被试对施害人给予的刑罚更重,但在高年级组被试中不存在显著差异,两组被试在情绪强度上也没有显著差异。法律专业比非法律专业被试对犯罪行为所产生的情绪强度更低。被试的专业背景对量刑决策没有显著影响。中介效应检验发现,在施害人的主观印象对刑罚决策的影响过程中,愤怒和同情表现出部分中介效应,厌恶情绪表现出完全中介效应。