Is your choice my choice? The owners’ effect on pet dogs’ (Canis lupus familiaris) performance in a food choice task

This study investigates the influence of owners on their dogs’ performance in a food choice task using either different or equal quantities of food. Fifty-four pet dogs were tested in three different conditions. In Condition 1 we evaluated their ability to choose between a large and small amount of food (quantity discrimination task). In Condition 2 dogs were again presented with a choice between the large and small food quantity, but only after having witnessed their owner favouring the small quantity. In Condition 3 dogs were given a choice between two equally small quantities of food having witnessed their owner favouring either one or the other. A strong effect of the owner on the dogs’ performance was observed. In Condition 1 dogs as a group chose significantly more often the large food quantity, thus showing their ability to solve the quantity discrimination task. After observing their owner expressing a preference for the small food quantity they chose the large quantity of food significantly less than in the independent choice situation. The tendency to conform to the owner’s choice was higher when the dogs had to choose between equally small quantities of food (Condition 3) rather than between a large and a small one (Condition 2). These results provide evidence that dogs can be influenced by their owners even when their indications are clearly in contrast with direct perceptual information, thus leading dogs to ultimately make counterproductive choices.     

‘Reflection is embedded in my brain forever now!’: personal development as a core module on an Executive MBA

Professional progression and skills development are the main expectations of mid-career managers when enrolling on an Executive MBA (EMBA), yet it can be personal development (PD) that turns out to be the unexpected benefit of management education. Joining a growing number of voices making a case for personal development and self-awareness in management education, and calling for schools to incorporate it in the curriculum, this paper advances the case for personal development as a core Executive MBA module. The paper sets out the holistic rationale and philosophic principles used to design and deliver a course underpinned by curiosity and self-reflection on an EMBA in the United Kingdom, and presents empirical findings from a survey conducted among 230 students and alumni. These suggest that the focus on reflective practice and integration of PD promotes a richer and deeper appreciation of the value of reflection for lasting and sometimes unexpected personal growth. In addition, the raising of awareness of self also brings awareness of others, and develops critical thinking in application of the MBA at work. The paper concludes with a discussion re-evaluating the subject of tacit knowledge in reflective practice.     

‘The friend of my enemy is my enemy’: Modeling triadic internation relationships

The evolution of internation relationships is studied by means of a mathematical model based on a popular rule of triadic interaction: the friend of my friend is my friend, the friend of my enemy is my enemy, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the enemy of my friend is my enemy. The rule is shown to lead to the formation and preservation of unipolar and bipolar configurations of nations, with the strengths of relationships, both friendly and conflictual, intensifying through time. These results confirm speculations originally made in static, graph theoretic studies of the balancing of relationships within individuals, small groups and systems of nations.This research was funded by a grant from the World Society Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland.     

Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate

According to what I call the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ (‘VT’) about belief, ‘believes’ is a vague predicate. On this view, our concept of belief admits of borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something (Price in Belief, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969) or be ‘in-between believing’ it (Schwitzgebel in Philos Q 51:76–82, 2001, Noûs 36:249–275, 2002, Pac Philos Q 91:531–553, 2010). In this article, I argue that VT is false and present an alternative picture of belief. I begin by considering a case—held up as a central example of vague belief—in which someone sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other ways as if she believes that it is not. I argue that, even from the third-person perspective prioritised by proponents of VT, the case does not motivate VT. I present an alternative understanding of the case according to which the person in question believes as they say they do yet also has a belief-discordant implicit attitude otherwise. Moreover, I argue that, independently of the interpretation of any particular case, VT fails to accommodate the first-person perspective on belief. Belief is not only an item of one’s psychology that helps explain one’s behaviour; it is what one takes to be true. This fact about belief manifests itself in the nature of deliberation concerning whether to believe something and that of introspection regarding whether one believes something. Attending to these phenomena reveals that VT is not merely unmotivated, but untenable.     

What is my evidence that here is a cup?

This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification.     

Incommensurability,incomparability, and God’s choice of a world

Anselmian theism holds that there necessarily exists a being, God, who is essentially unsurpassable in power, knowledge, goodness, and wisdom. This being is also understood to be the creator and sustainer of all that is. In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, this role is generally understood as follows: God surveys the array of possible worlds, and in his wisdom selects exactly one for actualization, based on its axiological properties. In this paper, I discuss an under-appreciated challenge for this account of the Anselmian God’s selection of a world. In particular, I urge that there are failures of comparability between various possible worlds, and I argue that, given certain assumptions, these failures threaten the rationality of God’s choice of a world. To the extent that rationality is deemed necessary for unsurpassability, this result also challenges the core Anselmian notion that God is an unsurpassable being.     

A functional analysis of personal autonomy: How restricting ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ affects experienced agency and goal motivation

Personal autonomy is central to people's experiences of agency and abilities to actively take part in society. To address the challenges of supporting autonomy, we propose a functional model of autonomy, according to which the experience of agency is a function of the opportunity to determine what to do, when to act and how to act in goal-pursuit. We tested the model in three experiments where the three goal-pursuit components could be constrained by another person or an artificial intelligence (AI) agent. Results showed that removing any of the three components from one's own decisions reduced experienced agency (Study 1a and 1b) and lowered motivation to pursue goals in organisational contexts (Study 2). In comparison to the strong and robust main effects, interactions between the components and the effects of the source of restriction (human vs. AI) were negligible. Implications for personal autonomy, algorithmic decision-making and behaviour change interventions are discussed.     

In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism,detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is, broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.     

Why is Law a Normative Discipline? on Hans Kelsen’s ‘Normology’

What does it mean to claim of law that it is a normative discipline? Can the answer be so simple that one need merely refer to law’s normative object of study and the conclusions that the legal participant must allegedly draw from this? What, in any case, is a ‘normative discipline’? The essay attempts to address these questions by analysing Hans Kelsen’s ‘normological’ theory of law through his work on sovereignty and especially by focusing on the normative character of Kelsen’s epistemological claims regarding law. A theoretical critique of Kelsen is offered through Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of logic as a normative discipline.     

Atheism and Dialetheism; or, ‘Why I Am Not a (Paraconsistent) Christian’

In ‘Theism and Dialetheism’, Cotnoir explores the idea that dialetheism (true contradictions) can help with some puzzles about omnipotence in theology. In this note, I delineate another aspect of this project. Dialetheism cannot help with one big puzzle about another classic ‘omni’ property, omnibenevolence—the famous problem of evil. For someone (including a dialetheist) who thinks that the existence of evil is a knock-down argument against traditional theism, it is a knock-down argument against dialetheic theism, too.     

‘There is a Time to be Born and a Time to Die’ (Ecclesiastes 3:2a): Jewish Perspectives on Euthanasia

Reviewing the publications of prominent American rabbis who have (extensively) published on Jewish biomedical ethics, this article highlights Orthodox, Conservative and Reform opinions on a most pressing contemporary bioethical issue: euthanasia. Reviewing their opinions against the background of the halachic character of Jewish (biomedical) ethics, this article shows how from one traditional Jewish textual source diverse, even contradictory, opinions emerge through different interpretations. In this way, in the Jewish debate on euthanasia the specific methodology of Jewish (bio)ethical reasoning comes forward as well as a diversity of opinion within Judaism and its branches.     

University students’ views about compatibility of cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) with their personal,social and religious values (a study from Pakistan)

Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) in its current form might not be applicable in non Western cultures. Differences between Western and non Western cultures have been reported widely. Psychotherapy was developed in the West and is underpinned by many beliefs which might be specific only to the Western culture. However, in order to modify CBT, we need to understand whether the concepts associated with the CBT might cause conflicts among people who receive therapy. This study explored the beliefs of the university students in Pakistan to find out if the concepts underpinning CBT are consistent with the personal, family, socio-cultural and religious values of the university students. Discussions were held with University students in Rahim Yar Khan, Pakistan. Students were given information on various aspects of the CBT and were asked to rate their agreement with these concepts on a visual analogue scale. There was little disagreement for the principles of CBT for personal values, while some disagreement existed for religious values. This study highlights the value of assessing peoples’ beliefs about acceptability of CBT in non Western cultures. Students in Pakistan felt that the principles of CBT are consistent with their belief system in most areas. However, the value system of students might not be representative of the rest of the population.     

Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’

A powerful objection to subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) concerns various ‘strange-but-true’ (or “embarrassing”) conditionals. One popular response to this objection is to argue that strange-but-true conditionals pose a problem for non-sceptical epistemological theories in general. In the present paper, it is argued that strange-but-true conditionals are not a problem for contextualism about ‘know’. This observation undercuts the proposed defence of SSI, and supplies a surprising new argument for contextualism.