唯识精进的结构与功能――以对主观幸福感的影响为例

以588名高中生为被试,以《精进问卷》、《生活满意度量表》和《积极与消极情感量表》为工具,先考察唯识精进的结构,然后,以精进对主观幸福感的影响为例,考察精进的功能。结果表明：（1）精进是七因素的结构;（2）对于生活满意度和积极情感而言,最有力的正向预测变量是无下和披甲精进;（3）对于消极情感而言,披甲和加行精进有微弱的负向预测作用。本研究突破了唯识心理学乃至佛教心理学偏重思辨研究而忽略实证研究的局限。     

心学的展开和晚明佛教的复兴

晚明佛教的复兴得益于心学的展开,具体表现在两个方面：一是心学以主体的自得为学术准则打破了理学一统天下的权威局面,为佛教复兴提供了多元化学术思想环境;二是心学学人对佛教心性理论的汲取刺激了佛教界对自身的反思,推动了佛教重新进入主流文化。晚明佛教在心学的影响下复兴,却又在一定程度上表现出对心学的反动。     

Idealism and illusions

According to the idealist, facts about phenomenal experience determine facts about the physical world. Any such view must account for illusions: cases where there is a discrepancy between the physical world and our experiences of it. In this article, I critique some recent idealist treatments of illusions before presenting my own preferred account. I then argue that, initial impressions notwithstanding, it is actually the realist who has difficulties properly accounting for illusions.     

McDowell and Idealism

John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common‐sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this intended coincidence. The upshot is a dilemma: McDowell can retain his conception of the subject, but lose the coincidence; or he can keep the coincidence, but abandon his conception of the subject.     

Nominalism and Idealism

The article considers, in a historical setting, the links between varieties of nominalism—the extreme nominalism of the Quine-Goodman variety and the trope nominalism current today—and types of idealism. In so doing arguments of various twentieth century figures, including Husserl, Bradley, Russell, and Sartre, as well as a contemporary attack on relations by Peter Simons are critically examined. The paper seeks to link the rejection of realism about universals with the rejection of a mind-independent “world”—in short, linking nominalism with idealism.     

Idealism and the Ontological Argument

The ontological proof became something of a signature argument for the British Idealist movement and this paper examines how and why that was so. Beginning with an account of Hegel's understanding of the argument, it looks at how the thesis was picked up, developed and criticized by the Cairds, Bradley, Pringle-Pattison and others. The importance of Bradley's reading in particular is stressed. Lastly, consideration is given to Collingwood's lifelong interest in the proof and it is argued that his attention is best understood as a direct continuation of theirs. In view of the fact that recent commentators have tried to draw a sharp line between Collingwood's approach to metaphysics and ontology and that of his predecessors, the establishment of this connection calls for a measure of reassessment on both sides.     

Idealism and Williams's Semantic Paradox

Bernard Williams's essay ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’ argues that that the conventionality of language entails the dependence of the truth of sentences and ultimately of corresponding states of affairs as truth‐makers on the existence of thinking subjects. Peter Winch and Colin Lyas try to avoid William's paradox by distinguishing between the existence conditions of a sentence and its assertion. The Winch‐Lyas solution is criticized and a stronger Winch‐Lays resistant version of Williams's paradox is proposed. A more satisfactory countercriticism is given, involving an ineliminable modal fallacy occurring in the paradox inference, that arises because of the argument's invalid combination of categorical and counterfactual assumptions and conclusions.     

From Kant to Post-Kantian Idealism: German Idealism: Paul Franks

German idealists regard Spinozism as both the realism that outflanks Kant's idealism and the source of the conception of systematicity with which to fortify idealism. But they offer little argument for this view. To fill the gap, I reconstruct arguments that could underlie Jacobi's and Pistorius's tentative but influential suggestions that Kant is or should be a Spinozist. Kant is indeed a monist about phenomena, but, unlike Spinoza, a pluralist about noumena. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Third Antinomy can be solved by a more thoroughgoing Spinozistic monism. The resulting Spinozism outflanks Kant by acknowledging Jacobi's charge that philosophy annihilates immediacy and individuality, whereas Kant's commitment to things in themselves can seem a half-hearted attempt to avoid the charge. However, the German idealist contention is that only a synthesis of such a Spinozism with Kantian idealism can retrieve immediacy and individuality, thus overcoming nihilism.     

From Kant to Post-Kantian Idealism: German Idealism: Sebastian Gardner

German idealism has been pictured as an unwarranted deviation from the central epistemological orientation of modern philosophy, and its close historical association with German romanticism is adduced in support of this verdict. This paper proposes an interpretation of German idealism which seeks to grant key importance to its connection with romanticism without thereby undermining its philosophical rationality. I suggest that the fundamental motivation of German idealism is axiological, and that its augmentation of Kant's idealism is intelligible in terms of its combined aim of consolidating the transcendental turn and legitimating the kind of (objectual) relation to value articulated in German romanticism.     

Heidegger and the Problem of Idealism

This paper contains a discussion of Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation within the more general thesis that using and understanding a language are to be conceived of as a creative and interpretative‐constructional activity. Indeterminacy is considered to be ineliminable. Three scenarios are distinguished concerning, first, the reasons for indeterminacy, second, the kinds of indeterminacy and, third, different levels of a general notion of recursive interpretation. Translational hypotheses are seen as interpretational constructs. The indeterminacy thesis turns out to be a consequence of the externalizing of language, meaning, and epistemology. By means of a three‐leveled interpretation model one can substantiate the crucial aspects, first, that indeterminacy is not an indeterminacy of facts of the matter and, second, that there is a significant difference between indeterminacy and underdetermination. In addition, the relationship between indeterminacy, interpretation, and charity is elucidated. Indeterminacy is seen not as an obstacle to but as a condition for communication. Charity and empathy in dialogue are conditional upon indeterminacy. All three components reveal the interpretative‐constructional character of the inseparable connection of meaning and experience.     

胡塞尔与观念论问题

确切说来,胡塞尔哲学是一种从内部摧毁观念论的尝试,是一种借助于意识去击穿先验分析之墙的尝试。与此同时,它还努力把这样的分析尽可能地加以应用。胡塞尔具有打破传统观念论的企图。可是,由于胡塞尔从没有把自己从观念论的假定中完全解脱出来,因此,他又遭遇到种种困难。胡塞尔在本质直观、被给予性、真理客观性、范畴直观、回到实事本身等关键问题上自相矛盾,存在着理论张力。被胡塞尔视为反对观念论的主要一击的本质学说,最终把自己展示为观念论的顶峰:纯粹本质似乎摒弃了任何主体建构的客观性,但它不过是抽象的主体性,是思维的纯粹功能,是康德意识同一性意义上的"我思"。