Dehumanization: A New Perspective

Dehumanization has traditionally been understood as an extreme form of prejudice that enables violence and cruelty. Recent work indicates that it can also take subtle and everyday forms. We give an overview of early contributions to the psychological study of dehumanization before reviewing recent research on the attribution and denial of humanness. We emphasize our own research program, which proceeds from a theoretical analysis of two distinct senses of humanness, which when denied to others yield two forms of dehumanization. In one form, people are denied uniquely human attributes and likened to animals, and in the other, they are denied essentially human attributes and likened to machines. We discuss the ways in which these two forms of dehumanization are manifest in perceptions of individuals and groups, and speculate on the cognitive and motivational processes involved.     

Attributing and denying humanness to others

We review a programme of research on the attribution of humanness to people, and the ways in which lesser humanness is attributed to some compared to others. We first present evidence that humanness has two distinct senses, one representing properties that are unique to our species, and the other—human nature—those properties that are essential or fundamental to the human category. An integrative model of dehumanisation is then laid out, in which distinct forms of dehumanisation correspond to the denial of the two senses of humanness, and the likening of people to particular kinds of nonhuman entities (animals and machines). Studies demonstrating that human nature attributes are ascribed more to the self than to others are reviewed, along with evidence of the phenomenon's cognitive and motivational basis. Research also indicates that both kinds of humanness are commonly denied to social groups, both explicitly and implicitly, and that they may cast a new light on the study of stereotype content. Our approach to the study of dehumanisation complements the tradition of research on infrahumanisation, and indicates new directions for exploring the importance of humanness as a dimension of social perception.     

Humanness beliefs about behavior: An index and comparative human-nonhuman behavior judgments

Social psychological research suggests that two distinct dimensions describe lay conceptions of humanness: a species-typical sense (i.e., human nature) and a species-unique sense (i.e., human uniqueness). Although these two senses of humanness have been discerned among psychological traits and states, there has been no systematic research into lay beliefs about the humanness of human behaviors. Using a range of 60 prosocial, nonsocial, and antisocial behaviors, it was demonstrated that people discriminate between species-typical and species-unique behaviors and that the capacity to perform species-unique behaviors distinguishes humans from animals, whereas the capacity to perform species-typical behaviors distinguishes humans from robots. Behaviors that exemplify the two senses of humanness are identified, and data representing rankings, raw scores, and z-scores in two indices of species typicality and species uniqueness are provided. Taken together, these findings expand our understanding of lay conceptions of humanness and provide researchers of humanness with a wider range of validated stimuli to probe the boundaries of humanity.     

More human than you: attributing humanness to self and others

People typically evaluate their in-groups more favorably than out-groups and themselves more favorably than others. Research on infrahumanization also suggests a preferential attribution of the "human essence" to in-groups, independent of in-group favoritism. The authors propose a corresponding phenomenon in interpersonal comparisons: People attribute greater humanness to themselves than to others, independent of self-enhancement. Study 1 and a pilot study demonstrated 2 distinct understandings of humanness--traits representing human nature and those that are uniquely human--and showed that only the former traits are understood as inhering essences. In Study 2, participants rated themselves higher than their peers on human nature traits but not on uniquely human traits, independent of self-enhancement. Study 3 replicated this "self-humanization" effect and indicated that it is partially mediated by attribution of greater depth to self versus others. Study 4 replicated the effect experimentally. Thus, people perceive themselves to be more essentially human than others.     

WHY A BRAIN CAPABLE OF LANGUAGE EVOLVED ONLY ONCE: PREFRONTAL CORTEX AND SYMBOL LEARNING

Abstract. Language and information processes are critical issues in scientific controversies regarding the qualities that epitomize humanness. Whereas some theorists claim human mental uniqueness with regard to language, others point to successes in teaching language skills to other animals. However, although these animals may learn names for things, they show little ability to utilize a complex framework of symbolic reference. In such a framework, words or other symbols refer not only to objects and concepts but also to sequential and hierarchical relationships with other symbols. This process is essential to human mental operations, including language, mathematics, and music. In humans, these operations may have coevolved with the prefrontal area of the cerebral cortex, which is proportionately much larger in humans than in other animals and more intricately linked with other areas of the brain. Analysis of the structure and function of the prefrontal area suggests that it is centrally involved in the operation of higher-order associative relationships involving the subordination of one set of associations to another. This alternate learning strategy apparently appeared at the cost of certain sensory, motor, or limbic abilities. The payoff was symbolic thinking. Humans thus are unique among species, not just for their highly developed language ability but for their odd style of thinking and learning.     

Embracing Humanity in the Face of Death: Why Do Existential Concerns Moderate Ingroup Humanization?

People humanize their ingroup to address existential concerns about their mortality, but the reasons why they do so remain ambiguous. One explanation is that people humanize their ingroup to bolster their social identity in the face of their mortality. Alternatively, people might be motivated to see their ingroup as more uniquely human (UH) to distance themselves from their corporeal “animal” nature. These explanations were tested in Australia, where social identity is tied less to UH and more to human nature (HN) which does not distinguish humans from animals. Australians attributed more HN traits to the ingroup when mortality was salient, while the attribution of UH traits remained unchanged. This indicates that the mortality-buffering function of ingroup humanization lies in reinforcing the humanness of our social identity, rather than just distancing ourselves from our animal nature. Implications for (de)humanization in intergroup relations are discussed.     

Reconsidering research on self-humanizing: The importance of mean comparative judgments

Self-humanization is defined as the tendency to view oneself as more essentially human than others. Researchers have claimed that people attribute human nature traits more strongly to themselves than to others, but not uniquely human traits. In this article we suggest that such claims are based on the misinterpretation of results. Most studies have not presented mean comparative judgments, making it impossible to determine whether people thought they possessed characteristics less strongly or more strongly than the average person. We found that people (N = 256) in Poland, Italy, and Korea perceived themselves as possessing desirable human nature and uniquely human characteristics more than others, as possessing undesirable uniquely human traits less than others, and as similar to others in terms of undesirable human nature characteristics. It seems that being more human than others means possessing some traits more than others and possessing some traits less than others.     

Blaming, praising, and protecting our humanity: the implications of everyday dehumanization for judgments of moral status

Being human implies a particular moral status: having moral value, agency, and responsibility. However, people are not seen as equally human. Across two studies, we examine the consequences that subtle variations in the perceived humanness of actors or groups have for their perceived moral status. Drawing on Haslam's two-dimensional model of humanness and focusing on three ways people may be considered to have moral status - moral patiency (value), agency, or responsibility - we demonstrate that subtly denying humanness to others has implications for whether they are blamed, praised, or considered worthy of moral concern and rehabilitation. Moreover, we show that distinct human characteristics are linked to specific judgments of moral status. This work demonstrates that everyday judgments of moral status are influenced by perceptions of humanness.     

Humanizing the self: moderators of the attribution of lesser humanness to others

Three studies investigated moderators of the tendency to attribute greater humanness to the self than to others, an interpersonal counterpart of outgroup infra-humanization. Study 1 demonstrated that this self-humanizing effect is reduced when the other is the focus of comparison. Study 2 showed that the effect is reduced when the other is individuated. Study 3 indicated that empathy does not moderate self-humanizing: Self-humanizing failed to correlate negatively with dispositional empathy or perspective-taking. Study 3 also indicated that abstract construal moderates the self-humanizing effect using a temporal comparison. Participants rated their future self, but not their past self, as less human than their present self. Studies 1 and 3 also showed that self-humanizing is greater for undesirable traits: People may view their failings as "only human." All findings were distinct from those attributable to self-enhancement. Self-humanizing may reflect a combination of egocentrism, focalism, abstract representation of others, and motivated processes.     

Attribute centrality and imaginative thought

Participants' representations of the concept human were examined to differentiate three types of associations between concepts and their component attributes: the capacity of concepts to cue attributes (attribute accessibility), the capacity of attributes to cue concepts (instance accessibility), and the extent to which attributes are thought of as central to concepts (attribute centrality). The findings provide information about the concept human itself and, more generally, about the functionally distinct roles those different attribute-concept associations play in guiding imaginative thought. College students listed attributes that differentiate humans from other animals, rated the centrality of those attributes, and listed animals that possess those attributes. Other students drew and described extraterrestrials that possessed some of the attributes that were found to vary across those listing and rating tasks. Rated centrality was the most important determinant of an attribute's impact on imaginative generation. When the imagined extraterrestrials were supposed to possess attributes that had been rated as central to humans (intelligence, emotional complexity, or opposable thumbs), participants projected more aspects of human form onto them than when the creatures were supposed to possess less central attributes or when attributes were unspecified.     

Conceptions of states and traits: dimensional attributes with ideals as prototypes

Traits and states are concepts that people use to both describe and understand themselves and others. We show that people view these concepts as prototype-based categories that have a graded internal structure and fuzzy boundaries and identify a set of attributes that define the prototypical cores of two categories: traits and states. Prototypical traits are stable, long-lasting, and internally caused. Prototypical states are temporary, brief, and caused by external circumstances. These prototypes are not defined by averages, as the family-resemblance principle would suggest, but by ideal (or extreme) attribute values. Like other ideal-based categories, traits and states serve particular goals. Trait concepts permit people to predict the present from the past; state concepts identify those behaviors that can be controlled by manipulating the situation. These two complementary schemas are part of the extensive theory of psychological causality that is implicit in language. Abstract social concepts differ from object categories in their category standards, the nature of their attributes, and the interrelations among those attributes.     

Empathy,culture and self‐humanising: Empathising reduces the attribution of greater humanness to the self more in Japan than Australia

People tend to ascribe greater humanness to themselves than to others. Previous research has indicated that this “self‐humanising” bias is independent of self‐enhancement and robust across cultures. The present study examined the possible role of empathy in reducing this bias in Japan (N = 80) and Australia (N = 80). Results showed that unlike Australians, Japanese participants who recalled personal experiences of empathising with others were less likely to self‐humanise than those in a neutral condition. The effect of the empathy manipulation was not observed in Australia. The findings suggest that empathy may reduce self‐focus and enable perceivers to appreciate the full humanness of others, but this effect may be culturally contingent.     

Our flaws are more human than yours: ingroup bias in humanizing negative characteristics

Four studies investigated whether people tend to see ingroup flaws as part of human nature (HN) to a greater degree than outgroup flaws. In Study 1, people preferentially ascribed high HN flaws to their ingroup relative to two outgroups. Study 2 demonstrated that flaws were rated higher on HN when attributed to the ingroup than when attributed to an outgroup, and no such difference occurred for positive traits. Study 3 replicated this humanizing ingroup flaws (HIF) effect and showed that it was (a) independent of desirability and (b) specific to the HN sense of humanness. Study 4 replicated the results of Study 3 and demonstrated that the HIF effect is amplified under ingroup identity threat. Together, these findings show that people humanize ingroup flaws and preferentially ascribe high HN flaws to the ingroup. These ingroup humanizing biases may serve a group-protective function by mitigating ingroup flaws as "only human."     

We are human,they are not: Driving forces behind outgroup dehumanisation and the humanisation of the ingroup

Mostly invigorated by infrahumanisation theory, our knowledge on processes of dehumanisation in intergroup relations has grown considerably in the last decade. Building on these earlier endeavours, the present chapter reviews some recent empirical extensions that highlight the importance of differentiating between ingroup humanisation and outgroup dehumanisation because they are often moderated by specific variables. The role of these separate processes is discussed as a function of the main structural elements that define intergroup behaviour; that is, the defining boundaries of the groups, the relation between the groups at hand, and the ideologies of its members. Finally, the role of the different senses of humanness is discussed, suggesting that the folk conception of humanness differs between cultures.     

Volume 21, 2012 - List of Contents,Author Index,and List of Reviewers

We examined how culture influences perceptions of applicant attributes when assessing employment suitability. In two studies (N = 408), we compared members from a collectivistic society (Singapore) to two samples from individualistic societies (the United States and Australia) on their perceptions of applicant attributes across job contexts. For each job, participants either chose between candidates with different attribute profiles or created ideal candidates by allocating a fixed amount of percentile points across different attributes. More often than Australians, Singaporeans chose the candidate with higher levels of the trait (e.g., openness to experience) uniquely associated with the job (e.g., graphic designer). More so than either Americans or Australians, Singaporeans prioritized having the trait most associated with each job. Members from collectivistic societies may require higher levels of the traits most associated with different jobs than members from individualistic societies, who prefer more well-rounded individuals for each job. As discussed, the study of lay perceptions may have implications for training hiring professionals and managers.     

Predicting Risk‐Mitigating Behaviors From Indecisiveness and Trait Anxiety: Two Cognitive Pathways to Task Avoidance

Past research suggests that indecisiveness and trait anxiety may both decrease the likelihood of performing risk‐mitigating preparatory behaviors (e.g., preparing for natural hazards) and suggests two cognitive processes (perceived control and worrying) as potential mediators. However, no single study to date has examined the influence of these traits and processes together. Examining them simultaneously is necessary to gain an integrated understanding of their relationship with risk‐mitigating behaviors. We therefore examined these traits and mediators in relation to wildfire preparedness in a two‐wave field study among residents of wildfire‐prone areas in Western Australia (total N = 223). Structural equation modeling results showed that indecisiveness uniquely predicted preparedness, with higher indecisiveness predicting lower preparedness. This relationship was fully mediated by perceived control over wildfire‐related outcomes. Trait anxiety did not uniquely predict preparedness or perceived control, but it did uniquely predict worry, with higher trait anxiety predicting more worrying. Also, worry trended toward uniquely predicting preparedness, albeit in an unpredicted positive direction. This shows how the lack of performing risk‐mitigating behaviors can result from distinct cognitive processes that are linked to distinct personality traits. It also highlights how simultaneous examination of multiple pathways to behavior creates a fuller understanding of its antecedents.     

Who cares when nobody is watching? Psychopathic traits and empathy in prosocial behaviors

Prosocial behaviors are voluntary acts intended to benefit others. Lack of empathy is a core feature of psychopathy, a constellation of personality traits that includes callousness, egocentricity, and antisociality. While psychopathy is often associated with antisocial behavior, its relation to prosociality may depend upon the class of prosocial behavior and facet of psychopathy considered. Public prosocial behavior may be more motivated by extrinsic social rewards than anonymous prosociality, which may be more motivated by empathy and altruistic motives. It was hypothesized that primary psychopathy, especially affective callousness, would be positively and uniquely associated with public prosociality, and inversely associated with anonymous and altruistic prosociality, and that these associations would be mediated by empathy. In contrast, secondary psychopathy was expected to be weakly and inversely associated with all three types of prosocial behavior and with empathy. In an undergraduate student sample (n = 539), unique and interaction effects were tested in hierarchical regression. Predictions were supported for primary psychopathy. Gender did not moderate associations. Theoretical and practical implications are considered.     

Association of attitude toward mathematics with self-efficacy, causal attribution, and personality traits.

983 children from Grades 1, 2, and 3 of the middle schools participated as subjects. Of these, 339 children were judged as having higher "self-efficacy" than the others. The associations of attitude toward mathematics with self-efficacy, attributions, and personality traits measured on the Shimoda Personality Inventory were investigated. Analysis showed that attitude toward mathematics had significant effects on mathematics performance. In attribution of effects to mathematics performance there were differences among the children across the grades. Among personality traits the immodithymic trait was significantly correlated with attitude toward mathematics.     

Social control of health behavior: associations with conscientiousness and neuroticism

Despite considerable research demonstrating associations of conscientiousness and neuroticism with health-related behavior, our understanding of how and why these traits are related to lifestyle is limited. This study examined the social regulation of health behavior in a probability sample of 509 household residents who completed a Random Digit Dial (RDD) telephone survey. Results suggest that the social regulation of health behavior experienced by highly conscientious individuals has more to do with their own internalized notions of responsibility and obligation to others than to specific actions by others aimed at influencing their health habits. In contrast, individuals with higher neuroticism experience more overt attempts by others to influence their health habits but have more negative affective and behavioral responses to these social influence attempts. Findings suggest that elucidating the distinct social influence processes that operate for conscientiousness and neuroticism may further understanding of how these traits are related to health behaviors and status.     

Exploring the Cognitive and Emotional Correlates to Proactive and Reactive Aggression in a Sample of Detained Girls

The current study examined the distinction between reactive and proactive aggression in a sample of detained girls (N = 58) aged 12 to 18. This study employed a self-report measure of aggression that was designed explicitly to assess both the forms that aggression takes (i.e., relational and overt), as well as the functions that aggression serves (i.e., reactive and proactive). Reactive aggression was uniquely associated with poorly regulated emotion and anger to perceived provocation, whereas proactive aggression was uniquely associated with callous-unemotional (CU) traits and biased outcome expectations for aggression. While overt aggression appeared to largely account for these associations, relational aggression showed strong and unique associations with CU traits. The current findings highlight the importance of assessing reactive and proactive aggression, as well as both overt and relational aggression, in detained girls.